Aapta Mimansa

Author(s): Saratchandra Ghoshal
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/022477/1

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ĀPTA-MĪMĀMSĀ
of
Acharya Samantabhadra
Edited and Translated by Saratchandra Ghoshal

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Apta-mīmāṁsā A Sanskrit treatise with 114 verses in ten chapters, Apta-mīmārsā means 'propounding the evident one.' It expounds the Jaina concept of 'omniscient in a philosophicalcum-logical manner. As a matter of fact, it is an eulogy. It is more popularly called Devāgama-stotra after the first word in its first verse. This fashion of nomenclature was followed in the outstanding eulogies—Bhaktāmara, Kalyāņamandira, Visāpahara, Ekibhāva etc. The magnanimous considerations, thorough discussions, perfect solutions on the one hand, and wide coverage, aphoristic phraseology, skilful presentation and poetic flavour make this text so copious and compendious that pioneers like Akalanka, Vidyānandi and Vasunandi chose it for their voluminous commentaries, respectfully called Asța sati, Asțasahasrī and Vịtti. Known for his short commentaries on and translations of ancient texts into English, Sarat Chandra Ghoshal has made this text easier to grasp and additionally charming, particularly for the researchers in Indian religions and philosophy. It is a must for the entrant into the field of logic.

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ĀPTA - MĪMĀMSĀ
of Achārya Samantabhadra

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ĀPTA - MĪMĀMSĀ
of Acharya Samantabhadra
Edited with Introduction, Translation, Notes and An Original
Commentary in English
SARATCHANDRA GHOSHAL
OR
ST
lele
i
SUOL
TO
ay
Bharatiya Jnanpith

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ISBN 81-263-0724 2
Moortidevi Granthamala: English Grantha No. 13
ĀPTA-MIMĀMSĀ of Āchārya Samantabhadra Edited by Saratchandra Ghoshal
Published by
Bharatiya Jnanpith
18, Institutional Area, Lodi Road
New Delhi - 110 003
Printed at
Nagri Printers, Delhi - 110 032
First Edition : 2002
Price: Rs. 150
Bharatiya Jnanpith

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To The Loving Memory
of Jaina-dharma-bhūsaņa Brahmachari Sital Prasad

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A GUIDE TO TRANSLITERATION
Vowels
3TT
her
#
15 15
-
5
15
O
Consonants
क ka
ख kha
p སོ
ग ga
घ gha
ङ na
ཀྱི་ ཕ
झ jha
chha
༧ ཨ
dha
ཋ མ
dha
ཟླ་ ཐ
bha
ra
la
va
ཝ
ha

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Introduction
Āpta-Mimāṁsā is a celebrated work written by the Digambara scholar Saint Samantabhadra. According to a tradition current amongst the Digambara Jains, this work is the opening portion of a commentary by the same author known as Gandhahasti Mahābhāşya on the Tattvārthādhigamasūtra by Umāsvāmi. This commentary in full has not been discovered.
The tradition about the existence of Gandhahasti Mahābhāṣya is supported by references to the same in different works. Abhaya-chandra Sūri (14th century A.D.) in his tikā on the sūtra Upajñāte (Sakațāyana Vyākarana, III, 1-182) has refered to Mahābhāsya of Samantabhadra (H1415 HETTO74). Mallişeņa-sūri in his Syādvādamañjari (Śaka era 1214) has mentioned Gandhahasti (aft 3764a-TTTAT FETE Fuad AIS ). Dharmabhūşana in his Nyāyadīpikā has mentioned : "It has been said by the Svāmi in Apta-mīmāṁsā at the beginning of Mahābhāsya” (AGCI स्वामिभिर्महाभाष्यस्यादावाप्तमीमांसाप्रस्तावे). Laghu Samantabhadra (not Svāmi Samantabhadra), who must have flourished later than Vikrama 12th century (because he makes mention of Vasunandi), also says that Devāgama was the Manglācharana of Gandhahasti Mahābhāsya of Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra.
This work is also known as Devāgama Stotra, because the first word of its first verse is Devāgama. Samanta-bhdara in the last verse of his work says that by the preceding verse he has made Āpta-mīmāṁsā (Determination of the Trustworthy). So the name Āpta-mīmāṁsā came also to 1. “तत्त्वार्थाधिगमस्य मोक्षशास्त्रस्य गंधहस्त्याख्यं महाभाष्यमुपनिवध्वन्तः...श्रीस्वामिसमन्त
भद्राचार्यास्तत्र किल मंगलपुरःसर-स्तवविषयपरमाप्तगुणातिशयपरीक्षामुपक्षिप्तवन्तो देवागमाभिधास्य प्रवचनतीर्थस्य सृष्टिमापूरयांचक्रिरे।" Visamapadatatparya-tika by Laghu Samantabhadra on Astasahsri.

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ĀPTA-MĪMĀṀSĀ
be applied to this collection of one hundred and fourteen
verses.
8
Some commentators of Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra accept that the following is the opening verse of the said work: “मोक्षमार्गस्य नेतारं भेत्तारं कर्मभूभृताम् ।
ज्ञातारं विश्वतत्त्वानां वन्दे तद्-गुणलब्धये ।। ”
i.e. "I bow to him who is the guide on the path to liberation, the destroyer of mountains of karmas and the knower of the principles of the universe, so that I may attain these qualities belonging to him.”
These commentators urge that at the beginning of the Mokṣa-śāstra, i.e., the Tattvarthādhigama-sūtra, the above mentioned salutation has been laid down. He who is thus saluted is Āpta. So Samantabhadra, at the beginning of his commentary on the Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, has examined the qualities of Apta in his attempt to explain the opening verse of the Tattvärthadhigama-sutra.
Vidyānandi who wrote a commentary (named Aṣṭasahasri) on Aṣṭaśati of Akalanka has accepted the fact that the verse is the opening verse of Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra and that consequently Samantbhadra has discussed Apta described in the verse. Vidyānandi says: "This work named Devāgama has established the Apta which is the subject-matter of praise composed at the beginning of the Sastra, i.e. Tattvārtha-sūtra. Vidyānandi himself later on clearly mentions: "By that Apta of the most excellent qualities praised by the sages for liberation and auspiciousness at the beginning of Niḥśreyasa-śāstra".1
Vidyānandi has again in his Mangalacharana to Aṣṭasahasri said: "I am now adoring the work of the determination of the trustworthy (Āpta-mimāṁsā) which is the subject-matter of praise in the beginning of the
1. “तदेवं निःश्रेयस-शास्त्रस्यादौ तन्निबन्धनतया मंगलार्थतया च मुनिभिः संस्तुतेन निरतिशयगुणेन भगवताप्तेन । ” Astasahasri.

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INTRODUCTION
Sastra (Tattvārtha-sūtra)."1 While explaining verse 114 of Apta-mimāṁsā, Vidyānanada writes : “This establishment, after examination of the omniscient Arhat, is made as he is the same as Apta praised at the beginning of the work as the guide to the path of liberation, the destroyer of mountains of karmas and the knower of the principles of universe." The epithets 'the guide to the path of liberation', 'the destroyer of mountains of karmas' and 'the knower of the principles of universe 2 are identical with the disputed opening verse of Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra already quoted. In the colophon of his original work Āpta-pariksa, Vidyānanda has accepted the verse as the opening verse of Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra. In Apta-parikṣā, arguments for establishing the Apta, as based on this verse, are employed, Vidyānanda expressly says in this colophon that Svāmi (Samantabhadra) had made a Mimāṁsā (referring to Aptamimāṁsā) of that praise which has been embodied in the beginning of Tattvārtha-śāstra.3
Some have however expressed the view that abovementioned situation is no part of Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra. J. L. Jaini writes "There is no sufficient reason to hold that these verses were composed by the author of Tattvārthasūtra. In the commentaries on Tattvārtha-sūtra such as Tattvārtha-rāja-vārtika by Akalankadeva and Sarvārthasidhhi by Pūjyapāda, these verses are not found. The last verse (e.g. HTANTRI Far etc.) appears to be the
1. “शास्त्रावताररचितस्तुतिगोचराप्तमीमांसितं कृतिरलंक्रियते मयाऽस्य।” Astasahasri. 2. "शास्त्रारम्भेष्वभिष्टुतस्याप्तस्य मोक्षमार्गप्रणेतृतया कर्मभूभृद्-भेत्तृतया विश्वतत्त्वानां ज्ञातृतया
a packa-Sta....Q9R114427 Parent” Aștasahasri. 3. “श्रीमत्-तत्वार्थशास्त्राद्भुत-सलिलविधेरिद्धरत्नोद्भवस्य
प्रोत्थानारम्भकाले सकलमलभिदे शास्त्रकारैः कृतं यत्। स्तोत्रं तीर्थोपमानं प्रथितपृथुपथं स्वामिमीमांसितं तत् विद्यानन्दैः स्वशक्त्या कथमपि कथितं सत्यवाक्यार्थसिद्ध्यै ॥
इति तत्त्वार्थशास्त्रादौ मुनीन्द्रस्तुतिगोचरा।। yuftangrytazi faarfaiqari Il" Apta-parikṣā, verses 123, 124.

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ĀPTA-MĪMĀSĀ
Margalācharaņa of Sarvārthasiddhi.”'l J.L. Jaini also says that Tattvārtha-sūtra is written in the form of aphorisms and it is unusual to find a verse at the beginning of any work composed in aphorisms. This objection can be met by showing that there are works written in aphorisms beginning with a verse, for example, Parīkņāmukha, a work written in aphorisms by Māņikyanandi, opens with a verse.
In Astašati, a commentary on Apta-mimāṁsā also, Akalarka has nowhere suggested that Samantabhadra has taken the verse (Herrer Har etc.) as the basis of Āptamimāṁsā. Akalanka simply says “Devāgama etc. are written for establishing an examination of the excellence of qualities for the great Apta which is the subject-matter of praise at the beginning of a work for auspiciousness." Vidyānanda has also written a commentary on Tattvārthādigama-sūtra. This commentary is known as Tattvārtha-slokavārtika. In this commentary, however, he has not explained the opening verse (H14rper fari etc.).?
In this connection, we may mention that Acharya Jugal Kishore holds the view that from a verse in the praśasti of the drama named Vikrānta-kaurava as well as the work Jinendrakalyāņābhudaya, it appears that Gandhahasti-bhāşya and Devāgama are two different works of Svāmi Samantabhadra.3 If Devāgama-stotra be a part of the Bhāsya, the names of both of these works should not have been mentioned, as the mention of only the Bhāşya would have been quite sufficient. He also says that Vasunandi has written in his Vrtti on verse 114 of
1. Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra edited by J.L. Jaini. Sacred Books of the
Jainas, Vol. II, page 4. 2. The opening verse of Parikṣāmukha is :
“प्रमाणादर्थसंसिद्धिस्तदाभासाद् विपर्ययः ।
इति वक्ष्ये तयोर्लक्ष्म सिद्धमल्पं लघीयसः ।।" 3. "Trarefasteiermeef-warta: 1
स्वामि समन्तभद्रोऽभूद् देवागमनिदेशकः ।।"

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INTRODUCTION
11
Apta--mimāmsā that this verse shows the end of the subject.1 In Aṣṭa-sati and Aṣṭa-sahasri also, he says that it is found that Samantabhadra has written the work, completing the same in ten chapters.2
The word Apta literally means "he who has attained or achieved". By Apta in Apta-mīmāmsā, Sarvajña or the omniscient is meant (आप्तमीमांसा सर्वज्ञविशेष - परीक्षा - Asta-śati and Aṣṭa-sahasri). In Jainism, Kundakunda first mentioned the doctrine of omniscience and was followed in this respect by Umāsvāmi (Tattvartha-sutra, I, 10, 11, 29). Denial of omniscience is made by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his expositions on the Pūrvamīmāṁsā philosophy. Kumārila's view is that a human being cannot see all things in all places and at all times. There is a limit to human vision or knowledge beyond which these cannot proceed. Things which are beyond the senses cannot be perceived. The proofs (pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, śabda-arthāpatti and abhāva) cannot establish omniscience. Those who profess to be omniscients, e.g. Gautama Bhuddha in Buddhism or Tirthankaras in Jainism do not agree in their views. So omniscience is an impossibility. As a result, opinion of no human being is to be regarded as infallible. Only Vedic injunctions are infallible and should be followed instead of the injunctions of Buddha or Tirthankaras. By performance of sacrifices as prescribed in the Vedas, a potential after-state is created which brings all desired fruits (Sloka-vārtika, Verse 111 and those following the same).
Kundakunda demonstrated that the help of senses is not required in omniscience. Omniscience is not magnified sense-perception. It is direct experiential knowledge. Atmā and Knowledge are co-extensive and co-existent (Pravachanasāra, I, 23). The soul (Ātmā) knows itself, other objects than itself, as well as those which result from the conbination of soul and matter, physical and karmic (Ibid, I, 36). Owing to knowledge-obscuring karmas, the
1. 'शास्त्रार्थोपसंहारकारिका' Vidāyanandī also writes that Samantabhadra herein shows that he has fulfilled his purpose ( कृतकृत्यः निर्व्यूढतत्त्वप्रतिज्ञः) 2. “इति स्वोक्तपरिच्छेदविहितेयमाप्तमीमांसा ।” Astaśati
" इति देवागमाख्ये स्वोक्तपरिच्छेदें शास्त्रे विहितेयमाप्तमीमांसा ।" Astasahasri.

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ĀPTA-MĪMĀMSĀ
ability of soul to have knowledge is obscured. When all the four obscuring and obstructive karmas are destroyed, the Soul becomes possessed of omniscience (Ibid, I, 1516). This knowledge is gained without the aid of senseorgans. It is atīndrīya-jñāna, also known as kṣāyika-jñāna, because it arises after the nitānta kṣaya (total destruction) of obscuring and obstructive karmas. The Kevalins, Tirthankaras and Siddhas have this omniscience.
Akalanka in his commentary on Apta-mimāṁsā (entitled Astasati) and Vidyānandi in his Aṣṭasahasri refute the arguments of Buddhists and Kumārila.
The time when Svāmi Samantabhadra flourished cannot definitely be ascertained. A discussion on this point has been advanced by Acharya Jugal Kishore in his Introduction to Ratnakarandaśrāvakāchāra. Samantabhadra flourished after Umāsvāmi or Umāsvāti and Kundakunda and before Pūjyapāda. Umāsvāmi, according to one view, flourished in about Vikrama Samvat 281. Samantabhdara's time, according to this calculation, will be about 265 A.D. According to another view, Umāsvāmi flourished in about Vikrama Samvat 360 or 362. Samantabhadra's time, according to this calculation, will be about 400 Vikrama Samvat (342 A.D.). According to a third view,
Umāsvāmi's time is about Vikrama Samvat 220. Samantabhadra, in that case, flourished in the second or third century A.D. According to a fourth view, Umāsvāmi lived about Vikram Samvat 444. Samantabhadra will then be of the 5th century A.D.
The time of Pujyapāda is more certain. Dr. Buhler in Indian Antiquary, Vol. XIV, page 355, has established that Pujyapāda lived in the fifth century A.D. It has been ascertained that Pūjyapāda lived before 482 A.D. This Pujyapāda has mentioned Samantabhadra in his work, Jainendra Vyakarana (Vol. 4, p. 140)—“ Hange”. So it is definite that Samantabhadra lived before 482 A.D. The view of Lewis Rice, as set forth in his Intrdocution to Inscriptoins at Śravanabelagola that "Samantabhadra flourished in the first or second century

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INTRODUCTION
13
A.D.”, that of Edward P. Rice in his History of Canarese Literature (following the Canarese work Karnātaka-KaviCharita by R.S. Narsinhāchārya and the Hindi work Karnatak Jaina Kavi by Nathuram Premi) that "Samantabhadra is by Jaina tradition placed in the second century”, that of M.S. Ayangar in his Studies on South Indian Jainism that “Samantabhadra was the first of a series of celebrated Digambara writers who acquired considrable prominence in the early Rāshtrakūta period”, and that of Dr. S.C. Vidyabhushana in his History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic that “Samantabhadra is supposed to have flourished about 600 A.D.” have been very ably criticised by Pandit Jugal Kishore. The curious reader may look up the detailed criticism in Pandit Jugal Kishore's Introduction already mentioned
Kundakunda flourished before Umāsvāmi. The different views about the approximate date of the latter have already been mentioned. Kundakunda's date was before this. A.N. Upadhye has in his Introduction to Pravachanasāra has after a very careful discussion on all points, come to the conclusion that “Kundakunda's age lies at the beginning of the Christian era.”
The style of writing and the language employed also support the view that the order of sequence was—(1) Kundakunda, (2) Umāsvāmi and (3) Samantabhadra. Kundakunda wrote in Prakrit verses. Earlier works on Jainism were all in Prakrit. The use of Sanskrit language came in later. The form of Sūtra was first employed in Sanskrit works and Umāsvāmi's work (Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra) was in the form of aphorisms. Samantabhadra began to write in Sanskrit verses. This use of Sanskrit verse was made by all later writers, though some exception is found in works like Pramāņa-mīmāṁsā by Hemchandra and Parikṣāmukha by Māņikyanandi. .
As to the life of Samantabhadra, very little is known. Pandit Jugal Kishore from a line in a manuscript copy of
1. “इति फणिमण्डलालंकारस्य उरगपुराधिपसूनोः श्रीस्वामिसमन्तभद्रमुनेः कृतौ आप्तमीमांसायाम्।”

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Āpta-mimāṁsā found in the library of Daurbali Jinadas Shastri of Śravnabelagola has concluded that Samantabhadra was the son of a ruler of Uragapur and from the colophon! of Stutividyā or Jina-stuti-satam or Jina-śataka or Jinaśatakalarkāra (these are different names of the same work), has mentioned that śāntivarma was the name of Samantabhadra before he become a saint. In my opinion, subject to correction by any later discovery of trustworthy materials, the line in the manuscript written by an unknown person at an unknown time is no authority for holding that Samantabhadra was the son of a ruler or Uragapur. I am also of opinion that from the nature of writings of Samantabhadra, it is very unlikely that he should be the author of a treatise of Alarkāra, devoting himself to highly artificial poetry. That Narsimha?, a commentator of this work or Ajitasena in his Alarkārachintamani has mentioned Samantabhadra to be its author, might be due to following a tradition. Such is the case of poet Kālidāsa being considered the author of Nalodaya, a highly artificial poem. From comparing the language and the method of writing, it has been established that this Nalodaya cannot be the work of the celebrated poet Kālidāsa, the author of Abhijñāna-sākuntalam, Raghuvamsam, Meghdūtam etc. Pandit Jugal Kishore has himself expressed doubt regarding a line4 referred to by Pandit Banshidhar but which could not, on a reference to him, be substantiated as coming from any authentic source. So it is not justifiable even to discuss the possibility of śāntivarma being king śāntivarma of Kadamba dynasty.
Hastimalia (Vikram 14th century) in his Vikrānta
1. “giftrationi forriga taqi" 2. Waifechasi for stralu rarffarfar I" 3. "sia HTTGERT Higa ___ लक्ष्यमाचं लिखामि स्वनामसूचितलक्षणम् ।।" 4. “इति फणिमण्डलालंकारस्य उरगपुराधिपसूनुना शान्तिवर्मनामा श्रीसमन्तभद्रेण।"

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INTRODUCTION
15
kaurava1 and Ayyappārya in his Jinendra-kalyāṇābhyudaya2 have mentioned that Samantabhadra belonged to Mūlasangha.
In the Jaina Paṭṭāvalis, in one place Samantabhadra being in the line with Kundakunda, is accepted as belonging to Nandigaṇa or Deśiyagana; while in the Paṭṭāvali of Senagana, he is said to belong to this Gana. The four kind of division in Sanghas took place after Akalanka. Samantabhadra, who lived long before this, cannot therefore be relegated to a particular Sangha. In Inscription No. 64 in 'Inscriptions in Sravanabelagola' by Lewis Rice, we find that the line of Gurus of Samantabhadra was Bhadrabahu, Chandragupta, Kundakunda, Umāsvāti alias Gridhrapichcha and Valākapichcha.3
According to tradition, Samantabhadra was at one time attacked with a kind of disease known as Bhasmaka which causes excessive hunger. According to Ayurveda Śāstra, vayu, pitta and kapha are the essentials in a human body and when kapha (phlegm or saliva) becomes reduced by eating bitter articles and dry rice, vayu and pitta increase and hunger, developed to the extreme by vayu, immediately reduces to ashes (Bhasma) everything eaten.* The only way to cure this disease is to eat in profuse quantity rich food which is also delicious to taste. This being opposed to the VOW of a Jaina Saint, Samantabhadra resolved to lay down his life by Sallekhanā, as allowed in Jainism. But his preceptor forbade him to have recourse to this action. Samantabhadra, thereupon, laid down the symbols of a 1. “श्रीमूलसंघव्योम्नेन्दुर्भारते भावितीर्थकृत् । देशे समन्तभद्राख्यौ मुनिर्जीयात् पदर्द्धिकः । । ”
2. “ श्रीमूलसंघ व्योम्रेन्दुर्भारते भावितीर्थकृत् । देशे समन्तभद्राख्यौ जीयात् प्राप्तपदर्द्धिकः । ।”
3. “एवं महाचार्यपरम्परायां स्यात्कारमुद्रांकिततत्त्वदीपः ।
भद्रः समन्ताद्गुणतो गणीशः समन्तभद्रोऽर्जाद्य वादि - सिंहः । । "
4. "कट्वादिरूक्षानूभुजां नराणां क्षीणे कफे मारुतपित्तवृद्धौ ।
अतिप्रवृद्धः पवनान्वितोऽग्निर्भुक्तं क्षणाद् भस्म करोति यस्मात् । ।” Bhāva-prakāśa.

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Digambara saint and adopted at different times dresses and symbols of a hermit of the Saiva sect, a Buddhist monk or a wandering beggar. He took meals which would cure his disease.1 He was cured by partaking of large offerings to Śiva in a temple by a king named Śivakoti. Śivakoti, learning about the extra-ordinary power of Samantabhadra in eating such a large quantity of food as is not possible for an ordinary human being, had the doors of the temple, where Samantabhadra used to take his meals, closed one day. Samantabhadra began to praise the twenty-four Jinas and when his praise to Chandraprabhu (the eighth Tirthankara) came to be recited, a miracle happened. In place of the Siva-linga which was in the temple, an image of Tirthankara Chandraprabhu appeared. Samantabhadra finished the praise of the remaining Tirthankaras. The King Śivakoti and his brother Śivayana, seeing this miracle, became Jains, accepting Samantabhadra as their spiritual preceptor.
This traditional account of Samantabhadra's Bhasmak disease, his bringing of Chandraprabhu through the mantra given to him by divine Padmavati, is referred to in a verse2 in an inscription dated Śaka Samvat 1050 known as Mallisena-prasasti (No. 67-Inscriptions at Sravanabelagola by Lewis Rice).
In the work Rājāvali-kathā in Canarese language and Ārādhanākathākoṣa in Sanskrit verse by Brahma Nemidatta, following Aradhana-sära of Prabhachandra, the substance of the above traditional account is given with some variation in detail as to the places visited by Samantabhadra during his wanderings in different guises.
1. Charaka describes how this strange hunger can be overcome : “तमेत्यग्निं गुरुस्निग्धशीतमधुरविज्वलैः ।
अन्नमानैर्नयेच्छान्तिं दीप्तमग्निमिवाम्बुभिः ।।”
2. “वंद्यो भस्मकभस्मसात्कृतियहः पद्मावती देवता
दत्तोदात्तमद-स्वमंत्रवचनव्याहूतचन्द्रप्रभः ।
आचार्यस्य समन्तभद्रगणभृद्ये काले कलौ
जैनं वर्त्म समन्तभद्रमभवद् भद्रं समन्तान्मुहुः । ।”

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INTRODUCTION
17
Edward P. Rice in his History of Canarese Literature has mentioned on the basis of Rājāvali-kathā : “It is told of him that in early life he (Samantabhadra) performed severe penance and on account of a depressing disease was about to make the vow of Sallekhanā or starvation; but was dissuaded by his Guru who foresaw that he would be a great pillar of the Jaina faith.”
Nemidatta has quoted two verses said to have been spoken by Samantabhadra to Sivakoti. Both of these two verses could not, however be uttered by a Jaina Saint who is absolutely free from any pride or self-aggrandisement. In the first verse, Samantabhadra is made to say : “I was a naked Digambara saint in Kāñchi (Kanjivaram), in Lāmbusa (this place has not been identified). I had a grey body (being smeared with ashes) in Pundra (Ganda in Bengal) and Uạra (Orissa). I was a begging Buddhist monk in the town of Daśapura (Mandasa). I was a wanderer eating sweets. In Benares, I was a person performing penance (with ashes on my body)—white like a moon (or white like Śiva). O king! I am a Jaina ascetic. He who has power may hold a discourse with me.” This is supposed to have given the places visited by Samantabhadra while he was ill.
The second verse is copied from that found in an inscription (No. 54 – Inscriptions at Sravanabelgola) about a century before Nemidatta's Ārādhanā-kathā-kosa was compiled. The verse is as follows : "Frist, I beat the drum in the town of Pāțaliputra (Patna); then I did so in Mālava (Malwā), Sindhu (Indus), Dhakka (not definitely identified—some say a place in Punjab and others say Dacca in Bengal), in Kāñchipura (Kanjivaram) and Vidiśā (Vilsā). O king! I have now come to Karņāțaka (Kanhada 1.“कांच्यां नग्नाटकोऽहं मलमलिनतर्नुलाम्बुशे पाण्डुपिण्डः
पुण्डोद्रे शाक्यभिक्षुर्दशपुरनगरे मिष्टभोजी परिव्राट् । वाराणस्यामभूवं शशिधरधवलः पांडुरंगस्तपस्वी राजन् यस्यास्ति शक्तिः स वदतु पुरतो जैननिर्ग्रन्थवादी।।"

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ĀPTA-MIMĀMSĀ
or Canara) full of heroes and learned men; and I am moving about like a tiger for discourse.")
Edward P. Rice says: "He (Samatabhadra) was a brilliant disputant and a great preacher of the Jaina religion throughout India. ...It was the custom in those days, alluded to by Fa Hian (400) and Hiun Sang (630), for a drum to be fixed in a public place in the city and any learned man, wishing to propogate a doctrine or prove his erudition and skill in debate, would strike it by way of challenge or disputation. ...Samantabhadra made full use of this custom and powerfully maintained the Jaina doctrine of Syādvāda”. M.S. Rāmsvāmi Ayangar in his 'Studies in South Indian Jainism' has also mentioned : "It is evident that he (Samantabhadra) was a great Jaina missionary who tried to spread far and wide Jaina doctrines and morals; and that he met with no opposition from other sects, wherever he went.” Though, in our opinion, Samatabhadra himself could not have made a boast of his prowess, as alleged by Nemidatta, we have no hestitation to accept that he preached and propogated the principles of Jainism by visiting many places throughout India. That he defeated those who came to discuss with him, is established by numerous references in Jaina works and Inscriptions.?
Nothing more in detail has yet been ascertained regarding the life of Samantabhadra. 1. “पूर्वं पाटलिपुत्रमध्यनगरे भेरी मया ताडिता
पश्चान्मालवसिन्धुढक्कविषये काञ्चीपुरे वैदिशे। प्राप्तोऽहं करहाटकं बहुभटं विद्योत्कटं संकटं वादार्थी विचराम्यहं नरपते शार्दूलविक्रीडितम् ।।" The metre of this verse in Sanskrit prosody is known as Sārdūlavikridita (Stremifashisa). So the last word is significant in
convenying a double sense. 2. "Tatiana ART: 154: " Adipurāņa by Jinasena.
"halfefellitud erita:” Varāngacharita by Vardhamāna-sūri. "calfcarcasa 4064-0ft: 1" Hanumachcharita by Brahma Ajit. “जयन्ति वाग्वज्रनिपातपाटितप्रतीपराद्धान्तमहीध्रकोटयः।” Gadya-chintamani
by Vādibha Simha

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INTRODUCTION
19
Other works of Samantabhadra are Yuktyanusāsana (a commentary on it by Vidyānandi has been found), Svayambhū-stotra (with a commentary by Prabhāchandra), Stutividyā or Jinastutisatam or Jina satakam or Jinašatakālankāra (with commentary by Narsimha) and Ratnakarandasrāvakāchāra.
There are inferences that there were other works of Samantabhadra such as Jiva-siddhi, Tattvānusāsana, a Prakrit Grammar, Pramānapadārtha, a commentary on Karmaprābhrta and Gandhahasti Mahābhāsya. Though references to these works are found in works of Jaina writers of a very late date, nothing definite can be said unless manuscripts of these are discovered.
In presenting an exposition by an original commentary in English of this abstruse work of Samantabhadra, I am fully aware of my short-comings to do full justice to this most difficult task. I have lost the help of Jainadharmabhūsaņa Brahmachari Shital Prasad at whose ernest desire, my friend Pandit Ajit Prasad, M.A., LL.B. asked me to take up this work. Brahmachariji was from the start of this series, entitled the 'Sacred Books of the Jainas”, devoted his heart and soul to the undertaking. His was a noble soul devoted entirely to the propogation of Jainism. Not daunted by his failing health, he was always, even on a sick-bed, eager to clear all doubtful points. And it is with the saddest heart that I now bring before the public my own endeavours, unassisted by the deep erudition of the departed scholar. By dedicating this work to his loving memory, I have but feebly expressed the thoughts that
“यदीयवाग्वज्रकठोरपातश्चूर्णीचकार प्रतिवादिशैलान्।" (Inscription no. 258, Sáka Saṁvat 1355, Inscriptions at Sravanabelagola) "अवटुतटमटति झटिति स्फुटपटुवाचाटधूर्जटेरपि जिह्वा । वादिनि समन्तभद्रे स्थितवति तव सदसि भूप कास्थान्येषाम् ।।" Mallisena-prasasti (inscription No. 67, Sáka Saṁvat 1050, Inscriptions at Sravanabelagola).

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ĀPTA-MIMĀSĀ
pass my mind. The co-operators of this Series have, one after another, left this world and no words can describe the void which they have created. Prof. Hermann Jacobi, Kumar Devendra Prasad, J.L. Jaini, C.R. Jain, Mahāmahopādhyāya S.C. Vidyābhūşaņa, Puranchand Nahar, Pannalal Paliwal—to speak about a few of the leading helpers--have all gone away. Only Pandit Ajit Prasad remains and may he live long to bear the torch illuminating Jainism. In the twilight of my own life, in which ill-health and bereavements are casting their shadows, I am not sure whether I shall appear any more before the readers, bringing out any subsequent volume. But I sincerely believe that more capable hands of an ever-increasing band of competent scholars would take up the standard and bring out to the world the unique doctrines of Syādvāda, the most wonderful tenet of Jainism, which is sure to find out its proper place amongst the philosophical doctrines of the world.
-S. C. Ghoshal
June, 1944 Cooch Behar
1. Pandit Ajit Prasad died on September 17, 1951

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CONTENTS
Verse Nos. Page Nos.
INTRODUCTION
7-20
25-86
CHAPTER I
1-23 Examination of the concept of the Great (Guru) Arguments to prove Omniscience Oinniscience admitted of Arhant Four types of Negation Traits of Position and Negation considered in their absolute form Concomitance of Position and Negation in a real Consideration of Absolutism of the two taken together and Absolute Inexpressibility Extension of these Traits and Theses to seven forms of Predication under Syādvāda
CHAPTER II
24-36
87-98
Theses of Absolute Monism (Non-Dualism) and Dualism examined Theses of Absolute Distinction and Non-Distinction examined Absolute Distinction between Knowledge and Knowable considered
100-118
CHAPTER III
37-60 Traits of Absolute Permanence and Absolute Transience examined Absolute Inexpressibility judged to be untenable

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Relative Permanence and Relative Transcience justified under Syādvāda Triple Nature of Reality established
61-72
120-131
CHAPTER IV Absolute Distinction between Cause and Effect, Attributes and Substance, and Universal and Particular considered Unity and Difference between Substances and Modes explained under Syādvāda
CHAPTER V
73-75
132-135
Traits of the Relational and the Non-Relational considered in their Absolute Form Extension of these Traits and Theses to remaining Traits and the Forms of Predications
76-78
135-137
CHAPTER VI Theses of Reasoning and Authority raised in their Absolute Forms Consistent positions of Reasoning and Authority established
79-87
138-145
CHAPTER VII Theses of the Internal (Cognitive) and the External (Objective) Reality raised in their Absolute Forms Inconsistency of such Absolute Theses brought to light Consistent position regarding them explained and established
88-91
146-147
CHAPTER VIII Theses of Determinism by Destiny and by Effort considered in their Absolute Forms

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Extension to the Absolutism of the two and their Absolute Inexpressibility
Consistent position of the two under specified contexts established
CHAPTER IX
Theses of earning Demerit by causing pain to others and earning Merit by causing happiness to others considered in their Absolute Forms
Reverse of the above Theses examined and shown untenable
Consistent position explained and established
CHAPTER X
Absolute Theses of Bondage by Nescience and Emancipation by little knowledge considered and examined
Consistent position regarding Bondage and Emancipation explained and established
Two divisions of Jivus into Liberable and Non-Liberable ones supported
Simutaneous Knowledge (Kevalajñāna) and Successive Knowledge (Syādvāda and Naya) distinguished
Propriety of the use of adverb (nipāta) Syāt Substance defined
Position of the Relational and the
Non-Relational Nayas explained
Regulation of Knowables by Prepositions through Assertion and Negation
Nature of Expression
Ethical import of Syādvāda
Objective behind the composition of Apta-mimāmsā
92-95 149-152
96-114 156-173

Page #26


Page #27

Chapter I
देवागम-नभोयान-चामरादि विभूतयः। मायाविष्वपि दृश्यन्ते नातस्त्वमसि नो महान् ॥1॥ devāgama-nabhoyāna-chămarādi-vibhūtayaḥ, māyāvişvapi drśyante nātas-tvamasi no mahān.
Coming down of heavenly beings, movements in sky, waving of whisks and other symbols of majesty (of a Tīrtharkara) are seen even in magicians. You are not our worshipful lord because of these things.
COMMENTARY According to the Jaina view heavenly beings come down on earth on special occasions in the life of a Tirthankara. These occasions are: conception, birth, adoption of ascetic vows, attaiment of perfect knowledge and liberation. A Tirthankara has eight symbols of majesty (prātihāryas), viz.,2 Asoka tree, throne, the triple canopy, halo of glory, divine discourse, shower of flowers, waving of sixtyfour flywhisks and heavenly music. The Tīrtharkaras, it is said, move in the sky, on golden lotuses.3 It is mentioned in this verse that these should not be accepted as essentials of Āpta, for magicians might show these to the people and deceive them.
Vasunandi in his Vrtti writes : “Achārya Samantabhadra might have seen the omniscient and spoken thus : 'O Lord! praise means the recital of greatness, but your greatness being not cognizable by senses, is beyond my perception. So, how can I praise 1. “स्वर्गावतरण-जन्मनिष्क्रमणकेवलज्ञानोत्पत्तिमुक्तिगमनस्थानेषु आगमनं आगमः अवतारः।”
Vịtti by Vasunandi 2. “wfa-TECH 37STAGSPARETHALIA fueganti" Vasunandi. 3. “ 7 24441-4 tp ri tanqi" Vasunandi.

