Aapta Mimansa

Author(s): Saratchandra Ghoshal
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/022477/1

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APTA-MIMAMSA of Acharya Samantabhadra Edited and Translated by Saratchandra Ghoshal

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Apta-mimamsa A Sanskrit treatise with 114 verses in ten chapters, Apta-mimarsa means 'propounding the evident one.' It expounds the Jaina concept of 'omniscient in a philosophicalcum-logical manner. As a matter of fact, it is an eulogy. It is more popularly called Devagama-stotra after the first word in its first verse. This fashion of nomenclature was followed in the outstanding eulogies--Bhaktamara, Kalyanamandira, Visapahara, Ekibhava etc. The magnanimous considerations, thorough discussions, perfect solutions on the one hand, and wide coverage, aphoristic phraseology, skilful presentation and poetic flavour make this text so copious and compendious that pioneers like Akalanka, Vidyanandi and Vasunandi chose it for their voluminous commentaries, respectfully called Asta sati, Astasahasri and Vitti. Known for his short commentaries on and translations of ancient texts into English, Sarat Chandra Ghoshal has made this text easier to grasp and additionally charming, particularly for the researchers in Indian religions and philosophy. It is a must for the entrant into the field of logic.

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APTA - MIMAMSA of Acharya Samantabhadra

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APTA - MIMAMSA of Acharya Samantabhadra Edited with Introduction, Translation, Notes and An Original Commentary in English SARATCHANDRA GHOSHAL OR ST lele i SUOL TO ay Bharatiya Jnanpith

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ISBN 81-263-0724 2 Moortidevi Granthamala: English Grantha No. 13 APTA-MIMAMSA of Acharya Samantabhadra Edited by Saratchandra Ghoshal Published by Bharatiya Jnanpith 18, Institutional Area, Lodi Road New Delhi - 110 003 Printed at Nagri Printers, Delhi - 110 032 First Edition : 2002 Price: Rs. 150 Bharatiya Jnanpith

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To The Loving Memory of Jaina-dharma-bhusana Brahmachari Sital Prasad

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A GUIDE TO TRANSLITERATION Vowels 3TT her # 15 15 - 5 15 O Consonants ka ka kha kha p so ga ga gha gha Ga na kyi- ph jha jha chha 7 a dha tth m dha zl- th bha ra la va w ha

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Introduction Apta-Mimamsa is a celebrated work written by the Digambara scholar Saint Samantabhadra. According to a tradition current amongst the Digambara Jains, this work is the opening portion of a commentary by the same author known as Gandhahasti Mahabhasya on the Tattvarthadhigamasutra by Umasvami. This commentary in full has not been discovered. The tradition about the existence of Gandhahasti Mahabhasya is supported by references to the same in different works. Abhaya-chandra Suri (14th century A.D.) in his tika on the sutra Upajnate (Sakatayana Vyakarana, III, 1-182) has refered to Mahabhasya of Samantabhadra (H1415 HETTO74). Mallisena-suri in his Syadvadamanjari (Saka era 1214) has mentioned Gandhahasti (aft 3764a-TTTAT FETE Fuad AIS ). Dharmabhusana in his Nyayadipika has mentioned : "It has been said by the Svami in Apta-mimamsa at the beginning of Mahabhasya" (AGCI svAmibhirmahAbhASyasyAdAvAptamImAMsAprastAve). Laghu Samantabhadra (not Svami Samantabhadra), who must have flourished later than Vikrama 12th century (because he makes mention of Vasunandi), also says that Devagama was the Manglacharana of Gandhahasti Mahabhasya of Tattvarthadhigama-sutra. This work is also known as Devagama Stotra, because the first word of its first verse is Devagama. Samanta-bhdara in the last verse of his work says that by the preceding verse he has made Apta-mimamsa (Determination of the Trustworthy). So the name Apta-mimamsa came also to 1. "tattvArthAdhigamasya mokSazAstrasya gaMdhahastyAkhyaM mahAbhASyamupanivadhvantaH...zrIsvAmisamanta bhadrAcAryAstatra kila maMgalapuraHsara-stavaviSayaparamAptaguNAtizayaparIkSAmupakSiptavanto devAgamAbhidhAsya pravacanatIrthasya sRssttimaapuuryaaNckrire|" Visamapadatatparya-tika by Laghu Samantabhadra on Astasahsri.

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APTA-MIMAMSA be applied to this collection of one hundred and fourteen verses. 8 Some commentators of Tattvarthadhigama-sutra accept that the following is the opening verse of the said work: "mokSamArgasya netAraM bhettAraM karmabhUbhRtAm / jJAtAraM vizvatattvAnAM vande tad-guNalabdhaye / / " i.e. "I bow to him who is the guide on the path to liberation, the destroyer of mountains of karmas and the knower of the principles of the universe, so that I may attain these qualities belonging to him." These commentators urge that at the beginning of the Moksa-sastra, i.e., the Tattvarthadhigama-sutra, the above mentioned salutation has been laid down. He who is thus saluted is Apta. So Samantabhadra, at the beginning of his commentary on the Tattvarthadhigama-sutra, has examined the qualities of Apta in his attempt to explain the opening verse of the Tattvarthadhigama-sutra. Vidyanandi who wrote a commentary (named Astasahasri) on Astasati of Akalanka has accepted the fact that the verse is the opening verse of Tattvarthadhigama-sutra and that consequently Samantbhadra has discussed Apta described in the verse. Vidyanandi says: "This work named Devagama has established the Apta which is the subject-matter of praise composed at the beginning of the Sastra, i.e. Tattvartha-sutra. Vidyanandi himself later on clearly mentions: "By that Apta of the most excellent qualities praised by the sages for liberation and auspiciousness at the beginning of Nihsreyasa-sastra".1 Vidyanandi has again in his Mangalacharana to Astasahasri said: "I am now adoring the work of the determination of the trustworthy (Apta-mimamsa) which is the subject-matter of praise in the beginning of the 1. "tadevaM niHzreyasa-zAstrasyAdau tannibandhanatayA maMgalArthatayA ca munibhiH saMstutena niratizayaguNena bhagavatAptena / " Astasahasri.

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INTRODUCTION Sastra (Tattvartha-sutra)."1 While explaining verse 114 of Apta-mimamsa, Vidyananada writes : "This establishment, after examination of the omniscient Arhat, is made as he is the same as Apta praised at the beginning of the work as the guide to the path of liberation, the destroyer of mountains of karmas and the knower of the principles of universe." The epithets 'the guide to the path of liberation', 'the destroyer of mountains of karmas' and 'the knower of the principles of universe 2 are identical with the disputed opening verse of Tattvarthadhigama-sutra already quoted. In the colophon of his original work Apta-pariksa, Vidyananda has accepted the verse as the opening verse of Tattvarthadhigama-sutra. In Apta-pariksa, arguments for establishing the Apta, as based on this verse, are employed, Vidyananda expressly says in this colophon that Svami (Samantabhadra) had made a Mimamsa (referring to Aptamimamsa) of that praise which has been embodied in the beginning of Tattvartha-sastra.3 Some have however expressed the view that abovementioned situation is no part of Tattvarthadhigama-sutra. J. L. Jaini writes "There is no sufficient reason to hold that these verses were composed by the author of Tattvarthasutra. In the commentaries on Tattvartha-sutra such as Tattvartha-raja-vartika by Akalankadeva and Sarvarthasidhhi by Pujyapada, these verses are not found. The last verse (e.g. HTANTRI Far etc.) appears to be the 1. "zAstrAvatAraracitastutigocarAptamImAMsitaM kRtiralaMkriyate myaa'sy|" Astasahasri. 2. "zAstrArambheSvabhiSTutasyAptasya mokSamArgapraNetRtayA karmabhUbhRd-bhettRtayA vizvatattvAnAM jJAtRtayA a packa-Sta....Q9R114427 Parent" Astasahasri. 3. "zrImat-tatvArthazAstrAdbhuta-salilavidheriddharatnodbhavasya protthAnArambhakAle sakalamalabhide zAstrakAraiH kRtaM yt| stotraM tIrthopamAnaM prathitapRthupathaM svAmimImAMsitaM tat vidyAnandaiH svazaktyA kathamapi kathitaM satyavAkyArthasiddhyai // iti tattvArthazAstrAdau muniindrstutigocraa|| yuftangrytazi faarfaiqari Il" Apta-pariksa, verses 123, 124.

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APTA-MIMASA Margalacharana of Sarvarthasiddhi."'l J.L. Jaini also says that Tattvartha-sutra is written in the form of aphorisms and it is unusual to find a verse at the beginning of any work composed in aphorisms. This objection can be met by showing that there are works written in aphorisms beginning with a verse, for example, Pariknamukha, a work written in aphorisms by Manikyanandi, opens with a verse. In Astasati, a commentary on Apta-mimamsa also, Akalarka has nowhere suggested that Samantabhadra has taken the verse (Herrer Har etc.) as the basis of Aptamimamsa. Akalanka simply says "Devagama etc. are written for establishing an examination of the excellence of qualities for the great Apta which is the subject-matter of praise at the beginning of a work for auspiciousness." Vidyananda has also written a commentary on Tattvarthadigama-sutra. This commentary is known as Tattvartha-slokavartika. In this commentary, however, he has not explained the opening verse (H14rper fari etc.).? In this connection, we may mention that Acharya Jugal Kishore holds the view that from a verse in the prasasti of the drama named Vikranta-kaurava as well as the work Jinendrakalyanabhudaya, it appears that Gandhahasti-bhasya and Devagama are two different works of Svami Samantabhadra.3 If Devagama-stotra be a part of the Bhasya, the names of both of these works should not have been mentioned, as the mention of only the Bhasya would have been quite sufficient. He also says that Vasunandi has written in his Vrtti on verse 114 of 1. Tattvarthadhigama-sutra edited by J.L. Jaini. Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. II, page 4. 2. The opening verse of Pariksamukha is : "pramANAdarthasaMsiddhistadAbhAsAd viparyayaH / iti vakSye tayorlakSma siddhamalpaM laghIyasaH / / " 3. "Trarefasteiermeef-warta: 1 svAmi samantabhadro'bhUd devAgamanidezakaH / / "

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INTRODUCTION 11 Apta--mimamsa that this verse shows the end of the subject.1 In Asta-sati and Asta-sahasri also, he says that it is found that Samantabhadra has written the work, completing the same in ten chapters.2 The word Apta literally means "he who has attained or achieved". By Apta in Apta-mimamsa, Sarvajna or the omniscient is meant (AptamImAMsA sarvajJavizeSa - parIkSA - Asta-sati and Asta-sahasri). In Jainism, Kundakunda first mentioned the doctrine of omniscience and was followed in this respect by Umasvami (Tattvartha-sutra, I, 10, 11, 29). Denial of omniscience is made by Kumarila Bhatta in his expositions on the Purvamimamsa philosophy. Kumarila's view is that a human being cannot see all things in all places and at all times. There is a limit to human vision or knowledge beyond which these cannot proceed. Things which are beyond the senses cannot be perceived. The proofs (pratyaksa, anumana, upamana, sabda-arthapatti and abhava) cannot establish omniscience. Those who profess to be omniscients, e.g. Gautama Bhuddha in Buddhism or Tirthankaras in Jainism do not agree in their views. So omniscience is an impossibility. As a result, opinion of no human being is to be regarded as infallible. Only Vedic injunctions are infallible and should be followed instead of the injunctions of Buddha or Tirthankaras. By performance of sacrifices as prescribed in the Vedas, a potential after-state is created which brings all desired fruits (Sloka-vartika, Verse 111 and those following the same). Kundakunda demonstrated that the help of senses is not required in omniscience. Omniscience is not magnified sense-perception. It is direct experiential knowledge. Atma and Knowledge are co-extensive and co-existent (Pravachanasara, I, 23). The soul (Atma) knows itself, other objects than itself, as well as those which result from the conbination of soul and matter, physical and karmic (Ibid, I, 36). Owing to knowledge-obscuring karmas, the 1. 'zAstrArthopasaMhArakArikA' Vidayanandi also writes that Samantabhadra herein shows that he has fulfilled his purpose ( kRtakRtyaH nirvyUDhatattvapratijJaH) 2. "iti svoktaparicchedavihiteyamAptamImAMsA / " Astasati " iti devAgamAkhye svoktaparicchedeM zAstre vihiteyamAptamImAMsA / " Astasahasri.

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12 APTA-MIMAMSA ability of soul to have knowledge is obscured. When all the four obscuring and obstructive karmas are destroyed, the Soul becomes possessed of omniscience (Ibid, I, 1516). This knowledge is gained without the aid of senseorgans. It is atindriya-jnana, also known as ksayika-jnana, because it arises after the nitanta ksaya (total destruction) of obscuring and obstructive karmas. The Kevalins, Tirthankaras and Siddhas have this omniscience. Akalanka in his commentary on Apta-mimamsa (entitled Astasati) and Vidyanandi in his Astasahasri refute the arguments of Buddhists and Kumarila. The time when Svami Samantabhadra flourished cannot definitely be ascertained. A discussion on this point has been advanced by Acharya Jugal Kishore in his Introduction to Ratnakarandasravakachara. Samantabhadra flourished after Umasvami or Umasvati and Kundakunda and before Pujyapada. Umasvami, according to one view, flourished in about Vikrama Samvat 281. Samantabhdara's time, according to this calculation, will be about 265 A.D. According to another view, Umasvami flourished in about Vikrama Samvat 360 or 362. Samantabhadra's time, according to this calculation, will be about 400 Vikrama Samvat (342 A.D.). According to a third view, Umasvami's time is about Vikrama Samvat 220. Samantabhadra, in that case, flourished in the second or third century A.D. According to a fourth view, Umasvami lived about Vikram Samvat 444. Samantabhadra will then be of the 5th century A.D. The time of Pujyapada is more certain. Dr. Buhler in Indian Antiquary, Vol. XIV, page 355, has established that Pujyapada lived in the fifth century A.D. It has been ascertained that Pujyapada lived before 482 A.D. This Pujyapada has mentioned Samantabhadra in his work, Jainendra Vyakarana (Vol. 4, p. 140)--" Hange". So it is definite that Samantabhadra lived before 482 A.D. The view of Lewis Rice, as set forth in his Intrdocution to Inscriptoins at Sravanabelagola that "Samantabhadra flourished in the first or second century

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INTRODUCTION 13 A.D.", that of Edward P. Rice in his History of Canarese Literature (following the Canarese work Karnataka-KaviCharita by R.S. Narsinhacharya and the Hindi work Karnatak Jaina Kavi by Nathuram Premi) that "Samantabhadra is by Jaina tradition placed in the second century", that of M.S. Ayangar in his Studies on South Indian Jainism that "Samantabhadra was the first of a series of celebrated Digambara writers who acquired considrable prominence in the early Rashtrakuta period", and that of Dr. S.C. Vidyabhushana in his History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic that "Samantabhadra is supposed to have flourished about 600 A.D." have been very ably criticised by Pandit Jugal Kishore. The curious reader may look up the detailed criticism in Pandit Jugal Kishore's Introduction already mentioned Kundakunda flourished before Umasvami. The different views about the approximate date of the latter have already been mentioned. Kundakunda's date was before this. A.N. Upadhye has in his Introduction to Pravachanasara has after a very careful discussion on all points, come to the conclusion that "Kundakunda's age lies at the beginning of the Christian era." The style of writing and the language employed also support the view that the order of sequence was--(1) Kundakunda, (2) Umasvami and (3) Samantabhadra. Kundakunda wrote in Prakrit verses. Earlier works on Jainism were all in Prakrit. The use of Sanskrit language came in later. The form of Sutra was first employed in Sanskrit works and Umasvami's work (Tattvarthadhigama-sutra) was in the form of aphorisms. Samantabhadra began to write in Sanskrit verses. This use of Sanskrit verse was made by all later writers, though some exception is found in works like Pramana-mimamsa by Hemchandra and Pariksamukha by Manikyanandi. . As to the life of Samantabhadra, very little is known. Pandit Jugal Kishore from a line in a manuscript copy of 1. "iti phaNimaNDalAlaMkArasya uragapurAdhipasUnoH zrIsvAmisamantabhadramuneH kRtau aaptmiimaaNsaayaam|"

