Aapta Mimansa

Author(s): Saratchandra Ghoshal
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith

Page 70

ĀPTA-MĪMĀMSĀ
कथञ्चित् ते सदेवेष्टं कथञ्चिदसदेव तत्। तथोभयमवाच्यं च नययोगान्न सर्वथा ॥ 14 ॥ kathañchit te sadeveștaṁ kathañchidasadeva tat, tathobhayamavāchyam cha naya-yogānna sarvathā.
14. With the application of naya, according to a particular sense, existence is accepted by you; according to another sense, non-existence is accepted). Similarly (according to a particular sense) both (existence and nonexistence) and indescribability are accepted by you (but) not in all respects.
COMMENTARY
It has been shown that it cannot be maintained that existence or non-existence or simultaneous existence and non-existence or indescribability without any limitations, is possible. In this verse, the Jain view that with limitations existence etc. can be accepted is laid down.1
A brief description of Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda has already been given. The different aspects are considered from different stand-ponts. The Jain view is that objects in their entire character are understood only by an omniscient being. The work, Āpta-mimāṁsā, has begun with obeisance to the omniscient and established omniscience by arguments refuting the view of those, who, like Kumārila Bhatta, have attacked omniscience. Then Samantabhadra has refuted the view of those who hold an entirely one-sided aspect of a thing. From this verse the author begins to establish the Syādvāda or Anekāntavāda of Jainism. Siddhasena has written : A thing which might be conceived from many points of view, is entirely knowable only by the omniscient. But a thing 1. “एकहेलया यदि सर्वथा सदसदुभयावक्तव्यरूपं तत्त्वं नास्ति, कथं तर्हि इत्याह।”
Vasunandi.