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26
ĀPTA-MIMĀMSĀ
you?' The Lord might have replied: 'My son! as others praise me understaning my greatness through advent of devas etc., why do you not adopt the same policy?' In reply Samantabhadra urges in this verse that 'Such things can be shown even by magicians deceiving our senses. So these cannot be the reasons for which you are the greatest of the great for us.1
The practices of magicians showing heavenly beings are mentioned in Hindu, Jain and Buddhist works of ancient India. In Act IV of Ratnāvali, a Drama by Sriharşa, a magician flourishing a fan of peacock feather, tells the king, “I shall show the gods like Hari, Hara, Brahmā etc. and the wives of siddhas, chārañas and suras dancing in the sky."2
Then he shows his feats. All present look up with wonder. The king, leaving his throne, exclaims, “Wonder, wonder. See, queen! this is Brahma on the lotus. This is Sankara adorned on the forehead by the crescent of the moon. This is Visnu, the killer of the Demons, bearing a bow, a sword, a mace and a discus in his hands. This is Indra, on the elephant, Airāvata. The other Gods are (also) here. The celestial nymphs are dancing in the sky with anklets ringing on their moving feet."3
In the Prakrit drama, Karpūra-mañjari of Rāja-sekhara, Bhairavānanda tells the king, “I shall show the moon 1. “श्रीसमन्तभद्राचार्यः सर्वज्ञ प्रत्यक्षीकृत्यैवमाचष्टे, हे भट्टारक, संस्तवो नाम
माहात्मस्याधिक्यकथनम्। त्वदीयं च माहात्म्यमतीन्द्रियं मम प्रत्यक्षगोचरम। अतः कथं मया स्तूयसे? अत आह भगवान्, ननु भो वत्स, यथाऽन्ये देवागमादिहेतोर्मम माहात्म्यवबुध्य स्तवं कुर्वन्ति तथा त्वं किमिति न कुरुषे? अत आह अस्माद्धेतोर्न महान् भवान् मां
प्रति, व्यभिचारित्वादस्य हेतोः, इति व्यभिचारं दर्शयति।" Vasunandi. 2. "ऐन्द्रजालिकः। (पिच्छिका भ्रमयन)
हरिहरब्रह्मणमुहं देवं दंसेमि देवराअं च।
गगणे वि सिद्धचारणसुरवहुसत्थं च णच्चंतं ॥" Ratnāvali, Act IV. 3. “सर्वे सविस्मयं पश्यन्ति। राजा (ऊर्ध्वं दृष्ट्वा आसनादवतरन्) : आश्चर्यम्, आश्चर्यम् ।
देवि, पश्य, एष ब्रह्मा सरोजे रजनिकरकलाशेखरः शंकरोऽयं दोभिदैत्यान्तकोऽसौ सधनुरसिगदाचक्रचिह्न॑श्चतुर्भिः । एषोऽप्यरावतस्थस्त्रिदशपतिरमी देवि देवास्तथान्ये . नृत्यन्ति व्योम्नि चैताश्चलचरणरणन्नूपुरा दिव्यनार्यः ॥” Ratnāvali, Act IV.

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CHAPTER I
which has descended to the earth. I shall stop the sun half way in the sky. I shall bring the wives of the Yakṣas, the Suras and the Siddhas. There is nothing in this world which I cannot do. So tell me what I shall do."
In all ancient works, a mangalācaraṇa is written at the very beginning. The object of the work is next explained. Prabhācandra in his Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa had quoted the following verses to prove the importance of setting out the purpose of a work :
"At the beginning of every sastra, the object with its connection should be mentioned, for a listener pays attention to only a definite subject and things connected with the same. Who will pay attention to a treatise or do any kind of work till its necessity is patent? That sastra for which no necessity is explained is not desired by the wise. So at the outset, the necessity is to be explained."2
Akalanka says that both mangalācaraṇa and the setting out of the purpose have been mentioned in the first verse. The praise of the omniscient in an attempt to examine his characteristics is the mangalācaraṇa. The necessity of the work is also indicated by laying down that it is characterised by faith (śraddha) and knowledge of the qualities (guṇajñatā)3. Śraddhā and guṇajñatā have been
1. “ दंसेमि तं पि ससिणं वसुहावतिण्णं थंभेमि तस्सवि रविस्स रहं णहद्धे ।
आमि जक्खसुरसिद्धगणंगणाओ
तं णत्थि भूमिवलए मह जं ण सज्जं ॥
ता भण किं करीअदु ।” Karpūra-manjari, Yavanikāntara' I.
2. “सिद्धार्थं ज्ञातसम्बन्धं श्रोता श्रोतुं प्रवर्तते ।
शास्त्रादौ तेन वक्तव्यः सम्बन्धः सप्रयोजनः ॥”
27
“सर्वस्यैव हि शास्त्रस्य कर्मणो वापि कस्यचित् ।
यावत् प्रयोजनं नोक्तं तावत् तत् केन गृह्यताम् ॥” “अनिर्दिष्टफलं सर्वं न प्रेक्षापूर्वकारिभिः ।
शास्त्रमाद्रियते तेन वाच्यमग्रे प्रयोजनम् ॥”
Prameya-kamala-mārtanda.
The first and the second verses are written by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and form verses 17 and 12 of his Sloka-vārtika, I.1.1.
3. “देवागमेत्यादिमंगलपुरःसर-स्तवविषयपरमाप्तगुणातिशयपरीक्षामुपक्षिपतैव स्वयं श्रद्धागुणज्ञतालक्षणं प्रयोजनमाक्षिप्तं लक्ष्यते, तदन्यतरापायेऽर्थस्यानुपपत्तेः ।” Astaśati.

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28
ĀPTA-MIMĀMSĀ
explained as darśana or faith arising out of knowledge following the examination of Jaina Nayavāda and Syādvāda. By establishing the omniscient in this work, a sound foundation will be laid for faith.
अध्यात्म बहिरप्येष विग्रहादिमहोदयः। दिव्यः सत्यो दिवौकस्स्वप्यस्ति रागादिमत्सु सः ॥2॥ adhyātmam bahirapyeșa vigrahādi-mahodayaḥ, divyaḥ satyo divaukas-svapyasti rāgādimatsu saḥ.
2. External physical excellence and internal good qualities, wonderful yet true, are found even in heavenly souls who are full of attachment (rāga etc.)
COMMENTARY In the first verse it has been mentioned that omniscience is not established from advent of celestical beings on the occasions of birth etc. of a Tīrthankara or from other marks of glory like movement in the sky or possession of various symbols of majesty. Magicians can show such tricks. Owing to the possibility of our having a false sight of these in magic, we cannot say that
Mahāmahopadhyāya Yaśovijaya Gani in his commentary on Astasahasri has written, “sraddhā and gunajñatā are called darśana. These are kinds of knowledge to examine Naya and Syādvāda." (Gllusid turligar-hi shfaqet asfalt) He has quoted the following verse from Sanmati-prakarana: "एवं जिणपण्णत्ते सद्दहमाणस्स भावओ भाणे। पुरिसस्साभिणिवोहे दंसणसद्दो हुवइ जुत्तो ॥" "the word darśana (faith) is fit to be applied in abhinibodha (mati-jñāna), i.e., knowledge derived from the bhāvas of a man having belief in the things laid down by the Jina." Pandit Bansidhar has explained sraddhā as "great attachment to the knowledge that this is to be revered. (प्रेरकत्वं वाराध्यत्वेन ज्ञानं भक्तिस्तत्रात्यन्तम- नुरागः श्रद्धा।) The interpretation of Mahāmahopādhyāya Yaśovijaya seems to be more apt.

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CHAPTER I
these establish the omniscient.
In the present verse, it is urged that there might be things not false which are present internally and externally in a being and these might establish the omniscient. For instance it might be said that lustre or absence of hunger, thirst, old age, death, sweats a shadow, in bodies of celestial beings are not false signs like those shown by magicians, but those really exist. But the author says that though these might exist in the dwellers of heaven, such appearances do not establish omnisciece, for such celestial beings are subject to passions (kaşāya), anger (krodha), pride (māna), deceipt (māyā) and greed (lobha) from which the omniscient is entirely free.
According to the Jain doctrine jīvās are of various kinds. Among these are celestial beings, human beings, sub-human beings and dwellers in hell. The celestial beings are of four kinds, residential (Bhavana-vāsin), peripatetic (Vyantara), stellar (Jyotiska) and heavenly (Vaimānika). These celestial beings have internal qualities, viz., freedom from sweat etc. and external qualities, viz, emitting sweet scent. It is said that though magicians can show false images of heavenly beings, these characteristics will be absent in such false sights. Those who practise Yoga say that the test of finding whether the sights of Gods and Godesses are real is to look for such characteristics, because a magician will not be able to reproduce these in a false show of celestial beings.
It might be urged, that as magicians fail to show these, the same are neither false nor mundane. So we should accept these as identifying essentials of the omniscient.3 To this, a reply is given that it cannot be so, for the omniscient is free from ghātiya karmas, but the celestial beings who possess similar specialities are not free from these, as
1. "Langagfofahrer: 1" Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra, IV.1. 2. “आत्मानमधिश्रित्य वर्तमानोऽध्यात्ममन्तरंगो विग्रहादिमहोदयः शश्वनिःस्वेदत्वादिः परानमेक्षत्वात्;
cal aferent chakula ut aluftara" Astasahasri. 3. " a Feat AFICI Pagal Haut 1174674Tata.” Astasahasri.

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they are possessed of the four kinds of passions, viz, anger, pride, deceit and greed.
Akalanka, therefore, says, "the internal and external excellence of bodies etc., though not found in shows of magicians, cannot be accepted as proving the omniscient, for these are seen in celestial beings whose passions have not disappeared. So, you are not praised as our Lord even for this."2
According to Jaina doctrine, "condition of existence (gati) is the state (of a soul) brought about by the operation of the body-condition-making (gati-nāma-karma) or it is the cause of the soul's passing in either of the four conditions of existence. The four kinds of the conditions of existence are : Hellish (Nāraka), Sub-human (Tiryancha), Human (Manusya), Celestial (Deva)."3
“Devas (celestials) are so called because they always amuse themselves with their eight heavenly acquisitions and have shining heavenly constitutions.94
1. 372 uçat: unatrys: a mafa, 7 arçant day to challe: PITCI" Asta
sahasri. From one point of view karmas are subdivided into two classes, ghāti (destructive) and aghāti (non-destructive) : "hui yu gera 3ffa o sift HOUT3TT 1” (Gommatasāra, Karma-kānda, verse 7). By ghāti karmas, perfect knowledge, perfect conation, infinite power, purified right belief, purified qualities (as conduct, charity etc.), sensitive (knowledge) and other subsidential thought-activities are destroyed, vide: “केवलणाणं दंसणमणंतविरियं च खयियसम्मं च। खयियगुणे मदियादी खओवसमिए य घादी दु ॥"
Gommatasāra, Karma-kānda, verse 10. 2. “बहिरन्तःशरीरादिमहोदयोऽपि पूरणादिष्वसम्भवी व्यभिचारी स्वर्गिषु भावादक्षीणकषायेषु।
ततोऽपि न भवान् परमात्मेति स्तूयते।” Asta-sati. 3. "TSUG4541 53113114TR TS at & णारयतिरिक्खमाणुसदेवगइत्ति य हवे चदुधा ॥"
Gommațasāra, Jiva-kānda, verse 146. "Frontefruit41619aifa 1 Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, VIII, Verse 10. 4. Scaifat et foreen Tolle Pacelinafsi il
erhafcicachrel et à afoupil dal ll" Ibid, verse 151.

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It is said that the celestials have eight acquisitions which become their nature. These are: aạiman (the power to make their bodies small), mahiman (the power to extend their bodies), laghiman (the power to make their bodies light), gariman (the power to make their bodies heavy), sakāma-rūpita (the power to adopt any form and any number of bodies at one time), vasitva (the power to subjugate others), išitva (the power by which they can exhibit superiority) and prākāmya (the power to act as they desire).
According to Yoga philosophy also Aạiman, Laghiman, mahiman, prāpti, prākāmya, vasitva, išitva and yatrakāmāvasāyitva can be attained by practising Yoga. According to this view even human beings can attain such power by Yogic practices.
According to Jainism, in case of liberated souls (Siddhas), karmas disappear altogether and that stage is higher than that of the celestial beings. The omniscient (Kevalin) also is in higher state. So the excellent qualities of celestial beings are not accepted in this verse as characteristics of the omniscient.
Both in the Hindu and Jain philosophies occult powers are not the highest goal to be achieved by souls. In all such philosophies it is accepted that such powers naturally come at a particular state of development and are often a source of obstruction to future development, by causing a feeling of arrogance to arise in the mind of the possessor. The souls who disregard such powers,
1. The 'Sacred Books of the Jainas', vol. V. (Gommațasāra, Jiva-kānda),
page 100. 2. “Tatsforhifa-yrgura: ARUHYGETHF=T991797 1” Pātañjala-yoga-sūtra,
Vibhūtipāda, aphorism 46. In Hindu philosophy animā, laghima, isitva, prākāinya and vasitva mean the same as explained in the Jaina doctrine as mentioned above. Garimā and mahimā are taken to be synonymous in philosophy meaning the same as mahima in Jaina philosophy. Yatrakāmāvasāyitva means infallibility of their wishes and prāpti is the power to attain a thing which is at a distance.

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advance to further stages of development. These powers are, therefore, not accepted in establising the existence of the omniscient for such powers are found in souls in much lower stages of development.1
तीर्थकृत्समयानां च परस्पर विरोधतः । सर्वेषामाप्तता नास्ति कश्चिदेव भवेद् गुरुः ॥3॥
tirthakṛt-samayānāṁ cha paraspara-virodhataḥ, sarveṣāmāptatā nāsti kaśchideva bhaved guruḥ.
3. Trustworthiness of everyone cannot be accepted, as the doctrines of Tirthakṛts are contradictory to one another. Only one of them can be accepted as the Lord
COMMENTARY
Tirthakṛt is one who prescribes means for escape from samsara (worldly existence). If it be urged that the omniscient is established from the qualification of his being a Tirthakṛt (advisor of escaping from mundane existence), we might reply that though this quality is
1. It may not be out of place to cite here an instance how a false sight of God can be shown to people even in modern age of civilization. In the diary of Kuladananda Brahmachari, dated the 19th April 1891, the following incident in the life of his preceptor Acharya Bijoykriṣṇa Gosvāmi is mentioned. On the above date the Acharya himself spoke about this incident to his disciple.
One day in Brindāvan, a Sādhu told the Acharya that he will show him the image of Viṣņu. The Acharya was asked to sit fixing his gaze on a room in front of him. The Sadhu sat near him and began to recite a mantra. A little after the Acharya saw a figure of Viṣṇu. The body had four arms but had not the usual conch, discus, mace and lotus respectively in the arms. The Acharya became suspicious and began to recite mantras. The image began to tremble and was soon transformed into the horrible form of an evil spirit. Mentioning this incident, the Acharya told his disciple that evil spirits can assume forms of gods and goddesses but cannot assume the peculiar symbols of the latter. (Sree Sree Sadgurusanga, Vol. III, pages 11-13). Instances of spirits assuming forms of departed persons are mentioned in works describing seances.

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absent in celestial beings like Indra etc., it is found in Buddha and others. In the second verse, it has been mentioned that excellence of heavenly bodies of celestial beings does not constitute the essential of the omniscient. It may be urged : “Be it so. But we might say that celestial beings are not Tirthakrts. We may hold that a Tirthakrt is the omniscient; holding this as the distinctive feature of the omniscient.” To this the reply is, that this cannot be accepted, for there are many who are accepted as Tīrthakrts. Buddha, Kapila and others are known as Tīrthakrts from sāstras. So if we accept this view Buddha, Kapila and others will be the Lord of the Jainas and so will deserve praise.
If we might say, what is the harm in holding that all these Tīrthakşts, Buddha, Kapila etc. are omniscient as well, as accepted by the Jains. The reply to this is that all these lay down different doctrines contradictory to one another. If they were all omniscient they could not have laid down contraditory doctrines. In other words all the founders of different religions cannot be held to be trustworthy because they contradict one another. So it is urged that only one of them can claim to be the best and most reliable.
Kumārila Bhatta has refuted in his commentary on Mimāṁsā-sūtras, the view of Samantabhadra that there is an omniscient being as laid down in Āpta-mimāṁsā. Kumārila is the author of commentaries Sloka-vārtika, Tantra-vārtika and Tup-tikā which expound the Mimāṁsāsūtras of Jaimini. The Mimāṁsā philosophy has also been expounded by Prabhākara. The views of Prabhākara and Kumārila are different at many points. The views of Prabhākara are also known as the views of the Guru and the same as those of Kumārila and Bhatta. Akalanka
1. " fa atefeheratri herufa, stabilitufa, Ilart getarai" Astašati. 2. “यथैव हि भगवति तीर्थकरत्वसमयोऽस्ति तथा सुगतादिष्वपि। सुगतस्तीर्थकरः कपिलस्तीर्थकर
Ruum af stat pro NT: THE RIDI” Aștasahasri. 3. "7 o H Helafsta: pierrfag 1f97: 1" Astašati.

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in his Asta-sati on Apta-mīmāṁsā has not replied to the triticisms of Kumārila regarding Samantabhdra's establishing the omniscient, but Vidyānandi in his Astasahasri has attempted a refutation of the views of Kumārila. For this reason, western scholars hold that Kumārila was later than Akalanka but prior to Vidyānandi.1
Kumārila says “If Buddha be omniscient, why cannot there be correct knowldege that Kapila also is omniscient? If both of them be accepted as omniscient, why are there differences of opinion between them?”2
So, we might hold that being a Tīrthakara does not establish the greatness of any one. Accordingly, we might hold that none is omniscient.3
Kumārila says that it is well-known that people desirous of welfare, gain the same from the Vedas. There is no necessity of praising any being as omniscient.
Vidyānandi says that the present verse can be interpreted in another way as refuting the views of such
1. “Kumārila's date is determinable within definite limits; he used the
Väkyapadiya of Bharthari; neither Hiuen-Tsang nor I-tsing mentions him; he was before Sankara; he attacked the Jain theory of an omniscient being as propounded in the Apta-mimāṁsā of Samantabhadra, but is not answered by Akalanka in his Asta-sati which comments on the Apta-mimāṁsā. On the other hand he is freely attacked by Vidyānandi and Prabhachandra who both lived before 838 A.D. Vidyānandi assures us, doubtless correctly, that he criticised the Buddhist Dharmakirti and Prabhākara, on the latter point arguing with the result above arrived from internal evidence. The upper limit of date is, therefore, not earlier than 700 A.D. The lower limit depends on his precise chronological relation to Sankara and the latter's exact date. Later tradition, the Sankaravijaya of Madhava and the pseudo-Anandagiri, would make him an older contemporary, but the interval may have been considerably longer."
The Karma-mimāṁsă by A.B. Keith, pages 10-11. 2. "a uf Hasit asperit afat Thi
acuit af Helsit 1975: i : 1" Verse quoted in Astasahasri. 3. “तीर्थकरत्वाख्यो न कस्यचिन्महत्त्वं साधयतीति कश्चिदेव गुरुर्महान् भवेत् ? नैव
afira!" Astasahasri. 4. “अतएव न कश्चित् पुरुषः सर्वज्ञः स्तुत्यः। श्रेयोऽर्थिनां श्रुतेरेव श्रेयःसाधनोपदेश
ufifunt:l" Astasahasri. (By apara, Kumārila Bhatta is meant.)

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persons like Kumārila who deny the existence of the omniscient. According to this interpretation tirthakrt' would mean "those who destroy the Tirtha, i.e. the omniscient" and would specially refer to the Mimāṁsakas who refute the existence of the omniscient. 'Tirthakrtsamaya’ would mean the different views of such deniers of the omniscient: for example, some hold that bhāvanā results from Vedic injunctions, while others urge that niyoga is signified from such injunctions. Owing to this difference of opinions none of these views can be tenable. In other words, as the Mīmāṁsakas hold different views, none of them can be accepted as reliable.
दोषावरणयोहानिनिःशेषाऽस्त्यतिशायनात् । क्वचिद्यथा स्वहेतुभ्यो बहिरन्तर्मलक्षयः ॥4॥ doşāvaraņayorhānir niḥseşāstyatiśāyanāt, kvachid yathā syahetubhyo bahirantar-malakṣayaḥ.
4. As from causes belonging to itself, destruction of external and internal impurities (takes place), so in some
1. “तं प्रत्यपीयमेव कारिका योज्या। तीर्थं कृन्तन्तीति तीर्थकृतो मीमांसकाः
सर्वज्ञागमनिराकरणवादित्वात्। तेषां समयास्तीर्थकृत्समयास्तीर्थच्छेदसम्प्रदाया भावनादिवाक्यार्थप्रवादा इत्यर्थः । तेषां च परस्परविरोधादाप्तता संवादकता नास्तीति कश्चिदेव सम्प्रदायो भवेद् गुरुः संवादको नैव भवेदिति व्याख्यानात्।” Astasahasri. Vasunandi also writes in his Vịtti: . "तीर्थं सर्वज्ञं कृन्तन्ति छिन्दन्ति इति तीर्थकृतः समया आम्नायाः संप्रदाया येषां ते तीर्थकृत्-समयाः, तेषाम् अन्योन्यविरोधात्। सर्वं निरवशेषमवमतं अगम्यावगमनं वा इच्छन्ति अभ्युपगच्छन्ति इति सर्वेषः। तेषां सर्वेषाम् आप्तता परमार्थवादित्वं नास्ति न विद्यते। अतः कः आत्मजीवः निश्चेतनोऽचेतनो भवत्येव। एवकारः अवधारणार्थः। भवं संसारं यान्ति गच्छन्ति इति भवेतः तेषां भवेतां शंखचक्रधरादीनामित्यर्थः । गुरु थः। भवेद् गुरुः भवेतां गुरुः। न च लब्धात्मस्वरूपाणाम्। किमुक्तं भवति-तीर्थकृच्छेदकाम्नायानामपि सर्वमेकेन प्रमाणेन षड्भिरभ्युपगच्छताम् आप्तता नास्ति परस्परविरोधात्। अतो यतिपतिरेव स्यानान्यः।" The interpretation of sarvesām and bhavet by subtle derivation in the vrtti appears to be far-fetched. It is said that by sarvesām it is meant those who wish to understand everything and bhaved guruh means Lord Indra étc. who come to saṁsāra.

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(soul) owing to a particular excellence, destruction of faults and impediments happens (takes place).
COMMENTARY
36
In this verse, it is mentioned that though all Tirthankaras cannot be trustworthy as urged in the previous verse, it is quite possible that in some souls, a particular stage of development produces excellence which destroys the dosas (faults) and avaranas (obstructions). This is like the purifying of a piece of metal like gold which might have external impurities like mud etc. attached to it and internal impurities like alloy mixed with the same. By washing or scouring we can do away with the external impurities and by melting we can destroy the alloy bringing out the pure gold. In a soul also karmas internally obstruct right faith or right knowledge and externally produce faults like attachment, moha, ignorance etc. When these karmas are destroyed, the soul becomes pure and fit for omniscience.1
According to Jainism, "the union of soul with matter results in the generation of different kinds of forces, some of which are obstructive of the pure natural functions of spirit..... The soul is subject to the following eight kinds of forces: (1) Jñānāvaraṇīya (the knowldedge-obstructing), (2) Darśanavaraṇiya (the perception-obstructing), (3) Vedaniya (which regulates the experiences of pleasure and pain), (4) Mohaninya which is of two kinds (a) Darśana-mohaniya (which stands in the way of the adoption of the right faith) and (b) Charitra-mohaniya (which prevents one from following the right path in practice), (5) Ayuḥ (the force which determines the duration of the association of the soul with its physical body), (6) Nāma (the group of forces which organize the
1. “ एतदुक्तं भवति । कस्मिंश्चिदतिशायनाद्दोषावरणयोर्हानिरस्ति । यथा धातुपाषाणस्य अन्तर्मलक्षयः । स कश्चिद् भवत्येव गुरुरिति संबन्धः । एकत्र स्वहेतवः सम्यग्दर्शनादयः । अन्यत्र पिण्डीबन्धन प्रयोगादयः । तथा एकत्र बहिर्मलः शरीरेन्द्रियादिकम् । अन्तर्मलः कर्म। अन्यत्र बहिर्मलः किटुकादिकम् । अन्तर्मलः कालिमादि । ” Vasunandi.

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body and its limbs), (7) Gotra (which attracts the soul into a new 'womb' upon which depends the Gotra, i.e., family or lineage of the individual) and (8) Antaraya (which prevents effectiveness and interferes with energy in general). Every unredeemed soul is under the sway of the above mentioned forces. ...Of these the first, second, fourth and eighth kind of forces are called ghatiya (destructive) because they stand in the way of the soul... They have to be overpowered before the desired perfection can be attained by the soul."1
"As regards the scientific nature of this enumeration, observation shows that the soul involved in the cycle of transmigration is unable to enjoy its natural perfection in respect of knowledge, perception and happiness, which therefore must be held in abeyance by some kind of force operating on it. We thus get three different kinds of forces, namely, (1) those which obstruct knowledge (Jñānāvaraṇiya), (2) those that interfere with perception and (3) those which stand in the way of happiness, leaving the soul to experience pleasure and pain through the senses (Vedaniya). Besides these, observation also proves the existence of another kind of force which does not permit the adoption of the Right Faith. The energies falling under this head are divisible into two classes: those which interfere with the very acquisition of faith, and those that offer opposition to its being put into practice. To the former class belong such forces as prejudice, bigotry, false belief and all those other kinds of mental energy, passions and emotions of the worst (anantānubandhi) type, whose uncontrolled and uncontrollable impetuosity deprives one of the full and proper exercise of the faculty of reflection, the most essential requisite for the discernment of truth; in the latter type, fall all those deep-rooted traits of mind, anger, pride, deceit and greed of different degrees of intensity other than the anantānubandhi already referred to which rob the mind of determination and serenity,
1. The Householder's Dharma by C.R. Jain, pages XXXVI-XL.

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and prevent concentration of attention, also certain minor faults, such as joking, attachment and the like, and bodily habits and propensities (e.g., laziness) which are prejudicial to an attitude of self-control. Thus the fourth kind of force consists of two distinct types, namely (1) Darsanāvaraṇīya which does not allow one to adopt the right faith, and (2) Chāritra-mohaniya which acts as an obstacle on the practical side of Dharma (religion).
“Apart from the above, we must allot separate places to the force which determines the duration of the association of the soul with its physical body (Ayuḥ-karma) and to the energies responsible for the making of that body and its limits (Nāma-karma). The status, descent, lineage and the like of the soul, which really depends on the 'womb' into which it is attracted by the operation of the forces of chemical affinity and magnetism residing in its two inner bodies, the Kārmaņa and the Taijasa, is also the outcome of a distinct type of energy, which is for that reason, to be treated as a class by itself (Gotrakarma). Lastly, we also notice that souls differ from one another in respect of physical prowess and the power to do or achieve what is desirable and desired. There are several kinds of energies which limit the power and effectiveness of the soul, and they constitute the type known as the Antarāya karma. These are the eight main kinds of forces operating on the soul in its unemancipated state.”1
“The only enemy of the soul is the force of its own karmas (actions) which it can destroy, by becoming fully self-conscious. On the destruction of its bonds, the soul becomes deified, and cannot be overcome afresh by karmas or any other force; for it is only liable to be affected by its own desires which are destroyed for good at the moment when omniscience is attained.”
1. The Householders Dharma by C.R. Jain, Introduction, page XXXVII,
Note. 2. The Householders Dharma by C.R. Jain, Introduction, page XXXI.

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“Every soul is potentially omniscient, in the fullest sense of the term. Consciousness being the very nature of the soul, and all things being knowable by nature, perfection in knowledge must be predicated in respect of the essential nature of each and every individual. Ready assent will be lent to this proposition by any one who will recognise the fact that all things in nature are knowable, which means, not that there is nothing unknown to us today, but that which will never be known by any one at all is non-existent; for that which will never be known to any one will never be known, much less proved to be existing, and without strict proof, existence cannot be conceded in favour of anything whatsoever. It is not even permissible to hold that the ‘unknowble' might mean an agglomeration of a certain indefinite number of attributes some of which may never be known, for we shall never have any reason whatsoever for alleging the existence of any of those unknowable attributes beyond a wilful refusal to be reasonable. Thus there is no escape from the position that all things are knowable.
“Now since the natural properties of a substance are to be found in all its units or individuals, it is obvious that what is known to one individual is capable of being known by all others. It follows from this that if there be an infinity of ideas, each of which is known to only one individual at a time, the consciousness of each and every soul is potentially able to know the whole infinity of them. Hence, each and every soul is potentially omniscient, that is to say, the consciousness of every living being is endowed with the capacity to know all things, unlimited by time or space. There is nothing to be surprised at in this conclusion, since knowledge merely means a state of conciousness, which being an affection or modification of the substance of its being, is felt by the soul. This amounts to saying that the soul is made of pure intelligence, in different language the jiva is a pure embodiment of knowledge.
“The soul is also endowed with faculties of

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clairvoyance, telepathy and the like, of which the ordinary humanity is almost wholly ignorant in our day. The researches of reliable bodies of men, such as the Psychical Research Society, as well of private individuals of undoubted veracity, prove the fact that the soul possesses a faculty of perception which is altogether independent of senses. The ancients who made a regular study of the subject and whose powers of observation were far in excess of our own, also bear powerful witness to the existence of this hidden source of perception.
The super-sensuous faculty of perception otherwise known as inner illumination enjoyed by advanced ascetics and saints, is a direct manifestation of this power, which is inhibited by the impetuosity of will running wild in pursuit of sense-gratification. A careful study of the lives of saintly personages yields the important truth that this faculty is also unlimited like the faculty of knowing of which it is an inseparable associate by nature, since knowledge and perception are dependant on one another to a considerable extent. We may, therefore say that the soul's faculty of perception is also infinite potentially.”
Kumārila Bhatta in his exposition of the Pūrva-mimāṁsā philosophy (Sloka-vārtika, verses from 141) has refuted the existence of an omniscient being. According to the Pūrvamīmāṁsā view expounded by Kumārila “Vedic injunctions are of the highest authority; the performance of the sacrifice is the highest duty which when performed gives rise to some unprecedented cosmic potency (apūrva), a potential afterstate of acts, which brings about all the fruits for the performer of the sacrifice. These tenets cannot allow any one to claim omniscience for the simple reason that if any one were to be omniscient outside the Vedic fold, his words would be looked upon as infallible and the Vedic authority would be questioned. Kumārila says that the human being might see only the general aspect of things, and hence it is not possible to believe that a man can
1. The Householders Dharma by C.R. Jain, Introduction, page XIX - XXI.

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see all things in all places and of all times. The omniscient will have to be a dirty being, because, being necessitated by the function of seeing, he will have to come into contact with so many dirty things. There is a limit to visionary and knowing ability, and it cannot be stretched beyond that; so none can be able to see things which are super-sensuous. None of the five proofs can justify any one's omniscience. The so-called omniscients do not agree among themselves; their words are against Vedas, whose authority is unquestionable; and no omniscient is ever come across by anybody: so omniscience is an impossibility. The all-knowledge attributed to Brahman means only self-knowldege."
This attack of Kumārila has twofold handicaps: first, his hands are tied down by the above tenets of his school and, secondly, he has not distinguished sense-perception from omniscience he attacks omniscience as if it is senseperception intensified and magnified. Kundakunda has plainly told us that "senses have no part to play in omniscience; it is the spirit, being a knower by nature and essentially constituted of knowledge that comes face to face with the complex reality, and comprehends it immediately and simultaneously in its entirety with no effort on his part and with no effect on his spiritul constitution."1
This verse of Āpta-mīmāṁsā is perhaps the first in Jaina literature where an attempt to establish omniscience by reasoning is made. Kevala-jñāna, which is the same as omniscience, was mentioned by Kundakunda, who was earlier than Samantabhadra, but he had taken it, as will appear from the commentary on the following verse of Apta-mīmāmsā as an essential characteristic of the Holy One. He did not make any attempt to justify the existence of quality or refute any argument against it. The Niryuktis make some reference to this subject, but the voluminous literature which subsequently grew up refuting and
1. Pravachana-sāra edited by A.N. Upadhye, Introduction, page LXXVIII. For a detailed comparative discussion, the reader may consult pages LXXII--LXXX.

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ĀPTA-MĪMĀŃSĀ conuter-refuting omniscience is later than the day of Samantabhadra. Siddhasena took up this subject in the second canto of Sanmati-prakarana and Abhayadevasūri in his commentery to this work, has discussed the matter in detail. Pātrakesari in his Pañchanamaskāra-stotra has defined kevala-jñāna.
Akalanka in his Asta-sati (commentary on Aptamimāṁsā) elaborated the point. Kumārila attacked the view of omniscience accepted by the Buddhists and Jains in Slokavārtika as already mentioned. The Buddhist writer śāntarakṣita in Tattva-sangraha (and Kamalaśila in his commentary to this work) refuted Kumārila's arguments and Vidyānandi in Asta-sahasri (commentary on Aptamīmāṁsā) has refuted Kumārila and śāntarakṣita. Special works establishing omniscience were written by Anantakirti known as Brhatsarvajña-siddhi and Laghusarvajña-siddhi.
सूक्ष्मान्तरित-दूरार्थाः प्रत्यक्षाः कस्यचिद् यथा। अनुमेयत्वतोऽग्न्यादिरिति सर्वज्ञसंस्थितिः ॥5॥ sūkṣmāntarita-dūrārthāḥ pratyakşāḥ kasyachid
yathā, anumeyatvato'gnyadiriti sarvajña-samsthitiḥ.
5. The existence of the ominiscient (is established) as objects which are minute, covered or distant are directly knowable by some persons and as fire etc. are known from inference.
COMMENTARY To every person all objects are not capable, at all times, of direct perception. An object may be very minute. Its existence might not be seen by the eye. But its presence can be established by inference. For example, in chemical experiments, if a particular colour results from adding a substance, we infer that a certain substance is the cause

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of the same. Atoms etc. are established not by sight of the eye. Again, objects might be far off from us and accordingly beyond sense perception. Mountains or oceans far away are mentioned by Vasunandi as illustrations of this. Further, a thing might be hidden by some covering and for this reason it might be beyond the direct perception of our senses. But still, these are capable of being known by persons.
It cannot be urged that a person within a room covered from our sight by walls, is non-existent. It cannot be said that the moon and the stars are nonexistent during the daytime because we do not see these. It is ludicrous to mention that persons living in the past whom we do not now see were non-existent. We cannot say that things in distant countries do not exist. We can know from books or reliable persons the existence of persons or things in the past or in distant countries.
Again, in inference, we establish the existence of fire by seeing smoke from distance. Here, though fire is not the object of our direct perception, there is no doubt about its existence.
As things can thus be known without direct perception, it is not absurd that an omniscient should be able to have perception of all things existing at all times. Kundakundāchārya says, “For him who is evolving into knowledge the modifications of all substances are perceptible; he does not know them by means of effects such as avagraha."
Amộtachandra Sūri explains this as follows: “Since the perfect sage does not obtain knowledge by the aid of the senses, through the precedent series of Avagraha (the taking of the object of knowledge by the senses), īhā (the readiness to know more of the things perceived) and Avāya (finding out the perfection or otherwise of a thing), and since he himself, at the moment of the annihilation of all obscurations (āvaraņas), accepted the 1. Pravachana-sāra, Śruta-skandha, L.21, Cambridge University Press,
p. 13.

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function of a cause (Kāraṇa), the innate nature of knowledge which has no beginning, no end, no cause (hetu) and has nothing in common with anything else, evolves, becoming the psychic exertion of arising absoluteknowledge, which immediately follows the annihilation of avaraṇas. Therefore, the modifications of all the substances are perceptible for him, since they conjointly become a basis for his consciousness inasmuch as all substances, times, places, and forms of being (bhāva) are appropriated by him simultaneously.1
44
"Nothing whatever is imperceptible to the Holy One at the very moment of the destruction of all obscurations; for he has surpassed the senses, each of which takes up its respective objects and causes the setting to work the forces necessary for the arising of mundane distinctions (parichhitti); he is rich at all points (since they have for him the same savour), in all qualities of the senses, in the form of the distinctions (parichhidā) in touch, taste, smell, colour and sound; he himself illuminates the self and the other by his completeness; he has become miraculous (lokottara) knowledge without restraint; so nothing is imperceptible to him, owing to the simultaneous grasping of all substances, places, times and forms of being."2
Kundakunda says: "The Holy Absolute Knower does not seize or release; does not evolve into anything else; but without exception he sees and knows everything all round."3 Amṛtachandra explains this as follows. "This self, according to its innate nature, of no seizing, no releasing, no evolution into anything else, evolves owing to its characteristic nature of absolute (Kevala) knowledge, which is its own principle (tattva). And thus, standing forth like a genuine jewel of motionless and radiant light, it possesses an everywhere glittering efficacy of vision
1. Pravachana-sāra, I.21, Cambridge University Press, p. 13. 2. Ibid, p. 14.
3. Ibid, p. 19.

