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CHAPTER IV
121
differentiation. There would be many (kāryas). Again owing to difference, there would be no one-ness.
COMMENTARY
The fault would be this. A pitcher (which is an avayavi, having form) will have no application to the forms (avayavas) giving rise to it. Because there will be absence of parts. If absolute separation of parts be accepted from the thing made up of the same, viz., that of threads from the cloth, then one (viz., cloth) cannot have connection with many (threads) forming its parts. Again, being separate, its one-ness cannot be affirmed.
“If every individual is independent, at least this individuality is a common property of all, e.g., materiality is the common property of ghata (a pitcher), pata (a cloth) etc. If not so, being devoid of individuality, their independence also would be lost. Although individuals are separate, individuality is a property residing upon all in common and hence even individuals are homogeneous by their common property. Thus even the individualism of the Naiyāyikas (and Vaišeşikas) is vitiated by the very presupposition of their own school.”l
देशकालविशेषेऽपि स्याद् वृत्तिर्युतसिद्धवत्। HARSTATT RIFL Latarupareat: 1163||| deśa-kāla-višeşe'pi syād vịttiryuta-siddhavat, samānadeśatā na syān mūrta-kāraņa-kāryayoḥ.
63. There will be existence like things separate in time and place. There will not be oneness in place in the case of cause and effect having form.
1. An Introduction to Jainism, p. 125
