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144
ĀPTA-MIMĀMSĀ
Thus the knowledge of apprehension, the word itself and the object expressed by the word reflects each of the three, viz., buddhi, sabda and artha'.
वक्तृश्रोतृप्रमातॄणां वाक्यबोधप्रमाः पृथक् ।
frida 441941 Trerit arestart 1186|| vaktr-śrotp-pamātņņām vākyabodha-pramāḥ prthak, bhrāntāveva pramā-bhrāntau bāhyārthau tādȚs
Letarau.
86. The true knowledge arising from knowledge due to words is different in case of the speaker, the hearer and the person who resorts to proof (to ascertain its nature). In delusion the external object will be connected with correct knowledge and fallacy according to that or its opposite.
COMMENTARY .
One utters words and another hears the same. The latter or any other person finds out the reality of the sense of the word by pramāņa (pratyakṣa or prokşa). If the speaker has no knowledge of the words he speaks, how could he utter the same? Without words, the hearer cannot have any knowledge. The man requiring proof of the word deals in a different way, from the speaker and the hearer. So we must accept the threefold nature of knowledge in such cases.
When there is true and false knowledge, the external object is also true or false. Some cases of apprehension will be valid and others invalid by reference to external factors. The theory of intrinsic validity or the reverse is not accepted in Jainism.
1. “वक्तुरभिधेयबोधाभावे कुतो वाक्यं प्रवर्तेत? तस्याभिधेयबोधनिबन्धनत्वात्। वाक्याभावे
च श्रोतुरभिधेयज्ञानासंभस्तस्य तन्निमित्तकत्वात्। प्रमातुः प्रमित्यभावे च शब्दार्थयोः प्रमेययोरव्यवस्थानादिष्टतत्त्वानुपपत्तेर्वक्त्रादित्रयस्य बोधादित्रयं पृथग्भूतमुपेयम्।”
Astasahasri.