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and knowledge; so then it becomes by itself, in itself, aware of the self in its entirety without remainder. Or to explain otherwise, by a simultaneous, intuitive perception (sākṣāt-karaṇa) of the multitude of all things, wavering of notion is excluded, and there is cessation of all supposed acts such as grasping and releasing. In this way, the Self (as Absolute-knower) by first evolving into all distinguishable appearances and then again not evolving into any appearance, sees and knows everything without exception everywhere whilst remaining in isolation."1
In Sankhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, an attempt has similarly been made to establish that because things are not perceptible ordinarily by senses, their existence cannot be denied, for their existence can be known by inference and even if these be not known by inference, their existence is established by scriptures of an Apta.
“ सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रतीतिरनुमानात् ।
amft anfug qamrarına fagy 11” Sānkhya-kārikā, verse 6.
In the next verse, it is also mentioned that there connot be direction of things which are at a great distance or very near (such as collyrium applied to eyes which cannot see it), or where there is a defect in vision or hearing as in the case of a blind or deaf person, or where attention is fixed to another object, e.g., a man attentively reading a book may not see a man passing by, or where the thing is very small like atom, or where there is something intervening or obstructing the perception, or where something obscures another as the sun obscuring the moon or the stars during daytime, or where similar things, e.g. waters of river and ocean get mixed up where they meet. We cannot say in such cases that these do not exist.
“अतिदूरात् सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।
cafraid antara 1" Sānkhya-kārikā, verse 7. 1. Pravachana-sara, 1.21, Cambridge University Press, p. 19.

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स त्वमेवासि निर्दोषो युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधिवाक् । अविरोधो यदिष्टं ते प्रसिद्धेन न बाध्यते ॥6॥ sa tvamevāsi nirdoso yukti-śāstrāvirodhivāk, avirodho yadiştaṁ te prasiddhena na bādhyate.
6. Only you, whose words are unopposed to logic and scriptures are free from all faults because what is your desire is not opposed to proof.
COMMENTARY In Asta-sahasri it is mentioned that Samantabhadra in one of his verses in Brhat-svayambhū-stotra, while praising Sambhava Jina, has mentioned:
“त्वं संभवः संभवतर्षरोगैः संतप्यमानस्य जनस्य लोके। आसीरिहाकस्मिक एव वैद्यो वैद्यो यथा नाथ रुजां प्रशान्त्यै ॥” Verse 11.
i.e. “You, O Sambhava, in this world you have suddenly appeared like a physician ministering to the cure of diseases, as a healer of people suffering from the thirst of worldly desires."
This verse of Āpta-mīmāṁsā is accordingly explained by Vidyānandi with analogy to the above praise.
It is mentioned by Vidyānandi that as a physician in mitigating a disease becomes faultless when he applies reasoning as well as medical science, so one who follows reasoning and scriptures in laying down liberation and its causes, is free from blemishes. The faults such as ignorance, attachment, aversion etc. are never present in a perfect soul.2 Vasunandi says that here absence of Avidyā arising from attachment or freedom from hunger, 1. “कथमत्र कारिकायामनुपात्तो भिषग्वरो दृष्टान्तः कथ्यतं इति चेत् स्वयं
ग्रन्थकारेणान्यत्राभिधानात्।” Asta-sahasri. 2. “दोषास्तावदज्ञानरागद्वेषादयः ....प्रमाणबलात् सिद्धः सर्वज्ञो वीतरागश्च सामान्यतो यः स त्वमेवार्हन् युक्तिशास्त्रविरोधिवाक्त्वात्। यो यत्र युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधिवाक् स तत्र निर्दोषो दृष्टो, यथा क्वचिद् व्याध्युपशमे भिषग्वरः। युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधिवाक् च भगवान् मुक्तिसंसारतत्कारणेषु, तस्मानिर्दोष इति निश्चयः।" Asta-sahasri, I. 6.

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thirst is mentioned by the word "fault-less."l It is urged that the omniscient Lord is free from faults and his words, following reasoring and the scriptures, are not opposed to the celebrated Anekānta view (or in another sense being not opposed to any pramāņa or proof). In other words, as a physician can prove that he is faultless by using reasoning and quoting works on medical science, so the words of a perfect soul are free from faults as these follow reasoning (which is not opposed to any pramāna) and are in perfect agreement with the scriptures.2 . --
Vasunandi raises a question, how can a perfect soul have a desire. He replies that this is merely suggested by implication. Really a perfect soul has no desire. In Ratnakaranda-śrāvakāchāra (1.8) Samantabhadra has mentioned that an Āpta who gives instructions, does good to the people, without being actuated by gain, fame, worship etc. A drum giving out sound at the touch of a beater does not want anything for itself:
"अनात्मार्थं विना रागैः शास्ता शास्ति सतो हितम्। ध्वनन् शिल्पिकरस्पर्शान् मुरजः किमपेक्षते ॥"
त्वन्मतामृतबाह्यानां सर्वथैकान्तवादिनाम् ॥
आप्ताभिमानदग्धानां स्वेष्टं दृष्टेन बाध्यते ॥7॥ tvanmatāmịta-bāhyānām sarvathaikāntavādinām, āptābhimāna-dagdhānāṁ sveștam dịştena bādhyate.
7. The views of those who are opposed to your 1. Samantabhadra in his Ratnakaranda-śrāvakāchāra (1.6) has mentioned:
"An Apta is one who is free from hunger, thirst, senility, disease, birth, death, pain, pride, attachment, aversion and infatuation." "क्षुत्पिपासाजरातङ्क-जन्मान्तकभयस्मयाः।
न रागद्वेषमोहाश्च यस्याप्तः स प्रकीर्त्यते ॥" 2. “यत्र यस्याभिमतं तत्त्वं प्रमाणेन न बाध्यते स तत्र युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधिवाक्। यथा
रोगस्वास्थ्यतत्कारणतत्त्वे भिषग्वरः । न बाध्यते च प्रमाणेन भगवतोऽभिमतं मोक्षसंसारतत्कारणतत्त्वम् । तस्मात् तत्र त्वं युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधिवाक् । इति विषयस्य युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधित्व- सिद्धेर्विषयिण्या भगवद्वाचो युक्तिशास्त्राविरोधित्वसाधनम् ।" Astasahasri. .. ..

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view, sweet as nectar, and who always profess only one aspect (of everything) are opposed to pratyakṣa pramāņa (or impliedly by objects having many-sided aspects).
48
COMMENTARY
or
The author says that religious teachers philosophers who do not follow the Anekantavāda (the theory of manysided aspects of a thing) of the Jains take false pride that only they are reliable persons. But really their views are opposed to reasoning and can be refuted by Anekāntavāda. The Anekānta view has been compared to nectar as it leads to happiness dstroying all misery and leads to liberation. Those who do not follow the Anekānta view are refuted by the Jaina view. In the previous verse it has been mentioned, "Your views are free from faults, being supported by logical reasoning following the established methods of proof." In this verse, it is said that the views of others who do not follow your view, are opposed to reasoning.
In this verse, the views like the Śūnyavāda of the Buddhists, Advaitavada of the Vedāntists etc. are said to be opposed to reasoning and the Syadvāda or Anekāntavāda of the Jainas is mentioned as the correct view.
The subject of Syāvāda or Anekāntavāda or Saptabhangi is the most important in Jaina philosophy. A short description of this is given below :
"A single substance is endowed with infinite modifications and there are infinite classes of substances... A substance is endowed with qualities and modifications; though the substance is the same, it comes to be different because of its passing through different modifications; so when something is to be stated about a substance, viewed through a flux of modifications, there would be seven modes of predication; according to some modification or other, it is stated that a substance (1) is, (2) is not, (3) is indescribable, (4) is

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and is not, (5) is and is indescribable, (6) is not and is indescribable, and (7) is, is not and is indescribable.”l
The seven forms are accordingly: (1) syād asti (it is); (2) syād nāsti (it is not); (3) syād avaktavya (it is indescribable); (4) syād asti nāsti (it is and it is not); (5) syād asti avaktavya (it is and is indescribable); (6) syād nāsti avaktavya (it is not and is indescribable); (7) syād asti nāsti avaktavya (it is, it is not and is indescribable).
"The word 'syād' may be paraphrased: the proposition holds true, provided you take it in the right sense, in the correct proportion, with other notions."2
Sapta-bhanga means seven turns or seven varied forms of idea of expression.3
In this sevenfold way a substance is described "(1) as being, with reference to itself, (2) as not being, with reference to another, (3) as indescribable, simultaneously with reference to itself and another, (4) as successively being and not being, with reference to itself and another, (5) as being and indescribable, with regard to reference to itself, and simultaneity with reference to itself and reference to another, (6) as not being and indescribable, with regard to reference to another, and simultaneity with reference to itself and another (7) as being, not being, and being indescribable with regard to reference to itself, reference to another and simultaneity with reference to itself and reference to another.”
“With reference to each single property of substance, with its unlimited number of properties, this seven-fold formula of restriction, interposing with its partly meant and partly not-meant affirmation (vidhi) and negation (pratişedha)... the invariably ennunciated word 'syāt' dispels the entire infatuation of contrariety."4
“The Jaina siddhānta insists on the employment of the word syāt before every judgment or statement of fact, 1. Pravachanasāra, Introduction by A.N. Upadhye, p. LXXXIII. 2. Pravachanasara, Cambridge University Press, page 91. 3. Ibid, page 92. 4. Ibid.

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though in ordinary parlance and composition, it is generally dispensed with. There are three kinds of judgment—the affirmative, the negative and the one which gives expression to the idea of indescribableness. Of these, the first kind affirms and the second denies the existence of a quality, property or thing, but the third declares an object to be indescribable. A thing is said to be indescibable when both existence and non-existence are to be attributed to it at one and the same time. These three forms of judgment give rise to seven possible modes of predication."1
“There are seven modes of expressing the is-ness or isnot-ness of thing; and these modes are all inter-related, and each presupposes the others, each implies the others. In accepting all these seven modes and so speaking correctly we do not mislead the person spoken to.... To speak correctly under this doctrine, the statement is commenced with an adverk 'syāt to indicate that there are six other implied ways of speaking about the subject. For instance, the negative statement (that we are not dust, for example) is tacit when making a positive statement (that we are immortal souls, for example). And in addition to this one kind there are five more kinds of tacit expressions implied by the one positive statement. The innumerable qualities of a thing cannot all be predicated in one statement, but they are all implied by any statement which predicates all of the qualities of a thing.”2
“Synthesis is the putting together of aspects in thought to realise that the truth consists in the irresolvable combination of all the possible aspects; and to speak the truth correctly all the seven modes of expression must be accepted. The subject is now how we should express ourselves when we make a statement about a thing. It is an important subject and the doctrine is found only in the Jaina philosophy. It is the doctrine of the non-violation of the parts, elements, properties or aspects 1. The Practical Path, C.R. Jain, p. 12 2. Jainism, H. Warren, pages 20-21.

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of things; it is the themes ofakmentitled speaking of a thing synthetically."1.
"The object of knowledge is a huge complexity constituted of substances, qualities and modifications extended over three times and infinite space, and simultaneously subjected to origination, destruction and permanence. Such an object of knowledge can be comprehended only in omniscience.2 The senses are the indirect means of knowledge, and whatever they apprehend is partial .... The ordinary human being cannot rise above the limitations of his senses; so his apprehension of reality is partial and it is valid only from a particular view-point... When ordinary human knowledge is partial, a new method of stating our approach to the complex reality had to be devised, and that is Syādvāda, the doctrine of conditional predications. Thus the doctrine is a direct result of the strong awareness of the complexity of the object of knowledge and of the limitations of human apprehension and expression. The substance is subjected to a constant flux of modifications and we always look at it through one modification or the other, present or absent. When we are looking at its present modification, we should not absolutely deny the past or future ones; this peculiar position leads us to a conditional affirmation, conditional negation and conditional indescribability which by their combination give rise to seven possible statements.”3
In the doctrine of Asti-năsti, there is a similarity between Jaina Syādvāda and Hegels view that “affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity 'is' and ‘is not which are really identical and same for they are the aspects of the same reality.” The whole of Hegelian
1. Jainism, H. Warren, p. 20. 2. The existence of an omniscient being has been established by
Samantabhadra in verse 5 of Apta-mīmāṁsā. As regards ordinary human beings, the excellence of Anekānta view as opposed to other
views which are mentioned as unreliable, is laid down in this verse. 3. Pravachana-sāra, A.N. Upadhye, p. LXXXIV.

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metaphysics however is not accepted by the Jainas. "Unlike Bradley, the greatest living representative of Hegelian absolutism, the Jainas emphasize this important aspect of reality. The reason which is employed by Bradley to condemn a thing to be appearance, is the very reason which serves the Jaina thinkers to proclaim the reality of the same."
The Saptabhangi will be taken up in ditail in verses 14-16 of this work, where further elucidation of the subject will be made.
कुशलाकुशलं कर्म परलोकश्च न क्वचित् । एकान्तग्रहरक्तेषु नाथ स्वपरवैरिषु ॥8॥
kuśalākuśalam karma paralokaścha na kvachit, ekānta-graha-rakteṣu nātha sva-para-vairiṣu.
8. O Lord! to those who accept only one-sided doctrine and whose doctrine is opposed to what they themselves accept and what are accepted by others, beneficial or its opposite actions and the other world etc., cannot (exist).
COMMENTARY
According to Jainism, yoga is a faculty of the soul which attracts matter according to the influence of karmas. This yoga is set in by the activity of body, speach or mind. The name "āsrava" is given to this yoga.3 The āsrava is of two kinds, subha or good which is the inlet of virtue or meritorious karmas and aśubha or bad which is the inlet of vice or demeritorious karmas. In this verse by kusala and akusala, these two varieties of Āsrava, viz. subha and aśubha, are denoted. 'Paraloka' is the attainment of another state after death. By implication that which
1. Sacred Books of the Jainas, vol. III, page LXXX.
2. ": " Tattvärthādhigama-sūtra, VI. 1.
3. “स आस्रवः ।” Ibid, VI. 2.
4. “ शुभः पुण्यस्याशुभः पापस्य । ” Ibid, VI. 3.

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causes a particular state after death, viz., meritorious or demeritorious karmas are also indicated by this word'. By the word 'and', liberation etc. are implied.? All these are not possible if we accept the view of those who lay down everything to be transient (like the Kṣaṇika-vāda of the Buddhists). For how can a future state of happiness or misery arising from meritorious on demeritorious karmas exist, if everything is transient. So the views of Sūnyavādins (Buddhists), Advaitavādins (Vedantists) who lay down everything as illusion (Māyā) etc. become opposed to what they themselves accept. Naturally, these views are also opposed to those of the Jainas. In this verse, it is laid down that who maintain only one-sided doctrine cannot be taken as Āpta as their accepted principles such as karmas, beneficial or harmful or a future state of existence, become opposed to their own doctrines.
भावैकान्ते पदार्थानामभावानामपहवात्। सर्वात्मकमनाद्यन्तमस्वरूपमतावकम् ॥9॥ bhāvaikānte padārthānām abhāvānāmapahņavāt, sarvātmakam anādyantam asvarūpam atāvakaṁ.
9. If it be accepted that objects are eternal, it would be opposed to your doctrine and these will become pervading in everything, without beginning or without end and opposed to its own nature.
COMMENTARY There are two views, viz., all objects are eternal or that all objects are not eternal. The Jaina view is that 1. dywna: palai, atgaf rutseroga, freut frutiarra.” Aștasahasri. 2. “9-97:stafa Rue: ” Ibid. 3. “एतत् सर्वम् एकान्तग्रहरक्तेषु अनित्यैकान्ताद्यभिनिवेश-पर-वशीकृतेषु मध्ये न
Hafa, dei Faac I” Ibid. 4. "पुण्यं पापं च कर्म तत्फलं कुशलमकुशलं च स्वं, तत्सम्बन्धः परलोकादिश्च तस्य
Fal44 h itelferici" Ibid.

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“the object of knowledge (artha) is made up of substances that are characterised by qualities, and with which, moreover, are associated the modifications. (1) Origination and destruction simultaneously take place in qualities and modes, when their substratum, namely the substance, permanently retains, its existential character.? (2) There are two classes of substances: sentient comprising jīvas alone, and insentient (ajīva) comprsing matter (pudgala), the fulcrum of motion (dharma), the fulcrum of rest (adharma), space (ākāśa) and time (kāla). To give their characterstics: jīva, or the soul or spirit, is constituted of sentiency and manifestation of consciousness; pudgala or matter is insentient and endowed with colour, taste, smell and touch to its last subtle condition; dharma is the condition of movement; adharma is the condition of rest; ākāśa or space gives room; and kāla or time marks the continuity. Excepting pudgala all are non-concrete or formless (amūrta), i.e., devoid of sense-qualities and not amenable to sense-perception."3
“Jainism does not accept creation in the Nyāyavaiseșika sense or emanation, whether actual or apparent in the Vedāntic sense. With it the world is existential and real. Since it is not created by any one on the analogy of a carpenter or a smith, the cosmic constituents enumerated by Jainism are such that they are capable of explaining the diverse phenomena by their mutual interaction. The ontological start is that of realistic dualism on even pluralism. The world of existence is constituted of two substances, life and non-life, which are not philosophical postulates but reals as spirit and matter which are pluralistic, constitutionally eternal, and not liable to lose or to interchange their nature.4
Abhāva or non-existence has been accepted as a Padārtha in Vaiseșika philosophy. It has been accepted
1. Pravachana-sära. II. 1. 2. Ibid, II. 5, 7, 37. 3. Pravachana-sāra, A.N. Upadhye, p. LXII. 4. Ibid, p. LXIII.

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as a kind of proof in manuals of Vedānta literature and in Nyāya philosophy. This abhāva is of four kinds: (1) prāgabhāva, (2) pradhvassābhāva, (3) atyantābhāva and (4) anyonyābhāva. In Vedānta-paribhāṣā we find, “Nonexistence is of four kinds: (1) antecedent, (2) emergent, (3) absolute and (4) reciprocal. Antecedent is the nonexistence in the cause (e.g., the lump of clay) of the effect (e.g., jar) previous to its production. It is expressed in the knowledge 'a thing will be’. Emergent is the nonexistence of the jar, consequent as its destruction by a pestle. Of this non-existence also there is an end in the destruction of the parts, which compose the jar... Absolute is the non-existence of something in a substrate through trivial time. Thus there is an absolute non-existence of colour in air... Reciprocal non-existence is expressed in the consciousness 'this is not that'. ... This reciprocal non-existence is of two kinds, so far as it is dependent on a limiting condition or independent of such. The former kind is that whose existence is pervaded by the existence of a limiting condition. (Thus, wherever there is differentiation of ākāśa there is existence of a limiting condition, e.g. a jar.) The latter kind is that which is destitute of such an existence. Thus the differentiation of ākāśa, in its own nature undifferenced, through the differences of its limiting conditions, e.g. jars and the like, is an example of the former kind. Or, of the sun through the water-vessels (which are its limiting conditions when the sun is reflected in their water); and so, too is the differentiation of Brahma, in its own nature undifferenced by means of the differences in the internal organs (which are its limiting conditions). The nonexistence (difference) of a piece of canvas in a jar is an example of the second kind.”l
1. Vedānta-paribhāsā, A.Venis, Chapter VI. See also Vedāntaparibhāṣā,
edited and translated by S.C. Ghoshal, pages 152-179. The original text, of which a translation is given above, is: “स च अभावश्चतुर्विधः। प्रागभावः, प्रध्वंसाभावः, अत्यन्ताभावः, अन्योन्याभावश्चेति। मृत्पिण्डादौ कारणे कार्यस्य घटादेरुत्पत्तेः पूर्वं योऽभावः स प्रागभावः, स च भविष्यतीति

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The Nyāya view is also the same. For example, in Tarka-sangraha of Annam Bhaṭṭa we find "Antecedent non-existence is without beginning and has no end. Such is the non-existence of an effect previously to its production. Destruction has a beginning, and has no end. (Such is the non-existence) of an effect subsequently to its production. Absolute non-existence is that of which the counter-entity is considered independently of the three times (past, present and future ). For example (such is the non-existence in the instance where it is remarked that): there is not a jar on the ground. Mutual nonexistence is that of which the counter-entity is considered with reference to the relation of identity. For example (such difference is referred to when it is remarked that): a jar is not a web of cloth.””
56
Laugākṣi Bhaskara in his Tarka-kaumudi has mentioned that abhāva is of two kinds, (a) anyonyābhāva and (b) samsargābhāva. The second, samsargābhāva, has three varieties, viz., (i) prāgabhāva, (ii) pradhvaṁsābhāva and (iii) atyantābhāva. All these four varieties are the same as described before.2
प्रतीति-विषयः । तत्रैव घटस्य मुद्गर- प्रहारानन्तरं योऽभावः स प्रध्वंसः । ध्वंसस्यापि स्वाधिकरणकपालनाशे नाश एव । ... यत्राधिकरणे यस्य कालत्रयेऽपि अभावः सोऽत्यन्ताभावः । यथा वाय रूपस्यात्यन्ताभावः । .' इदमिदं न' इति प्रतीतिविषयोऽन्योन्याभावः । पुनरपि भेदो द्विविधः, सोपाधिको निरुपाधिकश्चेति । तत्र उपाधिसत्ताव्याप्यसत्ताकत्वं सोपाधिकत्वं तत्शून्यत्वं निरुपाधिक्यत्वम् । तत्र आयो यथा एकस्यैव आकाशस्य घटाद्युपाधिभेदेन भेदः। यथा वा एकस्य सूर्यस्य जलभाजनभेदेन भेदः । तथा च एकस्यैव ब्रह्मणोऽन्तःकरणभेदात् भेदः । निरुपाधिकभेदो यथा घटे पटभेदः । ”
1. “अनादिः सान्तः प्रागभावः । उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं कार्यस्य । सादिरनन्तः प्रध्वंसः । उत्पत्त्यनन्तरं कार्यस्य । त्रैकालिकसंसर्गावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकोऽत्यन्ताभावः । यथा भूतले धटो नास्तीति । तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिकोऽन्योन्याभावः । यथा घटः पटो न भवति । " Tarka
sangraha.
2. “तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकोऽभावोऽन्योन्याभावः । स च घटः पटो नेत्यादिप्रत्ययप्रसिद्धः । अन्योन्याभावभिन्नोऽभावः संसर्गाभावः । स त्रिविधः । प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावाऽत्यन्ताभावश्चेति । उत्पत्तेः प्राक् समवायिकारणे कार्यस्य संसर्गाभावः प्रागभावः । स चेह कपाले घटो भविष्यतीति प्रत्ययप्रसिद्धः । उत्पत्तेरनन्तरं समवायिकारणे कार्यस्य

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Gautama in Nyāya-sūtra (II. 2, 8) and Kaņāda in Vaiseșika-sūtra (IX. 1) have accepted abhāva as a separate padārtha from bhāva.
Haribhadra Sūri in his Saddarśana-samuchchaya has written that the view of Jaimini, the propounder of Pūrvamimāṁsā philosophy is that abhāva is a pramāṇa to establish the existence of a thing where the five other pramāṇas fail to establish it. The five other pramāņas are pratyakşa, anumāna, upamāna, sabda and arthāpatti.
The Sānkhya philosophy does not accept that abhāva is a separate padārtha. The Sāňkhya "believes in real matter and an infinite plurality of individual souls which are not emanations of a single world-soul. The Sānkhya adopts the view that the cause and the effect are the undeveloped and developed states of one and the same substance. Development is the coming to light of what is latent or hidden even as destruction is disappearance into the original cause. There is no such thing as utter annihilation. Applying this principle, the ultimate basis of the empirical universe is said to be Prakrti (nature). The world is the transformation of Prakrti (nature) which cannot be equated with any one of the stages of its evolution....
The first product of the evolution of Prakrti (nature) is mahat, the great, or Buddhi (intelligence). Self-sense (Aharkāra) on the principle of individuation, arises next. From this, in its sattva aspect, arises the manas (internal organ), the five organs of perception and the five of action. From the same in the tamas aspect, the five fine elements (tanmātrās) arise. The rajas element helps both.
संसर्गाभावः प्रध्वंसः। स चेह कपाले घटो ध्वस्त इति प्रत्ययप्रसिद्धः। त्रैकालिकः संसर्गाभावोऽत्यन्तभावः । स चेह भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यादिप्रत्ययसिद्धः। एवमन्येषामकान्तर्भावः ।
यथान्धकारस्यालोकाभावे यत्रालोको-नास्ति तत्रैवान्धकारव्यवहारात्।” Tarka-kaumudi. 1. "447994 500 Ft degea 7 oridi
TUTTGCTETTE ETYATTATI!” Saddarśana-samuchchaya, 76.

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ĀPTA-MĪMĀMSĀ From the five fine elements, by a preponderance of tamas, the five gross elements are produced.”
“Purusa is the intelligent self, for whose experience Prakrti (nature) evolves. It is a mere witness, a solitary indifferent spectator. It is pure consciousness while Prakrti (nature) is unconscious. It is inactive, unalterably constant and devoid of the guņas while Prakrti is active, alterably constant and consists of them. Praksti and its products depend for their manifestation on the light of Purusa (self) which does not depend on anything else for illuminating objects. The Sānkhya believes in a plurality of selves. If the self were one, all should become few when one attained freedom which is not the case. Freedom is not coalescence with the absolute spirit but isolation from Prakrti.”2
Samantabhadra in this verse criticises the views of those who, like the followers of Sārkhya philosophy, believe in the perpetual existence of objects. In Aştasahasri, it is explained that if we accept the padārthas, e.g., twentyfive tattvas of the Sānkhya philosophy, the result will be a denial of all the four kinds of abhāva (as already described). Denial of each kind of abhāva will lead to a different kind of fault and by a denial of four kinds of abhāva, four kinds of fault will. arise. This is shown below.
If prāgabhāva is not accepted, the view of the Sārkhya 1. Indian Philosophy, S. Radhakrishnan. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th
edition, Vol. XII, p. 251. The Sārkhyas believe in the existence of the twentyfive tattvas. Puruşa, Prakrti, Mahat, Ahankāra, mind, the five tanmātrās (rūpa, rasa, gandha, sparsa and sabda), the five bhūtas (kṣiti, ap, tejas, marut and vyoma), the five organs of perception (chakşus, karna, nāsikā, jihvā and tvak) and the five organs of action (vāk, pāda, pāņi, pāyu and upastha). “मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त।
415270 Pachet 7 ufaf fagota: 269: Il" Sārkhya-kārikā, 3. 2. Indian Philosophy, S. Radhakrishnan. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th
edition, Vol. XII, p. 251. 3. “पदार्थाः प्रकृत्यादीनि पंचविंशतितत्त्वानि... तेषामस्तित्वमेवेति निश्चयो भावैकान्तः ।
तस्मिन्नभ्युपगम्यमाने सर्वेषामितरेतराभावादीनामभावानामपहवः स्यात। ततः सर्वात्मकत्वादिWHF: I" Astasahasri.

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philosophy, viz., Mahat arises from Prakrti, then aharkāra and from it the sixteen varieties (mind, the five organs of sense, the five organs of action and the five tanmātrās) and from the five tanmātrās the five elements appear, cannot stand and all these become without any beginning. (because we deny their prāgabhāva or previous nonexistence).
If pradhvaṁsābhāva is not accepted all these tattvas, which the Sānkhya says arise from Prakrti, will become eternal. But the Sārkhya has laid down that the five elements, earth etc., merge in the five tanmātrās which again with five organs of sense and five organs of action as well as mind merge in aharkāra. Ahankāra merges in mahat which merges in Prakrti. This merging will become impossible on denial of pradhvaṁsābhāva described before.3
If anyonyābhāva be denied, the twentythree principles leaving aside, Purusa and Prakrti will not exclude one aother, but each will involve the other and thus will become all-pervading. But definitions have been given in Sānkhya philosophy distinguishing these twentythree principles which are called vyakta from Prakrti which is called avyakta.4
If atyantābhāva be denied, the qualities of all the twentyfive tattvas cannot be distinguished each from the other; so these will lose their identity. If there is no
1. "Unteruraisichtig torga at59:1
ATTA 159cha mapit v ll" Sārkhya-kärikā, 22: 2. TYTORT 3946 HEGÉcrrafahrer alteraut: ... 7 7 .... ies42641
Paurangezdi” Astasahasri. 3. “प्रध्वंसाभावस्यापहवे तस्यानन्तप्रसंगात्, पृथिव्यादीनि पंच महाभूतानि पंचसु तन्मात्रेषु
लीयन्ते पृथिव्या गन्धरूपरसस्पर्शशब्दतन्मात्रेषु प्रवेशात्, सलिलस्य रसादिषु, तेजसो रूपादिषु, वायोः स्पर्शतन्मात्रयोः, आकाशस्य शब्दतन्मात्रानुप्रवेशात्; तन्मात्राणां च पंचानां बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां कर्मेन्द्रियाणां च मनसा सह षोडशकस्य गणस्याहंकारेऽन्तर्भावस्तस्य च
hafa 46: unifafa HER AG for RICI" Aştasahasri. 4. haftanlo HP447041f8tai fini
Hraga pari i fayda4245411" Sārkhya-kārikā, 10. " F leuretiraf ATYTARINET a lumichard Hatcycl4l” Aștasahasri.

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distinction (if vyakta and avyakta be of the same kind without there being any distinction of inherent qualities) no one will be able to find out the real nature of a tattva because the real nature is only understood when we take into account the distinguishing characteristics which are nothing but absence of particular qualities as the basis of differentiation.1
60
The four defects, viz., anadi, ananta, sarvātmaka and asvarupa, accordingly arise by denial of prāgabhāva, pradhvamsabhāva, anyonyābhāva and atyantābhāva respectively. These four defects, says Samantabhadra, do not exist in Jaina view as the Jainas do not deny non-existence wholesale.
कार्यद्रव्यमनादि स्यात् प्रागभावस्य निह्नवे । प्रध्वंसस्य च धर्मस्य प्रच्यवेऽनन्ततां व्रजेत् ॥10॥
kārya-dravyamanādi syāt prāgabhāvasya nihnave, pradhvamsasya cha dharmasya prachyaveʼnantatāṁ
vrajet.
10. The denial of antecedent non-existence, an effect and a substance will become without beginning. On denial of the quality (of non-existence) consisting of destruction, (the same) will become eternal.
COMMENTARY
We have already described the four varieties of abhāva in the commentary to the previous verse. In this verse the first and second abhāvas (viz., prāgabhāva and pradhvaṁsābhāva) are mentiond and in the next verse the third and fourth abhävas will be mentiond.
Vasunandi says that by 'karya' we mean that which is made such as a pitcher and 'dravya' signifies that which gets another condidtion (or modification). In a
1. प्रकृतिपुरुषयोरत्यन्ताभावनिह्नवे प्रकृतेः पुरुषात्मकत्वे सर्वात्मकत्वमेव ।... ततः सर्वमस्वरूपं स्वेनासाधारणेन रूपेण कस्यचित् तत्त्वस्य व्यवस्थानाघटनात् ।” Astasahasri.

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clod of earth, the existence of pitcher is wanting. This is antecedent non-existence (prāgabhāva). Similarly when we break the parts of a pitcher, emergent non-existence (or destruction) which is known as pradhvaṁsābhāva, arises. By denial of the first kind of Abhāva, all objects will be without any beginning and by denial of the second, everything will become eternal.
सर्वात्मकं तदेकं स्यादन्यापोहव्यतिक्रमे ।
अन्यत्र समवायेन व्यपदिश्येत सर्वथा ॥11॥
61
sarvātmakam tadekaṁ syād anyāpoha-vyatikrame, anyatra samavāyena vyapadiśyeta sarvathā.
11. The denial of anyonyābhāva (i.e., every substance) will embody everything (and there will therefore be only) one substance. In the other case (i.e., in the case of atyantābhāva), by wholesale acceptance (of everything including absurdities) everything can be postulated.
COMMENTARY
In this verse, Samantabhadra describes the third and fourth abhāva viz., anyonyābhāva which is called itaretarābhāva by Vasunandi in his vṛtti and in the Aṣṭasahasri. It is urged by Vasunandi that by anyonyābhāva we establish such prepositions as "there is non-existence of a canvas in a pitcher" as at a certain time these exist having qualities quite separate. If we deny the existence of this abhāva, there will be only one substance in the universe as the distinguishing characteristics will disappear and this one substance will embody everything (e.g., become sarvātmaka).
The second line of this verse has been differently interpreted by Vasunandi and Vidyānandi. Vasunandi's vrtti has been quoted above and English translation according to the same has been given. Vasnuandi interprets this line in the Vrtti as follows. In absolute non-existence such as the non-existence of pudgala (matter)

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in jiva (soul), the qualities of pudgala are absent at all times and under all circumstances in jīva. Such absolute non-existence, for example, is the absense of "horns in a hare." If we refuse to deny the existence of this abhāva, nothing will exist as one will be utilised in describing all
manners.
In Aṣṭa-sahasri, however, the second line has thus been written :
“ अन्यत्र समवाये न व्यपदिश्येत सर्वथा ।”
62
The explanation is thus attempted. If the qualities of one are accepted in another (by denial of absolute nonexistence of some qualities of a substance in another substance) there is anyatra samavāya, i.e., connection of qualities in another substance, e.g., if we predicate sense in an insentient substance, the ideas, 'this has consciousness' and 'this does not have consciousness' cannot be expressed, showing their distinction.1
Akalanka says that the view of the Buddhists, which also like the Sankhya view already discribed, denying the existence of Abhāva, is refuted in this verse. We see that some quality exists in something at a certain time. By denial of absolute non-existence, the position will be that every quality will exist in everything at all times.2
Prabhakara, one of the expounders of the Mimāmsā philosophy, has not accepted abhāva as a pramāṇa, but Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has accepted abhava (or anupalabdhi as a pramāņa). We have already quoted Haribhadra Sūri's verse in this respect. Mr. Keith summarises the view of Kumārila thus:
"Causation, however, affords Kumārila an argument in favour of his thesis of the reality of non-existence. That entity he classifies as prior, as the non-existence of 1. “स्वसमवायिनः समवाय्यन्तरे समवायः अन्यत्र समवायः, अत्यन्ताभावव्यतिक्रमः । तस्मिन् सर्वस्येष्टं तत्त्वं सर्वथा न व्यपदिश्येत । स्वेष्टात्मना व्यपदेशेऽनिष्टात्मनोऽपि व्यपदेशप्रसंगात्, तेनाव्यपदेशे स्वेष्टात्मनाप्यव्यपदेशापत्तेः स्वयमिष्टानिष्टात्मनोः कालत्रयेऽपि विशेषानुपगमात् । ” Aṣṭasahasri.
2. “अत्यन्ताभावापाकृतौ न क्वचित् किंचित् कथंचित् न वर्तेत । तथा सर्व सर्वत्र "Astasati.

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curd in milk; subsequent on destruction, as the nonexistence of milk in curd; mutual, as the non-existence of the horse in the cow and vice versa; and absolute, as the non-existence of a horn on the head of the hare. Without the recognition of the first two kinds, he contends, there could be no idea of causation: in its prior negation lies the character of the curd as effect, in its destruction that of the milk as the cause. Everything has two aspects: as regards its self, it exists; as regards anything else, it is non-existent; and both these aspects are real and necessary to each other. It is only through this fact that we can say 'there is no jar on the ground', as that we can ever differentiate things, which is possible only on the ground of a real existence of non-existence. It is impossible to perceive this entity, for perception must deal with the existent; the process of intellection is, therefore, purely mental; the ground is seen; the jar remembered, and then ensues the purely mental cognition styled negation, which must be distingnished from inference on any other form of knowledge."
अभावैकान्तपक्षेऽपि भावापह्नववादिनाम् ।
बोधवाक्यं प्रमाणं न केन साधनदूषणम् ॥12॥
abhāvaikānta-pakṣe'pi bhāvāpahnava-vādinām, bodha-vakyaṁ pramāṇaṁ na kena sādhanadūṣaṇam.
12. To those who deny existence, the view of (uniform) non-existence is not supported by any proof either used for one's own self or for convincing others. Hence how can there be establishment (of their view) on refutation of the view of their opponents?
COMMENTARY
In verses 8 and 9, the defects in the view of those who accept existence as the only view have been pointed
1. Karma-mimāmsā, A.B. Keith, p. 60.

