Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Sukhlal Sanghavi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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The Nature and the Cause of the World
ans at one single moment are different from one another even if mutually indivisible. Hence on the Buddhist view the word "atom' turns out to stand for the properties like colour, taste etc. which exist there for but one single moment and thus behave like an ultimate physical atom of the form of colour, taste etc. Thus denying the existence of something of the form of a bearer-ofproperties the Buddhist tradition posited mere properties existing there for but single moment. And an infinite number of series of the properties thus conceived is what constitutes the physical world. Since it was not admitted that series such as these ever came into existence for the first time or will go out of existence altogehter they are supposed to be something beginningless and endless. Thus as a result of logically criticizing the doctrine of an eternal-element-undergoing-no-change as also the doctrine of an eternal-element-undergoing-change there came into existence in the Buddhist tradition the doctrine of eternal series,16
In a general manner one might say that the basic positions as to fundamental principles that were first adopted in the Sankhya, Nyaya-Vaisesika and Jaina traditions underwent no change uptil this day whereas the case is different with the Buddhist and Upanisadic tradition. Just as in the midst of Vedantins investigating into fundamental principles on the basis of Upanisads there came into existence positions appearing to be absolutely different from one another (e. g. Bodhayana upholding the doctrine of transformation, Sankara that of illusion, and so on), similarly something happened in the case of the Buddhist tradition. Thus what is upheld by the Sarvästivada tradition basing itself on Buddha's preaching-something different from that is established by the Saufrantika tradition basing itself on that very preaching. Not only that, the Vijñānavādin and Sunyavādin uphled positions altogether different from those upheld by the above two traditions while there obtains a difference of opinion among the former two themselves.
Both the Sarvästivada and Sautrantika branches, while denying the existence of a bearer-of-properties whether of the form of something eternalundergoing-change or of the form of something eternal-undergoing-nochange, do posit a multiplicity of properties. However, the property posited by Sarvastivada, since it retains existence in all the three phases of time, in a way assumes the character of a bearer-of-properties. What till now existed as characterized by a future state now exists as characterized by a present state, and the same giving up the character of being present assumes the character of being past. Since all properties are conceived as existing
16 The Tattvasangraha sections-Sthirabhavaparikṣā, Karmaphala-sambandhapariksa, Dravyapariksa, Syädvādaparīkṣā and Traikalyaparikṣā.