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APTA-MIMANSA Apta-mimamsa found in the library of Daurbali Jinadas Shastri of Sravnabelagola has concluded that Samantabhadra was the son of a ruler of Uragapur and from the colophon! of Stutividya or Jina-stuti-satam or Jina-sataka or Jinasatakalarkara (these are different names of the same work), has mentioned that santivarma was the name of Samantabhadra before he become a saint. In my opinion, subject to correction by any later discovery of trustworthy materials, the line in the manuscript written by an unknown person at an unknown time is no authority for holding that Samantabhadra was the son of a ruler or Uragapur. I am also of opinion that from the nature of writings of Samantabhadra, it is very unlikely that he should be the author of a treatise of Alarkara, devoting himself to highly artificial poetry. That Narsimha?, a commentator of this work or Ajitasena in his Alarkarachintamani has mentioned Samantabhadra to be its author, might be due to following a tradition. Such is the case of poet Kalidasa being considered the author of Nalodaya, a highly artificial poem. From comparing the language and the method of writing, it has been established that this Nalodaya cannot be the work of the celebrated poet Kalidasa, the author of Abhijnana-sakuntalam, Raghuvamsam, Meghdutam etc. Pandit Jugal Kishore has himself expressed doubt regarding a line4 referred to by Pandit Banshidhar but which could not, on a reference to him, be substantiated as coming from any authentic source. So it is not justifiable even to discuss the possibility of santivarma being king santivarma of Kadamba dynasty. Hastimalia (Vikram 14th century) in his Vikranta 1. "giftrationi forriga taqi" 2. Waifechasi for stralu rarffarfar I" 3. "sia HTTGERT Higa ___ lakSyamAcaM likhAmi svanAmasUcitalakSaNam / / " 4. "iti phaNimaNDalAlaMkArasya uragapurAdhipasUnunA zAntivarmanAmA shriismntbhdrenn|"

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INTRODUCTION 15 kaurava1 and Ayyapparya in his Jinendra-kalyanabhyudaya2 have mentioned that Samantabhadra belonged to Mulasangha. In the Jaina Pattavalis, in one place Samantabhadra being in the line with Kundakunda, is accepted as belonging to Nandigana or Desiyagana; while in the Pattavali of Senagana, he is said to belong to this Gana. The four kind of division in Sanghas took place after Akalanka. Samantabhadra, who lived long before this, cannot therefore be relegated to a particular Sangha. In Inscription No. 64 in 'Inscriptions in Sravanabelagola' by Lewis Rice, we find that the line of Gurus of Samantabhadra was Bhadrabahu, Chandragupta, Kundakunda, Umasvati alias Gridhrapichcha and Valakapichcha.3 According to tradition, Samantabhadra was at one time attacked with a kind of disease known as Bhasmaka which causes excessive hunger. According to Ayurveda Sastra, vayu, pitta and kapha are the essentials in a human body and when kapha (phlegm or saliva) becomes reduced by eating bitter articles and dry rice, vayu and pitta increase and hunger, developed to the extreme by vayu, immediately reduces to ashes (Bhasma) everything eaten.* The only way to cure this disease is to eat in profuse quantity rich food which is also delicious to taste. This being opposed to the VOW of a Jaina Saint, Samantabhadra resolved to lay down his life by Sallekhana, as allowed in Jainism. But his preceptor forbade him to have recourse to this action. Samantabhadra, thereupon, laid down the symbols of a 1. "zrImUlasaMghavyomnendurbhArate bhAvitIrthakRt / deze samantabhadrAkhyau munirjIyAt padarddhikaH / / " 2. " zrImUlasaMgha vyomrendurbhArate bhAvitIrthakRt / deze samantabhadrAkhyau jIyAt prAptapadarddhikaH / / " 3. "evaM mahAcAryaparamparAyAM syAtkAramudrAMkitatattvadIpaH / bhadraH samantAdguNato gaNIzaH samantabhadro'rjAdya vAdi - siMhaH / / " 4. "kaTvAdirUkSAnUbhujAM narANAM kSINe kaphe mArutapittavRddhau / atipravRddhaH pavanAnvito'gnirbhuktaM kSaNAd bhasma karoti yasmAt / / " Bhava-prakasa.

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16 APTA-MIMAMSA Digambara saint and adopted at different times dresses and symbols of a hermit of the Saiva sect, a Buddhist monk or a wandering beggar. He took meals which would cure his disease.1 He was cured by partaking of large offerings to Siva in a temple by a king named Sivakoti. Sivakoti, learning about the extra-ordinary power of Samantabhadra in eating such a large quantity of food as is not possible for an ordinary human being, had the doors of the temple, where Samantabhadra used to take his meals, closed one day. Samantabhadra began to praise the twenty-four Jinas and when his praise to Chandraprabhu (the eighth Tirthankara) came to be recited, a miracle happened. In place of the Siva-linga which was in the temple, an image of Tirthankara Chandraprabhu appeared. Samantabhadra finished the praise of the remaining Tirthankaras. The King Sivakoti and his brother Sivayana, seeing this miracle, became Jains, accepting Samantabhadra as their spiritual preceptor. This traditional account of Samantabhadra's Bhasmak disease, his bringing of Chandraprabhu through the mantra given to him by divine Padmavati, is referred to in a verse2 in an inscription dated Saka Samvat 1050 known as Mallisena-prasasti (No. 67-Inscriptions at Sravanabelagola by Lewis Rice). In the work Rajavali-katha in Canarese language and Aradhanakathakosa in Sanskrit verse by Brahma Nemidatta, following Aradhana-sara of Prabhachandra, the substance of the above traditional account is given with some variation in detail as to the places visited by Samantabhadra during his wanderings in different guises. 1. Charaka describes how this strange hunger can be overcome : "tametyagniM gurusnigdhazItamadhuravijvalaiH / annamAnairnayecchAntiM dIptamagnimivAmbubhiH / / " 2. "vaMdyo bhasmakabhasmasAtkRtiyahaH padmAvatI devatA dattodAttamada-svamaMtravacanavyAhUtacandraprabhaH / AcAryasya samantabhadragaNabhRdye kAle kalau jainaM vartma samantabhadramabhavad bhadraM samantAnmuhuH / / "

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INTRODUCTION 17 Edward P. Rice in his History of Canarese Literature has mentioned on the basis of Rajavali-katha : "It is told of him that in early life he (Samantabhadra) performed severe penance and on account of a depressing disease was about to make the vow of Sallekhana or starvation; but was dissuaded by his Guru who foresaw that he would be a great pillar of the Jaina faith." Nemidatta has quoted two verses said to have been spoken by Samantabhadra to Sivakoti. Both of these two verses could not, however be uttered by a Jaina Saint who is absolutely free from any pride or self-aggrandisement. In the first verse, Samantabhadra is made to say : "I was a naked Digambara saint in Kanchi (Kanjivaram), in Lambusa (this place has not been identified). I had a grey body (being smeared with ashes) in Pundra (Ganda in Bengal) and Uara (Orissa). I was a begging Buddhist monk in the town of Dasapura (Mandasa). I was a wanderer eating sweets. In Benares, I was a person performing penance (with ashes on my body)--white like a moon (or white like Siva). O king! I am a Jaina ascetic. He who has power may hold a discourse with me." This is supposed to have given the places visited by Samantabhadra while he was ill. The second verse is copied from that found in an inscription (No. 54 - Inscriptions at Sravanabelgola) about a century before Nemidatta's Aradhana-katha-kosa was compiled. The verse is as follows : "Frist, I beat the drum in the town of Pataliputra (Patna); then I did so in Malava (Malwa), Sindhu (Indus), Dhakka (not definitely identified--some say a place in Punjab and others say Dacca in Bengal), in Kanchipura (Kanjivaram) and Vidisa (Vilsa). O king! I have now come to Karnataka (Kanhada 1."kAMcyAM nagnATako'haM malamalinatarnulAmbuze pANDupiNDaH puNDodre zAkyabhikSurdazapuranagare miSTabhojI parivrAT / vArANasyAmabhUvaM zazidharadhavalaH pAMDuraMgastapasvI rAjan yasyAsti zaktiH sa vadatu purato jainnirgrnthvaadii||"

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APTA-MIMAMSA or Canara) full of heroes and learned men; and I am moving about like a tiger for discourse.") Edward P. Rice says: "He (Samatabhadra) was a brilliant disputant and a great preacher of the Jaina religion throughout India. ...It was the custom in those days, alluded to by Fa Hian (400) and Hiun Sang (630), for a drum to be fixed in a public place in the city and any learned man, wishing to propogate a doctrine or prove his erudition and skill in debate, would strike it by way of challenge or disputation. ...Samantabhadra made full use of this custom and powerfully maintained the Jaina doctrine of Syadvada". M.S. Ramsvami Ayangar in his 'Studies in South Indian Jainism' has also mentioned : "It is evident that he (Samantabhadra) was a great Jaina missionary who tried to spread far and wide Jaina doctrines and morals; and that he met with no opposition from other sects, wherever he went." Though, in our opinion, Samatabhadra himself could not have made a boast of his prowess, as alleged by Nemidatta, we have no hestitation to accept that he preached and propogated the principles of Jainism by visiting many places throughout India. That he defeated those who came to discuss with him, is established by numerous references in Jaina works and Inscriptions.? Nothing more in detail has yet been ascertained regarding the life of Samantabhadra. 1. "pUrvaM pATaliputramadhyanagare bherI mayA tADitA pazcAnmAlavasindhuDhakkaviSaye kAJcIpure vaidishe| prApto'haM karahATakaM bahubhaTaM vidyotkaTaM saMkaTaM vAdArthI vicarAmyahaM narapate zArdUlavikrIDitam / / " The metre of this verse in Sanskrit prosody is known as Sardulavikridita (Stremifashisa). So the last word is significant in convenying a double sense. 2. "Tatiana ART: 154: " Adipurana by Jinasena. "halfefellitud erita:" Varangacharita by Vardhamana-suri. "calfcarcasa 4064-0ft: 1" Hanumachcharita by Brahma Ajit. "jayanti vaagvjrnipaatpaattitprtiipraaddhaantmhiidhrkottyH|" Gadya-chintamani by Vadibha Simha

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INTRODUCTION 19 Other works of Samantabhadra are Yuktyanusasana (a commentary on it by Vidyanandi has been found), Svayambhu-stotra (with a commentary by Prabhachandra), Stutividya or Jinastutisatam or Jina satakam or Jinasatakalankara (with commentary by Narsimha) and Ratnakarandasravakachara. There are inferences that there were other works of Samantabhadra such as Jiva-siddhi, Tattvanusasana, a Prakrit Grammar, Pramanapadartha, a commentary on Karmaprabhrta and Gandhahasti Mahabhasya. Though references to these works are found in works of Jaina writers of a very late date, nothing definite can be said unless manuscripts of these are discovered. In presenting an exposition by an original commentary in English of this abstruse work of Samantabhadra, I am fully aware of my short-comings to do full justice to this most difficult task. I have lost the help of Jainadharmabhusana Brahmachari Shital Prasad at whose ernest desire, my friend Pandit Ajit Prasad, M.A., LL.B. asked me to take up this work. Brahmachariji was from the start of this series, entitled the 'Sacred Books of the Jainas", devoted his heart and soul to the undertaking. His was a noble soul devoted entirely to the propogation of Jainism. Not daunted by his failing health, he was always, even on a sick-bed, eager to clear all doubtful points. And it is with the saddest heart that I now bring before the public my own endeavours, unassisted by the deep erudition of the departed scholar. By dedicating this work to his loving memory, I have but feebly expressed the thoughts that "yadIyavAgvajrakaThorapAtazcUrNIcakAra prtivaadishailaan|" (Inscription no. 258, Saka Samvat 1355, Inscriptions at Sravanabelagola) "avaTutaTamaTati jhaTiti sphuTapaTuvAcATadhUrjaTerapi jihvA / vAdini samantabhadre sthitavati tava sadasi bhUpa kAsthAnyeSAm / / " Mallisena-prasasti (inscription No. 67, Saka Samvat 1050, Inscriptions at Sravanabelagola).

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APTA-MIMASA pass my mind. The co-operators of this Series have, one after another, left this world and no words can describe the void which they have created. Prof. Hermann Jacobi, Kumar Devendra Prasad, J.L. Jaini, C.R. Jain, Mahamahopadhyaya S.C. Vidyabhusana, Puranchand Nahar, Pannalal Paliwal--to speak about a few of the leading helpers--have all gone away. Only Pandit Ajit Prasad remains and may he live long to bear the torch illuminating Jainism. In the twilight of my own life, in which ill-health and bereavements are casting their shadows, I am not sure whether I shall appear any more before the readers, bringing out any subsequent volume. But I sincerely believe that more capable hands of an ever-increasing band of competent scholars would take up the standard and bring out to the world the unique doctrines of Syadvada, the most wonderful tenet of Jainism, which is sure to find out its proper place amongst the philosophical doctrines of the world. -S. C. Ghoshal June, 1944 Cooch Behar 1. Pandit Ajit Prasad died on September 17, 1951

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CONTENTS Verse Nos. Page Nos. INTRODUCTION 7-20 25-86 CHAPTER I 1-23 Examination of the concept of the Great (Guru) Arguments to prove Omniscience Oinniscience admitted of Arhant Four types of Negation Traits of Position and Negation considered in their absolute form Concomitance of Position and Negation in a real Consideration of Absolutism of the two taken together and Absolute Inexpressibility Extension of these Traits and Theses to seven forms of Predication under Syadvada CHAPTER II 24-36 87-98 Theses of Absolute Monism (Non-Dualism) and Dualism examined Theses of Absolute Distinction and Non-Distinction examined Absolute Distinction between Knowledge and Knowable considered 100-118 CHAPTER III 37-60 Traits of Absolute Permanence and Absolute Transience examined Absolute Inexpressibility judged to be untenable

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Relative Permanence and Relative Transcience justified under Syadvada Triple Nature of Reality established 61-72 120-131 CHAPTER IV Absolute Distinction between Cause and Effect, Attributes and Substance, and Universal and Particular considered Unity and Difference between Substances and Modes explained under Syadvada CHAPTER V 73-75 132-135 Traits of the Relational and the Non-Relational considered in their Absolute Form Extension of these Traits and Theses to remaining Traits and the Forms of Predications 76-78 135-137 CHAPTER VI Theses of Reasoning and Authority raised in their Absolute Forms Consistent positions of Reasoning and Authority established 79-87 138-145 CHAPTER VII Theses of the Internal (Cognitive) and the External (Objective) Reality raised in their Absolute Forms Inconsistency of such Absolute Theses brought to light Consistent position regarding them explained and established 88-91 146-147 CHAPTER VIII Theses of Determinism by Destiny and by Effort considered in their Absolute Forms

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Extension to the Absolutism of the two and their Absolute Inexpressibility Consistent position of the two under specified contexts established CHAPTER IX Theses of earning Demerit by causing pain to others and earning Merit by causing happiness to others considered in their Absolute Forms Reverse of the above Theses examined and shown untenable Consistent position explained and established CHAPTER X Absolute Theses of Bondage by Nescience and Emancipation by little knowledge considered and examined Consistent position regarding Bondage and Emancipation explained and established Two divisions of Jivus into Liberable and Non-Liberable ones supported Simutaneous Knowledge (Kevalajnana) and Successive Knowledge (Syadvada and Naya) distinguished Propriety of the use of adverb (nipata) Syat Substance defined Position of the Relational and the Non-Relational Nayas explained Regulation of Knowables by Prepositions through Assertion and Negation Nature of Expression Ethical import of Syadvada Objective behind the composition of Apta-mimamsa 92-95 149-152 96-114 156-173

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Chapter I devAgama-nabhoyAna-cAmarAdi vibhuutyH| mAyAviSvapi dRzyante nAtastvamasi no mahAn // 1 // devagama-nabhoyana-chamaradi-vibhutayah, mayavisvapi drsyante natas-tvamasi no mahan. Coming down of heavenly beings, movements in sky, waving of whisks and other symbols of majesty (of a Tirtharkara) are seen even in magicians. You are not our worshipful lord because of these things. COMMENTARY According to the Jaina view heavenly beings come down on earth on special occasions in the life of a Tirthankara. These occasions are: conception, birth, adoption of ascetic vows, attaiment of perfect knowledge and liberation. A Tirthankara has eight symbols of majesty (pratiharyas), viz.,2 Asoka tree, throne, the triple canopy, halo of glory, divine discourse, shower of flowers, waving of sixtyfour flywhisks and heavenly music. The Tirtharkaras, it is said, move in the sky, on golden lotuses.3 It is mentioned in this verse that these should not be accepted as essentials of Apta, for magicians might show these to the people and deceive them. Vasunandi in his Vrtti writes : "Acharya Samantabhadra might have seen the omniscient and spoken thus : 'O Lord! praise means the recital of greatness, but your greatness being not cognizable by senses, is beyond my perception. So, how can I praise 1. "svargAvataraNa-janmaniSkramaNakevalajJAnotpattimuktigamanasthAneSu AgamanaM AgamaH avtaarH|" Vitti by Vasunandi 2. "wfa-TECH 37STAGSPARETHALIA fueganti" Vasunandi. 3. " 7 24441-4 tp ri tanqi" Vasunandi.