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out. In this verse the view of those who accept nonexistence as their doctrine is refuted.
There are some who deny existence altogether ; such as the Mādhyamikas or Sūnyavādins or Nihilists (a sect of Buddhist philosophers). They follow the view that non-existence is the only reality. There was a very old view in Hindu philosophy, known as Vijñānavāda which accepted all objects of knowledge apart from knowledge, as unreal. In Vişnu-purāna (III. 18) this view has been mentioned. This view has been refuted in the Vedāntasūtras (II. 2. 28 and 29). This view has given the example of dreams to establish unreality of objects of knowldege but Sankarāchārya in his commentary on Vedānta-sūtra "vaidharmyāchcha na svapnādivat" has pointed out that the knowledge in our waking stage is quite different from that when we dream.
Vijñāna of the Buddhists is the special knowledge that everything is momentary.2 In Kșanika-vāda of the Buddhists, vijñānas rise and disappear, one set giving rise to a corresponding set.3 Kundakunda has mentioned "substantial reality cannot be denied, as śāśvata-vāda, Uchchheda-vāda, Bhāva-vāda and its opposite, Vijñāna-vāda and its opposite, Sünyavāda and its opposite are not reasonable."4 1. “भावैकान्तपक्षेऽपि कुशलाकुशलकमदिरघटनां प्रदर्श्य अभावैकान्तपक्षेऽपि भृशं न घटेत इति
yastha 3116!” Vasunandi. 2. " Pasca fafgre ni Heard I" Saddarśana-samuchchaya,
commentary of Manibhadra on verse 5. 3. “सर्वसंस्काराः क्षणिकाः, सर्वेषां विश्वत्रयविवरविवर्तमानानां घटपटस्तम्भाम्भोरुहादीनां
द्वितीयादिक्षणेषु ‘स एवायं, स एवायम्' इत्याधुल्लेखेन ये संस्कारा ज्ञानसन्ताना उत्पद्यन्ते ते विचारगोचरगताः क्षणिकाः।”
Saddarśana-samuchchaya, Manibhadra's commentary on verse 7. 4. “सस्सदमध उच्छेदं भव्बमभव्यं च सुण्णमिदरं च। विण्णाणमविण्णाणं ण वि जुज्जदि असदि सद्भावै ॥"
Pañchăstikāya-sära, verse 37. Sāśvatavādins or Realists are the Sarvästivādins of the Buddhist philosophy. They maintain the reality of everything. They are divided into two groups, (i) Sautrāntikas and (ii) Vaibhāşikas.

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In this verse it is urged that the nihilistic view cannot be proved. There are two kinds of inference, svārthānumāna (inference for ones own conviction) and parārthānumāna (inference to convince others). Neither of these kinds of inferences can establish nihilism. So there can be neither sādhana, i.e., establishment of the preposition or dūşaņa (refutation of opposite view).
Svārthānumāna is inference for one's own self. This inference is drawn after repeated observations. For example, a man repeatedly sees in the kitchen and other places that there is fire where there is smoke and realises that there is a universal antecedence of fire in respect of smoke. Afterwards he goes to a hill and sees smoke and remembering the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, he concludes that the hill has fire as it has smoke. This is the inference for one's self.
The above example may be used for parārthānumāna (inference for the sake of others) thus : 1. This hill is full of fire. 2. Because it is full of smoke. 3. Whatever is full of smoke, is full of fire. 4. So is this hill full of smoke. 5. Therefore this hill is full of fire.
This five-limbed syllogism is accepted by Gautama in his Nyāya philosophy. Jaina logicians, however, hold that the first two limbs are sufficient, the others being redundant.1
By the word bodha (understanding) in the verse svārthānumāna is meant and by vākya (syllogism) parārthānumāna is signified. By none of these two kinds of inferences, nihilism can be proved. So a question has been put : “How can it be established or the views of others opposing it can be refuted?”
1. For a detailed description of svārthānumāna and parārthănumăna,
see Parikṣāmukha translated into English by S.C. Ghoshal, p. 117 (Sacred Books of the Jains, Vol. XI).

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ĀPTA-MĪMĀŃSĀ विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् । अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्ति वाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥13॥ virodhānnobhayaikātmyam syādvāda-nyāya
___vidvisam, avāchyataikānte'pyuktir-nāvāchyamiti yujyate.
13. The view of those who do not follow the logic of Suādvāda and hold that opposites can be inherent in a substance, is not tenable as it is self-contradictory. The view of those who accept the view of indescribableness without any limitation is also not tenable.
COMMENTARY Vasunandi says that after showing the defects of views of those who maintain either existence without any limitation or non-existence without any limitation, in this verse it is mentioned that the view of those who accept both existence and non-existence without any limitation, is not proper.1
The logic of Syādvāda or Anekāntavāda accepts existence or non-existence or indescribability with limitation. Leaving out the limitation, it is imposible to maintain the embodiment of existence and non-existence in the same substance because this will be quite inconsistent. This will be developed in the following verse.
In Asta-sati, amplified by Asta-sahasri, it is explained that the Sānkhya view of simultaneous existence and non-existence is hereby refuted, if we rememeber the definition of vyakta and avyakta3 which has been given in 1. "भावाभावैकान्तपक्षे विरोधं निरूप्य उभयैकान्तवादिनामपि न किंचित् संगच्छत इत्याह।" 2. “भावाभावयोरेकतरप्रतिक्षेपैकान्तपक्षोपक्षिप्तदोषपरिजिहीर्षया सदसदात्मकं सर्वमभ्युपगच्छतोऽपि
वाणी विप्रतिषिध्येत, तयोः परस्परपरिहारस्थितिलक्षणत्वात्। न हि सर्वात्मना कंचिदर्थं सन्तं
तथैवासन्तमाचक्षाणः स्वस्थः, स्वाभ्युपेतेतर-निरासविधानकरणाच्छून्यावबोधवत्।” Astasati. 3. "त्रैलोक्यस्य व्यक्तात्मनाऽपेतत्वसिद्धेः अव्यक्तात्मनास्तित्वव्यवस्थितेः
'हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिंगम्। सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥' इति वचनात्।” Astasahasri

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the commentary on verse 9.
In the second line of this verse, the Anirvachyavāda (the view expounding indescribability) has been attacked. Sankaracharya in expounding Advaitavāda has laid down
that the world is neither sat (existent) nor asat (nonexistent). "Śankara in his system asks whether there is anything in experience which may be regarded as foundational and discusses the claims of the different factors of experience of that title. Our senses may deceive us and our memory may be an illusion. The walking tracts may not be different from dream-walks where also we visit places, handle shadows and battle with ghosts. Though all objects of experience may be open to doubt, there is something which is beyond all doubt. Everyone is conscious of the existence of one's own self and no one thinks I am not'. The self cannot be doubted or denied, for it is the essential nature of him who denies it. Though we cannot know it by thought, it does not entirely escape us... This self is distinct from the body, the senses and the understanding. It is the principle of consciousness which is unaffected when the body is reduced to ashes and the mind perishes. It is one, universal and infinite...
"We cannot conceive the relation between the world and the absolute. The question of relation has meaning only if we have two 'distincts', but the world is not distinct from Brahman. The finite is the infinite hidden from our view through certain barriers. When we intuitively recognise the absolute, the relative disappears; when we discuss about the relative there is no absolute to which it has to be attached. The problem arises on account of a confusion of standpoints. If Brahman is to be viewed as the cause of the world it is only in the sense that the world cannot be explained apart from Brahman, though the latter is in no way touched by the world of appearance. Brahman is the basis of the apparent existence of the world." Śankara therefore has laid down the view of Anirvāchyavāda.
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1. Indian Philosophy, S. Radhakrishnan. Encyclopaedia Britanica, 14th edition, Vol. 12, p. 252.

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कथञ्चित् ते सदेवेष्टं कथञ्चिदसदेव तत्। तथोभयमवाच्यं च नययोगान्न सर्वथा ॥ 14 ॥ kathañchit te sadeveștaṁ kathañchidasadeva tat, tathobhayamavāchyam cha naya-yogānna sarvathā.
14. With the application of naya, according to a particular sense, existence is accepted by you; according to another sense, non-existence is accepted). Similarly (according to a particular sense) both (existence and nonexistence) and indescribability are accepted by you (but) not in all respects.
COMMENTARY
It has been shown that it cannot be maintained that existence or non-existence or simultaneous existence and non-existence or indescribability without any limitations, is possible. In this verse, the Jain view that with limitations existence etc. can be accepted is laid down.1
A brief description of Anekāntavāda or Syādvāda has already been given. The different aspects are considered from different stand-ponts. The Jain view is that objects in their entire character are understood only by an omniscient being. The work, Āpta-mimāṁsā, has begun with obeisance to the omniscient and established omniscience by arguments refuting the view of those, who, like Kumārila Bhatta, have attacked omniscience. Then Samantabhadra has refuted the view of those who hold an entirely one-sided aspect of a thing. From this verse the author begins to establish the Syādvāda or Anekāntavāda of Jainism. Siddhasena has written : A thing which might be conceived from many points of view, is entirely knowable only by the omniscient. But a thing 1. “एकहेलया यदि सर्वथा सदसदुभयावक्तव्यरूपं तत्त्वं नास्ति, कथं तर्हि इत्याह।”
Vasunandi.

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conceived from one particular point of view, is the object of naya (or partial knowledge).1
"A naya deals with only the particular aspect in view of the speaker but it does not deny the existence of the remaining attributes. When we speak of the colour of gold, we make no mention of its weight, touch, taste, smell and other attributes but our statement does not mean that gold is devoid of all the other attributes besides colour. When speaking from a limited point of view, Jaina scholars prefix the word 'syat' to every such predication to signify that the object is of a particular type from a particular stand-point but it is not so from other points of view. 'Syat' suggests the existence of other attributes but does not give primary importance to them. This is the differentiating point which helps in accuracy of expression by a scholar of the Jaina school of thought. Jaina school of philosophy (like the kṣaṇikavāda of the Buddhists) might say that all that exists is momentary and another school might say that reality is permanent (like the Śāśvatavādins or Sarvāstitvavādins as already described). Jainism reconciles both these seemingly contradictory statements by pointing out that the first view is true from the stand-point of modifications only which are subject to change every moment and the second view is also correct from the standpoint of elements of which the thing is composed. Onesided systems of philosophy deny the existence of attributes other than what they adopt, whereas the Jaina point of view admits their existence though these are not described being not of primary importance."2
The nayas have been broadly classified (i) dravyarthika which has the following varieties: (a) naigama, (b) sangraha, (c) vyavahāra and (ii) paryāyārthika which has the following varieties: (d) rju1. “ अनेकात्मकं वस्तु गोचरः सर्वसंविदाम् ।
एकदेशविशिष्टोऽर्थो नयस्य विषयो मतः ॥” Nyāyāvatāra, 29.
as
2. Parikṣāmukha, translated by S.C. Ghoshal, pages 199-200 (Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. XI).

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sūtra, (e) sabda, samabhirudha - and (8) evambhūta.
In dravyārthika naya, the statements refer only to the general attributes of a substance and not to the modifications which the substance is constantly undergoing. In paryāyārthika naya, the statements refer to the constantly changing conditions of a substance.
The seven nayas are briefly illustrated below.
“I. Naigama, not literal or figurative: When we speak of a past or future event as a present one, we have an illustration of this naya. It is of three kinds relating to past, present and future. If we say on the Diwali day ‘Lord Mahāvira attained liberation today', we mean that this day is the anniversary day of the past event. Again, we see a man booking his passage and on our query, he says, 'I am going to England'. This is a figurative way of speaking about a present event. Further when we see a man making a fire, and on our questioning him, he says, 'I am cooking', he really speaks of a future event for which he is making only a preparation.
II. Sangraha, comman or general: When we use a word denoting a class to mean the whole, we have an example of this naya. By using the word “Dravya' we take the six kinds of dravyasz taking only the general attributes of dravya (substance) and not considering the distinguishing features.
III. Vyavahāra, distributive: When we divide or separete a general term into its classes, orders, kinds or specialities, we have an example of this naya. For example, when we speak of dravya (substance) implying its six subdivisions of (soul, matter, space, time, media of motion and rest), we have an example of this naya.
By sangraha naya the generic properties alone are taken into consideration without any cognizance of the particular 1. TRY6Q106R ETTH4fddina FeT: 1" Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, I.
33. 2. Jiva (soul), pudgala (matter), dharma (principle of motion), adharma
(principle of rest), ākāśa (space) and kāla (time) are the six dravyas in Jainism.

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properties and by vyavahāra naya the particular properties alone are considered.
IV. Rju-sūtra, the straight expression: This naya takes into account (1) the actual condition at a particular moment and (2) the actual condition for a long time. The first variety is called sūkşma (fine) and the second sthūla (gross). A soul with a momentary good thought is an example of the former while a man with a human condition for a life-time is an example of the latter. By this naya a thing as it exists at present is considered without any reference to the past or future. The followers of this naya say that it is useless to ponder over things as they are in the past or will become in the future. All practical purposes are served by the thing itself as it exists at the present moment.
V. Sabda, Descriptive: This naya includes grammatical correctness and propriety of expression. From this point of veiw we can use the present for the past tense, plural for the singular number, feminine for the masculine gender, etc. An example of the first is when we speak 'In 1066 we see the Normans attack the Anglo-saxons'. The second is illustrated by the use of 'you' for one man. The third is exemplified by the use of a masculine name e.g. Lord Nelson for a vessel which is used in feminine gender.
VI. Samabhirūdha, specific: This naya is employed when we give a word, a fixed meaning out of several which it has. This is exemplified by the use of the word ‘nut' to denote an extra smart man or 'Dreadnought' to denote a particular kind of war-ship.
VII. Evambhūta, active: When we restrict the name to the very activity which is connected with the name we have an example of this naya, e.g., when we call Stratford-on-Avon by that name only so long as the town stands at the banks of the river Avon.”1
In this verse, it is made clear that according to the 1. Sacred Books of the- Jainas, Vol. II, p. 45.

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nayas detailed above, the Jainas accept a substance to exist from a particular aspect, not to exist from another aspect, both to exist and not exist from a third aspect or be indescribable from a fourth aspect.
It must be remembered that "these nayas deal with the various aspects of reality from their particular angles of vision, but they do not predicate the non-existence of other points of views. When one point of view becomes primary, the others become of secondary importance. It is incorrect to suppose that only a particular naya is correct and others are erroneous. As a matter of fact all these standpoints are equally true and valid and lead to correct knowledge, provided that they do not deny the existence of the other points of view, for one will be wholly untrue without the existence of others. In other words, the valid nayas are inter-dependent and when they become independent the result is that their very nature is annihilated. For example, the interdependence of cotton threads is possessed of the potentiality of warding off cold and providing comfort to the body, but if each of these threads become independent of others, these will not be able to serve the aforesaid purpose."1
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सदेव सर्वं को नेच्छेत् स्वरूपादिचतुष्टयात् । असदेव विपर्यासान्न चेन्न व्यवतिष्ठते ॥15॥ sadeva sarvam ko nechchhet svarūpādichatuṣṭayāt, asadeva viparyāsān-na chen-na vyavatiṣṭhate.
15. Who does not hold everything to exist from the four (aspects) svarupa etc. (sva-rupa, sva-kṣetra, sva-kāla and sva-bhāva)? On the contrary, who does not hold nonexistence (with reference to the absence of these four, viz. rūpa, kṣetra, kāla and bhāva)? If this be not (accepted), nothing can exist.
1. Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol XI, pages 203-204.

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COMMENTARY The seven modes of predication (Saptabhangi) will now be taken up and discussed.
First, it is laid down that there are four aspects, viz., rūpa or bhāva, dravya (matter), kşetra (place) and kāla (time). Whenever we predicate either affirmatively or negatively, our predication depends on these four aspects. When we predicate a particular form, matter, place or time with reference to a particular substance, we necessarily deny all these four belonging to alien substances as existing in the particular substance. For example, when we say "A pitcher (ghata) exists,” this statement can be examined from four different aspects, viz., with reference to dravya, i.e., the substance of which the pitcher is made, e.g., clay, kşetra, i.e., the place where the pitcher is; kāla, i.e., the time during which the pitcher exists; and bhāva, i.e., the form or attributes of the pitcher. If it be an earthen pitcher, it exists in the form of clay and not of gold or other substance. It exists in a particular place when we speak about it and not in anything else. The pitcher exists also in a particular time when we speak about it and not in any other time. It also has a particular shape or colour as distinct from other shapes or colours. This is the first mode of predication, viz., syādasti of the Saptabhangi, e.g., in a certain sense, the pitcher exists in the above four aspects. Thus the existence of a pitcher is affirmed as real with reference to sva-rūpa, sva-dravya, sva-ksetra and sva-kāla. By the word "svarūpādichatuștayāt” (from the four, sva-rūpa etc.) this is indicated.
The second mode of predication syān-nāsti (in a certain sense, it is not) is established by the denial of para-rūpa, para-dravya, para-kşetra and para-kāla. For example, in the case of a jar, the attributes of another thing, viz., a cloth, being quite foreign, would be para-rūpa. A golden pitcher would be an example of para-dravya in the case of an earthen pitcher. Para-kāla would refer to the time when the pitcher before formation by the potter was mere clay or when after its destruction would be mere

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shreds. Any other place where the pitcher is not situated would be its para-kṣetra.
Thus, the existence of a thing depends on its four aspects, svarūpa etc. and the non-existence of the same depends on its pararūpa etc. "The essential nature of a thing not only implies its svarupa but differentiates itself from pararupa. In experience, we not only perceive a thing, but perceive it as distinct from other things. A jar is seen not merely as a jar, but as a thing distinct from cloth by its side. Without this distinction there can be no perception of the jar at all. The very process of selfassertion implies differentiation from non-self."1
By the words "if this be not (accepted) there will be nothing at all" the following is meant. "One individual jar has its individuality as svarūpa, and every other jar will be pararupa. Jar 'A' exists on account of svarupa and does not on account of pararupa. If non-existence is associated with svarupa, then there will be no jar at all; if existence follows from pararupa then all jars will become one without distinction and there will be no separate individual ones... If the jar exists in parakṣetra also, then there will be no place without a jar... If the thing is not even in its own place then there will be no jar anywhere in the world. Either result will be unsatisfactory... If a thing exists in parakāla also as in svakāla, then it will be eternal; if it does not exist in svakāla, as in parakāla, then it will be nothing; for existence implies a relation to its time or duration." "2 Similar absurdity will arise if we accept that a jar exists in para-dravya or it does not exist in sva-dravya.
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क्रमार्पितद्वयाद् द्वैतं सहावाच्यमशक्तितः ।
अवक्तव्योत्तराः शेषास्त्रयो भंगाः स्वहेतुतः ॥16॥
kramārpita-dvayād dvaitaṁ sahāvāchyamaśaktitaḥ, Avaktavyottarāḥ śeṣāstrayo bhangāḥ svahetutaḥ.
1. Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. III, p. LXXIII. 2. Ibid, pages LXXI and LXXII.

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16. By consecutive application of the two, we get the category where both (existence and non-existence) can be predicated. Owing to absence of power of expression, the category of indescribability arises (when all qualities are desired to be expressed at the same time). From its own cause, the remaining three categories followed by avaktavya arise.
COMMENTARY The remaining modes of predication are referred to in this verse.
The third mode is syādasti-năsti. It has already been mentioned in the commentary to the previous verse that every substance “when thought of in respect of its substance (dravya), place (kşetra), time of existence (kāla) and attributes (bhāva), does in a certain sense exist; and when the substance, place, time and attributes of other. things are thought of, the thing itself does not exist. So in this third way of speaking, two natures of the thing (existence of the thing and non-existence of other things) are considered, first one and then the other. For example, the jar is a jar and is not cloth.”l
The fourth mode is syād-avaktavya. “This fourth way of speaking denies the possibility of mentioning at one and the same moment what the thing is and what it is not. The necessity for this way of speaking is that these two natures (what it is and what it is not) exist in a thing at one and the same time (or simultaneously), but it is impossible to express them simultaneously; when we see that there are two trees, a mango-tree and an orange-tree, they both exist simultaneously, but they come to our knowledge first one and then the other, and not simultaneously.”
The fifth mode is syād-asti chāvaktavya. “In this mode of speaking it is what the thing (jar, for instance) is that
1. Frist Principles of the Jaina Philosophy, H.L. Jhaveri, p. 38-39. 2. Ibid, p. 39.

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finds expression, and the reason for adding avaktavya is that when we are proving what a thing (jar, for instance) is, we wish to mention also that the thing has simultaneously negative attributes (is-not-ness) but that it is impossible to express them simultaneously. There is a jar here; but, as it is impossible to say simultaneously both what it is and what it is not, the word avaktavya is inserted in this statement.”1
The sixth mode is syān-nāsti chāvaktavya. “In this mode of speaking it is what the thing (jar, for instance) is not that finds expression. And the reason for adding avaktavya is that when we are proving what a thing (jar, for instance) is not, we wish to mention that the thing has at the same time positive attributes (is-ness) but that it is impossible to give them expression while we are proving what the thing is not.”2
The seventh and the last mode is syād-asti-năsti chävaktavya. “In the seventh mode of speaking one expresses first what the thing (jar, for instance) is, and then what it is not; and one adds that it is impossible to express both what it is and what it is not simultaneously. When one is talking of the attributes of a thing there is existence, and when he is talking of the attributes of another thing there is non-existence in the first thing, but it is impossible to express them both at the same time.”3
Kundakunda in his Pañchāstikāya-sāra (verse 14) has described the Saptabhangi : “Accordingly as dravya is viewed from different aspects of reasoning, it may be described by the following propositions: (1) perhaps it is, (2) perhaps it is not, (3) perhaps it is both (is and is not), (4) perhaps it is indefinable, (5) perhaps it is and is indefinable, (6) perhaps it is not and is indefinable, and (7) perhaps it is and is not and is indefinable.”4 1. Frist Principles of the Jaina Philosophy, H.L. Jhaveri, p. 39. 2. Ibid, p. 40. 3. Ibid. 4. "fory iet u 364 300 treo quit y afere
दव्वं खु सत्तभंगं आदेसवसेण संभवदि ॥" Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. III, p. 11.

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“Avaktavya should not be interpreted to be absolutely indescribable for then avaktavya itself would become meaningless. It only refers to the impossibility of finding an idea which would include both the thesis and the antithesis at the same time.”
This viewing of things from particular aspect has now being given an important place by less modern philosophers of the West. We find in Wolfenden's The Approach to Philosophy that special sciences deal “with some specially selected aspect of the general world and its conclusions apply to that special aspect alone. Any characteristics which a thing may possess in any other relations or for other purposes are irrelevant. To the psychologist people are their actions; to the physiologist they are more or less efficient organisms; to the chemist they are various collections of elements; to the physicist they are forces in motion. These same people may also be good husbands or good squash players, but these aspects of their whole personality are at the moment irrelevant. They may become relevant when the statistician enquires into these sides of their natures."2 Anekāntvāda or Syādvāda accepts different points of view. When we want to lay stress upon one point, the many are left in the background but are admitted by implication and not totally denied. The truth will be one in the many or many of the one. This is the utility of the use of 'syāt'. "The quality predicated is 'probably' or 'perhaps' true. The predication is accepted provisionally with the full recognition that the same may be denied and that other ideas may be affirmed of the subject."3
Kumārila Bhatta has criticised the Saptabhangi saying that in the same manner hundred bhangis can be formed. But the answer to this is that though many things can be said regarding a substance, the possible ways of 1. Pañchāstikāya-sāra (Chakravarti), p. 13. 2. Pravachana-sāra (Upadhye), p. XC. 3. Pañchāstikāya-samaya sāra (Chakravarti), p. 12. 4. "Tigace starea preci"

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speaking about its attributes will always be seven in number. The predication (and not the innumerable attributes present, past or future) will be in one of these seven ways. “The innumerable qualities of a thing cannot all be predicated in one statement, but they are all implied by any statement which predicates one of the qualities of a thing."
अस्तित्वं प्रतिषेध्येनाविनाभाव्येकधर्मिणि। विशेषणत्वात्साधर्म्यं यथा भेदविवक्षया ॥17॥ astitvam pratişedhyenāvinābhāvyeka-dharmiņi, višeṣaṇatvāt sādharmyam yathā bhedavivakṣayā.
17. As (we express) homogeneousness with the desire of establishing the difference (of its opposite), so according to qualification, (there is) existence in a single substance which is co-existent with its opposite.
COMMENTARY In this verse, it is established by argument how existence and non-existence can be predicated in the same substance.
In Nyāya philosophy the familiar example of an inference is "the hill is full of fire because there is smoke on it.” We establish the existence of fire (sādhya) by smoke (sādhana) through illustration (drstānta). This dȚstānta may be given affirmatively, e.g., "where there is smoke there is fire as in a kitchen” or negatively "where there is no smoke there is not fire as in a lake”. The inseparable connection (vyāpti) is shown in these cases by sādharmya (homogeneousness) or vaidharmya (heterogeneousness). The two syllogisms will be as follows : this hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke, just as the kitchen (homogeneous example). this hill has no smoke, because it has no fire, just as a lake (heterogeneous example).
1. Jainism (H. Warren), p. 21.

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Fire and smoke abide homogeneously in the kitchen, and by the homogeneous example inseparable connection (vyāpti) between the major term (sādhya) and the middle term (hetu) is established. Similarly the heterogeneous example reassures the connection by contrariety, viz., by showing that absence of the major term (sādhya) is attended by the absence of the middle term (hetu).1
79
In this verse, it is mentioned that in a dharmi (thing possessing qualities, e.g., a jiva), existence has inseparable connection with non-existence. "For instance the negative statement (that we are not dust, for example) is tacit when making a positive statement (that we are immortal souls, for example).”2
This inseparable connection is similar to sadharmya (homogeneouness) and vaidharmya (heterogeneousness) in the middle term (e.g., smoke in the example of syllogism already given). Akalanka has given this in the shape of a syllogism.3
नास्तित्वं प्रतिषेध्येनाविनाभाव्येकधर्मिणि । fastquciturf genstafaqueun ||18|||
nāstitvaṁ pratiṣedhyenāvinābhāvyekadharmiņi,
viśeṣaṇatvād-vaidharmyaṁ yathā'bheda-vivakṣayā.
18. As we express heterogeneousness with the desire of establishing non-difference, so according to qualification, (there is) non-existence in a single substance
1. “ साध्यसाधनयोर्व्याप्तिर्यत्र निश्चीयतेतराम् ।
साधर्म्येण स दृष्टान्तः सम्बन्धस्मरणान्मतः ॥ साध्ये निवर्तमाने तु साधनस्याप्यसंभवः ।
e folla a za: " Nyāyāvatāra, verse 18 and 19. “यो यो धूमवानसावसावग्निमान् यथा महानसः इति साधम्र्योदाहरणम् । यो योऽग्निमान्न भवति स स धूमवान्न भवति, यथा महाह्रदः, इति वैधम्र्योदाहरणम् ॥”
Nyaya-dipikā, Prakāśa III.
2. Jainism (H. Warren), p. 21.
3. “ तस्माद् यद् विशेषणं तत् प्रतिषेध्यविनाभावि क्वचिद् धर्मिणि, यथा साधर्म्यं भेदविवक्षया, कृतकत्वादौ विशेषणं चास्तित्वं ततः प्रतिषेध्यधर्मप्रतिबन्धि ।”

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which is co-existent with its opposite.
COMMENTARY If someone says that as you accept existence inseparably connected with non-existence, so when its opposite will come, viz., non-existence will be predicated, you will have to accept its contrary, viz., existence. Thus, when a substance does not absolutely exist, such as flowers in the sky or horns of a hare, you should also accept its existence. A reply is given that by inference we establish the reality of substances capable of our understanding and our example of homogeneousness or heterogeneousness applies to the establishment of such substances only.2
The non-existence of horns of a hare can be proved by inferential process, but it does not mean that its real existence arises from Saptabhangi. A dharmi is known sometimes by pramāņa, sometimes by vikalpa (imagination) and sometimes both by vikalpa and pramāņa.3 An example of the first is “this mountain has fire”; that of the second is "there exists an omniscient being"; that of the third is "sound is not eternal."4
When we see smoke and infer fire, the object in which the fire is (e.g., the mountain) is known by pratyaksa pramāņa. But in the case of our belief in the existence and non-existence, viz., "the omniscient exists” or "horns of the ass do not exist”, the sādhya consisting
1. “भवतु तावदस्तित्वं जीवादौ नास्तित्वेनाविनाभावि। नास्तित्वं तु कथमस्तित्वाविनाभावि,
a-go4it sussegueritafa RIHTI TIE: 1" Asta-sahasri. 2. "न हि स्वेच्छाप्रक्लृप्तधर्मधर्मिव्यवस्थायां परमार्थावतारः स्यात् तदसमीक्षिततत्त्वार्थे
र्लोकप्रतीतिवशाद् भेदाभेदव्यवस्थितिस्तत्त्वप्रतिपत्तये समाश्रीयत इति बालाभिलापकल्पं
746T41014 TTCI" Astašati. 3. “प्रसिद्धत्वं च धर्मिणः क्वचित् प्रमाणात्, क्वचिद् विकल्पात्, क्वचित् प्रमाणविकल्पाभ्याम्।"
Nyāya-dipikā. 4. “तत्र प्रमाणसिद्धो धर्मी यथा धूमवत्त्वादग्निमत्त्वे साध्ये पर्वतः खलु प्रत्यक्षेणानुभूयते।.
.. 344f het erf en great forrit hang FRETE: ” Nyāya-dipikā.

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of existence or non-existence is preceded by our such belief. So these are cases of vikalpa-siddhi of the dharmi.
Refutation of a non-existent thing by argument does not therefore lead to its existence by Sapta-bhangi.
विधेयप्रतिषेध्यात्मा विशेष्यः शब्दगोचरः। HTTTT ngregat ||1911 vidheyapratişedhyātmā višeşyaḥ śabda-gocharaḥ, sādhya-dharmo yathā hetur-ahetuschāpyapekṣayā.
19. The minor term is understood by sound, as it comprises the major term and its opposite. (This is) as, according to the desire of a speaker, the relationship of the major term is or is not with the middle term.
COMMENTARY In the example of inference “the mountain has fire as it has smoke”, the mountain is the paksa (minor term), fire is the sādhya (major term) and smoke is hetu, linga or sādhana (middle term).
Now the word vidheya in the verse may be taken to mean astitva (existence). Its pratiședhi (opposite) will be năstitva (non-existence). A substance which has these qualities, viz., jīva etc. might be considered as a paksa (minor term) in a syllogism. The qualities of sādhya would be its manifestation etc. These qualities are considered hetu (middle term) when we desire to establish their non-eternal aspect and ahetu (not the middle term) when we consider their eternal aspect. The example will be "Where the substance exists. the
exists, the qualities
1. "विकल्पसिद्धो यथा, सर्वज्ञः अस्ति सुनिश्चितासंभवबाधकप्रमाणत्वाद् इत्यस्तित्वे साध्ये
सर्वज्ञः। अथवा खरविषाणं नास्तीति नास्तित्वे साध्ये खरविषाणम्। सर्वज्ञो ह्यस्तित्वसिद्धेः प्राङ् न प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणसिद्धः । अपि तु प्रतीतिमात्रसिद्ध इति विकल्पसिद्धोऽयं धर्मी। तथा खरविषाणमपि नास्तित्वसिद्धेः प्राग विकल्पसिद्धम् ।” "विकल्पसिद्धे तु धर्मिणि सत्तासत्तयोरेव HTETAR F14:!” Nyaya-dipikā.

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exist” or “where the substance does not exist, the qualities do not exist." In this manner, existence and non-existence can be predicated in the same thing as it can be established by process of inference as shown above. In the familiar example, when the major term is fire, smoke becomes hetu but when the major term is water, smoke becomes ahetu. As in the same substance, the existence or absence of fire is established by different syllogisms, viz., through inseparable connection of fire and smoke or inseparable connection of absence of smoke in water, so there is no absurdity in holding existence and non-existence in the same substance by Sapta-bhangi.
By a similar process of inference it can be established that substances, jiva etc., can be known by words.2
शेषभङ्गाश्च नेतव्या यथोक्तनययोगतः। न च कश्चिद्विरोधोऽस्ति मुनीन्द्र तव शासने ॥20॥ seṣabhangāscha netavya yathokta-naya-yogataḥ, na cha kaśchid-virodho'sti munindra tava śāsane.
20. According to the connection of proper nayas, the remaining categories also are to be applied. O ! the best of the Kevalins, in your doctrine, there is no fault whatever.
COMMENTARY The categories syād-asti and syān-nāsti have been fully explained regarding their application. The other five categories, syād-avaktavya etc. (as mentioned before), are
1. “विधेयमस्तित्वम्, प्रतिपथ्यं नास्तित्वम्... तो आत्मानौ स्वभावौ यस्य स विधेयप्रतिषेध्यात्मा,
अर्थः सर्वो जीवादिरिति पक्षः। विशेष्यत्वादिति हेतुः, विशेष्य इति हेतुनिर्देशात् ।... साध्यो धर्मी साध्यधर्माधारतया तस्य साध्यव्यपदेशात्, तथोपचारस्य दृष्टान्तधर्मिव्यवच्छेदार्थत्वात्। तस्य धर्मो विवर्त्त उत्पत्तिमत्त्वादिः। स यथा हेतुरनित्यत्वसाध्यापेक्षया, नित्यत्वसाध्यापेक्षयाहेतुश्च, गमकत्वागमकत्वायोगात्, तथा साध्याविनाभावेतरसद्भावादिति
दृष्टान्तः । इत्यनुमानात् सत्त्वेतरात्मकः कथंचित् जीवाद्यर्थः सिद्ध्यत्येव।" Astasahasri. 2. “शब्दगोचरो जीवादिः विशेष्यत्वात् तद्वत्, इत्यनुमानात्तस्य साधनात्।” Astasahasri.

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to be applied in a similar manner according to the different standpoints of a speaker. Owing to difference in nayas, different categories will arise.
So it is urged that there is no contradiction in Jain doctrine. In doctrines defects like contradiction, doubt etc. arise because the propounders only insist upon one aspect of things, refusing to admit the different aspects of objects, which really is the true nature of substances.
112111
एवं विधिनिषेधाभ्यामनवस्थितमर्थकृत् । नेति चेन्न यथाकार्य बहिरन्तरुपाधिभिः ॥21॥ evam vidhi-nişedhābhyāmanavasthitamarthakrt, neti chenna yathākāryam vahirantarupādhibhiḥ.
21. In this manner, a substance understood by existence and non-existence becomes the cause of an effect. If you say no, the proper cause of an effect can not exist.
COMMENTARY “The Bauddhas who are known in philosophy as Kșaņika-ekānta-vādins... emphasize upon the fleeting nature of all existence... Thus the Bauddhas are exactly our 'flowing philosophers' holding everything to be ‘mere currents of incessant change'. Jainism waged a fierce war with them in old times, although by some irony of fate, in our own days, distinguished antiquarians piously confused one belligerent with the other...
Nothing is; but everything is not as soon as it is. The moment that it lives, is also the moment that it ceases to live. There is no being; all is always becoming. But is becoming possible for what is not being?
Cause and effect are in reality two phases of one and the same thing. The two are relative terms, with their solidarity so vital that the negation of the one is the negation of the other. But Kșanikavāda makes the relation fictitious and consequently there is neither cause

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nor effect in any case. Causation is thus reduced to mere sequence in time. But even this idea of mere time relation is untenable in Buddhism. If there is no cause, if there is nothing in the cause that is necessarily productive of the effect and if there is no essential relation between the two, all certainty in the natural order vanishes and there remains no uniformity even for bare time-successions, as the Ksanikavādins in ancient India or Comte and Mill in modern Europe tried to hold. The Kșanikavādins were not satisfied with these arguments and they rejoined by insisting that the 'unity of nature' between cause and effect as understood by Jainism was a fictitious or aupachārika one. It is, said they, an illusion, or as Mill would say, a mental habit and not a real fact. What is an illusion or mental habit? We think a cat as being 'a lion' or 'like a lion' by illusion or mental habit; but is this possible without our ever having seen some lion? Even an illusion pre-supposes a reality of which it is an illusion. The fiction of causal relation is therefore founded upon unquestionable facts.”1
In this verse it is urged that it is only when a substance is understood by two categories, viz., existence and non-existence, that it can become cause of an effect. For example, gold, when transformed into an ear-ring, becomes an upādāna kāraṇa of an ornament. In denial of this aspect of categories, the proper cause of an effect will cease to exist.
धर्मे धर्मेऽन्य एवार्थो धर्मिणोऽनन्तधर्मणः।
fra samh głHT THAT 1122|| dharme dharme'nya evārtho dharmiņo'nanta
dharmaṇaḥ, angitve'nyatamāntasya śeşāntānāṁ tadangatā.
22. The implication of infinite qualities of a substance
1. An Introduction to Jainism, A.B. Hatthe, pages 113-116.

