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ĀPTA-MĪMĀŃSĀ conuter-refuting omniscience is later than the day of Samantabhadra. Siddhasena took up this subject in the second canto of Sanmati-prakarana and Abhayadevasūri in his commentery to this work, has discussed the matter in detail. Pātrakesari in his Pañchanamaskāra-stotra has defined kevala-jñāna.
Akalanka in his Asta-sati (commentary on Aptamimāṁsā) elaborated the point. Kumārila attacked the view of omniscience accepted by the Buddhists and Jains in Slokavārtika as already mentioned. The Buddhist writer śāntarakṣita in Tattva-sangraha (and Kamalaśila in his commentary to this work) refuted Kumārila's arguments and Vidyānandi in Asta-sahasri (commentary on Aptamīmāṁsā) has refuted Kumārila and śāntarakṣita. Special works establishing omniscience were written by Anantakirti known as Brhatsarvajña-siddhi and Laghusarvajña-siddhi.
सूक्ष्मान्तरित-दूरार्थाः प्रत्यक्षाः कस्यचिद् यथा। अनुमेयत्वतोऽग्न्यादिरिति सर्वज्ञसंस्थितिः ॥5॥ sūkṣmāntarita-dūrārthāḥ pratyakşāḥ kasyachid
yathā, anumeyatvato'gnyadiriti sarvajña-samsthitiḥ.
5. The existence of the ominiscient (is established) as objects which are minute, covered or distant are directly knowable by some persons and as fire etc. are known from inference.
COMMENTARY To every person all objects are not capable, at all times, of direct perception. An object may be very minute. Its existence might not be seen by the eye. But its presence can be established by inference. For example, in chemical experiments, if a particular colour results from adding a substance, we infer that a certain substance is the cause