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26 APTA-MIMAMSA you?' The Lord might have replied: 'My son! as others praise me understaning my greatness through advent of devas etc., why do you not adopt the same policy?' In reply Samantabhadra urges in this verse that 'Such things can be shown even by magicians deceiving our senses. So these cannot be the reasons for which you are the greatest of the great for us.1 The practices of magicians showing heavenly beings are mentioned in Hindu, Jain and Buddhist works of ancient India. In Act IV of Ratnavali, a Drama by Sriharsa, a magician flourishing a fan of peacock feather, tells the king, "I shall show the gods like Hari, Hara, Brahma etc. and the wives of siddhas, charanas and suras dancing in the sky."2 Then he shows his feats. All present look up with wonder. The king, leaving his throne, exclaims, "Wonder, wonder. See, queen! this is Brahma on the lotus. This is Sankara adorned on the forehead by the crescent of the moon. This is Visnu, the killer of the Demons, bearing a bow, a sword, a mace and a discus in his hands. This is Indra, on the elephant, Airavata. The other Gods are (also) here. The celestial nymphs are dancing in the sky with anklets ringing on their moving feet."3 In the Prakrit drama, Karpura-manjari of Raja-sekhara, Bhairavananda tells the king, "I shall show the moon 1. "zrIsamantabhadrAcAryaH sarvajJa pratyakSIkRtyaivamAcaSTe, he bhaTTAraka, saMstavo nAma maahaatmsyaadhikykthnm| tvadIyaM ca mAhAtmyamatIndriyaM mama prtykssgocrm| ataH kathaM mayA stUyase? ata Aha bhagavAn, nanu bho vatsa, yathA'nye devAgamAdihetormama mAhAtmyavabudhya stavaM kurvanti tathA tvaM kimiti na kuruSe? ata Aha asmAddhetorna mahAn bhavAn mAM prati, vyabhicAritvAdasya hetoH, iti vyabhicAraM drshyti|" Vasunandi. 2. "aindrjaalikH| (picchikA bhramayana) hariharabrahmaNamuhaM devaM daMsemi devarAaM c| gagaNe vi siddhacAraNasuravahusatthaM ca NaccaMtaM // " Ratnavali, Act IV. 3. "sarve savismayaM pshynti| rAjA (UrdhvaM dRSTvA AsanAdavataran) : Azcaryam, Azcaryam / devi, pazya, eSa brahmA saroje rajanikarakalAzekharaH zaMkaro'yaM dobhidaityAntako'sau sadhanurasigadAcakracihna'zcaturbhiH / eSo'pyarAvatasthastridazapatiramI devi devAstathAnye . nRtyanti vyomni caitAzcalacaraNaraNannUpurA divyanAryaH // " Ratnavali, Act IV.

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CHAPTER I which has descended to the earth. I shall stop the sun half way in the sky. I shall bring the wives of the Yaksas, the Suras and the Siddhas. There is nothing in this world which I cannot do. So tell me what I shall do." In all ancient works, a mangalacarana is written at the very beginning. The object of the work is next explained. Prabhacandra in his Prameya-kamala-martanda had quoted the following verses to prove the importance of setting out the purpose of a work : "At the beginning of every sastra, the object with its connection should be mentioned, for a listener pays attention to only a definite subject and things connected with the same. Who will pay attention to a treatise or do any kind of work till its necessity is patent? That sastra for which no necessity is explained is not desired by the wise. So at the outset, the necessity is to be explained."2 Akalanka says that both mangalacarana and the setting out of the purpose have been mentioned in the first verse. The praise of the omniscient in an attempt to examine his characteristics is the mangalacarana. The necessity of the work is also indicated by laying down that it is characterised by faith (sraddha) and knowledge of the qualities (gunajnata)3. Sraddha and gunajnata have been 1. " daMsemi taM pi sasiNaM vasuhAvatiNNaM thaMbhemi tassavi ravissa rahaM Nahaddhe / Ami jakkhasurasiddhagaNaMgaNAo taM Natthi bhUmivalae maha jaM Na sajjaM // tA bhaNa kiM karIadu / " Karpura-manjari, Yavanikantara' I. 2. "siddhArthaM jJAtasambandhaM zrotA zrotuM pravartate / zAstrAdau tena vaktavyaH sambandhaH saprayojanaH // " 27 "sarvasyaiva hi zAstrasya karmaNo vApi kasyacit / yAvat prayojanaM noktaM tAvat tat kena gRhyatAm // " "anirdiSTaphalaM sarvaM na prekSApUrvakAribhiH / zAstramAdriyate tena vAcyamagre prayojanam // " Prameya-kamala-martanda. The first and the second verses are written by Kumarila Bhatta and form verses 17 and 12 of his Sloka-vartika, I.1.1. 3. "devAgametyAdimaMgalapuraHsara-stavaviSayaparamAptaguNAtizayaparIkSAmupakSipataiva svayaM zraddhAguNajJatAlakSaNaM prayojanamAkSiptaM lakSyate, tadanyatarApAye'rthasyAnupapatteH / " Astasati.

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28 APTA-MIMAMSA explained as darsana or faith arising out of knowledge following the examination of Jaina Nayavada and Syadvada. By establishing the omniscient in this work, a sound foundation will be laid for faith. adhyAtma bahirapyeSa vigrhaadimhodyH| divyaH satyo divaukassvapyasti rAgAdimatsu saH // 2 // adhyatmam bahirapyesa vigrahadi-mahodayah, divyah satyo divaukas-svapyasti ragadimatsu sah. 2. External physical excellence and internal good qualities, wonderful yet true, are found even in heavenly souls who are full of attachment (raga etc.) COMMENTARY In the first verse it has been mentioned that omniscience is not established from advent of celestical beings on the occasions of birth etc. of a Tirthankara or from other marks of glory like movement in the sky or possession of various symbols of majesty. Magicians can show such tricks. Owing to the possibility of our having a false sight of these in magic, we cannot say that Mahamahopadhyaya Yasovijaya Gani in his commentary on Astasahasri has written, "sraddha and gunajnata are called darsana. These are kinds of knowledge to examine Naya and Syadvada." (Gllusid turligar-hi shfaqet asfalt) He has quoted the following verse from Sanmati-prakarana: "evaM jiNapaNNatte saddahamANassa bhAvao bhaanne| purisassAbhiNivohe daMsaNasaddo huvai jutto // " "the word darsana (faith) is fit to be applied in abhinibodha (mati-jnana), i.e., knowledge derived from the bhavas of a man having belief in the things laid down by the Jina." Pandit Bansidhar has explained sraddha as "great attachment to the knowledge that this is to be revered. (prerakatvaM vArAdhyatvena jJAnaM bhaktistatrAtyantama- nurAgaH shrddhaa|) The interpretation of Mahamahopadhyaya Yasovijaya seems to be more apt.

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CHAPTER I these establish the omniscient. In the present verse, it is urged that there might be things not false which are present internally and externally in a being and these might establish the omniscient. For instance it might be said that lustre or absence of hunger, thirst, old age, death, sweats a shadow, in bodies of celestial beings are not false signs like those shown by magicians, but those really exist. But the author says that though these might exist in the dwellers of heaven, such appearances do not establish omnisciece, for such celestial beings are subject to passions (kasaya), anger (krodha), pride (mana), deceipt (maya) and greed (lobha) from which the omniscient is entirely free. According to the Jain doctrine jivas are of various kinds. Among these are celestial beings, human beings, sub-human beings and dwellers in hell. The celestial beings are of four kinds, residential (Bhavana-vasin), peripatetic (Vyantara), stellar (Jyotiska) and heavenly (Vaimanika). These celestial beings have internal qualities, viz., freedom from sweat etc. and external qualities, viz, emitting sweet scent. It is said that though magicians can show false images of heavenly beings, these characteristics will be absent in such false sights. Those who practise Yoga say that the test of finding whether the sights of Gods and Godesses are real is to look for such characteristics, because a magician will not be able to reproduce these in a false show of celestial beings. It might be urged, that as magicians fail to show these, the same are neither false nor mundane. So we should accept these as identifying essentials of the omniscient.3 To this, a reply is given that it cannot be so, for the omniscient is free from ghatiya karmas, but the celestial beings who possess similar specialities are not free from these, as 1. "Langagfofahrer: 1" Tattvarthadhigama-sutra, IV.1. 2. "AtmAnamadhizritya vartamAno'dhyAtmamantaraMgo vigrahAdimahodayaH zazvaniHsvedatvAdiH parAnamekSatvAt; cal aferent chakula ut aluftara" Astasahasri. 3. " a Feat AFICI Pagal Haut 1174674Tata." Astasahasri.

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30 APTA-MIMASA they are possessed of the four kinds of passions, viz, anger, pride, deceit and greed. Akalanka, therefore, says, "the internal and external excellence of bodies etc., though not found in shows of magicians, cannot be accepted as proving the omniscient, for these are seen in celestial beings whose passions have not disappeared. So, you are not praised as our Lord even for this."2 According to Jaina doctrine, "condition of existence (gati) is the state (of a soul) brought about by the operation of the body-condition-making (gati-nama-karma) or it is the cause of the soul's passing in either of the four conditions of existence. The four kinds of the conditions of existence are : Hellish (Naraka), Sub-human (Tiryancha), Human (Manusya), Celestial (Deva)."3 "Devas (celestials) are so called because they always amuse themselves with their eight heavenly acquisitions and have shining heavenly constitutions.94 1. 372 ucat: unatrys: a mafa, 7 arcant day to challe: PITCI" Asta sahasri. From one point of view karmas are subdivided into two classes, ghati (destructive) and aghati (non-destructive) : "hui yu gera 3ffa o sift HOUT3TT 1" (Gommatasara, Karma-kanda, verse 7). By ghati karmas, perfect knowledge, perfect conation, infinite power, purified right belief, purified qualities (as conduct, charity etc.), sensitive (knowledge) and other subsidential thought-activities are destroyed, vide: "kevalaNANaM daMsaNamaNaMtaviriyaM ca khayiyasammaM c| khayiyaguNe madiyAdI khaovasamie ya ghAdI du // " Gommatasara, Karma-kanda, verse 10. 2. "bahirantaHzarIrAdimahodayo'pi pUraNAdiSvasambhavI vyabhicArI svargiSu bhaavaadkssiinnkssaayessu| tato'pi na bhavAn paramAtmeti stuuyte|" Asta-sati. 3. "TSUG4541 53113114TR TS at & NArayatirikkhamANusadevagaitti ya have cadudhA // " Gommatasara, Jiva-kanda, verse 146. "Frontefruit41619aifa 1 Tattvarthadhigama-sutra, VIII, Verse 10. 4. Scaifat et foreen Tolle Pacelinafsi il erhafcicachrel et a afoupil dal ll" Ibid, verse 151.

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CHAPTER I It is said that the celestials have eight acquisitions which become their nature. These are: aaiman (the power to make their bodies small), mahiman (the power to extend their bodies), laghiman (the power to make their bodies light), gariman (the power to make their bodies heavy), sakama-rupita (the power to adopt any form and any number of bodies at one time), vasitva (the power to subjugate others), isitva (the power by which they can exhibit superiority) and prakamya (the power to act as they desire). According to Yoga philosophy also Aaiman, Laghiman, mahiman, prapti, prakamya, vasitva, isitva and yatrakamavasayitva can be attained by practising Yoga. According to this view even human beings can attain such power by Yogic practices. According to Jainism, in case of liberated souls (Siddhas), karmas disappear altogether and that stage is higher than that of the celestial beings. The omniscient (Kevalin) also is in higher state. So the excellent qualities of celestial beings are not accepted in this verse as characteristics of the omniscient. Both in the Hindu and Jain philosophies occult powers are not the highest goal to be achieved by souls. In all such philosophies it is accepted that such powers naturally come at a particular state of development and are often a source of obstruction to future development, by causing a feeling of arrogance to arise in the mind of the possessor. The souls who disregard such powers, 1. The 'Sacred Books of the Jainas', vol. V. (Gommatasara, Jiva-kanda), page 100. 2. "Tatsforhifa-yrgura: ARUHYGETHF=T991797 1" Patanjala-yoga-sutra, Vibhutipada, aphorism 46. In Hindu philosophy anima, laghima, isitva, prakainya and vasitva mean the same as explained in the Jaina doctrine as mentioned above. Garima and mahima are taken to be synonymous in philosophy meaning the same as mahima in Jaina philosophy. Yatrakamavasayitva means infallibility of their wishes and prapti is the power to attain a thing which is at a distance.

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32 APTA-MIMAMSA advance to further stages of development. These powers are, therefore, not accepted in establising the existence of the omniscient for such powers are found in souls in much lower stages of development.1 tIrthakRtsamayAnAM ca paraspara virodhataH / sarveSAmAptatA nAsti kazcideva bhaved guruH // 3 // tirthakrt-samayanam cha paraspara-virodhatah, sarvesamaptata nasti kaschideva bhaved guruh. 3. Trustworthiness of everyone cannot be accepted, as the doctrines of Tirthakrts are contradictory to one another. Only one of them can be accepted as the Lord COMMENTARY Tirthakrt is one who prescribes means for escape from samsara (worldly existence). If it be urged that the omniscient is established from the qualification of his being a Tirthakrt (advisor of escaping from mundane existence), we might reply that though this quality is 1. It may not be out of place to cite here an instance how a false sight of God can be shown to people even in modern age of civilization. In the diary of Kuladananda Brahmachari, dated the 19th April 1891, the following incident in the life of his preceptor Acharya Bijoykrisna Gosvami is mentioned. On the above date the Acharya himself spoke about this incident to his disciple. One day in Brindavan, a Sadhu told the Acharya that he will show him the image of Visnu. The Acharya was asked to sit fixing his gaze on a room in front of him. The Sadhu sat near him and began to recite a mantra. A little after the Acharya saw a figure of Visnu. The body had four arms but had not the usual conch, discus, mace and lotus respectively in the arms. The Acharya became suspicious and began to recite mantras. The image began to tremble and was soon transformed into the horrible form of an evil spirit. Mentioning this incident, the Acharya told his disciple that evil spirits can assume forms of gods and goddesses but cannot assume the peculiar symbols of the latter. (Sree Sree Sadgurusanga, Vol. III, pages 11-13). Instances of spirits assuming forms of departed persons are mentioned in works describing seances.

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CHAPTER I 33 absent in celestial beings like Indra etc., it is found in Buddha and others. In the second verse, it has been mentioned that excellence of heavenly bodies of celestial beings does not constitute the essential of the omniscient. It may be urged : "Be it so. But we might say that celestial beings are not Tirthakrts. We may hold that a Tirthakrt is the omniscient; holding this as the distinctive feature of the omniscient." To this the reply is, that this cannot be accepted, for there are many who are accepted as Tirthakrts. Buddha, Kapila and others are known as Tirthakrts from sastras. So if we accept this view Buddha, Kapila and others will be the Lord of the Jainas and so will deserve praise. If we might say, what is the harm in holding that all these Tirthaksts, Buddha, Kapila etc. are omniscient as well, as accepted by the Jains. The reply to this is that all these lay down different doctrines contradictory to one another. If they were all omniscient they could not have laid down contraditory doctrines. In other words all the founders of different religions cannot be held to be trustworthy because they contradict one another. So it is urged that only one of them can claim to be the best and most reliable. Kumarila Bhatta has refuted in his commentary on Mimamsa-sutras, the view of Samantabhadra that there is an omniscient being as laid down in Apta-mimamsa. Kumarila is the author of commentaries Sloka-vartika, Tantra-vartika and Tup-tika which expound the Mimamsasutras of Jaimini. The Mimamsa philosophy has also been expounded by Prabhakara. The views of Prabhakara and Kumarila are different at many points. The views of Prabhakara are also known as the views of the Guru and the same as those of Kumarila and Bhatta. Akalanka 1. " fa atefeheratri herufa, stabilitufa, Ilart getarai" Astasati. 2. "yathaiva hi bhagavati tIrthakaratvasamayo'sti tathA sugtaadissvpi| sugatastIrthakaraH kapilastIrthakara Ruum af stat pro NT: THE RIDI" Astasahasri. 3. "7 o H Helafsta: pierrfag 1f97: 1" Astasati.