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is different in each category. When one among these is given prominence, the others become subsidiary.
COMMENTARY
"A naya deals with only the particular aspect in view of the speaker but it does not deny the existence of the remaining attributes. When we speak of the colour of gold, we make no mention of its weight, touch, taste, smell and other attributes, but our statement does not mean that gold is devoid of all the other attributes besides colour. When speaking from a limited point of view, Jaina scholars prefix the word 'syat' to every such predication to signify that the object is of a particular type from a particular standpoint but it is not so from other points of view. Syat suggests the existence of other attributes but does not give primary importance to them.
Nayas deal with the various aspects of reality from their particular angles of vision but they do not predicate the non-existence of other points of view. When one point of view becomes primary, the others become of secondary importance. It is incorrect to suppose that only a particular naya is correct and others are erroneous. As a matter of fact all those standpoints are equally true and valid and lead to correct knowledge, provided that they do not deny the existence of the other points of view, for one will be wholly untrue without the existence of others. In other words, the valid nayas are interdependent and when they become independent, the result is that their very nature is annihilated. For example, the inter-dependence of cotton threads is possessed of the potentiality of warding off cold and providing comfort to the body, but if each of these threads become independent of others, these will not be able to serve the aforesaid purpose. This principle is applied to the doctrine of nayas.
Āchārya Amṛtachandra Sūri has mentioned that as a milk-maid draws part of the rope of the churning rod

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by one hand loosening the other part to get butter out of curd, so the Jaina doctrine of naya gives prominence to a particular attribute leaving aside the other views and by this means chunrns the nectar of reality (tattva): “एकेनाकर्षन्ती श्लथयन्ती वस्तुतत्त्वमितरेण ।
अन्तेन जयति जैनी नीतिर्मन्थाननेत्रमिव गोपी ॥ " ( Purusārthasiddhyupāya, verse 225.1)
86
एकानेकविकल्पादावुत्तरत्रापि योजयेत् ।
प्रक्रियां भङ्गिनीमेनां नयैर्नयविशारदः ॥ 23 ॥
ekāneka-vikalpādāvuttaratrāpi yojayet, prakriyām bhangīnīmenāṁ nayairnayaviśāradaḥ.
23. One adept in the use of naya should apply this method consisting of categories, as in the divergence of one or the many etc.
COMMENTARY
This method of the application of different categories will be shown further on, as the author will proceed to criticise the theory of Advaitavada etc. It will then be seen that the theory of Syādvāda, will refute the onesided theories of Advaitavadins.
End of Chapter I
1. See Parikṣāmukha (S.C. Ghoshal) Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. XI, page 199-204.

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अद्वैतैकान्तपक्षेऽपि दृष्टो भेदो विरुध्यते । कारकाणां क्रियायाश्च नैकं स्वस्मात् प्रजायते ॥24 ॥ advaitaikāntapakṣe'pi dṛṣṭo bhedo virudhyate, kārakāṇām kriyāyāṣcha naikaṁ svasmāt prajāyate.
24. Also, according to Advaitaikanta view, the perceptible differences, e.g. of instrumental cause, predicates etc. become impossible. One cannot be born (or produced) of itself.
COMMENTARY
The view of those who follow the doctrine of Advaitavada is refuted in this verse. The doctrine of Advaitavada as preached by the celebrated Sankarāchārya is that all the phenomenal universe and all the spiritual world is one homogenous spirit (Brahma) containing and absorbing all the illusory manifestations in the universe. Two objections are raised in this verse to oppose this view. The first is, self cannot create the self. "That means that Advaitism cannot explain without some duality to help how the all-in-all gave rise to itself or to the otherthan-itself." The second objection is that if we follow Advaitavada, the universally accepted duals like the doer (kāraka) and its action (kriya), the things inferred (parichhchedya vastu) and the inference (pramāṇa) cannot exist. As visible differences cannot be accounted for by adoption of only Brahma, a doctrine of Māyā had to be introduced by the Advaitavadins to explain such differences. The Jaina view is that the acceptance of Māyā at once does away with the absolute. Brahma and as soon as Brahma begins to work, its essential characteristic

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vanishes. In other words, the Jaina doctrine urges that the attempt of Advaitavādins to connect the ideal with the real world has failed.
कर्मद्वैतं फलद्वैतं लोकद्वैतं च नो भवेत्। faenlaag 7 RIC ETHIETEI TT 112511 karma-dvaitam phala-dvaitam loka-dvaitaṁ cha no
bhavet, vidyāvidyā-dayam na syāt bandha-mokşa-dvayam
tathā.
25. If we accept the Advaitavāda, there will not be the two kinds of karmas (good and evil), the two kinds of results of these karmas, (viz., punya, pāpa, virtue and vice), the two kinds of loka (mundane and the other world). Even vidyā (the true knowledge) and avidyā (absence of true knowldege) will cease to exist. There will also be nonexistence of bandha (bondage) and mokşa (liberation).
COMMENTARY The argument against Advaitavāda which is mentioned in this verse is that if we accept this view, there would be no distinction between an auspicious and an inauspicious action (śubha and 'aśubha karmas). virtue (punua) and vice (pāpa), the mundane world (ihaloka) and the other world (paraloka), the true knowldege (jñāna) and ignorance or absence of true knowledge (ajñāna), bondage (bandha) and mokṣa (liberation). All these different kinds of conceptions are admitted even by Advaitavādins. But by accepting Brahma as the only real thing in existence, these distinctions will disappear.
हेतोरद्वैतसिद्धिश्चेद् द्वैतं स्याद्धेतुसाध्ययोः। हेतुना चेद् विना सिद्धिद्वैतं वाङ्मात्रतो न किम् ॥26 ॥

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CHAPTER 11 hetoradvaita-siddhiśched dvaitam syāddhetu
sādhyayoḥ, hetuna ched vină siddhir-dvaitaṁ vānmātrato na kim.
26. If the establishment of Advaita be from hetu (the middle term), there will be duality of hetu (the middle term) and sādhya (the major term). If the establishment -be without the middle term, why not Dvaitavāda be accepted from mere words?
COMMENTARY In this verse, another argument against Advaitavāda is advanced. Can Advaitavāda be proved by logical process of reasoning or do you say that Advaitavāda is not proved by any logical process of reason but is its own justification? Both these qustions are taken up and. decided in this verse.
Now, in an inference, we prove a thing through universal concomitance (vyāpti) which is a kind of relationship between the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sādhya). For example, we infer fire (which is the major term or sādhya) from smoke (which is the middle term or Hetu) through the relationship of universal concomitance, viz., where there is fire, there is smoke.
If you say that Advaitavāda is established by inference, you must accept a major term and middle term. This is against the view that there is nothing but one (Advaita). Hetu (the middle term) and sādhya (the major term) being used in a reasoning to establish Advaitavāda, it must bring in duality (Dvaitavāda), the very opposite of Advaitavāda.
If you say, that Advaitavāda is not established by reason but by itself, the reasoning will be absurd. Nothing can be its own proof. If from mere words, a thing is established, anybody can establish anything by mearly uttering it in words (“PI614491effectief Hofer FACETT." — Astašati). Further, if Advaitavāda can be proved by itself without the help of any reasoning, Dvaitavāda can also

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अद्वैतं न विना द्वैतादहेतुरिव हेतुना। Hista: ufattet 7 gradeço parera 1127|| advaitam na vină dvaitādaheturiva hetunā, sanjñinaḥ pratiședho na pratiședhyādste kvachit.
27. As without ahetu, (there is) no hetu, so without dvaita, there cannot be advaita. Regarding every thing there cannot be refutation, if there be no object to be refuted.
COMMENTARY In this verse, it is urged that Advaitavāda must accept Dvaitavāda on the principle that to establish a thing by refuting another, there must be an object to be refuted. Without Dvaita, there cannot be Advaita as without an ahetu there cannot be a hetu. “It is a universal law of the mind to have its negative ideas based upon the knowledge of its positive ideas. You know a 'flower' and it is because you know it that you can say that there is no 'flower in the
ky'. You know that fire is inferred from the existence of smoke (hetu) and only from this knowledge it is that you can say that you cannot draw the same inference from the existence of water (ahetu). Similarly when you know that there is dualism (Dvaita) in the universe, then and then only, you can imagine its negative, the absence of dualism (Advaita).”1
पृथक्त्वैकान्तपक्षेऽपि पृथक्त्वादपृथक्कृतौ। qerara 7 Letohrai Pia nt mit Tor: 1128|| prthaktvaikāntapakşe'pi prthakatvädprthakkệtau, přthaktve na přthaktvaṁ syādanekastho hyasau
guṇaḥ. 1. An Introduction to Jainism by A.B. Latthe. p. 122.

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28. Also, in the one-sided view which holds the separate existence (of many objects), there will not be individuality owing to non-separation of an object and its qualities. Further, there will be no separate existence, if the object and its qualities are held to be inseparable. It is certain that a quality can exist (in many objects).
COMMENTARY
Refutation of the Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika views, viz., that there is separate existence of different properties and of their qualities is made in this verse. If we urge that everything is separate from everything else, we come to a view insisting on many being true as opposed to Advaitavada which insists on only one being true. As Jainism fights against all one-sided (ekānta) views, a refutation of this view follows the refutation of the Vedanta view (Advaitavāda). "If every individual is independent, at least this individuality is a comman property of all, e.g., materiality (a guna) is the property common to guņins, ghata (a pitcher), pața (a cloth) etc. If not so, being devoid of individuality their independence also will be lost. Although individuals are separate, individuality is a property residing in common and hence, even individuals are homogeneous by their common property. Thus even the individualism of the Nyāya (and Vaiseṣika school) is vitiated by the very presuppositions of their own school."1
सन्तानः समुदायश्च साधर्म्यं च निरंकुशः । प्रेत्यभावश्च तत्सर्वं न स्यादेकत्वनिणवे ॥29॥ santānaḥ samudāyaś-cha sādharmyaṁ cha
91
nirankuṣaḥ,
pretyabhāvaścha tatsarvam na syādekatva-nihṇave.
29. If we deny similarity or identity (in one sense) there will not be any gradual flow consisting of cause 1. An Introduction to Jainism, A.B. Latthe, p. 118.

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giving rise to an effect, or the existence (of different qualities) in a single object, or similarity or birth following death, for all of these would become impossible.
COMMENTARY In this verse the view of the Buddhists, who hold existence to be separate and momentary, is refuted.
We know that gradual change happens from one substance to another, e.g., milk changes into curd. The flow of cause producing effect in such cases shows that there is a continual connection between the two. Momentary existence of two separate substances in such cases would be opposed to reality. Further we know that in an object, there are different qualities, form, colour etc. But if we accept like the Buddhists the theory of changes following each other in succession, all these qualities become fictitious for there would remain nothing stable of which these can be properties. "If knowledge consists of passing sensations without the unity of apperception to cannect them, there is no pratyavijñā or recognition, e.g., this house as being the one that I visited yesterday." There will also be no knowledge of similarity on the same principle. If nothing remains stable, the persistence of human personality after death which is accepted by the Buddhists becomes impossible by their own doctrine. So the Jains do not accept the Buddhist view that in our mind we get unconnected but successive sensations received fro
सदात्मना च भिन्नं चेत् ज्ञानं ज्ञेयाद् द्विधाप्यसत्। ज्ञानाभावे कथं ज्ञेयं बहिरन्तश्च ते द्विषाम् ॥30॥ sadātmanā cha bhinnaṁ chet jñānam jñeyād
dvidhāpyasat, jñānābhāve katham jñeyam bahirantaścha te dviņām.
1. An Introduction to Jainism, A.B. Latthe, p. 118.

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30. If knowledge be different from the object known, these will be separate in their real existence. It will cease to exist in twofold manner. To those who are against this view, how can there be an object known internally or externally in absence of knowledge.
COMMENTARY
Another argument is adduced to refute the view of those who accept the reality of seperate existence of different things. If you say that everything has a separate real existence, you must accept the separate existence of knowledge and the object known. The result would be that both would become non-existent, for how can there be knowledge if there be not the thing known? There might be internal or external object of knowledge. But every such object would become non-existent, if there be no knowledge.1
Again, if knowlege be non-existent, the object of knowledge will also become non-existent as the object of knowledge depends on knowledge.2
So the view of the Buddhists like that of the followers of the Vaiseṣika system of philosophy who hold the one-sided view of separate existence, is refuted.3
In the verse, "your opponents" mean those who are opposite to Jain Anekantavāda. The Apta is adored as 'You' as in previous verses.
सामान्यार्था गिरोऽन्येषां विशेषो नाभिलप्यते । सामान्याभावतस्तेषां मृषैव सकला गिरः ॥31॥
sāmānyārthā giro'nyeṣām viseṣo nābhilapyate, sāmānyābhāvatasteṣāṁ mṛṣaiva sakalā giraḥ.
1. “ सदात्मना सत्सामान्यात्मना भिन्नमेव ज्ञानं ज्ञेयात् इति चेत्, द्विधाप्यसदेव प्राप्तं ज्ञानस्य असत्त्वे ज्ञेयस्य असत्त्वप्रसंगात् । ततो बहिरन्तश्च न किंचित् कथंचिदपि ज्ञेयं नाम त्वद्विषां "Asta-sahasri.
2. “ तदभावे बहिरन्तर्वा ज्ञेयमेव न स्यात्, तदपेक्षत्वात् । ” Astaśati.
3. “ततः श्रेयानयम् उपालम्भः पृथक्त्वैकान्तवाचां ताथागतानां वैशेषिकवत् । ” Astasati.

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31. The doctrine of those who profess generalization, does not touch the differentiation. All of their words become false for absence of generalization.
94
COMMENTARY
All objects have two kinds of properties, viz, sāmānya (general or generalizing) and viseṣa (specific or differentiating). The general properties express the genus (jāti) etc. and the specific properties describe the species, differences and distinctions. From general properties, we get the idea of jar-ness in hundred pitchers and from specific properties people distinguish their own pitchers from others.1
In this verse, the view of the Buddhists who suppose a general property (Sāmānya) without reference to the specific properties of a thing is refuted. It is urged that this view is absurd as everything becomes non-existent being devoid of its differentiating quality. For example, 'the horn of an ass' is without any differentia because it is totally non-existent. In the same way a thing is without its differentia only when it is considered to be totally non-existent.
By the word Anyeṣām and Teṣām in the verse the Buddhists are meant. It is laid down that all their words are false as in absence of differentiation, generalization cannot exist and without generalization, no process of inference can proceed.
1. अर्थाः सर्वेऽपि सामान्यविशेषा उभयात्मकाः । सामान्यं तत्र जात्यादि विशेषश्च विभेदकाः ॥ ऐक्यबुद्धिर्घटशते भवेत् सामान्यधर्मतः । विशेषाच्च निजं निजं लक्षयन्ति घटं जनाः ॥
Naya-karṇikā, verses 3 and 4.

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CHAPTER II विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्। अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्ति वाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥32॥ virodhānnobhayaikātmyam syādvāda-nyāya
vidvişām, avāchyatāikānte'pyuktirnāvāchyamiti yujyate.
32. The particular view of those who are antagonistic to the doctrine of Syādvāda that a thing can have both aspects together (cannot stand) as it is an impossibility. The view of those who hold that a thing is inexpressible cannot stand, being indescribable.
COMMENTARY
Akalanka explains this verse as follows: It is not possible that an object possessing qualities should have two natures opposed to each other existing at the same time. For example, existence and non-existence, oneness or many-sidedness, cannot be jointly predicated of the same thing, as one will oppose the other and existence of both will be self-contradictory; barren woman and a child cannot be connected together.1
Again, those who maintain the avaktavya view, viz., that everything is unknowable, are inconsistent with themselves. Some knowledge about a thing must exist before we can call it unknowable. So Jainism urges that uncertainty in knowledge is not an acceptable position.
अनपेक्षे पृथक्त्वैक्ये ह्यवस्तुद्वयहेतुतः।
dai Tera o FITAS: HTETT TETT 1133 il anapekṣe prthaktvaikye hyavastu dvayahetutaḥ, tadevaikyam pộthaktvaṁ cha svabhedaiḥ
sādhanam yathā. 1. “अस्तित्वनास्तित्वैकत्वानेकत्ववत् पृथक्त्वेत्तर-परस्परप्रत्यनीकस्वभावद्वयसंभवोऽपि मा
भूद्विप्रतिषेधात्। न खलु सर्वात्मना विरुद्धधर्माध्यासोऽस्ति तदन्योन्यविधिप्रतिषेधTAYICI&FEZITUACI" Astašati.

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33. Because of two reasons, those which are not related or are entirely separate, cannot become anything. Just as in the case of a sādhana, there is unity and diversity according to its variety.
COMMENTARY There might be an argument like this. Diversity is not existent because it is not connected with or related to unity. Again, unity alone cannot be in existence, because it is void of diversity. Though by showing the absurdity of such a reasoning the view of those who hold the Ekānta view can be refuted by our previously showing the twofold reasoning based (i) on unity and diversity as well as (ii) on neutrality. As fire is established from the existence of paksa, smoke, and nonexistence of water (which is vipakşa), so substances like jīva are established by a dual process of reasoning, e.g., substances like jiva become one when regarded through the existence of paksa, and they are regarded as different when they are established through difference.2
A thing has different varieties and different qualities. Without a noun there cannot be adjectives such as "horns of a hare.” Again without qualifying adjectives differentiating a substance, we cannot have an idea of the latter. To meet both these points, acceptance of Anekāntavāda is necessary, that is to say unity and diversity are not absolute realities.3
सत्सामान्यात्तु सर्वैक्यं पृथग्-द्रव्यादिभेदतः। tarafa HR414HTER TÈCET 1134|| sat-sāmānyāttu sarvaikyam prthag-dravyādi
bhedataḥ, bhedābheda-vivakṣāyāmasādhāraņa-hetuvat. 1. See Verse 24 and the following. 2. “यस्मादवस्त्वेवानपेक्षे पृथक्त्वैक्ये ऐक्यपृथक्त्वनिरपेक्षहेतुद्वयात् प्रतिपादिते प्राक्, तस्मात्तदेवैक्यं
पृथक्त्वं च जीवादिवस्तु कथंचिदेकत्वपृथक्त्वप्रत्ययहेतुद्वयादवसीयते। यथा साधनं सत्त्वादि
THETHYS Hra-fa HTH FIFTET: Pafgreitt utsy927:1" Astasahasri. 3. "ehrane art Atcha: 7: tenifefartenfafa paruldı” Ibid

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34. The unity is regarding existence which is inherent (in everything) and the diversity is regarding the difference in dravya etc. This is like the uncommon hetu when one wishes to speak about unity or diversity.
COMMENTARY By the word hetu employed here, the hetu as employed in inference (anumāna) is to be understood. Such a hetu is of two kinds: jñāpaka (that which makes a thing known, viz., smoke leading to the knowledge of fire) or kāraka (that from which a thing is made, viz., clay from which a pitcher is manufactured). We have different intentions when we speak of these different kinds of hetu. So when we intend merely to speak of existence, all substances (jīva etc.) are the same, but when we wish to express the difference according to dravya, kşetra, kāla and bhāva (already explained before, they are different.
विवक्षा चाविवक्षा च विशेष्येऽनन्तधर्मिणि। Hat fastaRIE Hartfristeffy: 113501 vivakşā chāvivakşā cha viśeșye'nanta-dharmiņi, sato višeşaņasyātra nāsatastaistądarthibhiḥ.
35. Those wishing for it, want to speak or not about an existing quality of a substance possessing infinite qualities, and not of non-existing (qualities).
COMMENTARY
This verse attempts to refute the view of the Buddhists who say that unity and divergence cannot be established by one's desire to speak or not about a 1. “सत्सामान्यं विशेषणमाश्रित्य सर्वेषां जीवादीनामैक्यमिति नैकत्वप्रत्ययो निर्विषयः, तस्य
सत्सामान्यविशेषत्वात्, पृथक् सर्वं जीवादि द्रव्यादिपदार्थभेदमाश्रित्यानुभूयते। ततो न पृथक्त्वप्रत्ययोऽपि निर्विषयः, तस्य द्रव्यादिभेदविषयत्वादिति निवेदितं बोद्धव्यम्। हेतुरत्र $11905: 10.97 Joa" Astasahasri

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certain quality of a substance, as both of these are unreal. For example, when we speak about unity, we deny the existence of diversity and vice versa. The reply is that when we want to speak about anything, we accept its existence. We never want to speak about anything which is non-existent. Otherwise we cannot have any action performed. By merely saying "a man, and fire” we cannot get cooking. There must be action to get cooking. The connection between qualities which we hold to be non-existing, when we want to speak about it, is merly an analogy. In reality existence or non-existence of qualities are not opposed to proof. For, when we establish identity of substance on certain qualities, we overlook other qualities leading to diversity; and when we establish diveragence we overlook the qualities leading to unity on a certain basis. Absolute existence or non-existence of qualities cannot happen. These are employed as one intends to emphasize one or the other.
प्रमाणगोचरौ सन्तौ भेदाभेदौ न संवृती। aragallanesat a T erra 1136 II pramāṇagocharau santau bhedābhedau na samvști, tāvekatrāvirudhau te guņamukhya-vivakşayā.
37. Unity and diversity are real and can be established by pramāņa. These are not imaginary. These are not opposed to in their existence in a single substance as we desire to speak either about the primary or secondary (qualities).
COMMENTARY The one-sided view that substances are different or the same, that everything is one, cannot be maintained. By employment of syllogism, it can be proved that oneness or many-sided-ness of substances are real and not 1. “विधिप्रतिषेधधर्माणां सतामेव विवक्षेतराभ्यां योगस्तदर्थिभिः क्रियेत, अन्यथार्थनिष्पत्तेरभावात्।
JYERHET I RICI 7 auftraforach şeylarta Yhterguyvadlı” Aștaśati.

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illusory or imaginary. It is when we want to establish the primary qualities showing unity, we speak about one-ness; and when we want to emphasise the secondary qualities showing divergence, we speak of many-sidedness. It is therefore not impossible that both of these can be predicated of a substance. The Anekāntavāda of the Jainas accepts these different ways of expression in preference to Ekāntavāda of the Vedantists or others.
End of Chapter 2

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Chapter III
नित्यत्वैकान्तपक्षेऽपि विक्रिया नोपपद्यते। प्रागेव कारकाभावः क्व प्रमाणं क्व तत्फलम् ॥37 ॥ nityatvaikāntapakşe'pi vikriyā nopapadyate, prāgeva kārakābhāvaḥ kva pramāṇam kva tat
phalam.
37. In the view of those who hold absolute permanent existence, there cannot be any modification. For, at the beginning there is want of an instrumental cause. How can there be a cause or its effect?
COMMENTARY This verse discusses the Sārkhya view holding that a Purusa exists without any kind of change. If it be accepted beforehand that the eternal Puruşa is void of change, then there cannot be any modification arising from it. There must be a cause giving rise to an effect. By denying the cause we also deny the effect. So the theory of the Sānkhya that the substances with all their varieties are created by the conjunction of the Purusa with Prakrti is not maintainable. For, one devoid of change, cannot give rise to any modification.
प्रमाणकारकैर्व्यक्तं व्यक्तं चेदिन्द्रियार्थवत्। ते च नित्ये विकार्यं किं साधोस्ते शासनाद्बहिः ॥38 ॥ pramāņakārakairvyaktam vyaktar chedindriyārthavat, te cha nitye vikāryam kim sādhoste śāsanād-bahiḥ.
38. If these be revealed by pramānas and kārakas like substances known by the senses, these are also eternal.

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How can these be subject to modification? These inconsistencies, O Lord! are excluded from your doctrine.
COMMENTARY If it be argued that even if we do not admit modifications, we can hold that mahat, ahankāra etc., as accepted by the Sānkhya system of philosophy, are things established by pramāṇas (pratyakşa, anumāna etc.) or by kārakas (kartı-subject, karma-object etc.). To support this, we might urge the example that by senses we get knowledge of objects as by the eye we see things. In reply to this, we say that pramāṇas and kārakas being accepted as eternal by the followers of the Sārkhya view, modifications cannot arise owing to absence of cause. In Anekāntavāda, however, there being no adherence to any absolute view-point, such defects are not possible.
यदि सत् सर्वथा कार्यं पुंवन्नोत्पत्तुमर्हति। परिणामप्रक्तृप्तिश्च नित्यत्वैकान्तवाधिनी ॥39॥ yadi sat sarvathā kāryam punvannotpattumarhati, pariņāma-praklçptischa nityatvaikāntavādhini.
39. If the effect is always in existence, it cannot come into being (as it will be) similar to Puruşa (whose eternal existence is admitted by the followers of Sārkhya). If there be an idea of modifications, it will entirely oppose (the view of) its eternal existence.
COMMENTARY If the effects be held to be always eternal, there cannot by any question of their happening in existence from causes, for these effects are accepted as eternal like the Puruşa of the Sānkhya view. The idea that we may consider the existence of modification by change is untenable, for that would be opposed to its eternal existence. That is to say, by accepting effects to be eternal, their causes are denied,

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and if modification by changes is admitted, it bars eternity.
पुण्यपापक्रिया न स्यात् प्रेत्यभावः फलं कुतः । बन्धमोक्षौ च तेषां न येषां त्वं नासि नायकः ॥ 40 ॥ punya-pāpa-kriyā na syāt pretyabhāvaḥ phalam
kutaḥ,
bandha-mokṣau cha teṣāṁ na yeṣāṁ tvaṁ nāsi
nāyakaḥ.
40. There will be no virtuous or sinful acts. How can there be re-birth as fruits (of the same). O Lord! whom you do not guide cannot (establish) bondage or liberation.
COMMENTARY
If Prakrti be accepted as eternal like Puruşa, there will be no virtuous or sinful acts, for, Prakṛti being eternal, cannot have these variations. And the view that re-birth happens according to good or bad acts done in this life, then becomes untenable because if the cause of being born in different manner in the next life be absent, how can the effect take place? Naturally, bondage or liberation will become untenable under this view.
This point has already been discussed in verse 8 where it has been shown that to accept the view of the Ekantvādins would lead to denial of virtuous or sinful acts and the next life.1
क्षणिकैकान्तपक्षेऽपि प्रेत्यभावाद्यसंभवः ।
प्रत्यभिज्ञाद्यभावान्न कार्यारम्भः कुतः फलम् ॥41 ॥
kṣaṇikaikāntapakṣe'pi pretyabhāvādyasambhavaḥ, pratyabhijñādyabhāvānna kāryārambhaḥ kutaḥ
phalam.
41. In the view of those who accept Kṣaṇikaikānta 1. “कुशलाकुशलं कर्म” (Verse 8 ) । “ इत्यत्र तदसंभवस्य समर्थितत्वात्।” Astasahasri.

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(absolute transitoriness), existence after death etc. is impossible. As there will be no Pratyabhijñā etc. there cannot be any beginning of any effect leading to any fruit.
COMMENTARY This verse is to refute the view of the Buddhists who hold the transitory nature of knowledge. For, to accept this transitory nature, we shall have to deny memory etc. Because, as soon as knowledge disappears, being transitory, it cannot remember what it had experienced before and comparing it what it experiences now. It cannot say that it remembers the same as experienced before. Existence after death is accepted to be regulated by the action and intentions of a being in this life. But if everything disappears as transitory, such actions and intentions cannot be causes in regulating rebirth which is accepted by the Buddhist philosophy. Innumerable stories are current in Buddhistic literature regarding the previous lives of Buddha.
If a man does not remember his previous experience, how can he act to satisfy his desire by doing necessary acts. One collects firewood, cooking pot, rice and water, wishing to cook food. Without pratyabhijñā (memory) this action (kāryārambha) can never take place, and the fruits of the act (phala) can consequently never happen.
यद्यसत् सर्वथा कार्यं तन्मा जनि खपुष्पवत् । मोपादाननियामोऽभून्माश्वासः कार्यजन्मनि ॥42॥ yadyasat sarvathā kāryam tanmā jani khapușpa-vat, mopādānaniyāmo'bhūn-māśvāsaḥ kāryajanmani.
42. If the effect be always non-existent, it cannot in that case ever happen, (as) a flower in the sky (can never get into existence). The rule of (existence according to) material will not in that case exist) and there will be no expectation in the rising of the effect.

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COMMENTARY Another argument is preferred against the Buddhists in this verse. That which is entirely non-existent like 'a flower in the sky' or 'horns of a hare' cannot come into existence. So it cannot be said that effects are non-existent from before. Again, substances are created from materials, e.g., a pitcher is made from clay, a cloth is made from threads etc. Connection between material and the substances produced will disappear, if effects (like pitcher, cloth etc.) are regarded as asat. Further, we shall not in that case be unable to expect what would be created from which (viz., a pitcher from clay or a cloth from threads). But in our practical experience we find that there is an essential connection between the material and the thing produced from the same. We expect that such and such a thing would be produced from such a material.
न हेतुफलभावादिरन्यभावादनन्वयात्। Walan: Haltirgan: TT 1143 11 na hetuphala-bhāvādiranyabhāvādananvayāt, santānāntaravannaikaḥ santānas-tadvataḥ prthak.
43. Being different and unconnected, relationship of cause and effect cannot exist, as one cannot be like another santāna. For, a santāna and that having a santāna are quite different.
COMMENTARY
The view of the Buddhist Kșaņikavāda recognising different moments and substances or knowledge modified by these moments and unconnected with one another, but taking rise one after the other is untenable. For it is accepted that a moment and the substance or knowledge modified according to a particular moment are different. These being quite distinct and unconnected with one

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another cannot bear the relationship of cause and effect. If all existence is of a fleeting nature, and everything, mere currents of incessant change, how can the relationship of cause and effet exist between unconnected and different substances?
अन्येष्वनन्यशब्दोऽयं संवृतिर्न मृषा कथम्। मुख्यार्थः संवृतिर्नास्ति विना मुख्यान्न संवृतिः ॥44 ॥ anyeșvananyaśabdo'yam samvịtirna mộşā katham, mukhyārthah samvștirnāsti vină mukhyānna
samvștiḥ.
44. This word without difference is applied to others .in fiction. (If so) why this fictitious application is not false? The real object cannot be fictitious and without a real object there cannot be any application by analogy.
COMMENTARY This is another argument to refute the Buddhists who hold the view of Ksaņikavāda. It is urged by the Buddhists that there is no being. Everything is always becoming. To refute this view it is mentioned by the Jainas that becoming is not possible for what is not being. “Cause nd effect are in reality two phases of one and the ame thing. The two are relative terms with their solidarity So vital that the negation of the one is the negation of the other. But Kşanikavāda makes the relation fictitious and consequently there is neither cause nor effect in any case. Causation is thus reduced to a mere 'sequence in time'. But even this idea of mere time relation is untenable in Buddhism. If there is no cause, if there is nothing in the cause that is necessarily productive of the effect and if there is no essential relation between the two, all certainty in the natural order vanishes and there remains no uniformity even for bare timesuccession."} 1. Introduction to Jainism, pages 114-115.

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Again, if it be urged that the word meaning the present moment (ananya-sabda) is applied to other moments (anyeșu) only by a fictitious application is an illusion or a mental habit and not a real fact. In answer it is urged that an illusion presupposes a reality of which it is an illusion. When we speak of a man to be like a lion, we must have seen a lion. The lion (mukhyārtha) cannot be an illusion and without it (vinā mukhyāt) a comparative application based on fictitious application is not possible. The fiction of causal relation is founded upon unquestionable facts.
चतुष्कोटेर्विकल्पस्य सर्वान्तेषूक्त्ययोगतः। तत्त्वान्यत्वमवाच्यं च तयोः सन्तानतद्वतोः ॥45॥ chatuşkotervikalpasya sarvānteşūktyayogataḥ, tattvānyatvamavāchyam cha tayoḥ santāna-tadvatoḥ.
45. As it is not fit to speak about the fourfold alternation regarding all qualities, nothing can be said about one-ness or many-ness of santāna and a substance possessing santāna.
COMMENTARY The Buddhists might resort to the argument of unknowability. “The (causal) relation is (i) either true or (ii) untrue, or (iii) is both true and untrue, or (iv) is neither true nor untrue. If cause and effect are one, there is no reason why we should distinguish them. If they are distinct, it is useless to find out relations as there is no certainty in the relations. To say that both the alternatives are true, is opposed to experience. Lastly, to deny both the alternatives, would be to deprive everything of its nature. So, they conclude that nothing can be said on the point. The answer to this... is that if you call all relations to be unknowable, the things of which they are the relations also become unknowable by the same mode of reasoning. Again, the four-fold alternation (chatuskoți-vikalpa) by being called unknowable becomes immediatly known. And also, if

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107 everything changes totally every moment, what reason have we to accept an opinion that also changes with every passing moment?” (Introduction to Jainism, pages 116-117.)
अवक्तव्यचतुष्कोटिविकल्पोऽपि न कथ्यताम्। असन्तिमवस्तु स्यादविशेष्यविशेषणम् ॥46॥ avaktavya-chatuşkoți-vikalpo'pi na kathyatām, asarvāntamavastu syādaviseşya-viseṣaṇam.
46. Do not say the indescribability of the fourfold alternation. For, then, (the result) will be non-existence of all qualities as well as substances possessing qualities and nothing can then be said to exist.
COMMENTARY In the commentary to the previous verse, the point taken up here has been explained. The Buddhists are told “Do not say that fourfold alternations are unknowable.” For then the distinctions will disappear, as one thing will overlap another. The qualifying attributes will be absent and the substances qualified in this manner will also totally disappear. This theory of the Buddhists will lead to the destruction of all knowledge, as all properties of objects become fictitious for the reason that nothing will remain stable of which they may be the properties.
द्रव्याद्यन्तरभावेन निषेधः संज्ञिनः सतः। असद्भेदो न भावस्तु स्थानं विधिनिषेधयोः ॥47॥ dravyādyantara-bhāvena niședhaḥ sanjñinaḥ sataḥ, asadbhedo na bhāvastu sthānam vidhi-nişedhayoḥ.
47. Denial of qualities of other objects regarding dravya etc. is made only in case of an existing object. The distinction regarding non-existent substances cannot become subject matter of affirmation or negation.

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ĀPTA-MIMĀŃSĀ COMMENTARY It has already been explained that existenece of every substance is taken with respect to its own dravya, kşetra, kāla and bhāva, that is to say, it exists with regard to these four limitations, but it does not exist in relation to dravya, kşetra, kāla and bhāva of another substance. The point is that existence and non-existence in such a case are connected with a thing which has existence and not with a thing which has no existence. Limitations of a non-existing substance can never become a determinant regarding existence or non-existence.
अवस्त्वनभिलाप्यं स्यात् सर्वान्तैः परिवर्जितम्। attaralgai afa yfir fagfira 1148 II avastvanabhilāpyam syāt sarvāntaiḥ parivarjitam, vastvevāvastutāṁ yāti prakriyāyā viparyayāt.
48. Void of all qualities, everything would become nonexistent, being indescribable. By a reversion of the process (of reasoning), non-existence is affirmed of existent objects only.
COMMENTARY By affirming absolute indescribability, the result would be that every substance, being devoid of differentiating qualities, would become non-existent. We establish the existence of a pitcher by a negative process of reasoning that it is not a cloth or another object. So the adoption of the view of absolute indescribability is opposed to all reason and experience.
सर्वान्ताश्चेदवक्तव्यास्तेषां किं वचनं पुनः। Hiqrasataqda Rurffauti na 1149 11 sarvāntāschedavaktavyās teşām kim vachanam
punaḥ, samvịtis-chen-mşşaivaiņā paramārtha-viparyayāt.

