Indian Philosophy

Author(s): Sukhlal Sanghavi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 40

32
Capacity for Valid Cognition
number of means-of-valid-cognition 11 Some have included scriptural testimony among inference while others have counted as subspecies of inference the means-of-valid-cognition called implication etc, as well. In this connection one further thing has to be noted. Thus originally the yogips understood by scripturat testimony just rtambharā prajñā, but when their ideas began to be expressed through words those words too were treated as scriptural testimony and when this scriptural testimony of the form of words found entrance in the current of sectarian religious differences so many elements of perception and inference too got included within the fold of scriptural testimony; not only that, too often it too happened that on account of the prestige gained by scriptual texts all sorts of relevant and irrelevant imaginary concoctions too got interpolated in these texts.12 For the present, however, we have only to see as to what type of capacity of a means-of-valid-cognition lies at the basis of the fundamental philosophical differences observable within the fold of the various philosophical trends. Our above discussion has revealed in brief that such a capacity obtains at three levels; the rest of the discussion pertaining to means-of-valid-cognition is a mere elaboration of the same.
If the tamil text Manimekbalai' mentions ten means-of-valid-cognition then Caraka, Mimāmsā, Purānas etc. mention even nine, eight and six of them,
The Age When Independent Discussion on the Means-of-valid-cognition was Absent and the One When It was Independently Present
Whatever investigation into matters physical and non-physical, nonconscious and conscious is found in Upanişads, Agamas and Pitakas is certainly based on some means-of-valid-cognition or other, but in
11 Thus there are Cārvākas positing just one means-of-valid-cognition in the form of
perception, Buddhists etc. positing two in the form of it and inference, Sānkhya etc. positing three in the form of these two and scriptural testimony. Naiyāyikas etc. positing four in the form of these three and analogy, Prabhākara positing five in the form of these four and implication, Kumärila positing six in the form of these five and absence, Caraka positing seven in the form of these six and reasoning (=yukti), other disputants positing eight in the form of these seven and historicity (=aitihya). See Tattvasangraha ( kārikās 1213-1708 ) for perception, inference and the remaining means--of-valid-cognition- also Yuktidipika pp. 36–9.
In Manimekhalãi there has been said that on the view of Vedavyāsa, Kętakoti and Taimini the number of means-of-valid-cognition is ten Nature (= syabhāva ) and elimination (=pariseşa )--these two new means-of-valid-cognition are found mentioned in this connection. See Manimekhaläi-in its Historical Settings' by
Aiyangar, pp. 57 and 189. 12. For this see the text elucidating Yuktidipikā and entitled 'Origin and Development
of the Sankhya System of thought', pp. 222ff.