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APTA-MIMAMSA in his Asta-sati on Apta-mimamsa has not replied to the triticisms of Kumarila regarding Samantabhdra's establishing the omniscient, but Vidyanandi in his Astasahasri has attempted a refutation of the views of Kumarila. For this reason, western scholars hold that Kumarila was later than Akalanka but prior to Vidyanandi.1 Kumarila says "If Buddha be omniscient, why cannot there be correct knowldege that Kapila also is omniscient? If both of them be accepted as omniscient, why are there differences of opinion between them?"2 So, we might hold that being a Tirthakara does not establish the greatness of any one. Accordingly, we might hold that none is omniscient.3 Kumarila says that it is well-known that people desirous of welfare, gain the same from the Vedas. There is no necessity of praising any being as omniscient. Vidyanandi says that the present verse can be interpreted in another way as refuting the views of such 1. "Kumarila's date is determinable within definite limits; he used the Vakyapadiya of Bharthari; neither Hiuen-Tsang nor I-tsing mentions him; he was before Sankara; he attacked the Jain theory of an omniscient being as propounded in the Apta-mimamsa of Samantabhadra, but is not answered by Akalanka in his Asta-sati which comments on the Apta-mimamsa. On the other hand he is freely attacked by Vidyanandi and Prabhachandra who both lived before 838 A.D. Vidyanandi assures us, doubtless correctly, that he criticised the Buddhist Dharmakirti and Prabhakara, on the latter point arguing with the result above arrived from internal evidence. The upper limit of date is, therefore, not earlier than 700 A.D. The lower limit depends on his precise chronological relation to Sankara and the latter's exact date. Later tradition, the Sankaravijaya of Madhava and the pseudo-Anandagiri, would make him an older contemporary, but the interval may have been considerably longer." The Karma-mimamsa by A.B. Keith, pages 10-11. 2. "a uf Hasit asperit afat Thi acuit af Helsit 1975: i : 1" Verse quoted in Astasahasri. 3. "tIrthakaratvAkhyo na kasyacinmahattvaM sAdhayatIti kazcideva gururmahAn bhavet ? naiva afira!" Astasahasri. 4. "ataeva na kazcit puruSaH sarvajJaH stutyH| zreyo'rthinAM zrutereva zreyaHsAdhanopadeza ufifunt:l" Astasahasri. (By apara, Kumarila Bhatta is meant.)

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CHAPTER I 35 persons like Kumarila who deny the existence of the omniscient. According to this interpretation tirthakrt' would mean "those who destroy the Tirtha, i.e. the omniscient" and would specially refer to the Mimamsakas who refute the existence of the omniscient. 'Tirthakrtsamaya' would mean the different views of such deniers of the omniscient: for example, some hold that bhavana results from Vedic injunctions, while others urge that niyoga is signified from such injunctions. Owing to this difference of opinions none of these views can be tenable. In other words, as the Mimamsakas hold different views, none of them can be accepted as reliable. doSAvaraNayohAniniHzeSA'styatizAyanAt / kvacidyathA svahetubhyo bahirantarmalakSayaH // 4 // dosavaranayorhanir nihsesastyatisayanat, kvachid yatha syahetubhyo bahirantar-malaksayah. 4. As from causes belonging to itself, destruction of external and internal impurities (takes place), so in some 1. "taM pratyapIyameva kArikA yojyaa| tIrthaM kRntantIti tIrthakRto mImAMsakAH srvjnyaagmniraakrnnvaaditvaat| teSAM samayAstIrthakRtsamayAstIrthacchedasampradAyA bhAvanAdivAkyArthapravAdA ityarthaH / teSAM ca parasparavirodhAdAptatA saMvAdakatA nAstIti kazcideva sampradAyo bhaved guruH saMvAdako naiva bhavediti vyaakhyaanaat|" Astasahasri. Vasunandi also writes in his Vitti: . "tIrthaM sarvajJaM kRntanti chindanti iti tIrthakRtaH samayA AmnAyAH saMpradAyA yeSAM te tIrthakRt-samayAH, teSAm anyonyvirodhaat| sarvaM niravazeSamavamataM agamyAvagamanaM vA icchanti abhyupagacchanti iti srvessH| teSAM sarveSAm AptatA paramArthavAditvaM nAsti na vidyte| ataH kaH AtmajIvaH nizcetano'cetano bhvtyev| evakAraH avdhaarnnaarthH| bhavaM saMsAraM yAnti gacchanti iti bhavetaH teSAM bhavetAM zaMkhacakradharAdInAmityarthaH / guru thH| bhaved guruH bhavetAM guruH| na ca lbdhaatmsvruupaannaam| kimuktaM bhavati-tIrthakRcchedakAmnAyAnAmapi sarvamekena pramANena SaDbhirabhyupagacchatAm AptatA nAsti prsprvirodhaat| ato yatipatireva syaanaanyH|" The interpretation of sarvesam and bhavet by subtle derivation in the vrtti appears to be far-fetched. It is said that by sarvesam it is meant those who wish to understand everything and bhaved guruh means Lord Indra etc. who come to samsara.

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APTA-MIMAMSA (soul) owing to a particular excellence, destruction of faults and impediments happens (takes place). COMMENTARY 36 In this verse, it is mentioned that though all Tirthankaras cannot be trustworthy as urged in the previous verse, it is quite possible that in some souls, a particular stage of development produces excellence which destroys the dosas (faults) and avaranas (obstructions). This is like the purifying of a piece of metal like gold which might have external impurities like mud etc. attached to it and internal impurities like alloy mixed with the same. By washing or scouring we can do away with the external impurities and by melting we can destroy the alloy bringing out the pure gold. In a soul also karmas internally obstruct right faith or right knowledge and externally produce faults like attachment, moha, ignorance etc. When these karmas are destroyed, the soul becomes pure and fit for omniscience.1 According to Jainism, "the union of soul with matter results in the generation of different kinds of forces, some of which are obstructive of the pure natural functions of spirit..... The soul is subject to the following eight kinds of forces: (1) Jnanavaraniya (the knowldedge-obstructing), (2) Darsanavaraniya (the perception-obstructing), (3) Vedaniya (which regulates the experiences of pleasure and pain), (4) Mohaninya which is of two kinds (a) Darsana-mohaniya (which stands in the way of the adoption of the right faith) and (b) Charitra-mohaniya (which prevents one from following the right path in practice), (5) Ayuh (the force which determines the duration of the association of the soul with its physical body), (6) Nama (the group of forces which organize the 1. " etaduktaM bhavati / kasmiMzcidatizAyanAddoSAvaraNayorhAnirasti / yathA dhAtupASANasya antarmalakSayaH / sa kazcid bhavatyeva gururiti saMbandhaH / ekatra svahetavaH samyagdarzanAdayaH / anyatra piNDIbandhana prayogAdayaH / tathA ekatra bahirmalaH zarIrendriyAdikam / antarmalaH krm| anyatra bahirmalaH kiTukAdikam / antarmalaH kAlimAdi / " Vasunandi.

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CHAPTER I 37 body and its limbs), (7) Gotra (which attracts the soul into a new 'womb' upon which depends the Gotra, i.e., family or lineage of the individual) and (8) Antaraya (which prevents effectiveness and interferes with energy in general). Every unredeemed soul is under the sway of the above mentioned forces. ...Of these the first, second, fourth and eighth kind of forces are called ghatiya (destructive) because they stand in the way of the soul... They have to be overpowered before the desired perfection can be attained by the soul."1 "As regards the scientific nature of this enumeration, observation shows that the soul involved in the cycle of transmigration is unable to enjoy its natural perfection in respect of knowledge, perception and happiness, which therefore must be held in abeyance by some kind of force operating on it. We thus get three different kinds of forces, namely, (1) those which obstruct knowledge (Jnanavaraniya), (2) those that interfere with perception and (3) those which stand in the way of happiness, leaving the soul to experience pleasure and pain through the senses (Vedaniya). Besides these, observation also proves the existence of another kind of force which does not permit the adoption of the Right Faith. The energies falling under this head are divisible into two classes: those which interfere with the very acquisition of faith, and those that offer opposition to its being put into practice. To the former class belong such forces as prejudice, bigotry, false belief and all those other kinds of mental energy, passions and emotions of the worst (anantanubandhi) type, whose uncontrolled and uncontrollable impetuosity deprives one of the full and proper exercise of the faculty of reflection, the most essential requisite for the discernment of truth; in the latter type, fall all those deep-rooted traits of mind, anger, pride, deceit and greed of different degrees of intensity other than the anantanubandhi already referred to which rob the mind of determination and serenity, 1. The Householder's Dharma by C.R. Jain, pages XXXVI-XL.

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38 - APTA-MIMAMSA and prevent concentration of attention, also certain minor faults, such as joking, attachment and the like, and bodily habits and propensities (e.g., laziness) which are prejudicial to an attitude of self-control. Thus the fourth kind of force consists of two distinct types, namely (1) Darsanavaraniya which does not allow one to adopt the right faith, and (2) Charitra-mohaniya which acts as an obstacle on the practical side of Dharma (religion). "Apart from the above, we must allot separate places to the force which determines the duration of the association of the soul with its physical body (Ayuh-karma) and to the energies responsible for the making of that body and its limits (Nama-karma). The status, descent, lineage and the like of the soul, which really depends on the 'womb' into which it is attracted by the operation of the forces of chemical affinity and magnetism residing in its two inner bodies, the Karmana and the Taijasa, is also the outcome of a distinct type of energy, which is for that reason, to be treated as a class by itself (Gotrakarma). Lastly, we also notice that souls differ from one another in respect of physical prowess and the power to do or achieve what is desirable and desired. There are several kinds of energies which limit the power and effectiveness of the soul, and they constitute the type known as the Antaraya karma. These are the eight main kinds of forces operating on the soul in its unemancipated state."1 "The only enemy of the soul is the force of its own karmas (actions) which it can destroy, by becoming fully self-conscious. On the destruction of its bonds, the soul becomes deified, and cannot be overcome afresh by karmas or any other force; for it is only liable to be affected by its own desires which are destroyed for good at the moment when omniscience is attained." 1. The Householders Dharma by C.R. Jain, Introduction, page XXXVII, Note. 2. The Householders Dharma by C.R. Jain, Introduction, page XXXI.

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CHAPTER I 39 "Every soul is potentially omniscient, in the fullest sense of the term. Consciousness being the very nature of the soul, and all things being knowable by nature, perfection in knowledge must be predicated in respect of the essential nature of each and every individual. Ready assent will be lent to this proposition by any one who will recognise the fact that all things in nature are knowable, which means, not that there is nothing unknown to us today, but that which will never be known by any one at all is non-existent; for that which will never be known to any one will never be known, much less proved to be existing, and without strict proof, existence cannot be conceded in favour of anything whatsoever. It is not even permissible to hold that the 'unknowble' might mean an agglomeration of a certain indefinite number of attributes some of which may never be known, for we shall never have any reason whatsoever for alleging the existence of any of those unknowable attributes beyond a wilful refusal to be reasonable. Thus there is no escape from the position that all things are knowable. "Now since the natural properties of a substance are to be found in all its units or individuals, it is obvious that what is known to one individual is capable of being known by all others. It follows from this that if there be an infinity of ideas, each of which is known to only one individual at a time, the consciousness of each and every soul is potentially able to know the whole infinity of them. Hence, each and every soul is potentially omniscient, that is to say, the consciousness of every living being is endowed with the capacity to know all things, unlimited by time or space. There is nothing to be surprised at in this conclusion, since knowledge merely means a state of conciousness, which being an affection or modification of the substance of its being, is felt by the soul. This amounts to saying that the soul is made of pure intelligence, in different language the jiva is a pure embodiment of knowledge. "The soul is also endowed with faculties of

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40 - APTA-MIMAMSA clairvoyance, telepathy and the like, of which the ordinary humanity is almost wholly ignorant in our day. The researches of reliable bodies of men, such as the Psychical Research Society, as well of private individuals of undoubted veracity, prove the fact that the soul possesses a faculty of perception which is altogether independent of senses. The ancients who made a regular study of the subject and whose powers of observation were far in excess of our own, also bear powerful witness to the existence of this hidden source of perception. The super-sensuous faculty of perception otherwise known as inner illumination enjoyed by advanced ascetics and saints, is a direct manifestation of this power, which is inhibited by the impetuosity of will running wild in pursuit of sense-gratification. A careful study of the lives of saintly personages yields the important truth that this faculty is also unlimited like the faculty of knowing of which it is an inseparable associate by nature, since knowledge and perception are dependant on one another to a considerable extent. We may, therefore say that the soul's faculty of perception is also infinite potentially." Kumarila Bhatta in his exposition of the Purva-mimamsa philosophy (Sloka-vartika, verses from 141) has refuted the existence of an omniscient being. According to the Purvamimamsa view expounded by Kumarila "Vedic injunctions are of the highest authority; the performance of the sacrifice is the highest duty which when performed gives rise to some unprecedented cosmic potency (apurva), a potential afterstate of acts, which brings about all the fruits for the performer of the sacrifice. These tenets cannot allow any one to claim omniscience for the simple reason that if any one were to be omniscient outside the Vedic fold, his words would be looked upon as infallible and the Vedic authority would be questioned. Kumarila says that the human being might see only the general aspect of things, and hence it is not possible to believe that a man can 1. The Householders Dharma by C.R. Jain, Introduction, page XIX - XXI.

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CHAPTER I 41 see all things in all places and of all times. The omniscient will have to be a dirty being, because, being necessitated by the function of seeing, he will have to come into contact with so many dirty things. There is a limit to visionary and knowing ability, and it cannot be stretched beyond that; so none can be able to see things which are super-sensuous. None of the five proofs can justify any one's omniscience. The so-called omniscients do not agree among themselves; their words are against Vedas, whose authority is unquestionable; and no omniscient is ever come across by anybody: so omniscience is an impossibility. The all-knowledge attributed to Brahman means only self-knowldege." This attack of Kumarila has twofold handicaps: first, his hands are tied down by the above tenets of his school and, secondly, he has not distinguished sense-perception from omniscience he attacks omniscience as if it is senseperception intensified and magnified. Kundakunda has plainly told us that "senses have no part to play in omniscience; it is the spirit, being a knower by nature and essentially constituted of knowledge that comes face to face with the complex reality, and comprehends it immediately and simultaneously in its entirety with no effort on his part and with no effect on his spiritul constitution."1 This verse of Apta-mimamsa is perhaps the first in Jaina literature where an attempt to establish omniscience by reasoning is made. Kevala-jnana, which is the same as omniscience, was mentioned by Kundakunda, who was earlier than Samantabhadra, but he had taken it, as will appear from the commentary on the following verse of Apta-mimamsa as an essential characteristic of the Holy One. He did not make any attempt to justify the existence of quality or refute any argument against it. The Niryuktis make some reference to this subject, but the voluminous literature which subsequently grew up refuting and 1. Pravachana-sara edited by A.N. Upadhye, Introduction, page LXXVIII. For a detailed comparative discussion, the reader may consult pages LXXII--LXXX.