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49. If all the qualities are indescribable, how can we even speak of the same? If (you say) that it is illusory, then it must be false, being opposed to reality.
COMMENTARY Before we call a thing ‘unknowable', we must have some knowledge about it. We cannot say all qualities or properties to be unknowable because it is for the above reason a self-contradictory position. The very affirmation of unknowability cannot take place. If anyone tries to avoid this by saying that this is not real but fictitious, the result would be that it is false. Without any real substance being in existence, there cannot be any illusion or fictitious appliance of the same. The Avaktavya-vādins are therefore inconsistent with themselves.
अशक्यत्वादवाच्यं किमभावात् किमबोधतः। आधन्तोक्तिद्वयं न स्यात् किं व्याजेनोच्यतां स्फुटम् ॥50॥ asakyatvādavāchyam kií abhāvāt kimabodhataḥ, ādyantokti-dvayam na syāt kim vyājenochyatām
sphuţam.
50. Is indescribability due to want of power, or for non-existence, or for want of knowledge? The first and the third (alternatives) cannot happen. What is the use of evasion? Speak clearly.
COMMENTARY The person holding the view that everything is indescribable is asked a question in this verse. There can be three possibilities in indescribability. The first is want of power. The Buddhists say that Buddha is possessed of the power of ten thousand elephants. It cannot therefore be said by the Buddhists that indescribability arises out of want of power. It cannot again be said that it is non-existent for the very proof

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will become non-existent in such a case, and non-existence cannot therefore be established by any process of reasoning. Thirdly, if you say that indescribability is due to want of knowledge, this also is open to objection as the Buddhists accept Buddha as omniscient. So none of those three alternatives are tenable to establish indescribability.
In Asta-sahasri, it is mentioned that want of tongue etc. which are the vocal organs may lead to absence of power. Again, a man who has taken the vow of silence or one who does not utter any word through modesty or fear might be said to be wanting in power. But all persons at all times are not affected by such disabilities. So this cannot establish indescribability.
हिनस्त्यनभिसन्धातृ न हिनस्त्यभिसन्धिमत्। बध्यते तद्वयापेतं चित्तं बद्धं न मुच्यते ॥51॥ hinastyanabhisandhātr na hinasty-abhisandhimat, badhyate tad-dvyayāpetam chittaṁ baddham na
muchyate.
51. One who does not determine to kill, will kill. The man who determins to kill does not kill. A soul cannot get bondage in both these cases and being in bondage cannot be liberated.
COMMENTARY The Buddhists hold that mind is formed of unconnected but successive sensations from objects. If this view is accepted, we are faced with this absurdity. When a butcher kills an animal, the mind that determines upon the killing is not the mind that kills the animal at the next moment. So the mind at the latter moment commits an act without any motive or responsibility. Again, if we hold that all killing is sin, and the butcher 1. In Asta-sahasri, the ten powers of Buddha are enumerated as kşamā,
maitri, dhyāna, dāna, virya, sila, prajñā, karuņā upaya and pramoda.

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will have to suffer the consequences of his act, we may say that cannot be possible for the mind that planned the act and that which executed the act are quite different from the mind that has to suffer the consequences. “The Buddhistic theory of changes following each other in unbroken succession being so changing without cause, the killing of animals by a butcher is not caused and therefore implies no responsiblity."1 Bondage from karma cannot therefore arise from such circumstances and there cannot also be liberation because all knowledge and volition will be without the unity of apperception to connect them.
This is another argument against the Kşaņikavādins.
अहेतुकत्वान्नाशस्य हिंसाहेतुर्न हिंसकः। चित्तसन्ततिनाशश्च मोक्षो नाष्टाङ्गहेतुकः ॥52 ॥ ahetukatvānnāśasya himsāheturna himsakaḥ, chittasantatināśaścha mokṣo nāştānga-hetukaḥ.
52. Because destruction is without any cause, the person causing injury cannot be the cause of injury. There would be no nirvāņa or destruction of chain of minds. There will be no liberation by eight causes.
COMMENTARY The Buddhists accept that destruction takes place of itself. To accept such a view would be to deny that a person injuring another is the cause of such injury. Further, the nirvāṇa as also liberation resulting from eight causes? as accepted by the Buddhists will also become untenable for these also being without any cause cannot happen.
In other words, it is urged that you accept that nirvāṇa is caused by the disappearance of the chain of minds and that mokṣa (liberation) is caused by eight 1. Introduction to Jainism, A. B. Latthe, p. 118. 2. The eight causes of moksa are (i) samyaktva, (ii) sanjñā, (iii) sanjñi,
(iv) vākkāyakarma, (v) antarvyāyāma, (vi) ājīva, (vii) smrti, (viii) samādhi.

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ĀPTA-MĪMĀMSĀ things. But by denying any cause at all of destruction, you preach against your own supposition regarding causes of destruction producing nirvāņa or causes producing liberation. विरूपकार्यारम्भाय यदि हेतुसमागमः। आश्रयिभ्यामनन्योऽसावविशेषादयुक्तवत् ॥53 ॥ virūpakāryārambhāya yadi hetu-samāgamaḥ, āśrayibhyām ananyo'sāvavićeşādayuktavat.
53. If cause comes in to produce unconnected effects, it will become one with its effects, for there will be ng distinction, as (this will be) like unconnected (ideas).
COMMENTARY
The Buddhist view is attacked in another way. Suppose a pitcher is broken by a man. The act produces destruction of the pitcher as well as production of broken parts. Now the cause of destruction and production is one and the same in such cases. This will make the view of the Buddhists, viz.: destruction arises of itself and is not caused by anything, untenable. The cause (asau' in the verse) is equally and solely connected with the effects (“āśrayibhyām' in the verse), viz., the distruction of the pitcher and creation of the shred. The destruction and production in such a case are identical (aviseşād' in the verse).
When we see a simšapā tree, we form an idea that it is a tree as well as that it is simšapā. Again when we see a picture, we have a knowledge of it simultaneously with the knowledge of its colour, blue etc. In these cases, the separate entities of knowledge become welded together and the causes are not different. If different causes be accepted in such cases, the fault would be loss of coherence. 1. “यथैव हि शिंशपात्ववृक्षत्वयोश्चित्रज्ञाननीलादिनिर्भासयोर्वा तादात्म्यमापन्नयोरयुक्तयोः
कारणसन्निपातो न भिन्नः संभवति, एककारणकलापादेव आत्मलाभादन्यथा dicieRTatar” Astasahasri.

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स्कन्धसन्ततयश्चैव संवृतित्वादसंस्कृताः। स्थित्युत्पत्तिव्ययास्तेषां न स्युः खरविषाणवत् ॥54॥ skandha-santatayaśchaiva samvștitvādasaṁskřtāḥ, sthityutpattivyayāsteṣam na syuḥ kharavişāņavat.
54. The connections of skandhas also are unreal, being illusory. These cannot arise, exist or disappear just as in the example of "horns of an ass.”
COMMENTARY The Buddhists accept five skandhas: (1) rūpa, (2) vedanā, (3) vijnana, (4) sanjna and (5) samskāra.1 These being regarded as fictitious applications will necessary be illusory and unreal. There are three stages of a substance- its natural state, e.g., clay; its appearance in a particular form, e.g., a pitcher; and its destruction, e.g., breaking of the pot into shreds. Horns of a hare cannot have these stages being entirely non-existent. The five skandhas of the Buddhists also will become the same, being unreal and illusory. Fictitious relation of cause and effect between the skandhas cannot be conceded if the Buddhist wants to take his stand on this point, because all fictions or illusions are unreal and cannot have sthiti, utpatti and vināśa.
The Ksaņikaikānta view is thus refuted like the Nityaikānta view.2 विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् । अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्ति वाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥55॥ virodhānnobhayaikātmyaṁ syādvāda-nyāya
___vidvisām, avāchyataikānte'pyuktirnāvāchyamiti yujyate. 1. “रूपरसगन्धस्पर्शपरमाणवः सजातीयविजातीयव्यावृत्ताः परस्परासंबद्धा रूपस्कन्धाः।
सुखदुःखादयो वेदनास्कन्धाः । सविकल्पकनिर्विकल्पकज्ञानभेदा विज्ञानस्कन्धाः । वृक्षादिनामानि (शब्दाः) संज्ञास्कन्धाः। ज्ञानपुण्यपापवासनाः संस्कारस्कन्धाः।" Pandit Bansidhar
in his note on Aştasahasri. 2. “ततो न क्षणिकैकान्तः श्रेयान्नित्यैकान्तवत् सर्वथा विचारासहत्वात्।"

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ĀPTA-MĪMĀSĀ 55. The view of those who do not follow the logic of Syādvāda and hold that opposites can be inherent in a substance, is not tenable as it is self-contradictory. The view of those who accept the view of indescribableness without any limitation is also not tenable.
COMMENTARY It cannot be urged by the Buddhists to escape the absurdity of their position that permanence and nonpermanence should jointly be accepted. For this would be impossible as simultaneous existence of life and death. Absurdity will arise in accepting indescribability as in the case of a man who says “I am under the vow of silence and never speak.”2
नित्यं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञानान्नाकस्मात्तदविच्छिदा।
fordi manara a realora: 115611 nityam tat-pratyabhijñānānnākasmāttadavichchhidā, kṣaṇikam kālabhedāt te buddhyasañcharadoştaḥ.
56. That (jīva etc.) is permanent, from pratyabhijñāna. It is not sudden, having a connection. Owing to difference in time they are momentary, for otherwise there would be the fault of non-flowing of knowledge.
COMMENTARY
After refuting the view of Ekāntavādins, the Anekānta view is now established. We see a man named Devadatta and subsquently we recognise him as such. This process is pratyabhijñāna. The seven tattvas of Jainism, jīva, ajīva, āsrava, bandha, samvara, nirjarā and mokṣa are eternal. These are recognised by pratyabhijñāna when the same is without
1. "Aid Chlutar 4stohet, farteng yoyillanuevaa" Astašati. 2. “सर्वथानभिलाप्यं तत्त्वम् इत्यभिलपत एव वचनविरोधात् सदा मौनिवतिकोऽहम्
Fruitcaa" Aștasahasri.

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any hindrance. A wrong recognition is known as recognition without any basis (akasmāt).1 It is not possible to know one substance and another at the same time, denying the movement through inclination of mind passing from one to the other. Avoiding this fault, the Anekanta view is that according to modifications, the seven tattvas may in one sense be recognised as transitory for there is a difference in time in seeing and recognition.2
115
न सामान्यात्मनोदेति न व्येति व्यक्तमन्वयात् । व्येत्युदेति विशेषात्ते सहैकत्रोदयादि सत् ॥57॥ na sāmānyātmanodeti na vyeti vyaktamanvayāt, vyetyudeti viseṣātte sahaikatrodayādi sat.
57. It does not come into existence or go out of existence according to sāmānya svabhāva (common nature). This is clear from its existence in a general way. It comes into existence or goes out of existence according to its viseṣa svabhāva (nature peculiar to itself). Sat is simultaneous possession in one of udaya (birth) etc.
COMMENTARY
According to Jainism "everything has its natures, both those peculiar to itself and those in common with other things." "Any substance, any real, concrete, existing thing or being can be looked upon in a general way or in a particular way; that is to say, it has natures in common with other things (sāmānya svabhāva) and at the same time it has natures peculiar to itself (viseṣa svabhāva). For instance, this book is matter, in common with all other material things, and at the same time it is a
1. “सर्वं जीवादितत्त्वं स्यान्नित्यमेव प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वात् । न अकस्मात् तत् प्रत्यभिज्ञानं तस्य अविच्छेदेन अनुभवात् । निर्विषयं हि प्रत्यभिज्ञानं अकस्मादिति प्रसिद्धम् । यथा तादृशे तदेवेदम् इति, तत्रैव वा तादृशमिदमिति भ्रान्तं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ।” Astasahasri. 2. “ततः क्षणिकं कालभेदात् दर्शनप्रत्यभिज्ञानसमययोरभेदे तदुभयाभावप्रसङ्गात् ।” Astasati. 3. Jainism, H. Warren, p. 18.

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particular matter, viz., paper. According to Jainism there is no such thing as matter (pudgala) or any substance (dravya) only in general; wherever there is matter, it is matter of a particular kind; paper for instance, not stone; or wherever there is substance (dravya) it is substance of a particular kind; matter (pudgala) for instance, not space." Space is substance according to Jainism.
Now, sat (being or is-ness) is the differentia of substance.2 Sat is simultaneous possession of utpāda (birth or coming into existence), vyaya (death, decay or going out of existence) and dhrauvya (permanence or continuous sameness of existence).3
116
From the point of view of the permanent nature of the thing (Dravyarthika naya-sāmānyātmanā in the verse), there is no birth or death (existence or disappearance). From this point of view we hold that differences of time, space and modifications inhere together in a substance and though there might be differences in the units making up the mass of any substance, there is always unity in the mass.
Again, from the view of Paryāyārthika naya we hold that substance is the subject of qualities (guna) and modifications (paryāya). "The quality stays with the substance and is constant; the modifications succeed each other. A particular piece of clay always has form, but not always the same form. It is never without form; form is a constant quality; it may be now round, then square; these are modifications."4
From the two previous points of view taken together, we define that substance is that in which there are origination, destruction and permanence. "With the origination of a new mode of existence there was the destruction of the old mode of existence, while the substance has remained permanent. With the destruction
1. Jainism, H. Warren, p. 17.
2. "I" Tattvärthadhigama-sutra, V. 29.
3. “उत्पादव्ययध्रौव्ययुक्तं सत् ।” Ibid, V. 30.
4. Jainism, Herbert Warren, p. 15-16.

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of a house, there is the origination or coming into existence of a heap of debris, while the bricks etc. are the same. The substance is neither destroyed nor originated, only the mode of existence; only the relations between the parts, in this case.”l
"The important matter is this: birth or death (utpāda and vyaya) are of a condition of a dravya (substance). The dravya is uncreated and indestructible; its essential qualities remain the same (dhrauvya); it is only its paryāya or condition, that can and does change. And it is logically neccessary from the first position taken up by Jainism, namely, that substances and attributes are distinguishable but not distinct. The attributes are not all fixed; they come and go (utpāda, vyaya) but the substance remains (dhrauvya).”
कार्योत्पादः क्षयो हेतोर्नियमाल्लक्षणात् पृथक् । qat urRHAIGHT: ayoyaa 1158|| kāryotpādaḥ kṣayo hetor niyamāllakşaņāt přthak, na tau jātyādyavasthānād-anapekşāḥ kha-puşpavat.
58. The appearance of kārya is the cause of destruction of cause. But surely according to differentia these are separate. Because jāti etc. exists in both of these, they cannot be said to be (non-existent) like 'a flower in the sky' because they are not absolutely interdepenent.
COMMENTARY To give a familiar example, a potter prepares a pitcher of clay. The potter is the instrumental cause, but the clay is the material cause (upādāna kāraṇa). When a pitcher is produced, this kārya necessarily means destruction of clay in its original form (upādāna kāraņa). But the inherent qualities of existence, being capable of being perceived by the senses exist both in the pitcher 1. Jainism, Herbert Warren, p. 16. 2. Outlines of Jainism, J.L. Jaini, pages 11-12.

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as well as in clay. It cannot be urged that there is no connection between the original clay and the pitcher. So utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya cannot be said to be nonexistent like a flower in the sky.' The above example will show that in some respect these are identical, while in another respect these are different. This appreciation of different aspects in a single substance is the bedrock of Anekāntavāda of the Jaina philosophy.
118
घटमौलिसुवर्णार्थी नाशोत्पादस्थितिष्वयम् । शोकप्रमोदमाध्यस्थ्यं, जनो याति सहेतुकम् ॥59 ॥
ghața-mauli-suvarṇārthi nāśotpada-sthitiṣvayam, śoka-pramoda-mādhyasthyam jano yāti sahetukam.
59. A person wishing a pitcher, ornament or gold gets grief, joy or indifference caused by destruction, creation and permanent existence.
COMMENTARY
An example is given how from a cause the three, utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya can arise. Suppose, there is a golden pitcher. It is broken and transformed into an ornament or it is kept only in its material, named gold. A person who wishes for a pitcher feels grief when it is broken (vyaya or nasa or destruction). He who wishes for ornament becomes joyful when it is manufactured (utpāda) with the gold of the pitcher. And one who is satisfied merely with gold, remains unaffected whether the pitcher be destroyed or ornament be not manufactured. Gold as a material always remains the same (dhrauvya). It appears in the form of an ornament (uṭpāda) disappearing as a pitcher (vyaya). All substances have these threefold qualifications. (See verse 57.)
पयोव्रतो न दध्यत्ति न पयोऽत्ति दधिव्रतः 1 अगोरसव्रतो नोभे तस्मात् तत्त्वं त्रयात्मकम् ॥6॥

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payovrato na dadhyatti na payo'atti dadhi-vrataḥ, agorasa-vrato nobhe tasmāt tattvam trayātmakam.
60. One who has made a vow to drink only milk, does not drink curd. One who has taken a vow to drink curd only, does not drink milk. The person who has taken a vow not to drink anything yeilded by a cow, does not drink either. So substances possess threefold qualifications.
COMMENTARY Another example is given to elucidate the Jaina view that all substances have threefold qualifications, viz., utpāda, vyaya and dhrauvya. Milk is derived from a cow, curd is prepared from milk. One who will drink only milk, disregards curd and one who will only drink curd, disregards milk, though curd is produced from milk. Again, one who will not drink either of these, disregards them both. Now though the same thing is changed by a process, it is not equally acceptable to all. So prominence is given to one aspect of substances, disregarding the other aspects, though it must be understood that by doing so, the other aspects are not at all denied.
End of Chapter III.

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कार्यकारणनानात्वं गुणगुण्यन्यतापि च। सामान्यतद्वदन्यत्वं चैकान्तेन यदीष्यते ॥61॥ kārya-kāraṇa-nānātvaṁ guna-gunyanyatāpi cha, sāmānya-tad-vadanyatvam chaikāntena yadișyate.
61. If those holding Ekānta view, accept difference of cause and effect or qualities and things possessed of the same and difference between common existence, and dravya, guna and karma. (The answer is given in the next verse).
COMMENTARY
In this chapter the Ekānta view of the followers of Nyāya and Vaiseșika schools of philosophy, viz., everything is separate from everything else, is refuted.
The view opposed to Jainism is laid down in this verse. The Ekānta view is that a kārya (pitcher) etc. is different from its causes (e.g., its upādāna cause, clay). Again the quality, e.g., form etc. (guna) of a thing is different from the substance having the same (gunin). Further, the existence features common to one genus (sāmānya) are different from those possessing it (tadvat, viz., cow etc.). If this view is held, the result will be faulty as shown in the next verse.
एकस्यानेकवृत्तिर्न भागाभावाद् बहूनि वा। nificare are trei stata le 116211 ekasyāneka-výttirna bhāgābhāvād bahūni vā, bhāgitvād vāsya naikatvaṁ doạo vịtteranārhate.
62. In the non-Jaina view the fault would be-one would not have application to many as there will be no

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differentiation. There would be many (kāryas). Again owing to difference, there would be no one-ness.
COMMENTARY
The fault would be this. A pitcher (which is an avayavi, having form) will have no application to the forms (avayavas) giving rise to it. Because there will be absence of parts. If absolute separation of parts be accepted from the thing made up of the same, viz., that of threads from the cloth, then one (viz., cloth) cannot have connection with many (threads) forming its parts. Again, being separate, its one-ness cannot be affirmed.
“If every individual is independent, at least this individuality is a common property of all, e.g., materiality is the common property of ghata (a pitcher), pata (a cloth) etc. If not so, being devoid of individuality, their independence also would be lost. Although individuals are separate, individuality is a property residing upon all in common and hence even individuals are homogeneous by their common property. Thus even the individualism of the Naiyāyikas (and Vaišeşikas) is vitiated by the very presupposition of their own school.”l
देशकालविशेषेऽपि स्याद् वृत्तिर्युतसिद्धवत्। HARSTATT RIFL Latarupareat: 1163||| deśa-kāla-višeşe'pi syād vịttiryuta-siddhavat, samānadeśatā na syān mūrta-kāraņa-kāryayoḥ.
63. There will be existence like things separate in time and place. There will not be oneness in place in the case of cause and effect having form.
1. An Introduction to Jainism, p. 125

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COMMENTARY
A pitcher and a cloth, for example, are accepted as separate by the Naiyāyikas not only from themselves but also from their parts (avayava). The result would be that the parts and the objects having parts might be said to exist in different place and time which is absurd. If they try to escape by saying that we accept existence in the same place we urge that even this is not possible for things having form (avayavi) which cannot exist with their parts (avayavas) in the same place. These will occupy different space, like an ass and an elephant.1
Yutasiddha and ayutasiddha are special terms used in Nyaya and Vaiśesika philosophies. Among two things, if one cannot exist without the other, both of these are known as ayutasiddha. Yutasiddhi is separate or interdependent existence. This co-inherence (samavāya) will further be illustrated in the next verse. According to Nyaya philosophy this co-inherence exists between the whole and its parts, the class and the individual, substance and qualities, agent and action, the ultimate atom and its viseṣa.
Samavāya will be mentioned in the following verse. In the Bhāṣya by Prasastapāda on the Vaiseṣika philosophy "Samavāya is defined by the notion ayuta-siddhi and yutasiddhi with the help of samavaya. yutasiddhi is (1) the independent possession of movement of two or one of two eternal things; thus a moving atom is yutasiddha in comparison with another atom or physical space; and (2) the relation of samavaya in separate existences in the case of transient substances; thus a stick and (the body of) the bearer of the stick are yutasiddha, since they are both transient and inhere in separate groups of atoms. On the other hand, samavāya exists between objects which are not yutasiddha, and one of which is that which contains (ādhāra), whilst the other is that which is
1. “अवयवावयविनोः समानदेशे वृत्तिर्न भवेत्, मूर्तिमत्वात् खरकरभवत् ।” Astaśati.

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contained (ādheya); thus there is samavāya between the aggregate and its portions, the quality and the substance, the genus called substance (dravyatva) and the particular substance, existence and the thing existent.”l
आश्रयाश्रयिभावान्न स्वातन्त्र्यं समवायिनाम्। gut: # HETT 7 : Hah: 116411 āśray āśrayi-bhāvān-na svātantryam samavāyinām, ityuktaḥ sa sambandho na yuktaḥ samavāyibhiḥ.
64. If it be said that one being dependent on another there is no difference of samavāyins, (we reply) that that relation of coinherence is not connected with samavāyins.
COMMENTARY Samavāya (co-inherence) in Nyāya philosophy is described as 'intimate relation'. It exists in things which cannot exist separately. Two things which cannot exist separately are those of which two, the one exists only as lodged in the other. Such pairs are, parts and what is made up of the parts, qualities and the thing qualified, action and agent, species and individual, different and eternal substances.?
The Naiyāyikas might say, the samavāyin (a cloth, for example) is not separate from its parts (threads) because these have co-inherence. The Jaina view is that this view cannot be made relevant with the doctrine of cause and effect. As the Naiyāyikas accept that from the material threads, (upādāna kārana) a cloth is woven by a weaver, (instrumental kārana), the view of co-inherence will destroy the theory of causation.
1. Pravachana-sāra, B. Faddegon, p.70, note 1. 2. "नित्यसंबन्धः समवायोऽयुतसिद्धवृत्तिः। ययोर्द्वयोर्मध्य एकमपराश्रितमेवावतिष्ठते तावयुतसिद्धौ।
Bauarculant quruforait fabulerant Hilda fastes t gi" Tarkasangraha.

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सामान्यं समवायश्चाप्येकैकत्र समाप्तितः। अन्तरेणाश्रयं न स्यान्नाशोत्पादिषु को विधिः ॥65॥ sāmānyaṁ samavāyaş-chāpyekaikatra samāptitaḥ, antareņāśrayam na syānnāśotpādiișu ko vidhiḥ.
65. Sāmānya and samavāya, being complete in one substance, will not exist without an asraya. So what will be the rule about the causation, destruction etc.
COMMENTARY The view of the Vaiseșikas is refuted. They hold that in reality the relationship of samavāya is with sāmānya (that which is the unchangeable substratum in different things) and the relationship of one samavāya with another (having no real connection) is merely a supposed or fictitious relationship.
In a permanent thing, the existence of sāmānya and samavāya will be complete. So each will lose its āśraya, and without aśraya their existence will be impossible, e.g., a cloth cannot exist without threads, or common properties cannot exist without individuals possessing the same. When existence itself will become impossible in this manner, on what basis will creation, destruction etc. will stand? The Vaiseșikas hold that "formerly a thing (pitcher etc.) did not exist in the place of its existence; it does not leave its former recipients after its existence; it itself occupies its place after existence, and being indestructible is not destroyed even after the destruction of asraya and each of samavāya and sāmānya is complete in the thing :” This view will become untenabale, being unable to explain destruction or creation of a substance.
1. “fetay-pant yra 7 Brita..., a ufa..., Fauna Targuaf..., 3 TSusangt
a 7 794f..., orta RHAITI a sta partera.” Astasahasri. The following verse laying down the same has been quoted by Pandit Bansidhar: “न याति न च तत्रास्ते न पश्चादस्ति नाशवत्। जहाति पूर्वं नाधारमहो व्यसनसन्ततिः ॥"

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सर्वथाऽनभिसम्बन्धः सामान्यसमवाययोः । ताभ्यामर्थो न सम्बद्धस्तानि त्रीणि खपुष्पवत् ॥66॥
125
sarvatha'nabhisambandhaḥ sāmānya-samavāyayoḥ, tābhyāmartho na sambaddhastāni trīņi khapuṣpavat.
66. Being in every respect unconnected, sāmānya and samavāya are also not connected with a substance. So all these three (are non-existent) like a flower in the sky.
COMMENTARY
There is no possibility of any relationship between sāmānya and samavāya. So a substance also is not connected with either of these. The Vaiseṣikas accept samyoga of dravyas only and samavāya as previously explained happens in the case of Ayutasiddhi. The very existence of sāmānya, samavāya and substances will therefore be impossible.
अनन्यतैकान्तेऽणूनां संघातेऽपि विभागवत् । असंहतत्वं स्याद्भूतचतुष्कं भ्रान्तिरेव सा ॥67॥
ananyataikānte'ņūnāṁ saṁghāte'pi vibhāgavat, asaṁhatatvam syād-bhūtachatuṣkam bhrāntireva sā.
67. In the ekanta view that atoms are always separate even in fusion there will be non-cohesion, for there will be individual separate existence even in combination just as when they are separate (in division). So the four elements (earth, air, fire and water) would become illusory.
COMMENTARY
This verse refutes the Buddhist view analogous to that of the Vaiseṣikas that there are eternal atoms corresponding to the four elements-earth, air, fire and water. Vijñānavādins among the Buddhists cannot be said to accept real atoms as they deny the reality of substance. The Jaina view is that the primary atom is

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not of four kinds according to the above-mentioned view, but it is only one in nature, though it is the coustitutive basis of the four dhātus (elements ) or modes of physical existence. The atom, according to Jainism, has its own essential nature which is distinct from that of the four elements.
Umāsvāmi has mentioned that matter has two chief forms, atom and molecule. Molecules are formed in three ways: (a) by division (bheda), e.g., when a penny will be cut into smallest possible pieces, each piece will retain the composition of the matter of the penny, (b) by fusion (samghāta), e.g., when water is formed by two parts of hydrogen and one of oxygen, (c) by both, viz., a mixed process of division and fusion as in cooking. Atom is obtained only by division (to an infinite extent) and molecules can sometimes be decomposed into their visible parts by division and union, e.g., marsh gas treated with chlorine gives methyl chloride and hydrochloric acid.
The argument used by the Jains as laid down in this verse is that if it be accepted that atoms have eternal separate existence, then they cannot produce anything by fusion (saṁghāta) by losing their separate entity. So they must be accepted to remain the same in the case of division (bheda) as in the case of fusion (samghāta) which is absurd according to experience. By supporting the theory of the divisibility in cases of atoms in fusion, the existence of the elements will become impossible.
कार्यभ्रान्तेरणुभ्रान्तिः कार्यलिङ्गं हि कारणम् । 39444919dfintei Tuoitida 7 116811 kārya-bhrānteraņubhrāntiḥ kāryalingam hi kāraṇam, ubhayābhāvatastatstham guņajātītarachcha na.
68. If kārya be illusory, atoms will also be illusory, 1. “300: FREMST I”, RIGHETE Srianti", GIGY: 1”, “GHETETT ATT:["
Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, Chapter V, Verses 25-28.

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because a cause is known from its effect. If both of these are non-existent, then guņa, jāti and the other (kriyā) cease to exist.
COMMENTARY The ekānta view that atoms are always separate on the ground that the idea of thickness etc. as gained in the sensation through eyes is illusory, is refuted in this verse. If the things seen be regarded as illusory, the atoms also are illusory, for effect shows the cause. If the effect be illusory, there cannot be any cause in reality and the atoms which are regarded as the cause, cannot be said to exist.
Again, if the existence of both, viz., the atoms and the substances produced by them be denied, guna e.g. quilities (rūpa, form etc.), jāti (genus) and kriyā (action) will become non-existent. For, how can these exist, when the very objects are illusory? There cannot be any smell of a flower in the sky'.1
एकत्वेऽन्यतराभावः शेषाभावोऽविनाभुवः। Paraliaujatega Hiqmaganda HT 116911 ekatve'nyatarābhāvaḥ śeşābhāv'ovinābhuvah, dvitvasankhyāvirodhascha samvịtischen mrsaiva sā.
69. If there be identity (of cause and effect), each of these will be non-existent. The other will become non-existent as one cannot exist without the other. There will be opposiiton to the number 'Two". (If you say) it is merely fictitious, that must be false.
COMMENTARY This verse refutes the Sankhya view about the identity of cause and effect. Cause and effect are not
1. "MA ARTidsla aceptaRUTY4144HT!” Aștasahasri.

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identical for in that case, why do you mention the two, viz., the cause (Pradhāna) produces the kāyas (mahat, aharkāra etc.). The effect will disappear, if it is identical with the cause. And with the disappearance of the effect the cause will also disappear; for in the case of cause and effect, one cannot exist without the other. “These two are relative terms with their solidarity so vital that the negation of the one is the negation of the other.”] If you urge that the kārya is embodied in the cause without having any separate existence and the cause is eternal, the answer is; the use of the number 'two' will become faulty in such a case. The difficulty cannot be avoided by saying that the mention of two' is fictitious, for in that case everything will become illusory. Without number, things counted cannot exist and an object void of all qualities such as being counted, must be nonexistent. So the Sānkhya view is as untenable as the Nyāya-vaiseșkra view, already discussed, regarding cause and effect
विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्। 3791cudan tayfadatareyfifa geed 117011 virodhānnobhayaikātmyam syādvāda-nyāya
vidviņām, avāchyataikānte'pyuktir-nāvāchyamiti yujyate.
70. For translation, see verse 13.
COMMENTARY The simultaneous existence of avayava and avayavi, guna and guņi, sāmānya and that possessing the same
1. An Introduction to Jainism by A.B. Lathe., p. 114 2. “यदि पुनः कार्यस्य कारणेऽनुप्रवेशात् पृथगभावाभावेऽपि कारणमेकमास्ते एव नित्यत्वाद्
sa 6M, GT Parationstestai" Astasahasri. 3. “परमार्थतः संख्यापाये संख्येयाव्यवस्थानात्, सकलधर्मशून्यस्य कस्यचिद् वस्तुनोऽसंभवात्।"
Ibid.

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cannot be established, as the same is opposed to the view of all of those who will accept only ekānta view. They also cannot maintain that these are indescribable form ekanta side. In Syādvāda, however, there is no flaw as by the adoption of different nayas, we can say of every substance that they are describable in one sense viz., vyañjana-paryaya and indecribable in another sense, viz., artha-paryāya.1
129
द्रव्यपर्याययोरैक्यं तयोरव्यतिरेकतः ।
परिणामविशेषाच्च शक्तिमच्छक्तिभावतः ॥ 71॥
dravya-paryayayoraikyaṁ tayoravyatirekataḥ, pariņāma-viśeṣāchcha śaktimachchhaktibhāvataḥ.
71. There is unity of dravya and paryāya because they do not have vyatireka (divergence). This is also established from particular parināmas and from possession of energy, having the quality of potentiality.
COMMENTARY
In this verse, the Jaina view of dravya paryāya is given. Umāsvāmi says, "Substance is possessed of attributes and modifications."2 "Gunas or attributes 1. “ स्यादवादाभ्युयगमे तु न दोषः, कथंचित् तथाभावोपलब्धेः ।” Asta-śati.
“सर्वं हि वस्तु व्यञ्जनपर्यायात्मकतया वाच्यमर्थ पर्यायात्मकतया वाच्यमिति enganfefeferene" Aṣṭa-sahasri.
Paryaya or mode of existence is viewed from two different aspects artha-paryaya and vyañjana-paryaya. "Dravya is but an entity that is continually changing... Permanancy through births and deaths, through creation and destruction gives to dravya a characteristic mode of existence every moment... This intrinsic change of dravya is known as artha-paryāya... vyañjana-paryāya has a pretty fixed duration of existence. Besides the molecular aggregation and disintegration that take place every moment in a physical object, the object may have a particular mode of existence, as a pot for example, for a certain duration of time. This paryaya of pot is vyanjana-paryāya of pudgala." (Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. III, Panchästikäyasāra, Introduction, p. xxi)
2. " " Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra, V. 38.

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depend upon substance fand are never without it). An attribute (as such) cannot be the substratum of another attribute (although of course, many attributes can coexist in one and the same substance at one and the same time and place). There cannot be any attribute of an attribute”! “The becoming of that is modification. Pariņāma or modification of a substance is the change in the character of its attributes.”2 Gunas or attributes coexist with a substance and paryāyas or modifications succeed one another.
Dravya is always associated with certain intrinsic and inalienable qualities called guņas. The yellow colour, malleability etc. are the qualities of gold. Dravyas also with their inalienable qualities must exist in some state or form. Paryāya is this mode of existence. The mode might change, a golden ring might be changed into an ear-ring. But this creation of a new mode, e.g., ear-ring and destruction of ring are relevant only to paryāyas while the dravya (gold) remains the constitutive substance. Dravya is eternal. It cannot be created or destroyed. Creation and destruction are relevant only to paryāya of any one of the dravyas. Dravya and paryāya are, in this way, identical. One does not succeed the other as we can find from the illustration given above about particular modifications of gold, succeeding one after the other, while the dravya remains the same.
There are special energies of every substance. These consist of the power to work continually. From this, it is established that modifications continually take place keeping dravya the same. Thus, through the energies of the sameness which develop the gold and which are a successive procedure in the nature of particular divergences, the gold will become the very modifications, ring etc. 1. "Jupe parfon TOM:1" Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, V. 41. 2. "75417: 11:1” Ibid, V. 42.

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संज्ञासंख्याविशेषाच्च स्वलक्षणविशेषतः।
imation T rai T He 117211 sañjñā-sankhyā-viseşāch-cha svalakşaņa-višeşataḥ, prayojanādibhedāchcha tannānātvas na sarvathā.
72. Its variety is not absolute, but in accordance with particulars, viz., nomenclature, number etc. and according to its particular distinguishing marks and according to divergence of purpose
COMMENTARY
This verse is a continuation of the preceding one. Dravya and paryāya are spoken of as different though in reality they are not so, when we intend to emphasise the difference of name or number or when we take into account the different characteristics of a particular thing, distinguishig it from others, or according to different necessities etc. We have one necessity regarding dravya and another regarding paryāya, as we have different necessities regarding the flowers or fruits of a tree.
"The substance is one in view of its substantiality, but it comes to be manifold because the modifications pervading it for the time being." "To illustrate: Soul is a substance; manifestation of consciousness is its quality; and its modifications are hellish, sub-human, human and divine embodiments which are caused by Nāma-karma, or even the state of a Siddha; behind all these modifications the soul is essentially the same and permanent.”l
End of Chapter IV.
1. Pravachana-sdra, A.N. Upadhye, p. LXV.

