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JULY, 1990)
INTERSTATE RELATIONS IN ANCIENT INDIA
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(8) E-C's friend i.e. friend's friend (mitra-mitra);
(6) F-D's friend i.e: friend of the enemy's friend (ari-mitra-mitra). It will be seen that C, D, E, F are equally divided among themselves as adhoronts of A and B; for to the ultimate analyule, O and E would be on the side of A, and D and F
on that of B (Diagram III). It was not generally thought necessary Four types of states to add to the chain of friendly and hostile states any more, for in front.
tnter-state relations were not considered generally to bring into operation the active friendliness or hostility of a larger number of states in a partioular direction. In the opposite direction, however, it would be necessary to take into account a number
of states, for the reason that if the casus belli occurs between A and B, Four states in the and they be the actual belligerents, A may be attacked and helped roer.
from behind in the same way we we have supposed in B's case. Four states are therefore set down in the rear, their attitude towards the central state being determined by the usual principle. These states are called
(7) A-Rear-enemy (pdrahni-grdha (lit. "heel-oatoher")]; (8) B-Rear-friend (dibranda); (9) C-Rear-enemy's friend (pdrohni-grdhapdra);
(10) D-Rear-friend's friend (dleranddadra). Thus the two belligerents A and B have each two adherenta in front and two in the roar, tho total number including the belligerents themselves being ten (Diagram IV). The reasons for supposing the belligerents to be as adjacent states and not belonging to
separated "zones" are perhaps that (1) adjacenoy was the most prolifio Why belligerente
de ben source of jealousy and enmity, and (2) the waging of war between two adjacent
distant states with one or more territories separating them rendered the outbreak of war a difficult matter until the interposing states were persuaded to allow them a free passage of troope and all other necessaries of war through their territories, This was rendered diffioult by the fact that the states of the first and every alternate song of each of them are naturally hostile to it, and should they be persuaded by money or otherwise to admit such passage, severance of supply and communioation might arise at any moment; for the hostile states could not be fully trusted, and thefe temporary accession to a demand might ultimately prove to be a trap for the hazarding parties. (8) If however the hazarding party was very powerful, it might cabdue first the interposing states and reach its distant enemy; but such cases must be rare. (4) If the interposing hostile states were won over by money or prospeot of material gains to fight on tho side of the attaoking party against its distant enemy, the situation would then be reduood to one of adjacenoy of the central state and its onomy, allianoe having axtonded the former's range of hostile activities to the latter's door. In these oiroumatanoo, it WAS raonable to put down the belligerents as adjacent states and determine the mutual attitude of the surrounding territories by the application of the principle of adjacenoy as the cause of enmity, - principle that has not perhape yot lost its foroe.