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42 APTA-MIMANSA conuter-refuting omniscience is later than the day of Samantabhadra. Siddhasena took up this subject in the second canto of Sanmati-prakarana and Abhayadevasuri in his commentery to this work, has discussed the matter in detail. Patrakesari in his Panchanamaskara-stotra has defined kevala-jnana. Akalanka in his Asta-sati (commentary on Aptamimamsa) elaborated the point. Kumarila attacked the view of omniscience accepted by the Buddhists and Jains in Slokavartika as already mentioned. The Buddhist writer santaraksita in Tattva-sangraha (and Kamalasila in his commentary to this work) refuted Kumarila's arguments and Vidyanandi in Asta-sahasri (commentary on Aptamimamsa) has refuted Kumarila and santaraksita. Special works establishing omniscience were written by Anantakirti known as Brhatsarvajna-siddhi and Laghusarvajna-siddhi. sUkSmAntarita-dUrArthAH pratyakSAH kasyacid ythaa| anumeyatvato'gnyAdiriti sarvajJasaMsthitiH // 5 // suksmantarita-durarthah pratyaksah kasyachid yatha, anumeyatvato'gnyadiriti sarvajna-samsthitih. 5. The existence of the ominiscient (is established) as objects which are minute, covered or distant are directly knowable by some persons and as fire etc. are known from inference. COMMENTARY To every person all objects are not capable, at all times, of direct perception. An object may be very minute. Its existence might not be seen by the eye. But its presence can be established by inference. For example, in chemical experiments, if a particular colour results from adding a substance, we infer that a certain substance is the cause

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CHAPTER 1 of the same. Atoms etc. are established not by sight of the eye. Again, objects might be far off from us and accordingly beyond sense perception. Mountains or oceans far away are mentioned by Vasunandi as illustrations of this. Further, a thing might be hidden by some covering and for this reason it might be beyond the direct perception of our senses. But still, these are capable of being known by persons. It cannot be urged that a person within a room covered from our sight by walls, is non-existent. It cannot be said that the moon and the stars are nonexistent during the daytime because we do not see these. It is ludicrous to mention that persons living in the past whom we do not now see were non-existent. We cannot say that things in distant countries do not exist. We can know from books or reliable persons the existence of persons or things in the past or in distant countries. Again, in inference, we establish the existence of fire by seeing smoke from distance. Here, though fire is not the object of our direct perception, there is no doubt about its existence. As things can thus be known without direct perception, it is not absurd that an omniscient should be able to have perception of all things existing at all times. Kundakundacharya says, "For him who is evolving into knowledge the modifications of all substances are perceptible; he does not know them by means of effects such as avagraha." Amotachandra Suri explains this as follows: "Since the perfect sage does not obtain knowledge by the aid of the senses, through the precedent series of Avagraha (the taking of the object of knowledge by the senses), iha (the readiness to know more of the things perceived) and Avaya (finding out the perfection or otherwise of a thing), and since he himself, at the moment of the annihilation of all obscurations (avaranas), accepted the 1. Pravachana-sara, Sruta-skandha, L.21, Cambridge University Press, p. 13.

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APTA-MIMAMSA function of a cause (Karana), the innate nature of knowledge which has no beginning, no end, no cause (hetu) and has nothing in common with anything else, evolves, becoming the psychic exertion of arising absoluteknowledge, which immediately follows the annihilation of avaranas. Therefore, the modifications of all the substances are perceptible for him, since they conjointly become a basis for his consciousness inasmuch as all substances, times, places, and forms of being (bhava) are appropriated by him simultaneously.1 44 "Nothing whatever is imperceptible to the Holy One at the very moment of the destruction of all obscurations; for he has surpassed the senses, each of which takes up its respective objects and causes the setting to work the forces necessary for the arising of mundane distinctions (parichhitti); he is rich at all points (since they have for him the same savour), in all qualities of the senses, in the form of the distinctions (parichhida) in touch, taste, smell, colour and sound; he himself illuminates the self and the other by his completeness; he has become miraculous (lokottara) knowledge without restraint; so nothing is imperceptible to him, owing to the simultaneous grasping of all substances, places, times and forms of being."2 Kundakunda says: "The Holy Absolute Knower does not seize or release; does not evolve into anything else; but without exception he sees and knows everything all round."3 Amrtachandra explains this as follows. "This self, according to its innate nature, of no seizing, no releasing, no evolution into anything else, evolves owing to its characteristic nature of absolute (Kevala) knowledge, which is its own principle (tattva). And thus, standing forth like a genuine jewel of motionless and radiant light, it possesses an everywhere glittering efficacy of vision 1. Pravachana-sara, I.21, Cambridge University Press, p. 13. 2. Ibid, p. 14. 3. Ibid, p. 19.

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CHAPTER I 45 and knowledge; so then it becomes by itself, in itself, aware of the self in its entirety without remainder. Or to explain otherwise, by a simultaneous, intuitive perception (saksat-karana) of the multitude of all things, wavering of notion is excluded, and there is cessation of all supposed acts such as grasping and releasing. In this way, the Self (as Absolute-knower) by first evolving into all distinguishable appearances and then again not evolving into any appearance, sees and knows everything without exception everywhere whilst remaining in isolation."1 In Sankhya-karika of Isvarakrsna, an attempt has similarly been made to establish that because things are not perceptible ordinarily by senses, their existence cannot be denied, for their existence can be known by inference and even if these be not known by inference, their existence is established by scriptures of an Apta. " sAmAnyatastu dRSTAdatIndriyANAM pratItiranumAnAt / amft anfug qamrarina fagy 11" Sankhya-karika, verse 6. In the next verse, it is also mentioned that there connot be direction of things which are at a great distance or very near (such as collyrium applied to eyes which cannot see it), or where there is a defect in vision or hearing as in the case of a blind or deaf person, or where attention is fixed to another object, e.g., a man attentively reading a book may not see a man passing by, or where the thing is very small like atom, or where there is something intervening or obstructing the perception, or where something obscures another as the sun obscuring the moon or the stars during daytime, or where similar things, e.g. waters of river and ocean get mixed up where they meet. We cannot say in such cases that these do not exist. "atidUrAt sAmIpyAdindriyaghAtAnmano'navasthAnAt / cafraid antara 1" Sankhya-karika, verse 7. 1. Pravachana-sara, 1.21, Cambridge University Press, p. 19.

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APTA-MIMAMSA sa tvamevAsi nirdoSo yuktizAstrAvirodhivAk / avirodho yadiSTaM te prasiddhena na bAdhyate // 6 // sa tvamevasi nirdoso yukti-sastravirodhivak, avirodho yadistam te prasiddhena na badhyate. 6. Only you, whose words are unopposed to logic and scriptures are free from all faults because what is your desire is not opposed to proof. COMMENTARY In Asta-sahasri it is mentioned that Samantabhadra in one of his verses in Brhat-svayambhu-stotra, while praising Sambhava Jina, has mentioned: "tvaM saMbhavaH saMbhavatarSarogaiH saMtapyamAnasya janasya loke| AsIrihAkasmika eva vaidyo vaidyo yathA nAtha rujAM prazAntyai // " Verse 11. i.e. "You, O Sambhava, in this world you have suddenly appeared like a physician ministering to the cure of diseases, as a healer of people suffering from the thirst of worldly desires." This verse of Apta-mimamsa is accordingly explained by Vidyanandi with analogy to the above praise. It is mentioned by Vidyanandi that as a physician in mitigating a disease becomes faultless when he applies reasoning as well as medical science, so one who follows reasoning and scriptures in laying down liberation and its causes, is free from blemishes. The faults such as ignorance, attachment, aversion etc. are never present in a perfect soul.2 Vasunandi says that here absence of Avidya arising from attachment or freedom from hunger, 1. "kathamatra kArikAyAmanupAtto bhiSagvaro dRSTAntaH kathyataM iti cet svayaM grnthkaarennaanytraabhidhaanaat|" Asta-sahasri. 2. "doSAstAvadajJAnarAgadveSAdayaH ....pramANabalAt siddhaH sarvajJo vItarAgazca sAmAnyato yaH sa tvamevArhan yuktishaastrvirodhivaaktvaat| yo yatra yuktizAstrAvirodhivAk sa tatra nirdoSo dRSTo, yathA kvacid vyAdhyupazame bhissgvrH| yuktizAstrAvirodhivAk ca bhagavAn muktisaMsAratatkAraNeSu, tasmAnirdoSa iti nishcyH|" Asta-sahasri, I. 6.

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CHAPTER I thirst is mentioned by the word "fault-less."l It is urged that the omniscient Lord is free from faults and his words, following reasoring and the scriptures, are not opposed to the celebrated Anekanta view (or in another sense being not opposed to any pramana or proof). In other words, as a physician can prove that he is faultless by using reasoning and quoting works on medical science, so the words of a perfect soul are free from faults as these follow reasoning (which is not opposed to any pramana) and are in perfect agreement with the scriptures.2 . -- Vasunandi raises a question, how can a perfect soul have a desire. He replies that this is merely suggested by implication. Really a perfect soul has no desire. In Ratnakaranda-sravakachara (1.8) Samantabhadra has mentioned that an Apta who gives instructions, does good to the people, without being actuated by gain, fame, worship etc. A drum giving out sound at the touch of a beater does not want anything for itself: "anAtmArthaM vinA rAgaiH zAstA zAsti sato hitm| dhvanan zilpikarasparzAn murajaH kimapekSate // " tvanmatAmRtabAhyAnAM sarvathaikAntavAdinAm // AptAbhimAnadagdhAnAM sveSTaM dRSTena bAdhyate // 7 // tvanmatamita-bahyanam sarvathaikantavadinam, aptabhimana-dagdhanam svestam distena badhyate. 7. The views of those who are opposed to your 1. Samantabhadra in his Ratnakaranda-sravakachara (1.6) has mentioned: "An Apta is one who is free from hunger, thirst, senility, disease, birth, death, pain, pride, attachment, aversion and infatuation." "kssutpipaasaajraatngk-jnmaantkbhysmyaaH| na rAgadveSamohAzca yasyAptaH sa prakIrtyate // " 2. "yatra yasyAbhimataM tattvaM pramANena na bAdhyate sa tatra yuktishaastraavirodhivaak| yathA rogasvAsthyatatkAraNatattve bhiSagvaraH / na bAdhyate ca pramANena bhagavato'bhimataM mokSasaMsAratatkAraNatattvam / tasmAt tatra tvaM yuktizAstrAvirodhivAk / iti viSayasya yuktizAstrAvirodhitva- siddherviSayiNyA bhagavadvAco yuktizAstrAvirodhitvasAdhanam / " Astasahasri. .. ..

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APTA-MIMAMSA view, sweet as nectar, and who always profess only one aspect (of everything) are opposed to pratyaksa pramana (or impliedly by objects having many-sided aspects). 48 COMMENTARY or The author says that religious teachers philosophers who do not follow the Anekantavada (the theory of manysided aspects of a thing) of the Jains take false pride that only they are reliable persons. But really their views are opposed to reasoning and can be refuted by Anekantavada. The Anekanta view has been compared to nectar as it leads to happiness dstroying all misery and leads to liberation. Those who do not follow the Anekanta view are refuted by the Jaina view. In the previous verse it has been mentioned, "Your views are free from faults, being supported by logical reasoning following the established methods of proof." In this verse, it is said that the views of others who do not follow your view, are opposed to reasoning. In this verse, the views like the Sunyavada of the Buddhists, Advaitavada of the Vedantists etc. are said to be opposed to reasoning and the Syadvada or Anekantavada of the Jainas is mentioned as the correct view. The subject of Syavada or Anekantavada or Saptabhangi is the most important in Jaina philosophy. A short description of this is given below : "A single substance is endowed with infinite modifications and there are infinite classes of substances... A substance is endowed with qualities and modifications; though the substance is the same, it comes to be different because of its passing through different modifications; so when something is to be stated about a substance, viewed through a flux of modifications, there would be seven modes of predication; according to some modification or other, it is stated that a substance (1) is, (2) is not, (3) is indescribable, (4) is

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CHAPTER I 49 and is not, (5) is and is indescribable, (6) is not and is indescribable, and (7) is, is not and is indescribable."l The seven forms are accordingly: (1) syad asti (it is); (2) syad nasti (it is not); (3) syad avaktavya (it is indescribable); (4) syad asti nasti (it is and it is not); (5) syad asti avaktavya (it is and is indescribable); (6) syad nasti avaktavya (it is not and is indescribable); (7) syad asti nasti avaktavya (it is, it is not and is indescribable). "The word 'syad' may be paraphrased: the proposition holds true, provided you take it in the right sense, in the correct proportion, with other notions."2 Sapta-bhanga means seven turns or seven varied forms of idea of expression.3 In this sevenfold way a substance is described "(1) as being, with reference to itself, (2) as not being, with reference to another, (3) as indescribable, simultaneously with reference to itself and another, (4) as successively being and not being, with reference to itself and another, (5) as being and indescribable, with regard to reference to itself, and simultaneity with reference to itself and reference to another, (6) as not being and indescribable, with regard to reference to another, and simultaneity with reference to itself and another (7) as being, not being, and being indescribable with regard to reference to itself, reference to another and simultaneity with reference to itself and reference to another." "With reference to each single property of substance, with its unlimited number of properties, this seven-fold formula of restriction, interposing with its partly meant and partly not-meant affirmation (vidhi) and negation (pratisedha)... the invariably ennunciated word 'syat' dispels the entire infatuation of contrariety."4 "The Jaina siddhanta insists on the employment of the word syat before every judgment or statement of fact, 1. Pravachanasara, Introduction by A.N. Upadhye, p. LXXXIII. 2. Pravachanasara, Cambridge University Press, page 91. 3. Ibid, page 92. 4. Ibid.

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50 APTA-MIMAMSA though in ordinary parlance and composition, it is generally dispensed with. There are three kinds of judgment--the affirmative, the negative and the one which gives expression to the idea of indescribableness. Of these, the first kind affirms and the second denies the existence of a quality, property or thing, but the third declares an object to be indescribable. A thing is said to be indescibable when both existence and non-existence are to be attributed to it at one and the same time. These three forms of judgment give rise to seven possible modes of predication."1 "There are seven modes of expressing the is-ness or isnot-ness of thing; and these modes are all inter-related, and each presupposes the others, each implies the others. In accepting all these seven modes and so speaking correctly we do not mislead the person spoken to.... To speak correctly under this doctrine, the statement is commenced with an adverk 'syat to indicate that there are six other implied ways of speaking about the subject. For instance, the negative statement (that we are not dust, for example) is tacit when making a positive statement (that we are immortal souls, for example). And in addition to this one kind there are five more kinds of tacit expressions implied by the one positive statement. The innumerable qualities of a thing cannot all be predicated in one statement, but they are all implied by any statement which predicates all of the qualities of a thing."2 "Synthesis is the putting together of aspects in thought to realise that the truth consists in the irresolvable combination of all the possible aspects; and to speak the truth correctly all the seven modes of expression must be accepted. The subject is now how we should express ourselves when we make a statement about a thing. It is an important subject and the doctrine is found only in the Jaina philosophy. It is the doctrine of the non-violation of the parts, elements, properties or aspects 1. The Practical Path, C.R. Jain, p. 12 2. Jainism, H. Warren, pages 20-21.

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CHAPTER I of things; it is the themes ofakmentitled speaking of a thing synthetically."1. "The object of knowledge is a huge complexity constituted of substances, qualities and modifications extended over three times and infinite space, and simultaneously subjected to origination, destruction and permanence. Such an object of knowledge can be comprehended only in omniscience.2 The senses are the indirect means of knowledge, and whatever they apprehend is partial .... The ordinary human being cannot rise above the limitations of his senses; so his apprehension of reality is partial and it is valid only from a particular view-point... When ordinary human knowledge is partial, a new method of stating our approach to the complex reality had to be devised, and that is Syadvada, the doctrine of conditional predications. Thus the doctrine is a direct result of the strong awareness of the complexity of the object of knowledge and of the limitations of human apprehension and expression. The substance is subjected to a constant flux of modifications and we always look at it through one modification or the other, present or absent. When we are looking at its present modification, we should not absolutely deny the past or future ones; this peculiar position leads us to a conditional affirmation, conditional negation and conditional indescribability which by their combination give rise to seven possible statements."3 In the doctrine of Asti-nasti, there is a similarity between Jaina Syadvada and Hegels view that "affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity 'is' and 'is not which are really identical and same for they are the aspects of the same reality." The whole of Hegelian 1. Jainism, H. Warren, p. 20. 2. The existence of an omniscient being has been established by Samantabhadra in verse 5 of Apta-mimamsa. As regards ordinary human beings, the excellence of Anekanta view as opposed to other views which are mentioned as unreliable, is laid down in this verse. 3. Pravachana-sara, A.N. Upadhye, p. LXXXIV.