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Chapter V
यद्यापेक्षिकसिद्धिः स्यान्न द्वयं व्यवतिष्ठते। 371farthest at Melastaan 117311 yadyāpekşika-siddhiḥ syānna dvayam
vyavatişthate, anāpekşika-siddhau cha na sāmānya-viśeşatā.
73. If dependent existence be accepted, the two cannot exist. If independent existence be accepted, there cannot be the quality of sāmānya and višesa.
COMMENTARY
The first line of this verse refutes the Buddhist and the second, the Nyāya-vaiseșika view. If we can use the view, the result would first be that owing to dependence on relation (apeksā), the two, viz., a thing possessed of qualities and the qualities, cannot have simultaneous existence. Such will also be in the case of cause and effect.
If on the contrary, we take the Nyāya-vaiseșika view of the independence, the existence of anvaya (sāmānya) and vyatireka (visesa)" accepted by them will disappear. The existence of one of these is related to the other. Diveregence and identity are only relative. They are connected with sāmānya and viseșa?. This point will be elucidated further in verse 75 where the Jain view will be mentioned.
1. “अन्वयो हि सामान्यं, व्यतिरेको विशेषः । तौ च परस्परापेक्षौ व्यवतिष्ठते। तयोरनापेक्षिकसिद्धौ
a 7 Haritat.” Astasahasri. 2. “तस्यानपेक्षापक्षेऽपि नान्वयव्यतिरेको स्याता, भेदाभेदयोरन्योन्यापेक्षात्मकत्वाद्विशेषेतरभावस्य ।”
Astašati.

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विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्। अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्ति वाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥7॥ virodhānnobhayaikātmyam syādvāda-nyāya
vidvişām, avāchyataikānte’apyuktir-nāvāchyamiti yujyate. 74. For translation, see verse 13.
COMMENTARY The Ekānta view that apekşā and anapekṣā as shown in the two lines of the previous verse, are both applicable simultaneously, is not tenable. Nor we can say that it is indescribable.
धर्मधर्म्यविनाभावः सिद्ध्यत्यन्योन्यवीक्षया। न स्वरूपं स्वतो ह्येतत् कारकज्ञापकाङ्गवत् ॥75॥ dharmadharmyavinābhāvaḥ siddhyatyanyonya
vikṣayā, na svarūpam svato hyetat kāraka-jñāpakāngavat.
75. The non-difference of dharma and dharmin and not their ownself, is established from one being dependent on the other. They have no separate manifestation. This is established from itself like limbs implying a karaka.
COMMENTARY Before we speak of dharma (quality) or a dharmi (substance possessed of a quality), their own nature has already been established. These are established through dependence of one on the other. This is established by themselves, as we have knowledge of sāmānya and visesa (anvaya and vyatireka)".- We express universal 1. “धर्मधर्मिणोरविनाभावोऽन्योन्यापेक्षयैव सिद्ध्यति, न तु स्वरूपं, तस्य पूर्वसिद्धत्वात्। स्वतो
ह्येतत् सिद्धं सामान्यविशेषवत् ।” Astasahasri.

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concomitance in two ways, affirmatively called anvaya, e.g., 'wherever there is smoke there is fire' or negatively called vyatireka, e.g., 'where there is no fire there is no smoke. Sāmānya is self-established and is known from anvaya dependent on vyatireka. Višesa also is selfestablished and is known from vyatireka dependent on anvaya. The identity where one looks at the other is accepted in Jainism and this will be further clear from the illustration given below;
The example is given of a relation expressed by a grammatical case. The function of a grammatical nominative (kartặtva) is not inter-dependent of the relation of the accusative towards the verb (karmatva) because the nominative ends in settlement of an accusative and the relationship of an accusative also is derived from the knowledge of the nominative. But the real nature of the nominative or the accusative is not dependent one on the other.3
End of Chapter V.
1. “सामान्यं हि स्वतः सिद्धस्वरूपं भेदापेक्षान्वयप्रत्ययादवगम्यते। विशेषोऽपि स्वतः सिद्धस्वरूपः
सामान्यापेक्षव्यतिरेकप्रत्ययादवसीयते।” Astasahasri. 2. “नापि कर्तृत्वव्यवहारः कर्मत्वव्यवहारो वा परस्परानपेक्षः, कर्तृत्वस्य कर्मनिश्चयावसेयत्वात्।
कर्मत्वस्यापि कर्तृप्रतिपत्तिसमधिगम्यमानत्वात्।" Ibid. 3. "न हि कर्तृस्वरूपं कर्मापेक्षं, कर्मस्वरूपं वा कत्रपेक्षम्।" Ibid.
Vidyānandin has given the Sapta-hharigi thus: “(1) स्पादापेक्षिकी सिद्धिः, तथा व्यवहारात्। (2) स्यादनापेक्षिकी, पूर्वप्रसिद्धस्वरूपत्वात्। (3) स्याभयी क्रमार्पितद्वयात्। (4) स्यादवक्तव्या, सहार्पितद्वयात्। (5) स्यादापेक्षिकी चावक्तव्या च, तथा निश्चयेन सहार्पितद्वयात्। (6) स्पादनापेक्षिकी चावक्तव्या च, पूर्वसिद्धत्वसहार्पितद्वयात्। (7) स्पादुभयी चावक्तव्या च, क्रमाक्रमार्पितोभयात्।”

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Chapter VI
सिद्धं चेद्धेतुतः सर्वं न प्रत्यक्षादितो गतिः। सिद्धं चेदागमात् सर्वं विरुद्धार्थमतान्यपि ॥76॥ siddham cheddhetutaḥ sarvam na pratyakşādito
____gatih, siddham chedāgamāt sarvam viruddhārtha-matāny
api.
76. If everything be established by anumāna, there cannot be any knowledge through pratyakşa etc. If everything be established by āgama, the views of the opposite schools are also established.
COMMENTARY Vidyānandi says that in this world the thing to be obtained is first mentioned and then the means to obtain that thing is discussed. Without necessity, even a fool does not work. So the necessity is first established. To get crops we must do works like ploughing etc. To have mokşa (liberation) we must also pursue the proper path, which, according to Jainism, consists of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. It is only the Charvāka school of philosophgy that does not recognise the next world or liberation. All other schools of Indian philosophy keep liberation as their goal. In this verse, the goal has been
1. “इह हि सकललौकिकपरीक्षकैः उपेयतत्त्वं व्यवस्थाप्योपायतत्त्वं व्यवस्थाप्यते, कृष्यादिषु
प्रवर्तमानानां व्यवस्थित-शस्यायुपेयानामेव तदुपायव्यवस्थापकप्रयत्नोपलम्भात्, 'प्रयोजनमनमुद्दिश्य न मन्दोऽपि प्रवर्तत' इति प्रसिद्धः, मोक्षार्थिनां च प्रेक्षावतां व्यवस्थितोपेय-मोक्षस्वरूपाणामेव तदुपायव्यवस्थापनव्यापारदर्शनात्, अव्यवस्थितमोक्षतत्वानां तदुपायव्यस्थापनपराङ्मुखत्वात् चार्वाकादिवत् ।” Astasahasri.

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described in the previous verses and now the way to attain that goal is discussed.
In this verse the view of that school of Buddhists who say that everything is only established by anumāna (inference), is refuted. To accept this view would be to discard other pramāņas like pratyakşa and āgama. It is our everyday experience that we get knowlege of objects through the senses (pratyakşa). We also get knowledge of things beyond the immediate perception of the senses through āgama, viz., of the existence of distant countries like Malaya or Kashmir. There are many persons who urge that without the logical process of reasoning of anumāna, we would not accept the proof, even if it be seen by our eyes?. For example, we may see a mirage but the water there is not true. To these the reply is that there may be fallacies of pratyakşa pramāṇa as of other pramāņas, but from this example, you cannot say that you would not accept any pramāņa other than anumāna.
Again, to establish everything by āgama, would lead to the difficulty of accepting the conflicting views of scriptures of every school, for each regards his own scripture as authoritative. So the ekānta view of anumāna alone or āgama alone as proof is not acceptable.
The Jaina view is that pramāņa is of two kinds, pratyaksa and paroksa (the latter including smrti, pratyabhijñāna, tarka, anumāna and āgama).?
विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् । अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥77॥ virodhānnobhayaikātmyam syādvāda-nyāya
vidviņām, avāchyataikānte'pyuktirnāvāchyamiti yujyate. 1. "युक्त्या यन्न घटमुपैति तदहं दृष्ट्वापि न श्रद्धधे इत्यादेरेकान्तस्य बहुलं दर्शनात् ।”
Asta-sati 2. The reader is referred to Pariksāmúkha by S.C c. Ghoshal, Chapters
II and III, for a detailed description of these pramānas.

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77. Translation in verse 147.
COMMENTARY The ekānta view that both anumāna and āgama are simultaneously capable of being pramāņa, is untenable. Neither can it be said that the same is indescribable.
वक्तर्यनाप्ते यद्धेतोः साध्यं तद्धेतुसाधितम्। 31147 am agairic H814114HIETTA 117811 vaktaryanāpte yaddhetoḥ sādhyam taddhetu
sādhitam, āpte vaktari tad-vākyāt sādhyamāgamasādhitam.
78. What is known by a process of reasoning in the case of a speaker who is not reliable, is established by anumāna. That which is established from the word of a reliable person is done by āgama.
COMMENTARY The Jaina view is that anumāna and āgama are two among other varieties of paroksa pramāņa. The words, signs etc. of a person who has no motive for deceiving or misleading any one, are reliable. Such a person is known as āpta and the knowledge derived from words etc. of an āpta is called agama.
It is mentioned in this verse that where the speaker is reliable, we get a thing established by āgama pramāņa. But where the speaker is not reliable we employ the process of reasoning known as anumāna and establish sādhya (e.g., fire) from hetu (e.g., smoke). The anekānta view is not one-sided as criticised in verse 76.
End of Chapter VI.

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Chapter VII
अन्तरङ्गार्थतैकान्ते बुद्धिवाक्यं मृषाखिलम् । प्रमाणाभासमेवातस्तत्प्रमाणादृते कथम् ॥79॥
antarangārthataikānte buddhivākyaṁ mṛṣākhilam, pramāṇābhāsamevātas-tat pramāṇādṛte katham.
79. In the ekanta view of the reality of thought alone, anumāna and agama must be false. From it there will be a fallacy, but how can there be a fallacy without pramāṇa?
COMMENTARY
This verse refutes the view of Vijñānādvaita-vādins among the Buddists who hold that thought only is real. In that view there is no necessity of any play of knowledge, deriving from external objects either through the process of inference or through agama. For everything else than thought, is un-real. You cannot urge that we accept these as fallacies. We reply that they must first accept pramānas (anumāna, agama etc.) before our accepting their fallacies. "The opposite of it is ābhāsa of the same." There must first be acceptance of the nature, number, object and result of pramāņas before we can proceed to speak the opposite of the same. But by denying the reality of anything beyond one's own knowledge, the necessity of the existence of pramāņa itself is denied. So fallacies of the same must also be said to be non-existent. Consequently this ekānta view of the Vijñānavādins is not tenable.
The view of the Vijñānandins is that the inward world is only real. This world consists of five groups (skandhas),
1. Parnikṣāmukha, VI, 1.

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viz., the group of sensation (rūpaskandha), the group of knowledge (vijñānaskandha), the group of feeling (vedanāskandha), the group of verbal knowledge (sañjñāskandha) and the group of impressions (saṁskāraskandha). These taken together contain the basis of all personal existence.
साध्यसाधनविज्ञप्तेर्यदि विज्ञप्तिमात्रता। THIEZI 7 7 ulaşilegalaa: 118011 sādhya-sādhana-vijñapter-yadi vijñapti-mātratā, na sādhyam na cha hetuscha pratijñā-hetu-doșataḥ.
80. If the knowledge of sādhya and sādhana be merely thought, there will be no sādhya or hetu owing to fault of pratijñā.
COMMENTARY If you say that everything internal or external (mental process or material objects) are all thought realities, defects will arise as follows.
In Parārthānumāna (inference for the sake of others), the following may be taken as an instance :
1. This hill (pakşa) is full of fire (sādhya). This is the proposition or pratijñā.
2. Because it is full of smoke (sādhana), this is hetu.
3. Whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, just as the kitchen, this is drstānta (example).
4. So is this hill full of smoke. This is upanaya (application).
5. Therefore, this hill is full of fire, this is nigamana (conclusion).
The Jaina logicians hold that the first two links are sufficient; but they have described the others as the same might be necessary for understanding of persons of limited knowledge. 1. See Sacred Books of East, Vol. XXXIV, p. 403.

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Now there will be a fault in the proposition of Vijñānavādins when they will establish the quality of non-manifest Viseṣya and Viseṣaṇa.1 For example, the word 'blue' and the knowledge arising from this word will be identical or different. Identity cannot be accepted as the Vijñānavādins maintain the difference of qualities and objects possessing qualities and a difference between hetu and dṛṣṭanta. Again acceptance of reality of knowledge only will be barred by the maintenance of its divisions. By accepting difference of the word 'blue' and the knowledge arising from it, and the qualities (viseṣaṇa), there will be opposition to their own proposition2. So it has been mentioned in this verse that sadhya, hetu and dṛṣṭanta will not exist following fault in pratijñā, if it be conceded that thought only is the cause of knowledge of sädhya and sadhana.
140
बहिरङ्गार्थतैकान्ते प्रमाणाभासनिह्रवात् ।
सर्वेषां कार्यसिद्धिः स्याद् विरुद्धार्थाभिधायिनाम् ॥8॥॥ bahirangārthataikānte pramāṇābhāsanihnavāt, sarveṣām kārya-siddhiḥ syād viruddhārthābhidhāyināṁ.
81. In the ekanta view of (the reality of) everything outside (knowledge), fallacies are denied. So all that expresses the opposite thing will be established.
COMMENTARY
If all external things be accepted as real, there cannot be any fallacy. The result would be that such a sentence, 1. “विज्ञानवादिनोऽप्रसिद्धविशेष्यत्वमप्रसिद्धविशेषणत्वं च प्रतिज्ञादोषः स्यात्, नीलतद्धियोविशेष्ययोस्तदभेदस्य च विशेषणस्य स्वयमनिष्टेः ।” Astasahasri.
2. “प्रतिज्ञादोषस्तावत् स्ववचनविरोधः साध्यसाधनविज्ञानस्य विज्ञप्तिमात्रमभिलपतः प्रसज्यते । ....स्वोक्तधर्मधर्मिभेदवचनस्य हेतुदृष्टान्तभेदवचनस्य चाद्वैतवचनेन विरोधात्, संविदद्वैतवचनस्य च तद्भेदवचनेन व्याघातात्, तद्वचनज्ञानयोश्च भेदे तदेकत्वसाधनाभिलापविरोधात्, तदभिलापे वा तद्भेदविरोधात् ।” Ibid.

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viz., "One hundred elephants are standing at the tip of the finger", will have to be accepted. For examples of all kinds of fallacies, Samuddeśa VI of Parinkṣāmukha1 may be referred to. Even things seen in a dream will be true in following the Ekanta view of the reality of everything external.
विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् । अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥82॥ virodhānnobhayaikātmyaṁ syādvāda-nyāya
vidviṣām,
avāchyataikānte'pyuktirnāvāchyamiti yujyate.
82. Translation in verse 13.
141
COMMENTARY
The ekanta view of the simultaneous reality of both internal thoughts and external objects is untenable. The person holding such a view cannot also escape by saying that he is unable to describe it.
भावप्रमेयापेक्षायां प्रमाणाभासनिह्नवः ।
बहिः प्रमेयापेक्षायां प्रमाणं तन्निभं च ते ॥88॥
bhāvaprameyāpekṣāyāṁ pramāṇābhāsa-nihnavaḥ, bahiḥ prameyāpekṣāyāṁ pramāṇaṁ tannibham cha
te.
83. In accepting knowledge as the only object, fallacy is denied. Your pramāna and pramāṇābhāsa (fallacy) deal with external objects only.
COMMENTARY
According to the Buddhists, rūpaskandha comprises the senses and their objects, colour etc. The sense organs 1. Sacred Books of the Jainas, vol XI

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and the objects perceived by the senses are called bhautika. The vijñānaskandha comprises the series of selfcognition and in addition the knowledge interminate and indeterminate, of external things. The vedanāskandha comprises pleasure, pain etc. The sañjñāskandha comprises the cogntion of things by their names. The samskäraskandha comprises passion, aversion etc. The vijñānaskandha is chitta, the other skandhas are chaitta.
The Buddhists accept that pratyaksa is knowledge of itself of all chittas and chaittas. So they admit that whenever there is knowledge of a substance by itself, it is pratyakşa. In that case there cannot be any fallacy as everything will become pratyakşa, because all knowledge from its own illumination will become pramāņa. Pramāņa and its fallacy can only exist in connection with the external objects.
जीवशब्दः सबाह्यार्थः संज्ञात्वाद्धेतुशब्दवत्। hru HH FIT97 Re: Re: yollana 1184|| jiva-sabdaḥ sabāhyārthaḥ sañjñātvāddhetu-sabda
vat, māyādibhrānti-sañjñāścha māyādyaiḥ svaiḥ
pramoktivat.
81. The word Jiva is connected with its external object, because it has a name like the word hetu. The names denoting delusion like illusion etc. (are also connected) with their own illusory (objects) as the words of pramāna (express their own meaning).
COMMENTARY
This verse is in reply to the argument of those who say that jīva is non-existent. We say that the existence of jīva can be established by proof. A word has three connections: an external object, form like that of a pitcher etc., and knowledge of its meaning. So because jīva bears

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a name, it is connected with an external object. The example is that of the word hetu which establishes the above mentioned connection of three kinds. The Buddhists also accept hetu in establishing fire from smoke.
If you urge, what should then happen in cases where the names are given of delusions, such as dream, magic? The reply is, in those cases there is a connection betwen the word and the object which is attempted to be conveyed by it, though we understand their real falsity through fallacy. The view that all words express merely their meaning and do nothing else is thus refuted.
बुद्धिशब्दार्थसंज्ञास्तास्तिस्रो बुद्ध्यादिवाचिकाः। gm ca tega percufafa-scht: 118501 buddhi-sabdārtha-sanjñāstāstisro budhyādi
vāchikāḥ, tulyā buddhyādibodhās-cha trayastatpratibimbikāḥ.
85. The nomenclatures of buddhi (apprehension), sabda (word) and artha (object) express buddhi etc. (respectively) and are therefore three. Knowledge of apprehension etc. is the same. The three reflect these.
COMMENTARY
A word is connected with the object it denotes, and the apprehension which it causes. This threefold relation must be remembered. For example, when one says 'cow', the apprehension of a cow is the mental idea of a cow. The man who hears it has knowledge of the import of the word. If one says "he has spoken the word 'cow'", the speaker is concerned merely with the word 'cow' and the person hearing the same would confine his apprehension merely to the word and nothing else. Thirdly, when a man says "Bring the cow for milking”, the hearer has knowledge of the external object denoted by the word, viz., a particular animal having udder etc.

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Thus the knowledge of apprehension, the word itself and the object expressed by the word reflects each of the three, viz., buddhi, sabda and artha'.
वक्तृश्रोतृप्रमातॄणां वाक्यबोधप्रमाः पृथक् ।
frida 441941 Trerit arestart 1186|| vaktr-śrotp-pamātņņām vākyabodha-pramāḥ prthak, bhrāntāveva pramā-bhrāntau bāhyārthau tādȚs
Letarau.
86. The true knowledge arising from knowledge due to words is different in case of the speaker, the hearer and the person who resorts to proof (to ascertain its nature). In delusion the external object will be connected with correct knowledge and fallacy according to that or its opposite.
COMMENTARY .
One utters words and another hears the same. The latter or any other person finds out the reality of the sense of the word by pramāņa (pratyakṣa or prokşa). If the speaker has no knowledge of the words he speaks, how could he utter the same? Without words, the hearer cannot have any knowledge. The man requiring proof of the word deals in a different way, from the speaker and the hearer. So we must accept the threefold nature of knowledge in such cases.
When there is true and false knowledge, the external object is also true or false. Some cases of apprehension will be valid and others invalid by reference to external factors. The theory of intrinsic validity or the reverse is not accepted in Jainism.
1. “वक्तुरभिधेयबोधाभावे कुतो वाक्यं प्रवर्तेत? तस्याभिधेयबोधनिबन्धनत्वात्। वाक्याभावे
च श्रोतुरभिधेयज्ञानासंभस्तस्य तन्निमित्तकत्वात्। प्रमातुः प्रमित्यभावे च शब्दार्थयोः प्रमेययोरव्यवस्थानादिष्टतत्त्वानुपपत्तेर्वक्त्रादित्रयस्य बोधादित्रयं पृथग्भूतमुपेयम्।”
Astasahasri.

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बुद्धिशब्दप्रमाणत्वं बाह्यार्थे सति नासति । सत्यानृतव्यवस्थैवं युज्यतेऽर्थापत्यनाप्तिषु ॥87॥
145
buddhi-sabda-pramāṇatvaṁ bāhyārthe sati nāsati, satyānṛta-vyavasthaivaṁ yujyate'arthāptyanaptiṣu.
87. The correctness of the apprehension and word happens when there is external object; otherwise not. The establishment of truth and falsity is appropriate when an object is got or not.
COMMENTARY
Pramāņa or fallacy can only happen when there are external objects. A word or knowledge proceeding from it results in getting a desired object, when there is such an external object. When there is no such object, it cannot be attained.
This lays down a view which is opposed to the doctrine of Mimāmsā philosophy, the cardinal doctrine of which is the intrinsic validity of apprehension. The Jaina view is that words become true only when it leads to external objects meant by it and are false when there are no such objects. When mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver, or in the dream-state the cognitions are erroneous having no real external object corresponding to the same.
End of Chapter VII.

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Chapter VIII
दैवादेवार्थसिद्धिश्चेद् दैवं पौरुषतः कथम्। Tanahia: uti faci na 1188|| daivādevārtha-siddhisched daivaṁ pauruşataḥ
katham, daivataśchedanirmokṣaḥ pauruşaṁ nişphalam
bhavet. 88. If objects be attained by Daiva, how can Daiva arise from Puruşakāra? If Daiva be said to arise from Daiva, it cannot be established. Purusakāra then becomes useless.
COMMENTARY In this chapter the question of respective power of Daiva (predestination) and Puruşakāra (attempts by self) is discussed. If you say that objects are attained only according to what has been preordained, the question arises, does this preordination result from Puruşakāra or from Daiva? We see a man ploughing a field, cultivate crops on the same and harvest it. It cannot be said that in this case predestination results from the attempts of the man (Puruşakāra). The object attained here, viz., crop is clearly due to the efforts of the man and does not depend on Daiva. So we cannot say that in such a case Daiva results from Puruşakāra. If you say that Daiva arises from another Daiva, Puruşakāra becomes useless and we see actually in the world that things are attained by efforts of men.
पौरुषादेव सिद्धिश्चेत् पौरुषं दैवतः कथम्। atbaidahla Pira Hayford 1994 118911

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CHAPTER VIII
pauruṣādeva siddhiśchet pauruṣaṁ daivataḥ
pauruṣāchchedamoghaṁ syāt sarvaprāṇiṣu
katham,
pauruşam.
89. If (you say) objects are attained only through Puruṣakāra, how can Puruṣakāra result from Daiva? If results follow only from Puruṣakāra, there would be infallible attainment of objects through efforts by all beings.
147
COMMENTARY
It cannot be said that objects are attained only through personal effort without being affected in any way by predestination. For we see, that all efforts of every being do not succeed. There must then be something to prevent Puruṣakāra in such cases.
विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् । अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥90॥ virodhānnobhayaikātmyaṁ syādvāda-nyāya
90. See verse 13.
vidviṣām,
avāchyataikānte'pyuktir-nāvachyamiti yujyate.
अबुद्धिपूर्वापेक्षायामिष्टानिष्टं स्वदैवतः । बुद्धिपूर्वव्यपेक्षायामिष्टानिष्टं स्वपौरुषात् ॥91॥
COMMENTARY
The one-sided (ekanta) view that attainment of objects proceeds only from Daiva or only from Paurusa is untenable. It cannot be said to be indescribable. The Syādvāda view is given in the next verse.
abuddhi-pūrvāpekṣāyāmiṣṭāniṣṭaṁ svadaivataḥ, buddhi-pūrvavyapekṣāyāmiṣṭāniṣṭam svapauruṣāt.

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ĀPTA-MĪMĀSĀ
91. When desired or undesired objects are attained without there being any known action, this is one's own Daiva; and when desired or undesired objects are attained by action, it is from one's own pauruşa.
COMMENTARY The Jaina view is that when one engages in discriminating good or bad actions and begins to act accordingly, the results flowing from it are caused by Pauruşa and when things (for or against us) happen without there being even any thought of the same (not to speak of efforts) the result is from Daiva.
End of Chapter VIII.
1. cansaladife Tayflogei ufaragni at dagoci, afguitai at591914
!" Astašati.

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Chapter IX
पापं ध्रुवं परे दुःखात् पुण्यं च सुखतो यदि।
1190 pit o aterai Aftag: 119211 pāpaṁ dhruvam pare duḥkhāt punyaṁ cha sukhato
yadi,
achetanākaşāyau cha badhyeyātām nimittataḥ.
92. If there be sin from pain caused to others and virtue from happiness (caused to others), the unconcious instruments and those free from kaşāyas, will get bondage being instrumental cause.
COMMENTARY In this verse the view of those, who hold that sin arises from causing pain to others and virtue from happiness caused to others and not from predestination, is refuted. It is urged that to hold this view, the unconscious objects, viz., poison or weapons which are used to kill others will be the cause of bondage. If you say that only animate beings are meant, the fault would be that even a Jina, free from all kaşāyas will become subject to bondage for bondage results from happiness and misery. If you say that he has no intention (manaḥsankalpa), it cannot be accepted that bondage from punya and pāpa fesults from happiness or misery caused to others.
Kaşāyas are of four kinds: krodha (anger), māna (pride), māyā (deceit) and lobha (greed). A Jina is free from all these.
The Jaina view is this. Yoga is the name of a faculty of the soul itself to attract matter, under the influence

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of past karmas. The activity of mind, body and speech brings this faculty into play.1 This Yoga is the channel of asrava or inflow of karmic matter into the soul.2 Asrava is of two kinds-subha or good which is the inlet of punya (virtue) or meritorious karmas; and asubha or bad which is the inlet of papa (vice) or demeritorious karmas.3
In Aṣṭa-sahasrī, it is mentioned, Daiva is of two kinds, punya and papa, which cause good or evil to beings. In Tattvärthadhigama-sūtra, it is mentioned "Punya or meritorious Karmans are the following (1) pleasure-bearing (sadvedya or sātāvedanīya) (2) producing good age (subhāyu), (3) good body-making (śubha-nāma), (4) determining high family (subha-gotra). The karmas other than these are păpa (or demeritorious karmas)."4 To remove the doubts as to the cause of asrava of punya and papa, the subject is taken up in this chapter.5
150
पुण्यं ध्रुवं स्वतो दुःखात् पापं च सुखतो यदि । वीतरागो मुनिर्विद्वांस्ताभ्यां युञ्ज्यान् निमित्ततः ॥93॥ punyam dhruvaṁ svato duḥkhāt pāpaṁ cha sukhato yadi, vitarāgo munir-vidvāns-tābhyāṁ yuñjyān nimittataḥ.
93. If it be certain that punya (virtue) results from pain caused to oneself and papa (vice) from happiness caused to oneself, a soul void of rāga and dveṣa (such as a Jina), a learned muni, would become attached by these causes.
1. ":" Tattvarthadhigama-sūtra, VI, 1.
2. "I" Ibid VI, 2.
3. 'शुभः पुण्यस्याशुभः पापस्य', Ibid, VI, 3.
See, S.B.J., vol. II, page 124.
4. Chapter VIII, Verses 25 and 26
5. “द्विविधं हि दैवं, पुण्यं पापं च प्राणिनामिष्टानिष्टसाधनमुक्तं 'सद्वेद्यशुभायुर्नामगोत्राणि पुण्यम्', 'इतरत् पापम्' इति वचनात् । तदास्रवनिमित्तविप्रतिपत्ति-विपत्त्यर्थमिदमुक्तम् ।” Aṣṭasahasri.

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151
COMMENTARY A person practising penances and void of rāga (attachment) or dvesa (aversion) often causes pain to his body. To hold that from this pain, there would be punya, will mean that he will have bondage from this punya and would not be able to attain liberation. Further, a learned muni has pleasure from equanimity resulting from knowledge of realities. To hold that pāpa results from one's own happiness would mean that such a person would have bondage from this cause. The view that punya and pāpa are derived from causing pain or pleasure to oneself is untenable. The result would be that no one would attain liberation which happens only when there is no possibility of any bondage resulting from punya or pāpa."
विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् । अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥94॥ virodhānnobhayaikātmyam syādvād-nyāya
vidvişām, avāchyatāikānte'pyūktir-nāvāchyamiti yujyate. 94. For translation, see verse 13.
COMMENTARY
It cannot be said by those opposing the Syādvāda view, that the view of verse 92 and verse 93 is not maintainable separately. They can be asserted jointly. It cannot also be urged that it is indescribable (from the ekānta view) without considering the various aspects as laid down yādvāda.
1. “आत्मसुखदुःखाभ्यां पापेतरैकान्तकृतान्ते पुनरकषायस्यापि ध्रुवमेव बन्धः स्यात्। ततो न
framuntetied, 79144147HYATT!” Aștašati.

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APTA-MİMAŃSĀ
विशुद्धिसंक्लेशाङ्गं चेत् स्वपरस्थं सुखासुखम् । पुण्यपापास्रवौ युक्तौ न चेद् व्यर्थस्तवार्हतः ॥95॥ viśuddhi-sankleśārgam chet svaparastham sukhā
sukham, punya-pāpāsravau yuktau na ched vyarthastav
ārhataḥ.
95. It is proper that asrava influx) of punya (virtue) and pāpa (vice) happens through pleasure or pain caused to others or one-self, if the same consists of visuddhi or sarklesa. Otherwise, the view of the Arhats will be untenable.
COMMENTARY The Jaina view, regarding the influx of karma (āsrava) consisting of punya and pāpa, is that the cause of such influx depends on visuddhi and sarkleśa relating to happiness or misery of one's own or of others.
Sarkleśa is the result of ārta and raudra dhyāna and its absence is visuddhi, i.e., the existence of the soul in its innate nature.2
Dhyāna or concentration is confining one's thought to one particular object.3 Dhyāna is of four kinds : ārta, raudra, dharmya and sukla. The last two are the causes of liberation. The first two are the causes of bondage.
Arta-dhyāna (painful concentration) is of four kinds. The first is repeatedly thinking about separation from an unpleasant object (anista samyogaja).5
The second ārta-dhyāna is repeated thinking of reunion with a pleasing object on being separated from it.
1. "344: RRT AT Hog:aut: failes
H etrura que91972CÉG HI” Astašati. 2. “HARTGEZET4R014 TT, T TC fagles inha: Ficha 41" Ibid. 3. “...gerufe TIIRTEN 164...!” Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, 1-27. 4. " TSERISTAI 1” wote walı” Ibid, IX, 28-29. 5."1444 Fister Agent alagutin mfTHIER:1” Ibid IX, 30

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This is the opposite of the first and is known as iştaviyogaja as explained above.
The third ārta-dhyāna is repeated thinking about becoming free from troubles, e.g., a disease.?
The fourth is constant thought of gaining objects in future life, being not able to get these in this life.3
Raudra-dhyāna (wicked concentration) is also of four kinds: delight in causing hurt (hiṁsānanda); delight in falsehoods (anstānanda); delight in theft (steyānanda) and delight in preserving objects of sense-enjoyment (vişayasamraksaņānanda).
According to Jainism there are different stages of spirituality (gunasthānas) of a man. Arta-dhyāna is possible in persons in the first four : fourth (avirata), fifth (deśavirata) and the sixth (pramatta-samyata) stages.5
In the avirata stage, a person is without any vows. In the desa-virata stage, he has only partial vows and in the pramatta-samyata he keeps the vows imperfectly. In pramattasamyata stage, however, there is no nidāna (the fourth kind of ārta-dhyāna).
Dharmya-dhyāna is of four kinds: (a) contemplation of the principles taken on the faith of the scriptures which are the teachings of Arhats (ājñā-vichaya); (b) contemplation about the way in which the wrong belief, knowledge and conduct can be removed (apāya-vichaya); (c) contemplation about the fruition of different kinds of karmas (vipākavichaya); and (d) contemplation about the nature and constitution of the universe (samsthāna-vichaya). Dharmyadhyāna is possible for persons who are in the fourth to seventh spiritual stages of development
1. wysta FISIRTI" Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra, IX, 31. 2. "GIRAITSTI" Ibid, 1X, 32. 3. u ri al" Ibid, 1x, 33. 4. "Hartefaepercitaromit stufararaanfaaet: 1" Ibid, IX, 35. 5. "AfacramfarayuaHUAHIHI" Ibid, IX, 34. 6. "31Tsurf4HRISTIERUIR ERHEI” Ibid, IX, 36.

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ĀPTA-MĪMĀMSĀ
Sukla (pure) dhyāna is of four kinds: (a) absorption in the meditation of the self but unconsciously allowing its different attributes to replace one another (prthaktvavitarka); (b) absorption in one aspect of the self without changing the particular aspect concentrated upon (ekatvavitarka). (c) the very fine vibratory movements in the soul, even when it is deeply absorbed in itself in a Kevalin (sūkşma-kriyā-pratipāti); (d) total absorption of the soul in itself fixed steadily and undisturbably without the least motion or vibration (vyuparata-kriyā-nivstti).1
The first two kinds of sukla-dhyāna are possible in those who know the fourteen Pūrvas and are present in the eighth to twelfth spiritual stages. The last two kinds are peculiar to Kevalins (who have perfect knowledge.)3 The third arises in the thirteenth and the fourth in the fourteenth or the highest stage of development.
It will now be understood how according to Jainism influx of karma leading to pāpa happens through ārta and raudra dhyānas and how the opposite punya comes from its absence. The soul gradually develops itself through different stages and sheds off impurities. Influx (āsrava) of impure karmas is stopped, shedding off those which have already got connection with the soul (nirjarā) and then liberation (moksa) is attained.
From sukla-dhyāna, no impurity can arise. “Who so, having destroyed the stains of infatuation and being detached from sense-objects, restrains his mind and abides in his innate nature, becomes a contemplator of the self.934
Amộtachandra in explaining this verse of Kundakunda says: “To the self whose stains of infatuation are destroyed belongs detachment from sense-objects, because
1. “पृथक्त्वैकत्ववितर्कसूक्ष्मक्रियाप्रतिपातिव्युपरतक्रियानिवर्तीनि।” Tattvārthādhigama
sūtra, IX, 39. 2. "gant are yafas: 1" Ibid, IX, 37. 3. “op? Data:1”, Ibid, IX, 38. 4. Pravachana-sāra by B. Faddegon. II, 104.

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it abstains from activity towards the 'other' (substance) whereof that infatuation is the root. Then comes restraint (nirodha) of the internal sense which has nothing else for refuge because there is no other substance which could be its resting place (adhikarana), like a flying bird for which there is only one bark in the mid-ocean. Thereupon, through the disappearance of flightiness, whereof that (not-restrained internal-sense) is the root, comes steadfastness in his innate nature, which is unlimited innate intelligence. And that, because of being an unperturbed, deeply attentive thoughtfulness, proceeding (pravịtta) from its own nature, is entitled 'contemplation' (dhyāna). Hence contemplation, as being an abiding in one's inborn nature is the self, since it is not anything other than the self.”l
End of Chapter IX.
1. Pravachana-sāra by B. Faddegon. II, 148.

