Book Title: Indian Philosophy
Author(s): Sukhlal Sanghavi
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

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Page 36
________________ 28 The Relation of Cause and Effect parināmavāda', pratîtyasa. the diverse doctrines called arambhavada', mutpädavada' and 'vivartavāda'. The Four Doctrines Ārambhavada etc. Defined? Arambhavāda : (1) Positing an infinite number of basic causes independent of one another; (2) Absolute difference between a cause and its effect; (3) Whether permanent or otherwise a cause undergoes to transformation in the course of producing its effects; (4) The origin or short-time: duration of such an effects as was altogether novel-that is, something nonexistent prior to its origination, Pariņāmavāda : (1) Positing either single basic cause or a number of basic causes; (2) Real non-difference between a cause and its effect; (3) Even a permanent cause exists and functions in the form of something that undergoes transformation; (4) The all-time existence of an effect in its cause and that of the totality of effects in the concerned basic cause that is, a total denial that there ever originates any thing altogether novel. Pratityasamutpädavada : (1) Absolute difference between a cause and its effect; (2) Absolute denial of a cause that is permanent as also of one that undergoes transformation; (3) Origination of just such an effect as was earlier not-existent. Vivartarvada : (1) Positing such an ultimate real cause as neither produces an effect nor undergoes transformation; (2) Absolute denial that the gross or subtle apparent world ever originates or is the transformation of a basic cause; (3) The unreal or imaginary existence of the gross world. that is, its appearing there owing to an illusion. This brief discussion should make it clear as to how even if the doct. rine of causal relation is a unanimously accepted doctrine its employment in different ways on the part of those upholding different world-views gives rise to a multiplicity of philosophical trends. The Capacity for Valid-cognition Considered AU the Indian philosophers subscribe to the doctrine mänādbina meyayyavasthā' or prameyasiddhih pramāņāddhi '8; this means that the doctrine in question is here a unanimously accepted doctrine. Certainly. each philosopher establishes his view as to what constitutes an existingelement (=tattva) or an object-of-valid-cognition (=pra.neya) with the help of a means-of-valid-cognition (= pramänt). Thus it is that even while taking recourse to a capacity for valid-cogaition the philosophers too often 7 For details see Framānamīnāmsā, Intro. pp. 6-11 or Darshan aur Chinlan', pp. 355-61 8 Sänkhyakārikā, kārikā 4 Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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