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52 APTA-MIMAMSA metaphysics however is not accepted by the Jainas. "Unlike Bradley, the greatest living representative of Hegelian absolutism, the Jainas emphasize this important aspect of reality. The reason which is employed by Bradley to condemn a thing to be appearance, is the very reason which serves the Jaina thinkers to proclaim the reality of the same." The Saptabhangi will be taken up in ditail in verses 14-16 of this work, where further elucidation of the subject will be made. kuzalAkuzalaM karma paralokazca na kvacit / ekAntagraharakteSu nAtha svaparavairiSu // 8 // kusalakusalam karma paralokascha na kvachit, ekanta-graha-raktesu natha sva-para-vairisu. 8. O Lord! to those who accept only one-sided doctrine and whose doctrine is opposed to what they themselves accept and what are accepted by others, beneficial or its opposite actions and the other world etc., cannot (exist). COMMENTARY According to Jainism, yoga is a faculty of the soul which attracts matter according to the influence of karmas. This yoga is set in by the activity of body, speach or mind. The name "asrava" is given to this yoga.3 The asrava is of two kinds, subha or good which is the inlet of virtue or meritorious karmas and asubha or bad which is the inlet of vice or demeritorious karmas. In this verse by kusala and akusala, these two varieties of Asrava, viz. subha and asubha, are denoted. 'Paraloka' is the attainment of another state after death. By implication that which 1. Sacred Books of the Jainas, vol. III, page LXXX. 2. ": " Tattvarthadhigama-sutra, VI. 1. 3. "sa AsravaH / " Ibid, VI. 2. 4. " zubhaH puNyasyAzubhaH pApasya / " Ibid, VI. 3.

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CHAPTER 1 causes a particular state after death, viz., meritorious or demeritorious karmas are also indicated by this word'. By the word 'and', liberation etc. are implied.? All these are not possible if we accept the view of those who lay down everything to be transient (like the Ksanika-vada of the Buddhists). For how can a future state of happiness or misery arising from meritorious on demeritorious karmas exist, if everything is transient. So the views of Sunyavadins (Buddhists), Advaitavadins (Vedantists) who lay down everything as illusion (Maya) etc. become opposed to what they themselves accept. Naturally, these views are also opposed to those of the Jainas. In this verse, it is laid down that who maintain only one-sided doctrine cannot be taken as Apta as their accepted principles such as karmas, beneficial or harmful or a future state of existence, become opposed to their own doctrines. bhAvaikAnte pdaarthaanaambhaavaanaamphvaat| sarvAtmakamanAdyantamasvarUpamatAvakam // 9 // bhavaikante padarthanam abhavanamapahnavat, sarvatmakam anadyantam asvarupam atavakam. 9. If it be accepted that objects are eternal, it would be opposed to your doctrine and these will become pervading in everything, without beginning or without end and opposed to its own nature. COMMENTARY There are two views, viz., all objects are eternal or that all objects are not eternal. The Jaina view is that 1. dywna: palai, atgaf rutseroga, freut frutiarra." Astasahasri. 2. "9-97:stafa Rue: " Ibid. 3. "etat sarvam ekAntagraharakteSu anityaikAntAdyabhiniveza-para-vazIkRteSu madhye na Hafa, dei Faac I" Ibid. 4. "puNyaM pApaM ca karma tatphalaM kuzalamakuzalaM ca svaM, tatsambandhaH paralokAdizca tasya Fal44 h itelferici" Ibid.

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APTA-MIMAMSA "the object of knowledge (artha) is made up of substances that are characterised by qualities, and with which, moreover, are associated the modifications. (1) Origination and destruction simultaneously take place in qualities and modes, when their substratum, namely the substance, permanently retains, its existential character.? (2) There are two classes of substances: sentient comprising jivas alone, and insentient (ajiva) comprsing matter (pudgala), the fulcrum of motion (dharma), the fulcrum of rest (adharma), space (akasa) and time (kala). To give their characterstics: jiva, or the soul or spirit, is constituted of sentiency and manifestation of consciousness; pudgala or matter is insentient and endowed with colour, taste, smell and touch to its last subtle condition; dharma is the condition of movement; adharma is the condition of rest; akasa or space gives room; and kala or time marks the continuity. Excepting pudgala all are non-concrete or formless (amurta), i.e., devoid of sense-qualities and not amenable to sense-perception."3 "Jainism does not accept creation in the Nyayavaisesika sense or emanation, whether actual or apparent in the Vedantic sense. With it the world is existential and real. Since it is not created by any one on the analogy of a carpenter or a smith, the cosmic constituents enumerated by Jainism are such that they are capable of explaining the diverse phenomena by their mutual interaction. The ontological start is that of realistic dualism on even pluralism. The world of existence is constituted of two substances, life and non-life, which are not philosophical postulates but reals as spirit and matter which are pluralistic, constitutionally eternal, and not liable to lose or to interchange their nature.4 Abhava or non-existence has been accepted as a Padartha in Vaisesika philosophy. It has been accepted 1. Pravachana-sara. II. 1. 2. Ibid, II. 5, 7, 37. 3. Pravachana-sara, A.N. Upadhye, p. LXII. 4. Ibid, p. LXIII.

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CHAPTER 1 55 as a kind of proof in manuals of Vedanta literature and in Nyaya philosophy. This abhava is of four kinds: (1) pragabhava, (2) pradhvassabhava, (3) atyantabhava and (4) anyonyabhava. In Vedanta-paribhasa we find, "Nonexistence is of four kinds: (1) antecedent, (2) emergent, (3) absolute and (4) reciprocal. Antecedent is the nonexistence in the cause (e.g., the lump of clay) of the effect (e.g., jar) previous to its production. It is expressed in the knowledge 'a thing will be'. Emergent is the nonexistence of the jar, consequent as its destruction by a pestle. Of this non-existence also there is an end in the destruction of the parts, which compose the jar... Absolute is the non-existence of something in a substrate through trivial time. Thus there is an absolute non-existence of colour in air... Reciprocal non-existence is expressed in the consciousness 'this is not that'. ... This reciprocal non-existence is of two kinds, so far as it is dependent on a limiting condition or independent of such. The former kind is that whose existence is pervaded by the existence of a limiting condition. (Thus, wherever there is differentiation of akasa there is existence of a limiting condition, e.g. a jar.) The latter kind is that which is destitute of such an existence. Thus the differentiation of akasa, in its own nature undifferenced, through the differences of its limiting conditions, e.g. jars and the like, is an example of the former kind. Or, of the sun through the water-vessels (which are its limiting conditions when the sun is reflected in their water); and so, too is the differentiation of Brahma, in its own nature undifferenced by means of the differences in the internal organs (which are its limiting conditions). The nonexistence (difference) of a piece of canvas in a jar is an example of the second kind."l 1. Vedanta-paribhasa, A.Venis, Chapter VI. See also Vedantaparibhasa, edited and translated by S.C. Ghoshal, pages 152-179. The original text, of which a translation is given above, is: "sa ca abhaavshcturvidhH| prAgabhAvaH, pradhvaMsAbhAvaH, atyantAbhAvaH, anyonyaabhaavshceti| mRtpiNDAdau kAraNe kAryasya ghaTAderutpatteH pUrvaM yo'bhAvaH sa prAgabhAvaH, sa ca bhaviSyatIti

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APTA-MIMAMSA The Nyaya view is also the same. For example, in Tarka-sangraha of Annam Bhatta we find "Antecedent non-existence is without beginning and has no end. Such is the non-existence of an effect previously to its production. Destruction has a beginning, and has no end. (Such is the non-existence) of an effect subsequently to its production. Absolute non-existence is that of which the counter-entity is considered independently of the three times (past, present and future ). For example (such is the non-existence in the instance where it is remarked that): there is not a jar on the ground. Mutual nonexistence is that of which the counter-entity is considered with reference to the relation of identity. For example (such difference is referred to when it is remarked that): a jar is not a web of cloth."" 56 Laugaksi Bhaskara in his Tarka-kaumudi has mentioned that abhava is of two kinds, (a) anyonyabhava and (b) samsargabhava. The second, samsargabhava, has three varieties, viz., (i) pragabhava, (ii) pradhvamsabhava and (iii) atyantabhava. All these four varieties are the same as described before.2 pratIti-viSayaH / tatraiva ghaTasya mudgara- prahArAnantaraM yo'bhAvaH sa pradhvaMsaH / dhvaMsasyApi svAdhikaraNakapAlanAze nAza eva / ... yatrAdhikaraNe yasya kAlatraye'pi abhAvaH so'tyantAbhAvaH / yathA vAya rUpasyAtyantAbhAvaH / .' idamidaM na' iti pratItiviSayo'nyonyAbhAvaH / punarapi bhedo dvividhaH, sopAdhiko nirupAdhikazceti / tatra upAdhisattAvyApyasattAkatvaM sopAdhikatvaM tatzUnyatvaM nirupAdhikyatvam / tatra Ayo yathA ekasyaiva AkAzasya ghaTAdyupAdhibhedena bhedH| yathA vA ekasya sUryasya jalabhAjanabhedena bhedaH / tathA ca ekasyaiva brahmaNo'ntaHkaraNabhedAt bhedaH / nirupAdhikabhedo yathA ghaTe paTabhedaH / " 1. "anAdiH sAntaH prAgabhAvaH / utpatteH pUrvaM kAryasya / sAdiranantaH pradhvaMsaH / utpattyanantaraM kAryasya / traikAlikasaMsargAvacchinnapratiyogiko'tyantAbhAvaH / yathA bhUtale dhaTo nAstIti / tAdAtmyasaMbandhAvacchinnapratiyogiko'nyonyAbhAvaH / yathA ghaTaH paTo na bhavati / " Tarka sangraha. 2. "tAdAtmyasaMbandhAvacchinnapratiyogitAko'bhAvo'nyonyAbhAvaH / sa ca ghaTaH paTo netyAdipratyayaprasiddhaH / anyonyAbhAvabhinno'bhAvaH saMsargAbhAvaH / sa trividhaH / prAgabhAvaH pradhvaMsAbhAvA'tyantAbhAvazceti / utpatteH prAk samavAyikAraNe kAryasya saMsargAbhAvaH prAgabhAvaH / sa ceha kapAle ghaTo bhaviSyatIti pratyayaprasiddhaH / utpatteranantaraM samavAyikAraNe kAryasya

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CHAPTER I 52 Gautama in Nyaya-sutra (II. 2, 8) and Kanada in Vaisesika-sutra (IX. 1) have accepted abhava as a separate padartha from bhava. Haribhadra Suri in his Saddarsana-samuchchaya has written that the view of Jaimini, the propounder of Purvamimamsa philosophy is that abhava is a pramana to establish the existence of a thing where the five other pramanas fail to establish it. The five other pramanas are pratyaksa, anumana, upamana, sabda and arthapatti. The Sankhya philosophy does not accept that abhava is a separate padartha. The Sankhya "believes in real matter and an infinite plurality of individual souls which are not emanations of a single world-soul. The Sankhya adopts the view that the cause and the effect are the undeveloped and developed states of one and the same substance. Development is the coming to light of what is latent or hidden even as destruction is disappearance into the original cause. There is no such thing as utter annihilation. Applying this principle, the ultimate basis of the empirical universe is said to be Prakrti (nature). The world is the transformation of Prakrti (nature) which cannot be equated with any one of the stages of its evolution.... The first product of the evolution of Prakrti (nature) is mahat, the great, or Buddhi (intelligence). Self-sense (Aharkara) on the principle of individuation, arises next. From this, in its sattva aspect, arises the manas (internal organ), the five organs of perception and the five of action. From the same in the tamas aspect, the five fine elements (tanmatras) arise. The rajas element helps both. saMsargAbhAvaH prdhvNsH| sa ceha kapAle ghaTo dhvasta iti prtyyprsiddhH| traikAlikaH saMsargAbhAvo'tyantabhAvaH / sa ceha bhUtale ghaTo naastiityaadiprtyysiddhH| evamanyeSAmakAntarbhAvaH / yathAndhakArasyAlokAbhAve yatrAloko-nAsti ttraivaandhkaarvyvhaaraat|" Tarka-kaumudi. 1. "447994 500 Ft degea 7 oridi TUTTGCTETTE ETYATTATI!" Saddarsana-samuchchaya, 76.

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APTA-MIMAMSA From the five fine elements, by a preponderance of tamas, the five gross elements are produced." "Purusa is the intelligent self, for whose experience Prakrti (nature) evolves. It is a mere witness, a solitary indifferent spectator. It is pure consciousness while Prakrti (nature) is unconscious. It is inactive, unalterably constant and devoid of the gunas while Prakrti is active, alterably constant and consists of them. Praksti and its products depend for their manifestation on the light of Purusa (self) which does not depend on anything else for illuminating objects. The Sankhya believes in a plurality of selves. If the self were one, all should become few when one attained freedom which is not the case. Freedom is not coalescence with the absolute spirit but isolation from Prakrti."2 Samantabhadra in this verse criticises the views of those who, like the followers of Sarkhya philosophy, believe in the perpetual existence of objects. In Astasahasri, it is explained that if we accept the padarthas, e.g., twentyfive tattvas of the Sankhya philosophy, the result will be a denial of all the four kinds of abhava (as already described). Denial of each kind of abhava will lead to a different kind of fault and by a denial of four kinds of abhava, four kinds of fault will. arise. This is shown below. If pragabhava is not accepted, the view of the Sarkhya 1. Indian Philosophy, S. Radhakrishnan. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th edition, Vol. XII, p. 251. The Sarkhyas believe in the existence of the twentyfive tattvas. Purusa, Prakrti, Mahat, Ahankara, mind, the five tanmatras (rupa, rasa, gandha, sparsa and sabda), the five bhutas (ksiti, ap, tejas, marut and vyoma), the five organs of perception (chaksus, karna, nasika, jihva and tvak) and the five organs of action (vak, pada, pani, payu and upastha). "mUlaprakRtiravikRtirmahadAdyAH prakRtivikRtayaH spt| 415270 Pachet 7 ufaf fagota: 269: Il" Sarkhya-karika, 3. 2. Indian Philosophy, S. Radhakrishnan. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 14th edition, Vol. XII, p. 251. 3. "padArthAH prakRtyAdIni paMcaviMzatitattvAni... teSAmastitvameveti nizcayo bhAvaikAntaH / tasminnabhyupagamyamAne sarveSAmitaretarAbhAvAdInAmabhAvAnAmapahavaH syaat| tataH sarvAtmakatvAdiWHF: I" Astasahasri.

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CHAPTER I 59 philosophy, viz., Mahat arises from Prakrti, then aharkara and from it the sixteen varieties (mind, the five organs of sense, the five organs of action and the five tanmatras) and from the five tanmatras the five elements appear, cannot stand and all these become without any beginning. (because we deny their pragabhava or previous nonexistence). If pradhvamsabhava is not accepted all these tattvas, which the Sankhya says arise from Prakrti, will become eternal. But the Sarkhya has laid down that the five elements, earth etc., merge in the five tanmatras which again with five organs of sense and five organs of action as well as mind merge in aharkara. Ahankara merges in mahat which merges in Prakrti. This merging will become impossible on denial of pradhvamsabhava described before.3 If anyonyabhava be denied, the twentythree principles leaving aside, Purusa and Prakrti will not exclude one aother, but each will involve the other and thus will become all-pervading. But definitions have been given in Sankhya philosophy distinguishing these twentythree principles which are called vyakta from Prakrti which is called avyakta.4 If atyantabhava be denied, the qualities of all the twentyfive tattvas cannot be distinguished each from the other; so these will lose their identity. If there is no 1. "Unteruraisichtig torga at59:1 ATTA 159cha mapit v ll" Sarkhya-karika, 22: 2. TYTORT 3946 HEGEcrrafahrer alteraut: ... 7 7 .... ies42641 Paurangezdi" Astasahasri. 3. "pradhvaMsAbhAvasyApahave tasyAnantaprasaMgAt, pRthivyAdIni paMca mahAbhUtAni paMcasu tanmAtreSu lIyante pRthivyA gandharUparasasparzazabdatanmAtreSu pravezAt, salilasya rasAdiSu, tejaso rUpAdiSu, vAyoH sparzatanmAtrayoH, AkAzasya zabdatanmAtrAnupravezAt; tanmAtrANAM ca paMcAnAM buddhIndriyANAM karmendriyANAM ca manasA saha SoDazakasya gaNasyAhaMkAre'ntarbhAvastasya ca hafa 46: unifafa HER AG for RICI" Astasahasri. 4. haftanlo HP447041f8tai fini Hraga pari i fayda4245411" Sarkhya-karika, 10. " F leuretiraf ATYTARINET a lumichard Hatcycl4l" Astasahasri.