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Chapter X
अज्ञानाच्चेद् ध्रुवो बन्धो ज्ञेयानन्त्यान्न केवली। starrilarg faster dastrar CEMTS-TTT 1196|| ajñānāchched dhruvo bandho jñeyānantyānna kevali, jñāna-stokād vimokşaśchedajñānād bahuto'anyathā.
96. If bandha (bondage) be certain from ajñāna (want of knowledge), a kevalin (can never be liberated) for knowable things are infinite. If you say that there is liberation with a little knowledge, there will be liberation by other means from greatness of ajñāna (ignorance).
COMMENTARY This verse refutes the view that ajñāna is the cause of āśrava of punya and pāpa.
According to Jainism, when there is an influx of matter into the soul, certain energies (karmas) are produced which consist of bondage of the soul with matter. This bondage is called bandha. First of all there is an influx of karmas through asravas. Then follow some activities of conciousness which attach themselves to the soul and produce a peculiar kind of bondage which is called bhāvabandha. Bhāva-bandha is followed by a union of jīva with actual karmas consisting of interpenetration of the soul by the karmas and the bondage resulting from this is known as dravya-bandha. Excited by kaşāya (attachment and aversion) a jīva assimilates pudgalas fit for karmas and this is known as bandha.
In the Astasahasri, it is mentioned that this verse 1. "Hal4allwita: font utrera gamHIGH H FRET: 1" Tattvārthādhigama
sūtra, VIII, 2.

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refutes the Sānkhya view that liberation happens from jñāna and bandha (bondage) from ajñāna. According to the Sārkhya view, when there is knowledge that the soul is different from the prakrtis and vikytis, there is liberation and ignorance of this leads to bondage.
It is urged that as there are innumerable things, it is not possible to have a knowledge of everything and in that case even a Kevalin cannot get liberation. It cannot again be said that a slight knowledge will do and full knowledge of everything is not necessary. The fault will remain that in case of limited true knowledge, of only certain objects, there will be false knowledge regarding a large number of other objects, and as false knowledge will lead to bondage, liberation can never take place.
Akalarika says: “If the view that bondage follows from ajñāna, be accepted, no one will attain liberation, for in everyone ajñāna might sometimes arise, the knowable things being infinite. The other view, viz., that liberation might result from a little knowledge, is also untenable for there will be ajñāna on various points which must oppose liberation and cause bondage”.?
विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम्। 37aastaseinafaraftfa quedt 197|| virodhānnbhayaikātmyam syādvāda-nyāya-vidvişām, avāchyataikānte'pyuktir-nāvāchyamiti yujyate.
97. For translation, see verse 13.
1. Vide : "ma allait fagetuiend ET: 1" Sārkhyakārikā of Isvarakrşņa,
verse 44. 2. “यदि बन्धोऽयमविज्ञानान्नेदानी कश्चिन्मुच्यते, सर्वस्य क्वचिदज्ञानोपपत्तेर्जेयानन्त्यादिति।"
Before becoming a Kevalin, a soul cannot become omniscient. ufa पुनर्ज्ञाननिर्हासाद् ब्रह्मप्राप्तिस्ज्ञानात् सुतरां प्रसज्येत।"

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COMMENTARY The position that both the views in verse 96 might be amalgamated or that it is unknowable, is untenable.
अज्ञानान्मोहतो बन्धो नाज्ञानाद् वीतमोहतः। straia HT: RICHTER en smerett|198|| ajñānān-mohato bandho nājñānād vītamohataḥ, jñāna-stokāchcha mokṣaḥ syādamohān mohiton
yathā.
98. Bandha follows from ajñāna if there be moha, but not from ajñāna where moha has disappeared. When there is no moha, mokşa (liberation) takes place even from little jñāna but not where moha exists.
COMMENTARY
The Jaina view is expounded in this verse. It is urged that moha decides everything in this case. Svāmi-Kārtikeya has said that ásravas are certain movements of jīva resulting from actions of speech, mind and body either accompanied by or bereft of moha-karma. We have mentioned in the commentary to verse 96 that karmas take possesion of a soul through āsravas. There are eight kinds of karmas, viz., jñānāvaraṇīya, darśanāvaranīya, mohanīya, antarāya, āyu, nāma, gotra and vedaniya. When a person wants to have liberation he attempts to have right faith, right knowledge and right conduct.2 When he attains these three, he becomes free from the first four kinds of karmas known as ghātiya (destructive) karmas. The influx of karmas can be stopped by samvara. By this stoppage fresh karmas cannot enter the soul. But even after stopping the entrance of fresh karmas, it is necessary to purge the soul of karmas which have already taken possession of the same. 1. “मणवयणकायजोया जीवपयेसाण फंदणविसेसा। मोहोदयेण जुत्ता निजुत्ता वि य आस्रवा
Erfall" Svāmi-Kārtikeyānupreksā, Verse 88. 2. Vide verse 39 of Dravya-sargraha, S.B.J., vol. I.

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This can be done by nirjarā. Then only the karmas, vedaniya, nāma, gotra and āyu which cause wordly existence, disappear and a being attains liberation.
Mohaniya are “energies, the nature of which is to infatuate us so that we cannot distinguish between right and wrong belief (darśana-mohanīya) and so that we are prevented from acting rightly (chāritra-mohaniya). Thus there are two chief kinds of these forces; first that which obstructs our faculty of realising and relishing the truth, and secondly that which in its operation makes us unable to act rightly; it is moral unclearness and non-perception of what is right. Right action as here meant is right action accompanied by the conviction that it is right.”2 The Delusive karmas are of twenty-eight kinds. 3
When moha (infatuation) disappears, liberation can take place even if ajñāna in some matters exists. If there be infatuation, there must be bondage.
“He who has become and remains pure according to his power by means of psychic-exertion, i.e., evolution of his intelligence, obtains an excellent efficacy of purity which springs up at every step, and an intelligence completely free from blemish, because the very strong knot (granthi) of infatuation bound together all the saṁsāra through, is untied; he obtains an efficacy of self expanding without obstacles, because he has thrown aside all karmas which obscure knowledge and faith (jñānāvaraṇīya and darśanāvaraṇīya) and those karmas which obstruct (antarāya); having himself become thus, he reaches the boundary of all things which can be known. Here then the innate nature of self is knowledge; and knowledge is nothing less than the things knowable; so then the self owing to its pure exertion, reaches the self, which in innate nature consists of
1. " HORTO IT for
SATTTET Hecho 1 Tauracionit que to do that.” Parīсhāstikāya-sāra, verse 153. 2. Jainism, H. Warren, p. 34 3. See Outlines of Jainism, p. 32.

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ĀPTA-MĪMĀŃSĀ knowledge, which knowledge again, pervades everything that is knowable."]
कामादिप्रभवश्चित्रः कर्मबन्धानुरूपतः। तच्च कर्म स्वहेतुभ्यो जीवास्ते शुद्ध्यशुद्धितः ॥99॥ kāmādiprabhavaśchitraḥ karma-bandhānurūpataḥ, tachchha karma svahetubhyo jivāste śuddhya
sudditaḥ.
99. According to the bondage of karma, the results of kāma (attachment) etc. are varied. That karma arises from its own cause. The jivas are from suddhi (purity) or aśuddhi (impurity).
COMMENTARY According to Jainism, matter is concrete and possessed of sensory qualities to its last unit and the world is full of material bodies. “The universe is in all directions densely packed as room filled, with material bodies fine and gross, unadaptable and adaptable."2 Possession of potentiality for evolving karmic matter exists only in cases of not excessive fineness or grossness. "Aggregates adaptable to karma-condition, when they meet with a soul's evolution, attain the state of karmas; but they are not made to evolve by the soul.”3 That is to say the molecules of matter which are capable of becoming karmas come into contact with developments of the soul which is without passion and are transformed into karmas.
The Jaina view is that the soul is associated with matter from time immemorial and both are eternal and not created by any supreme being. The rise of kāma (attachment) etc., as mentioned in this verse, is various
1. Pravachana-sära, by B. Faddegon, page 9. 2. Pravachana-sāra, II. 76. 3. Ibid VI, 77.

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and happens from the eight kinds of karmas, Jñānāvaraṇīya etc. As seeds produce a plant and plant produces seeds so this eternal chain of bondage and the cause of bondage goes on.
“Actions of the soul cause the assimilation or binding (bandha) of fresh karmic matter in the karmic body which envelops the soul. This karma, thus bound, is for a longer or shorter time in a latent condition (sattā); every moment when the soul is in action some of this gets collected. Karma is used and is then said to be in a rising condition (udaya); but simultaneously and in consequence fresh karma is bound”. 1 "Karma particles in the origination stage are declared by the best of Jinas (to come forth) necessarily. He who is filled with infatuation, attachment or aversion for them, experiences bondage. The soul abiding in the cycle of existences of necessity possesses particles of material karma in the origination stage. And he who being conscious of their existence evolves into infatuation, attachment or aversion, joins himself with action, which consists in evolution into the knowable thing. Therefore he experiences bondage, which is the fruit of action. So then action and the fruit of action originate from the arising of infatuation, but not from knowledge."2
There are two kinds of mundane (saṁsāri) jivas according to Jaina view. These are suddha (pure) or aśuddha (impure) or according to another nomenclature bhavya or abhavya, i.e., qualified or not-qualified for being at sometime liberated from sarsāra.
"The not-qualified (abhavya) do not believe, when they hear that among joys the highest happiness is that of those whose destructive karmas have vanished; but the qualified admit it. To those who have abundance of infatuating and other karmas there may be here a semblance of joy; but because of hindrances to their
1. Pravachana-sära by B. Faddegon, p. 26 2. Ibid, pages 26-27

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inner nature and because of perturbation it is an unreal (apāramārthika) 'joy.' But the holy absolute sages, whose destructive karmas are annihilated being free from repungnance to their innate nature and from perturbation have a joy supremely real, since the above-described cause is present and the definition applies. But those not-qualified who have not this belief are far from the nectar-beverage of the joy of liberation and only see the water-mass of a mirage.1
162
शुद्ध्यशुद्धी पुनः शक्ती ते पाक्यापाक्यशक्तिवत् । साद्यनादी तयोर्व्यक्ती स्वभावोऽतर्कगोचरः ॥100॥
śuddhyaśuddhi punaḥ śakti te pākyāpākya-śakti
vat,
sādyanādi tayorvyakti svabhāvo'tarka-gocharaḥ.
100. The quality of suddhi and aśuddhi are again like the power of being cooked or not. Their manifestations are having a beginning or eternal. Its nature cannot be established by process of reasoning.
COMMENTARY
It has been mentioned in the previous verse that some jivas believe and some not. This quality is like that of some pulses which can be cooked and which cannot be cooked. There are some pulses which cannot be made edible by cooking inspite of all efforts. This is compared to aśuddha or abhavya quality of a jiva which hinders their belief and prevents their liberation. On the other hand there are jivas having suddha or bhavya quality who easily believe and can proceed to the path of liberation without any hindrance.
The power (sakti) is with reference to its appearance, being considered only in respect of its modification (paryaya). It may be said to have a beginning. According
1. Pravachana-sara by B. Faddegon, p. 41

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to its dravya-bhāva, it is eternal. The manifestation is accordingly of these two kinds according to different view points.
तत्त्वज्ञानं प्रमाणं ते युगपत् सर्वभासनम्। क्रमभावि च यज्ज्ञानं स्याद्वादनयसंस्कृतम् ॥101॥ tattvajñānaṁ pramāṇam te yugapat sarvabhāsanam, kramabhāvi cha yaj-jñānam syādvāda-naya
saṁskrtam.
101. The knowledge of realities and pramāņa at once illuminates every object. The knowledge which is derived gradually is purified by naya of Syādvāda.
COMMENTARY Upto this, the subject of prameya (knowable) has been treated. Now pramāṇa is established.
One who has thrown aside all karmas, which obscure knowledge and faith (āvaraṇīya), which obstruct (antarāya) and which infatuate (mohaniya), reaches the summit of all things knowable?. “Here then the innate nature of self is knowledge; and knowledge is nothing less than the things knowable. So then the self owing to its pure exertion, reaches the self, which in innate nature consists of knowledge, which knowledge again, pervades everything that is knowable.”3
"This omniscience is supersensuous; therein the apprehension of the objectivity takes place directly by the soul without the aid of sense-organs; there are no sensational stages, but the apprehension is sudden and simultaneous; it is endowed with the potencies of all the senses together as it were; and there is nothing that is 1. “शक्तेः प्रादुर्भावापेक्षया सादित्वम्। ततः शक्तिय॑क्तिश्च स्यात्सादिः, स्यादनादि
f arfars: 1" Astasahasri. 2. Pravachana-sāra, B. Faddegon, I. 15. 3. Ibid, p. 9.

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not visualised in omniscience.”] “The object of knowledge is a huge complexity constituted of substances, qualities or modifications extended over three times and infinite space, and simultaneously subjected to origination, destruction and permanence. Such an object of knowledge can be comprehended only in omniscience.
The senses are the indirect means of knowledge and whatever they apprehend is partial like the perception of an elephant by several blind persons, each of whom touches only different part of its body and forms a wrong idea. The ordinary human being cannot rise above the limitations of his senses; so his apprehension of reality is partial, and it is valid only from a particular view-point : this leads to the Nayavāda of the Jainas. When ordinary human knowledge is partial, a new method of stating our approach to the complex reality had to be derived and that is Syādvāda, the doctrine of conditional predications. Thus the doctrine is a direct result of the strong awareness of the complexity of the object of knowledge and of the limitations of human apprehension and expression. The substance is subjected to a constant flux of modifications, and we always look at it through one modification or the other, present or absent. When we are looking at its present modification, we should not absolutely deny the past or future ones; this peculiar position leads us to conditional affirmation, conditional negation and conditional indescribability which by their combination give rise to seven possible statements (Sapta-bhangi).
उपेक्षाफलमाद्यस्य शेषस्यादानहानधीः। पूर्वं वाऽज्ञाननाशो वा सर्वस्यास्य स्वगोचरे ॥102॥ upekṣā-phalamādyasya seşasyādānahānadhīḥ, pūrvam vājñāna-nāšo vā sarvasyāsya svagochare. 102. The result of the former is indifference and that
1. Pravachana-sāra, A.N. Upadhye, p. LXXIV. 2. Ibid, page LXXXIV.

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of the latter is desire to get or leave. The result of the former might again be said to be destruction of ignorance in all substances connected with it.
COMMENTARY The substance of this verse is summarised in Parikṣāmukha thus "the result is the dispelling of false knowledge and leaving (the undesirable things), acquirement (of desirable things) and indifference (to other things)”.In Nyāyāvatāra it is mentioned that "the immediate result of pramāņa is the removal of ignorance. The mediate effect is happiness and indifference or equanimity to a Kevalin (possessed of omniscience) and to others a desire to accept (desirable objects) and leave (undesirable objects)". In Sarvārtha-siddhi we have “The result (of pramāna) is said to be the absence of false knowledge resembling darkness, on the destruction of false knowledge.”3 Hemachandra says "When pramāņa arises in a person, the correct knowledge of an object is established. The immediate result is therefore the destruction of false knowledge or the idea of leaving (the undesirable) etc.94 The primary result is correct knowledge. The secondary result arises after we ascertain an object correctly by Pramāņa.
वाक्येष्वनेकान्तद्योती गम्यं प्रति-विशेषकः। Fiyasefiiftara na partirefo 010301 vākyeşvanekānta-dyoti gamyam prati-viśeşakaḥ,
syānnipāto'rtha-yogitvāt tava kevalināmapi. 1. "375114fqitet 114166-198799 6614I" Verse V, 1. 2. "WIRT HEşinfractal ___ केवलस्य सुखोपेक्षे शेषस्यादानहानधीः॥" 3. “3-TOARm41516-1974: 3514419īt ar gadi" 4. "RII HR HU IM Pramāna-mimāṁsā, I, 1, 38.
"3şti fafarafı" Ibid, I, 1, 39. “Tagat. #”, Ibid, I, 1, 41.

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103. The (use) of indeclinable syāt in sentences signifies the Anekānta (many-sided view) and qualifies the meaning and being connected with the substance, happens in your case as well as those of the Kevalins.
COMMENTARY The seven modes of expression in Jainism (Saptabhargi) have already been described. The word syāt is used in the beginning of each sentence laying down one mode of expression. This means that the proposition is true, provided you take it in the right sense, viz., in the correct proposition with other notions. The word syāt accordingly warns us that only a partial view is being expressed according to our present intention in applying a particular proposition and it is not an absolute proposition denying the other varied aspects of a substance.
In this verse by 'Kevalin' Sruta-kevalins are meant, for by the use of the word 'tava' (your), kevalins are all included. During sixtytwo years after Mahāvīra (up to 465 B.C.) three Kevalins (Gautama, Sudharma and Jambū) were the propagators of Jainism. After them upto 365 B.C. five Śruta-kevalins, viz., Vişņunandi, Nandimitra, Aparājita, Govardhana and Bhadrabāhu were the same.
स्याद्वादः सर्वथैकान्तत्यागात् किंवृत्तचिद्विधिः। 1619
ufagt : ||104||| syādvādaḥ sarvathaikānta-tyāgāt kimvșttachid
vidhiḥ, saptabhanga-nayāpekṣo heyādeya-viśeşakaḥ.
104. The word ‘syāt leaves out the absolute onesided view point. (Its interpretations) are words derived from ‘kim' and (derivations) 'chiť etc. This depends upon the sevenfold Saptabhangi Naya and is distinguished by things to be discarded or acquired.

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COMMENTARY The Saptabhangi Naya has already been described in detail. The use of 'syāt' characterises this. This proves that the absolute one-sided view cannot be accepted.
The sense of ‘syāt' is also expressed by words such as ‘kathañchit', 'kinchit', 'kathañchana' etc. These are derived by affixes 'chit', 'chana' etc. to the words 'katham' ‘kim' etc.
स्याद्वादकेवलज्ञाने सर्वतत्त्वप्रकाशने। भेदः साक्षादसाक्षाच्च गवस्त्वन्यतमं भवेत् ॥105॥ syādvāda-kevalajñāne sarvatattva-prakāśane, bhedaḥ sākşādasāksāchcha hyavastva
nyatamam bhavet.
105. Syādvāda and Kevala knowledge (omniscience) illuminate all the tattvas (principles). Their difference is from pratyaksa and paroksa. That which is beyond these two kinds of knowledge is not a substance.
COMMENTARY
The seven principles (tattvas) of Jainism are jiva, ajiva, āsrava, bandha, samvara, nirjarā and mokşa. As these are established by Syādvāda and Kevala knowledge, these are said to illuminate all tattvas. Immediate perception falls under Kevelajñāna and mediate perception falls under Syādvāda. There cannot be any substance which is not the subject of perception of either of these two knowledges.
सधणैव साध्यस्य साधादविरोधतः। RIIGIGYforeffagtaray Bulat 74: 11106|| sadharmaņaiva sādhyasya sādharmyādavirodhataḥ,
syādvāda-pravibhaktārtha--viseșavyañjako nayaḥ. 1. “जीवादयः सप्त पदार्थास्तत्त्वं, 'जीवाजीवास्रवबन्धसंवरनिर्जरामोक्षास्तत्त्वम्' इति वचनात् ।
caufauiculaster FIGICODOMşhut: Harayonigahelyi” Aștasahasri.

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106. Naya signifies the particular nature of a substance taken (as a proposition) by Syādvāda through sādhya (major term) and by drstānta (illustration) the quality of similarity being universally concomitant.
COMMENTARY After dealing with pramāņa, naya is described. Briefly speaking, objects possess many different characteristics and may be taken from different standpoints. By omniscience alone, their entire character is understood. The scope of naya (one-sided method of comprehension) is to take them from a certain stand-point. For a detailed exposition of naya, reference may be made to Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. XI?
नयोपनयैकान्तानां त्रिकालानां समुच्चयः। 3 yrg-919 E Tt sa 4 ETT 1110711 nayopanayaikāntānāṁ trikālānāṁ samuchchayaḥ, avibhrāt-hāvasambandho dravyamekamanekadhā.
107. Substance (dravya) is the collection of three times (past, present and future) brought by naya and upanaya (branches of naya). Having non-seperate connection of existence, it is one and many (from different points of view).
COMMENTARY In this verse, the subject of dravya is taken up. Dravya is a generic name for soul, matter, time, space and the principles of motion and rest. It comes into (utpāda) or goes out of existence (vyaya), while its continuous sameness (dhrauvya) remains. The inner nature or essential attributes (dhrauvya) always remains the same through
1. "Brent Hiru ar a: Haifacra | C ontaisiesợi lâu Hư:” Ngãyānatāra, 29. 2. Parikṣāmukha, Samuddeśa VI, V. 74, pp. 198-204

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its modifications (utpäda and vyaya). By naya and its branches we grasp the different modifications in the past, present and future of substances remembering that there is a continuous sameness of existence throughout. “The substance is during the times of its several particularities, not other than the particularity of each time, because it has the nature of it, as in the case of fire which has the nature of the collected (material) of grass, or leaves or wood”l. When one looks at the modification-aspect (paryāyārthika) of substances, these are many, but when one looks to the substance-aspect (dravyārthika), it is only one. For a detailed exposition of the subject, see Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. III.2
मिथ्यासमूहो मिथ्या चेन्न मिथ्र्यकान्ततास्ति नः। ARGET PIHEZ H19 are a serena 11 108|| mithyā-samūho mithyā chenna mithaikāntatāsti naḥ, nirapekşā nayā mithyā sāpekṣā vastu te'rthakịt.
108. If you say that collection of falsehoods must be false,' we reply that in our view there is not absolute one-sided falsity. The nayas which are unconnected with one another are false, but they being connected imply objects.
COMMENTARY The Naiyāyika may argue, if you accept sunaya and durnaya (correct and false naya) from a collection of false knowledge, falsity will arise. In reply it is mentioned that in durnaya there is only a refutation of what is not our object to establish. It is in that sense that it is disconnected and false. But when nayas are taken in a connected tissue they are all true and there is no shadow of falsity.
1. Pravachana-sära by B. Faddegon, p. 91 2. Pañchâstikāya-sära by A. Chakravarti, Introduction, p. XXIII-XXV

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ĀPTA-MĪMĀMSĂ नियम्यतेऽर्थो वाक्येन विधिना वारणेन वा। CMS-t a Hisagu4fagterratrem ||10911 niyamyate'rtho vākyena vidhinā vāraṇena vā, tathā'anyathā cha so'vaśyamavićeșyatvamanyathā.
109. By a proposition, something is affirmed or denied. A substance is regulated thus or otherwise. If this is not accepted, it must become a non-substance.
COMMENTARY In this verse, it is mentioned how a substance characterised by many-sidedness, can be established by a proposition so that a person can be induced to act according to it. 1
A substance is established by affirmation or negation. From a merely one-sided view, there will be no difference between existence and non-existence of a substance. As the knowledge is varied according to pramāṇa and naya, its object is also of many kinds.2
तदतद्वस्तु वागेषा तदेवेत्यनुशासति। 7 HIT RIEL Tararat: fer deareftat 1111011 tadatad-vastu vāgeşā tadevetyanuśāsati, na satyā syān mặşāvākyaiḥ katham tattvārtha
desanā.
110. This proposition implies that or not-that substance, by that only'. If this be not true, how can there be teaching of reality by false proportions?
COMMENTARY The one-sided view of the meaning of a propostion 1. “नन्वेवमनेकान्तात्मार्थः कथं वाक्येन नियम्यते यतः प्रतिनियते विषये प्रवृत्तिर्लोकस्य
PUIGCAR CRAGHETTI” Aștasahasri. 2. "Tina Houthalilc4542ffa echirara Fafacerar ritafdraau” Astašati.

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cannot be accepted, for this will be false and how can there be realisation of truth through false propositions? So the Anekānta view that a proposition has connection with itself as well as with its opposite must be accepted. By denying the opposite, a substance is established through pramāņas, pratyakşa etc.That is to say, we mention that a substance is ‘this, and not this' and do not hold only that it is this for the latter is false and cannot lead to correct knowledge.?
वाक्स्वभावोऽन्यवागर्थप्रतिषेधनिरङ्कुशः। आह च स्वार्थसामान्यं तादृग् वाच्यं खपुष्पवत् ॥11॥ vaksvabhāvo'nya-vāgartha-pratiședha-nirankuśaḥ, āha cha svārtha-sāmānyaṁ tādrg vāchyaṁ kha
puspavat.
111. The nature of a word is that it, without any obstruction, denies the meaning of another word. If only it is said that it expresses the sāmānya of its own meaning, the interpretation would be (impossible) like a sky-flower.
COMMENTARY When we say “bring a pitcher', it necessarily opposes bringing of other things. The inherent nature of a word is therefore its own meaning apart from, and in opposition to the meaning of other words.
In every substance there is knowledge of its general and special characteristics. “The objects of pramāņa are sāmānya, common qualities, i.e., generic attributes, or višesa, distinguishing attributes, i.e. differentia. This 1. "tranfeuerufalement fargenfem u ruf besar athal ... Teini_ 'विरुद्धमपि संसिद्धं तदत्तद्प वेदनम्।
Ac Fruit tad a /?" Aștasahasri. 2. “तदेवेत्येकान्तेन प्रतिपादयन्ती मिथ्यैव भारती, कथमनयार्थदेशनम् ? इत्येकान्ते
aferent TypeRITETTI" Astašati.

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twofold distinction is applied to substances, attributes and modifications." We do not find anywhere sāmānya without viseṣa or viseṣa without sāmānya.2 The Chārvāka view of sāmānya without viseṣa is an impossibility.
172
To exemplify, we have a general knowledge that this is a man. A particular man has special qualities, viz., he is a Brahmin, etc. Again he grows up leaving his childhood, youth and becomes old. But throughout his different ages, he maintains his essential characteristics. This acceptance of a change, leading to the manysidedness of a thing, is a peculiarity of the Jain doctrine establishing Anekāntavāda.
"The substance is an existent, the quality is an existent and the modification is an existent"3. "As one pearl necklace extends itself over a triplicity, namely, the necklace, the string and the pearl so the one substance extends itself over a triplicity, viz., the substance, the quality and the modification."4
सामान्यवाग् विशेषे चेन्न शब्दार्थो मृषा हि सा ॥ अभिप्रेतविशेषाप्तेः स्यात्कारः सत्यलाञ्छनः ॥112॥
sāmānya-vāg viseṣe chenna sabdārtho mṛṣā hi sā, abhipreta-viseṣāpteḥ syātkāraḥ satya-lāñchhanaḥ.
112. The sāmānya word if not connected with vaseṣa, will be false. To attain particular object the word 'syat' is the sign of truth.
COMMENTARY
The two dogmas of Madhyamika philosophers of Buddhism are refuted by the Jain doctrine of Syādvāda.
1. Outlines of Jainism, p.115.
2. कूर्मरोमादिवत् न च सामान्यं विशेषपरिहारेण विशेषो वा सामान्यपरिहारेण क्वचिदुपलभामहे ।”
Astaśati.
3. Pravachana-sara by B. Faddegon, Ch-II, Verse 15
4. Ibid, p. 83

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173 These are the sūnyavāda and Apohavāda. The former laid down the nothingness, absence, shallowness or contradictoriness of everything; the latter upheld the impossibility even of defining.” For genera do not exist in nature, or even in our mind. If you will define a cow, you may say that it is not a horse, not an elephant, in short, not a non-cow, but really you do not get further by that."! The Jain view as laid down in the previous verses refutes these views and lays down Anekāntavāda distinguished by the use of the word 'syāt'.
विधेयमीप्सितार्थाङ्गं प्रतिषेध्याविरोधि यत्। petardusuraffa PIIGIGHRufa: 1|113|| vidheyamīpsitārthāngam pratiședhyāvirodhi yat, tathaivādeya-heyatvamiti syādvāda-samsthitiḥ.
113. That which is mentioned as the object of our desire, refuting its opposite goes in the same manner as its accep-tance or discarding. Syādvāda is established in this way.
COMMENTARY
When we want to have a pitcher, we say “bring a pitcher.' This necessarily goes to mean that we do not want to have a picture. The acceptance of pitcher and discarding other things necessarily comes from our intention. In this manner, the seven modes of predication (Sapta-bhargi) are accepted by refuting opposites and accepting viseșa.? .
इतीयमाप्तमीमांसा विहिता हितमिच्छताम्। सम्यमिथ्योपदेशार्थविशेषप्रतिपत्तये ॥14॥
1. Pravachana-sāra by B. Faddagon, Note, p.8.
For refutation, see pages 84-85 2. "Tefastauftdurchfastara FIGC: ubudt
H
T
ACI” Astašati.

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ĀPTA-MĪMĀŃSĂ itiyamāpta-mimāṁsā vihitā hitamichchhatām, samyan-mithyopadeśārtha-višeşapratipattaye.
114. This Āpta-mimāṁsā (establishment of the Omniscient) is composed for those who seek liberation, for attainment of proper objects from correct and false teachings.
COMMENTARY Some read Fearofit' meaning the author "with the object of conferring" benefit to the people. But Akalanka accepts the reading 'feartogath' and explains it as “ F HChifff” i.e., those who seek liberation. Aptamimāṁsā is explained by Akalarika as “thorough examination of the omniscient" (Sarvajña-višeşa-parikṣā).
The object of this work is correct teaching (samyagupadeśa) which lays down that the path to liberation consists of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. Liberation cannot happen in absence of one of these. Other views regarding liberation, viz., liberation is attained through knowledge alone, are false teaching. These are refuted.
The omniscient is established, refuting the view of those, e.g., Mimāṁsakas who deny omniscience.2
In ten parichchhedas (chapters) this work is here finished.3 Vasunandi has added a marigalācharaña verse after this verse, but this is neither accepted by Akalarika nor by Vidyānandi. This point has been dealt in detail in the Introduction.
The End.
1. “सम्यग्दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्ग इति सम्यगुपदेशः। तदन्यतमापाये मोक्षस्यानुपपत्तेः
समर्थनात्। 'ज्ञानेन चापवर्गः' इत्यादिमिथ्योपदेशस्तस्य दृष्टेष्टविरुद्धत्वसाधनात्।"
Astasahasri. 2. “pace Haiti Hearden RIUT a Areati" Ibid. 3. “इति देवागमाख्ये स्वोक्तपरिच्छेदेन शास्त्रे (स्वेनोक्ताः परिच्छेदा दश यस्मिन् तत्
Failuredena na Raffat)” Ibid.

Page #177

INDEX

Page #178


Page #179

INDEX
INDEX OF THE VERSES with their series numbers
abhāvaikānta-pakṣe'pi abuddhi-pūrvāpekṣāyām
adhyātmam bahirapyeṣa advaitaikantapakṣe'pi
advaitam na vinā dvaitād
ahetukatvānnāśasya ajñānāchched dhruvo bandho ajñānān-mohato bandho
ananyataikante'ņūnām
anapekşe pṛthaktvaikye
antarangārthataikante
anyeṣvananyaśabdo'yam asakyatvādavāchyam kim āśrayāśrayi-bhāvān astitvam pratiṣedhyenā
avaktavya-chatuşkoti
avastvanabhilāpyaṁ syāt bahirangarthataikante bhāvaikānte padarthānām
bhāvaprameyāpekṣāyāṁ
buddhi-sabda-pramāṇatvaṁ
buddhi-śabdārtha-sanjñāstās
chatuşkotervikalpasya
daivādevārtha-siddhiśched
deśa-kala-viśeşe'pi devāgama-nabhoyāna
177
Nôn đồ ă ă ô nhớ a ă gì có ai có cô có thì có cơ
12
91
2
24
27
52
96
98
67
33
79
44
50
64
17
46
48
81
9
83
87
85
45
88
63 1

Page #180

178
ĀPTA-MĪMĀMSĀ
75
114
84
dharmadharmyavinābhāvaḥ dharme dharme'nya evārtho doşāvaranayorhānir dravyādyantara-bhāvena dravya-paryāyayoraikyam ekāneka-vikalpādāv ekasyāneka-vșttirna ekatve'nyatarābhāvaḥ evam vidhi-nişedhābhyām ghața-mauli-suvarņārthi hetoradvaita-siddhisched hinastyanabhisandhāt; itiyamāpta-mimāṁsā jīva-sabdaḥ sabāhyārthaḥ kāmādiprabhavaśchitraḥ karma-dvaitaṁ phala-dvaitam kārya-bhrānteranubhrāntiḥ kārya-dravyamanādi syāt kārya-kāraṇa-nānātvam kāryotpādaḥ kṣayo hetor kathañchit te sadeveștam kramārpita-dvayād dvaitam kṣaṇikaikāntapakşe'pi kusalākusalaṁ karma mithyā-samūho mithyā na hetuphala-bhāvādi na sāmānyātmanodeti năstitvaṁ pratiședhyena nayopanayaikāntānām nityam tat-pratyabhijñāna nityatvaikāntapakşe'pi
58
14
16
108
18
107
56

Page #181

INDEX
179
109
92
28
30
15
106
80
31
niyamyate’rtho vākyena pāpam dhruvaṁ pare duḥkhāt pauruşādeva siddhischet payovrato na dadhyatti pramāṇagocharau santau pramāṇakārakairvyaktar přthaktvaikāntapakşe’pi puṇyam dhruvaṁ svato duḥkhāt punya-pāpa-kriyā na syāt sadātmanā cha bhinnaṁ chet sadeva sarvaṁ ko nechchhet sadharmaņaiva sādhyasya sādhya-sādhana-vijñapter sāmānyam samavāyas-cha sāmānyārthā giro'nyeşāṁ sāmānya-vāg viseșe chenna sañjñā-sarkhyā-višeşāch santānaḥ samudāyas-cha sarvāntāśched avaktavyās sarvathānabhisambandhah sarvātmakaṁ tadekaṁ syād sat-sāmānyāttu sarvaikyam sa tvamevāsi nirdoso śeṣabhangāścha netavya siddhaṁ cheddhetutaḥ sarvam skandha-santatayaśchaiva suddhyaśuddhi punaḥ sakti sūkṣmāntarita-dūrārthāḥ syādvādaḥ sarvathaikānta syādvāda-kevalajñāne tadatad-vastu vāgeşā
112
72
29
49
66
34
76
54
100
5
104
105
110

Page #182

180
ĀPTA-MĪMĀMSĀ
101
102
111
78
86
103
113
19
55
tattvajñānaṁ pramāņaṁ te tirthakrt-samayānāṁ cha tvanmatāmsta-bāhyānāṁ upekṣā-phalamādyasya vaksvabhāvo'nya-vägartha vaktaryanāpte yaddhetoh vaktr-śrotr-pamātīņāṁ vākyeșvanekānta-dyoti vidheyamipsitārthānigam vidheyapratiședhyātmā virodhānnobhayaikātmyam virodhānnobhayaikātmyam virodhānnobhayaikātmyam virodhānnobhayaikātmyam virodhānnobhayaikātmyaṁ virodhānnobhayaikātmyam virodhānnobhayaikātmyaṁ virodhānnobhayaikātmyam virodhānnobhayaikātmyam virodhānnbhayaikātmyam virūpakāryārambhāya viśuddhi-sarikleśānigam chet vivakşā chāvivakşā cha yadi sat sarvathā kāryam yadyāpekșika-siddhiḥ syānna yadyasat sarvathā kāryam
70
74
111
94
97
95
35

Page #183

Sarat Chandra Ghoshal Academic researches in ancient Indian literature and philosophy have to depend upon Sarat Chandra Ghoshal's contribution. He was one of the few Indologists who translated the old texts into English. Well-versed in ancient Indian history, culture and archaeology, he is also known for his studies in numismatics and such other disciplines of historical value. Holding the degrees of M.A., B.L., Sarasvati Kavyatirtha, Vidyabhushana and Bharati, late Sarat Chandra Ghoshal was a Jubilee Post-graduate Scholar, Bankimchandra Gold Medallist. Jyotish Chandra Medalist (University of Calcutta); Member of the Numismatic Society of India, Evert Prizeman (Scottish Church College). He authored the Digambara Saints of India, Varuni, Vairagyer Pathe etc. and edited Vedānta-paribhāṣā, Dravyasangraha, Parikṣāmukha, Kriyāyogasāra, Upakathā, Gitāvali, Sundarananda, Rāmāyaṇa etc.

Page #184
Bharatiya Jnanpith Aims & Objects To conduct researches so as to bring out the extinct, rare and unpublished works of knowledge and to give impetus to the creation of original literature for the benefit of the people. Founders Late Sahu Shanti Prasad Jain Late Smt. Rama Jain President Smt. Indu Jain Office: 18, Institutional Area, Lodi Road, New Delhi-110 003