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APTA-MIMAMSA distinction (if vyakta and avyakta be of the same kind without there being any distinction of inherent qualities) no one will be able to find out the real nature of a tattva because the real nature is only understood when we take into account the distinguishing characteristics which are nothing but absence of particular qualities as the basis of differentiation.1 60 The four defects, viz., anadi, ananta, sarvatmaka and asvarupa, accordingly arise by denial of pragabhava, pradhvamsabhava, anyonyabhava and atyantabhava respectively. These four defects, says Samantabhadra, do not exist in Jaina view as the Jainas do not deny non-existence wholesale. kAryadravyamanAdi syAt prAgabhAvasya nihnave / pradhvaMsasya ca dharmasya pracyave'nantatAM vrajet // 10 // karya-dravyamanadi syat pragabhavasya nihnave, pradhvamsasya cha dharmasya prachyave'nantatam vrajet. 10. The denial of antecedent non-existence, an effect and a substance will become without beginning. On denial of the quality (of non-existence) consisting of destruction, (the same) will become eternal. COMMENTARY We have already described the four varieties of abhava in the commentary to the previous verse. In this verse the first and second abhavas (viz., pragabhava and pradhvamsabhava) are mentiond and in the next verse the third and fourth abhavas will be mentiond. Vasunandi says that by 'karya' we mean that which is made such as a pitcher and 'dravya' signifies that which gets another condidtion (or modification). In a 1. prakRtipuruSayoratyantAbhAvanihnave prakRteH puruSAtmakatve sarvAtmakatvameva / ... tataH sarvamasvarUpaM svenAsAdhAraNena rUpeNa kasyacit tattvasya vyavasthAnAghaTanAt / " Astasahasri.

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CHAPTER I clod of earth, the existence of pitcher is wanting. This is antecedent non-existence (pragabhava). Similarly when we break the parts of a pitcher, emergent non-existence (or destruction) which is known as pradhvamsabhava, arises. By denial of the first kind of Abhava, all objects will be without any beginning and by denial of the second, everything will become eternal. sarvAtmakaM tadekaM syAdanyApohavyatikrame / anyatra samavAyena vyapadizyeta sarvathA // 11 // 61 sarvatmakam tadekam syad anyapoha-vyatikrame, anyatra samavayena vyapadisyeta sarvatha. 11. The denial of anyonyabhava (i.e., every substance) will embody everything (and there will therefore be only) one substance. In the other case (i.e., in the case of atyantabhava), by wholesale acceptance (of everything including absurdities) everything can be postulated. COMMENTARY In this verse, Samantabhadra describes the third and fourth abhava viz., anyonyabhava which is called itaretarabhava by Vasunandi in his vrtti and in the Astasahasri. It is urged by Vasunandi that by anyonyabhava we establish such prepositions as "there is non-existence of a canvas in a pitcher" as at a certain time these exist having qualities quite separate. If we deny the existence of this abhava, there will be only one substance in the universe as the distinguishing characteristics will disappear and this one substance will embody everything (e.g., become sarvatmaka). The second line of this verse has been differently interpreted by Vasunandi and Vidyanandi. Vasunandi's vrtti has been quoted above and English translation according to the same has been given. Vasnuandi interprets this line in the Vrtti as follows. In absolute non-existence such as the non-existence of pudgala (matter)

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APTA-MIMAMSA in jiva (soul), the qualities of pudgala are absent at all times and under all circumstances in jiva. Such absolute non-existence, for example, is the absense of "horns in a hare." If we refuse to deny the existence of this abhava, nothing will exist as one will be utilised in describing all manners. In Asta-sahasri, however, the second line has thus been written : " anyatra samavAye na vyapadizyeta sarvathA / " 62 The explanation is thus attempted. If the qualities of one are accepted in another (by denial of absolute nonexistence of some qualities of a substance in another substance) there is anyatra samavaya, i.e., connection of qualities in another substance, e.g., if we predicate sense in an insentient substance, the ideas, 'this has consciousness' and 'this does not have consciousness' cannot be expressed, showing their distinction.1 Akalanka says that the view of the Buddhists, which also like the Sankhya view already discribed, denying the existence of Abhava, is refuted in this verse. We see that some quality exists in something at a certain time. By denial of absolute non-existence, the position will be that every quality will exist in everything at all times.2 Prabhakara, one of the expounders of the Mimamsa philosophy, has not accepted abhava as a pramana, but Kumarila Bhatta has accepted abhava (or anupalabdhi as a pramana). We have already quoted Haribhadra Suri's verse in this respect. Mr. Keith summarises the view of Kumarila thus: "Causation, however, affords Kumarila an argument in favour of his thesis of the reality of non-existence. That entity he classifies as prior, as the non-existence of 1. "svasamavAyinaH samavAyyantare samavAyaH anyatra samavAyaH, atyantAbhAvavyatikramaH / tasmin sarvasyeSTaM tattvaM sarvathA na vyapadizyeta / sveSTAtmanA vyapadeze'niSTAtmano'pi vyapadezaprasaMgAt, tenAvyapadeze sveSTAtmanApyavyapadezApatteH svayamiSTAniSTAtmanoH kAlatraye'pi vizeSAnupagamAt / " Astasahasri. 2. "atyantAbhAvApAkRtau na kvacit kiMcit kathaMcit na varteta / tathA sarva sarvatra "Astasati.

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CHAPTER I 63 curd in milk; subsequent on destruction, as the nonexistence of milk in curd; mutual, as the non-existence of the horse in the cow and vice versa; and absolute, as the non-existence of a horn on the head of the hare. Without the recognition of the first two kinds, he contends, there could be no idea of causation: in its prior negation lies the character of the curd as effect, in its destruction that of the milk as the cause. Everything has two aspects: as regards its self, it exists; as regards anything else, it is non-existent; and both these aspects are real and necessary to each other. It is only through this fact that we can say 'there is no jar on the ground', as that we can ever differentiate things, which is possible only on the ground of a real existence of non-existence. It is impossible to perceive this entity, for perception must deal with the existent; the process of intellection is, therefore, purely mental; the ground is seen; the jar remembered, and then ensues the purely mental cognition styled negation, which must be distingnished from inference on any other form of knowledge." abhAvaikAntapakSe'pi bhAvApahnavavAdinAm / bodhavAkyaM pramANaM na kena sAdhanadUSaNam // 12 // abhavaikanta-pakse'pi bhavapahnava-vadinam, bodha-vakyam pramanam na kena sadhanadusanam. 12. To those who deny existence, the view of (uniform) non-existence is not supported by any proof either used for one's own self or for convincing others. Hence how can there be establishment (of their view) on refutation of the view of their opponents? COMMENTARY In verses 8 and 9, the defects in the view of those who accept existence as the only view have been pointed 1. Karma-mimamsa, A.B. Keith, p. 60.

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64 APTA-MIMAMSA out. In this verse the view of those who accept nonexistence as their doctrine is refuted. There are some who deny existence altogether ; such as the Madhyamikas or Sunyavadins or Nihilists (a sect of Buddhist philosophers). They follow the view that non-existence is the only reality. There was a very old view in Hindu philosophy, known as Vijnanavada which accepted all objects of knowledge apart from knowledge, as unreal. In Visnu-purana (III. 18) this view has been mentioned. This view has been refuted in the Vedantasutras (II. 2. 28 and 29). This view has given the example of dreams to establish unreality of objects of knowldege but Sankaracharya in his commentary on Vedanta-sutra "vaidharmyachcha na svapnadivat" has pointed out that the knowledge in our waking stage is quite different from that when we dream. Vijnana of the Buddhists is the special knowledge that everything is momentary.2 In Ksanika-vada of the Buddhists, vijnanas rise and disappear, one set giving rise to a corresponding set.3 Kundakunda has mentioned "substantial reality cannot be denied, as sasvata-vada, Uchchheda-vada, Bhava-vada and its opposite, Vijnana-vada and its opposite, Sunyavada and its opposite are not reasonable."4 1. "bhAvaikAntapakSe'pi kuzalAkuzalakamadiraghaTanAM pradarzya abhAvaikAntapakSe'pi bhRzaM na ghaTeta iti yastha 3116!" Vasunandi. 2. " Pasca fafgre ni Heard I" Saddarsana-samuchchaya, commentary of Manibhadra on verse 5. 3. "sarvasaMskArAH kSaNikAH, sarveSAM vizvatrayavivaravivartamAnAnAM ghaTapaTastambhAmbhoruhAdInAM dvitIyAdikSaNeSu 'sa evAyaM, sa evAyam' ityAdhullekhena ye saMskArA jJAnasantAnA utpadyante te vicAragocaragatAH kssnnikaaH|" Saddarsana-samuchchaya, Manibhadra's commentary on verse 7. 4. "sassadamadha ucchedaM bhavbamabhavyaM ca suNNamidaraM c| viNNANamaviNNANaM Na vi jujjadi asadi sadbhAvai // " Panchastikaya-sara, verse 37. Sasvatavadins or Realists are the Sarvastivadins of the Buddhist philosophy. They maintain the reality of everything. They are divided into two groups, (i) Sautrantikas and (ii) Vaibhasikas.

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CHAPTER I 65 In this verse it is urged that the nihilistic view cannot be proved. There are two kinds of inference, svarthanumana (inference for ones own conviction) and pararthanumana (inference to convince others). Neither of these kinds of inferences can establish nihilism. So there can be neither sadhana, i.e., establishment of the preposition or dusana (refutation of opposite view). Svarthanumana is inference for one's own self. This inference is drawn after repeated observations. For example, a man repeatedly sees in the kitchen and other places that there is fire where there is smoke and realises that there is a universal antecedence of fire in respect of smoke. Afterwards he goes to a hill and sees smoke and remembering the inseparable connection between fire and smoke, he concludes that the hill has fire as it has smoke. This is the inference for one's self. The above example may be used for pararthanumana (inference for the sake of others) thus : 1. This hill is full of fire. 2. Because it is full of smoke. 3. Whatever is full of smoke, is full of fire. 4. So is this hill full of smoke. 5. Therefore this hill is full of fire. This five-limbed syllogism is accepted by Gautama in his Nyaya philosophy. Jaina logicians, however, hold that the first two limbs are sufficient, the others being redundant.1 By the word bodha (understanding) in the verse svarthanumana is meant and by vakya (syllogism) pararthanumana is signified. By none of these two kinds of inferences, nihilism can be proved. So a question has been put : "How can it be established or the views of others opposing it can be refuted?" 1. For a detailed description of svarthanumana and pararthanumana, see Pariksamukha translated into English by S.C. Ghoshal, p. 117 (Sacred Books of the Jains, Vol. XI).

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66 APTA-MIMANSA virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyukti vAcyamiti yujyate // 13 // virodhannobhayaikatmyam syadvada-nyaya ___vidvisam, avachyataikante'pyuktir-navachyamiti yujyate. 13. The view of those who do not follow the logic of Suadvada and hold that opposites can be inherent in a substance, is not tenable as it is self-contradictory. The view of those who accept the view of indescribableness without any limitation is also not tenable. COMMENTARY Vasunandi says that after showing the defects of views of those who maintain either existence without any limitation or non-existence without any limitation, in this verse it is mentioned that the view of those who accept both existence and non-existence without any limitation, is not proper.1 The logic of Syadvada or Anekantavada accepts existence or non-existence or indescribability with limitation. Leaving out the limitation, it is imposible to maintain the embodiment of existence and non-existence in the same substance because this will be quite inconsistent. This will be developed in the following verse. In Asta-sati, amplified by Asta-sahasri, it is explained that the Sankhya view of simultaneous existence and non-existence is hereby refuted, if we rememeber the definition of vyakta and avyakta3 which has been given in 1. "bhAvAbhAvaikAntapakSe virodhaM nirUpya ubhayaikAntavAdinAmapi na kiMcit saMgacchata ityaah|" 2. "bhAvAbhAvayorekatarapratikSepaikAntapakSopakSiptadoSaparijihIrSayA sadasadAtmakaM sarvamabhyupagacchato'pi vANI vipratiSidhyeta, tayoH prsprprihaarsthitilkssnntvaat| na hi sarvAtmanA kaMcidarthaM santaM tathaivAsantamAcakSANaH svasthaH, svaabhyupetetr-niraasvidhaankrnnaacchuunyaavbodhvt|" Astasati. 3. "trailokyasya vyaktAtmanA'petatvasiddheH avyaktAtmanAstitvavyavasthiteH 'hetumadanityamavyApi sakriyamanekamAzritaM liNgm| sAvayavaM paratantraM vyaktaM viparItamavyaktam // ' iti vcnaat|" Astasahasri

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CHAPTER I the commentary on verse 9. In the second line of this verse, the Anirvachyavada (the view expounding indescribability) has been attacked. Sankaracharya in expounding Advaitavada has laid down that the world is neither sat (existent) nor asat (nonexistent). "Sankara in his system asks whether there is anything in experience which may be regarded as foundational and discusses the claims of the different factors of experience of that title. Our senses may deceive us and our memory may be an illusion. The walking tracts may not be different from dream-walks where also we visit places, handle shadows and battle with ghosts. Though all objects of experience may be open to doubt, there is something which is beyond all doubt. Everyone is conscious of the existence of one's own self and no one thinks I am not'. The self cannot be doubted or denied, for it is the essential nature of him who denies it. Though we cannot know it by thought, it does not entirely escape us... This self is distinct from the body, the senses and the understanding. It is the principle of consciousness which is unaffected when the body is reduced to ashes and the mind perishes. It is one, universal and infinite... "We cannot conceive the relation between the world and the absolute. The question of relation has meaning only if we have two 'distincts', but the world is not distinct from Brahman. The finite is the infinite hidden from our view through certain barriers. When we intuitively recognise the absolute, the relative disappears; when we discuss about the relative there is no absolute to which it has to be attached. The problem arises on account of a confusion of standpoints. If Brahman is to be viewed as the cause of the world it is only in the sense that the world cannot be explained apart from Brahman, though the latter is in no way touched by the world of appearance. Brahman is the basis of the apparent existence of the world." Sankara therefore has laid down the view of Anirvachyavada. 67 1. Indian Philosophy, S. Radhakrishnan. Encyclopaedia Britanica, 14th edition, Vol. 12, p. 252.

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APTA-MIMAMSA kathaJcit te sadeveSTaM kathaJcidasadeva tt| tathobhayamavAcyaM ca nayayogAnna sarvathA // 14 // kathanchit te sadevestam kathanchidasadeva tat, tathobhayamavachyam cha naya-yoganna sarvatha. 14. With the application of naya, according to a particular sense, existence is accepted by you; according to another sense, non-existence is accepted). Similarly (according to a particular sense) both (existence and nonexistence) and indescribability are accepted by you (but) not in all respects. COMMENTARY It has been shown that it cannot be maintained that existence or non-existence or simultaneous existence and non-existence or indescribability without any limitations, is possible. In this verse, the Jain view that with limitations existence etc. can be accepted is laid down.1 A brief description of Anekantavada or Syadvada has already been given. The different aspects are considered from different stand-ponts. The Jain view is that objects in their entire character are understood only by an omniscient being. The work, Apta-mimamsa, has begun with obeisance to the omniscient and established omniscience by arguments refuting the view of those, who, like Kumarila Bhatta, have attacked omniscience. Then Samantabhadra has refuted the view of those who hold an entirely one-sided aspect of a thing. From this verse the author begins to establish the Syadvada or Anekantavada of Jainism. Siddhasena has written : A thing which might be conceived from many points of view, is entirely knowable only by the omniscient. But a thing 1. "ekahelayA yadi sarvathA sadasadubhayAvaktavyarUpaM tattvaM nAsti, kathaM tarhi ityaah|" Vasunandi.

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CHAPTER I 69 conceived from one particular point of view, is the object of naya (or partial knowledge).1 "A naya deals with only the particular aspect in view of the speaker but it does not deny the existence of the remaining attributes. When we speak of the colour of gold, we make no mention of its weight, touch, taste, smell and other attributes but our statement does not mean that gold is devoid of all the other attributes besides colour. When speaking from a limited point of view, Jaina scholars prefix the word 'syat' to every such predication to signify that the object is of a particular type from a particular stand-point but it is not so from other points of view. 'Syat' suggests the existence of other attributes but does not give primary importance to them. This is the differentiating point which helps in accuracy of expression by a scholar of the Jaina school of thought. Jaina school of philosophy (like the ksanikavada of the Buddhists) might say that all that exists is momentary and another school might say that reality is permanent (like the Sasvatavadins or Sarvastitvavadins as already described). Jainism reconciles both these seemingly contradictory statements by pointing out that the first view is true from the stand-point of modifications only which are subject to change every moment and the second view is also correct from the standpoint of elements of which the thing is composed. Onesided systems of philosophy deny the existence of attributes other than what they adopt, whereas the Jaina point of view admits their existence though these are not described being not of primary importance."2 The nayas have been broadly classified (i) dravyarthika which has the following varieties: (a) naigama, (b) sangraha, (c) vyavahara and (ii) paryayarthika which has the following varieties: (d) rju1. " anekAtmakaM vastu gocaraH sarvasaMvidAm / ekadezaviziSTo'rtho nayasya viSayo mataH // " Nyayavatara, 29. as 2. Pariksamukha, translated by S.C. Ghoshal, pages 199-200 (Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. XI).

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APTA-MIMASA sutra, (e) sabda, samabhirudha - and (8) evambhuta. In dravyarthika naya, the statements refer only to the general attributes of a substance and not to the modifications which the substance is constantly undergoing. In paryayarthika naya, the statements refer to the constantly changing conditions of a substance. The seven nayas are briefly illustrated below. "I. Naigama, not literal or figurative: When we speak of a past or future event as a present one, we have an illustration of this naya. It is of three kinds relating to past, present and future. If we say on the Diwali day 'Lord Mahavira attained liberation today', we mean that this day is the anniversary day of the past event. Again, we see a man booking his passage and on our query, he says, 'I am going to England'. This is a figurative way of speaking about a present event. Further when we see a man making a fire, and on our questioning him, he says, 'I am cooking', he really speaks of a future event for which he is making only a preparation. II. Sangraha, comman or general: When we use a word denoting a class to mean the whole, we have an example of this naya. By using the word "Dravya' we take the six kinds of dravyasz taking only the general attributes of dravya (substance) and not considering the distinguishing features. III. Vyavahara, distributive: When we divide or separete a general term into its classes, orders, kinds or specialities, we have an example of this naya. For example, when we speak of dravya (substance) implying its six subdivisions of (soul, matter, space, time, media of motion and rest), we have an example of this naya. By sangraha naya the generic properties alone are taken into consideration without any cognizance of the particular 1. TRY6Q106R ETTH4fddina FeT: 1" Tattvarthadhigama-sutra, I. 33. 2. Jiva (soul), pudgala (matter), dharma (principle of motion), adharma (principle of rest), akasa (space) and kala (time) are the six dravyas in Jainism.

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CHAPTER I 71 properties and by vyavahara naya the particular properties alone are considered. IV. Rju-sutra, the straight expression: This naya takes into account (1) the actual condition at a particular moment and (2) the actual condition for a long time. The first variety is called suksma (fine) and the second sthula (gross). A soul with a momentary good thought is an example of the former while a man with a human condition for a life-time is an example of the latter. By this naya a thing as it exists at present is considered without any reference to the past or future. The followers of this naya say that it is useless to ponder over things as they are in the past or will become in the future. All practical purposes are served by the thing itself as it exists at the present moment. V. Sabda, Descriptive: This naya includes grammatical correctness and propriety of expression. From this point of veiw we can use the present for the past tense, plural for the singular number, feminine for the masculine gender, etc. An example of the first is when we speak 'In 1066 we see the Normans attack the Anglo-saxons'. The second is illustrated by the use of 'you' for one man. The third is exemplified by the use of a masculine name e.g. Lord Nelson for a vessel which is used in feminine gender. VI. Samabhirudha, specific: This naya is employed when we give a word, a fixed meaning out of several which it has. This is exemplified by the use of the word 'nut' to denote an extra smart man or 'Dreadnought' to denote a particular kind of war-ship. VII. Evambhuta, active: When we restrict the name to the very activity which is connected with the name we have an example of this naya, e.g., when we call Stratford-on-Avon by that name only so long as the town stands at the banks of the river Avon."1 In this verse, it is made clear that according to the 1. Sacred Books of the- Jainas, Vol. II, p. 45.

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APTA-MIMAMSA nayas detailed above, the Jainas accept a substance to exist from a particular aspect, not to exist from another aspect, both to exist and not exist from a third aspect or be indescribable from a fourth aspect. It must be remembered that "these nayas deal with the various aspects of reality from their particular angles of vision, but they do not predicate the non-existence of other points of views. When one point of view becomes primary, the others become of secondary importance. It is incorrect to suppose that only a particular naya is correct and others are erroneous. As a matter of fact all these standpoints are equally true and valid and lead to correct knowledge, provided that they do not deny the existence of the other points of view, for one will be wholly untrue without the existence of others. In other words, the valid nayas are inter-dependent and when they become independent the result is that their very nature is annihilated. For example, the interdependence of cotton threads is possessed of the potentiality of warding off cold and providing comfort to the body, but if each of these threads become independent of others, these will not be able to serve the aforesaid purpose."1 72 sadeva sarvaM ko necchet svarUpAdicatuSTayAt / asadeva viparyAsAnna cenna vyavatiSThate // 15 // sadeva sarvam ko nechchhet svarupadichatustayat, asadeva viparyasan-na chen-na vyavatisthate. 15. Who does not hold everything to exist from the four (aspects) svarupa etc. (sva-rupa, sva-ksetra, sva-kala and sva-bhava)? On the contrary, who does not hold nonexistence (with reference to the absence of these four, viz. rupa, ksetra, kala and bhava)? If this be not (accepted), nothing can exist. 1. Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol XI, pages 203-204.

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CHAPTER I COMMENTARY The seven modes of predication (Saptabhangi) will now be taken up and discussed. First, it is laid down that there are four aspects, viz., rupa or bhava, dravya (matter), ksetra (place) and kala (time). Whenever we predicate either affirmatively or negatively, our predication depends on these four aspects. When we predicate a particular form, matter, place or time with reference to a particular substance, we necessarily deny all these four belonging to alien substances as existing in the particular substance. For example, when we say "A pitcher (ghata) exists," this statement can be examined from four different aspects, viz., with reference to dravya, i.e., the substance of which the pitcher is made, e.g., clay, ksetra, i.e., the place where the pitcher is; kala, i.e., the time during which the pitcher exists; and bhava, i.e., the form or attributes of the pitcher. If it be an earthen pitcher, it exists in the form of clay and not of gold or other substance. It exists in a particular place when we speak about it and not in anything else. The pitcher exists also in a particular time when we speak about it and not in any other time. It also has a particular shape or colour as distinct from other shapes or colours. This is the first mode of predication, viz., syadasti of the Saptabhangi, e.g., in a certain sense, the pitcher exists in the above four aspects. Thus the existence of a pitcher is affirmed as real with reference to sva-rupa, sva-dravya, sva-ksetra and sva-kala. By the word "svarupadichatustayat" (from the four, sva-rupa etc.) this is indicated. The second mode of predication syan-nasti (in a certain sense, it is not) is established by the denial of para-rupa, para-dravya, para-ksetra and para-kala. For example, in the case of a jar, the attributes of another thing, viz., a cloth, being quite foreign, would be para-rupa. A golden pitcher would be an example of para-dravya in the case of an earthen pitcher. Para-kala would refer to the time when the pitcher before formation by the potter was mere clay or when after its destruction would be mere

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APTA-MIMAMSA shreds. Any other place where the pitcher is not situated would be its para-ksetra. Thus, the existence of a thing depends on its four aspects, svarupa etc. and the non-existence of the same depends on its pararupa etc. "The essential nature of a thing not only implies its svarupa but differentiates itself from pararupa. In experience, we not only perceive a thing, but perceive it as distinct from other things. A jar is seen not merely as a jar, but as a thing distinct from cloth by its side. Without this distinction there can be no perception of the jar at all. The very process of selfassertion implies differentiation from non-self."1 By the words "if this be not (accepted) there will be nothing at all" the following is meant. "One individual jar has its individuality as svarupa, and every other jar will be pararupa. Jar 'A' exists on account of svarupa and does not on account of pararupa. If non-existence is associated with svarupa, then there will be no jar at all; if existence follows from pararupa then all jars will become one without distinction and there will be no separate individual ones... If the jar exists in paraksetra also, then there will be no place without a jar... If the thing is not even in its own place then there will be no jar anywhere in the world. Either result will be unsatisfactory... If a thing exists in parakala also as in svakala, then it will be eternal; if it does not exist in svakala, as in parakala, then it will be nothing; for existence implies a relation to its time or duration." "2 Similar absurdity will arise if we accept that a jar exists in para-dravya or it does not exist in sva-dravya. 74 kramArpitadvayAd dvaitaM sahAvAcyamazaktitaH / avaktavyottarAH zeSAstrayo bhaMgAH svahetutaH // 16 // kramarpita-dvayad dvaitam sahavachyamasaktitah, Avaktavyottarah sesastrayo bhangah svahetutah. 1. Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. III, p. LXXIII. 2. Ibid, pages LXXI and LXXII.

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CHAPTER I 75 16. By consecutive application of the two, we get the category where both (existence and non-existence) can be predicated. Owing to absence of power of expression, the category of indescribability arises (when all qualities are desired to be expressed at the same time). From its own cause, the remaining three categories followed by avaktavya arise. COMMENTARY The remaining modes of predication are referred to in this verse. The third mode is syadasti-nasti. It has already been mentioned in the commentary to the previous verse that every substance "when thought of in respect of its substance (dravya), place (ksetra), time of existence (kala) and attributes (bhava), does in a certain sense exist; and when the substance, place, time and attributes of other. things are thought of, the thing itself does not exist. So in this third way of speaking, two natures of the thing (existence of the thing and non-existence of other things) are considered, first one and then the other. For example, the jar is a jar and is not cloth."l The fourth mode is syad-avaktavya. "This fourth way of speaking denies the possibility of mentioning at one and the same moment what the thing is and what it is not. The necessity for this way of speaking is that these two natures (what it is and what it is not) exist in a thing at one and the same time (or simultaneously), but it is impossible to express them simultaneously; when we see that there are two trees, a mango-tree and an orange-tree, they both exist simultaneously, but they come to our knowledge first one and then the other, and not simultaneously." The fifth mode is syad-asti chavaktavya. "In this mode of speaking it is what the thing (jar, for instance) is that 1. Frist Principles of the Jaina Philosophy, H.L. Jhaveri, p. 38-39. 2. Ibid, p. 39.

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76 APTA-MIMANSA finds expression, and the reason for adding avaktavya is that when we are proving what a thing (jar, for instance) is, we wish to mention also that the thing has simultaneously negative attributes (is-not-ness) but that it is impossible to express them simultaneously. There is a jar here; but, as it is impossible to say simultaneously both what it is and what it is not, the word avaktavya is inserted in this statement."1 The sixth mode is syan-nasti chavaktavya. "In this mode of speaking it is what the thing (jar, for instance) is not that finds expression. And the reason for adding avaktavya is that when we are proving what a thing (jar, for instance) is not, we wish to mention that the thing has at the same time positive attributes (is-ness) but that it is impossible to give them expression while we are proving what the thing is not."2 The seventh and the last mode is syad-asti-nasti chavaktavya. "In the seventh mode of speaking one expresses first what the thing (jar, for instance) is, and then what it is not; and one adds that it is impossible to express both what it is and what it is not simultaneously. When one is talking of the attributes of a thing there is existence, and when he is talking of the attributes of another thing there is non-existence in the first thing, but it is impossible to express them both at the same time."3 Kundakunda in his Panchastikaya-sara (verse 14) has described the Saptabhangi : "Accordingly as dravya is viewed from different aspects of reasoning, it may be described by the following propositions: (1) perhaps it is, (2) perhaps it is not, (3) perhaps it is both (is and is not), (4) perhaps it is indefinable, (5) perhaps it is and is indefinable, (6) perhaps it is not and is indefinable, and (7) perhaps it is and is not and is indefinable."4 1. Frist Principles of the Jaina Philosophy, H.L. Jhaveri, p. 39. 2. Ibid, p. 40. 3. Ibid. 4. "fory iet u 364 300 treo quit y afere davvaM khu sattabhaMgaM AdesavaseNa saMbhavadi // " Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. III, p. 11.

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CHAPTER 1 77 "Avaktavya should not be interpreted to be absolutely indescribable for then avaktavya itself would become meaningless. It only refers to the impossibility of finding an idea which would include both the thesis and the antithesis at the same time." This viewing of things from particular aspect has now being given an important place by less modern philosophers of the West. We find in Wolfenden's The Approach to Philosophy that special sciences deal "with some specially selected aspect of the general world and its conclusions apply to that special aspect alone. Any characteristics which a thing may possess in any other relations or for other purposes are irrelevant. To the psychologist people are their actions; to the physiologist they are more or less efficient organisms; to the chemist they are various collections of elements; to the physicist they are forces in motion. These same people may also be good husbands or good squash players, but these aspects of their whole personality are at the moment irrelevant. They may become relevant when the statistician enquires into these sides of their natures."2 Anekantvada or Syadvada accepts different points of view. When we want to lay stress upon one point, the many are left in the background but are admitted by implication and not totally denied. The truth will be one in the many or many of the one. This is the utility of the use of 'syat'. "The quality predicated is 'probably' or 'perhaps' true. The predication is accepted provisionally with the full recognition that the same may be denied and that other ideas may be affirmed of the subject."3 Kumarila Bhatta has criticised the Saptabhangi saying that in the same manner hundred bhangis can be formed. But the answer to this is that though many things can be said regarding a substance, the possible ways of 1. Panchastikaya-sara (Chakravarti), p. 13. 2. Pravachana-sara (Upadhye), p. XC. 3. Panchastikaya-samaya sara (Chakravarti), p. 12. 4. "Tigace starea preci"

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78 APTA-MIMAMSA speaking about its attributes will always be seven in number. The predication (and not the innumerable attributes present, past or future) will be in one of these seven ways. "The innumerable qualities of a thing cannot all be predicated in one statement, but they are all implied by any statement which predicates one of the qualities of a thing." astitvaM prtissedhyenaavinaabhaavyekdhrminni| vizeSaNatvAtsAdharmyaM yathA bhedavivakSayA // 17 // astitvam pratisedhyenavinabhavyeka-dharmini, visesanatvat sadharmyam yatha bhedavivaksaya. 17. As (we express) homogeneousness with the desire of establishing the difference (of its opposite), so according to qualification, (there is) existence in a single substance which is co-existent with its opposite. COMMENTARY In this verse, it is established by argument how existence and non-existence can be predicated in the same substance. In Nyaya philosophy the familiar example of an inference is "the hill is full of fire because there is smoke on it." We establish the existence of fire (sadhya) by smoke (sadhana) through illustration (drstanta). This dTstanta may be given affirmatively, e.g., "where there is smoke there is fire as in a kitchen" or negatively "where there is no smoke there is not fire as in a lake". The inseparable connection (vyapti) is shown in these cases by sadharmya (homogeneousness) or vaidharmya (heterogeneousness). The two syllogisms will be as follows : this hill is full of fire, because it is full of smoke, just as the kitchen (homogeneous example). this hill has no smoke, because it has no fire, just as a lake (heterogeneous example). 1. Jainism (H. Warren), p. 21.

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CHAPTER I Fire and smoke abide homogeneously in the kitchen, and by the homogeneous example inseparable connection (vyapti) between the major term (sadhya) and the middle term (hetu) is established. Similarly the heterogeneous example reassures the connection by contrariety, viz., by showing that absence of the major term (sadhya) is attended by the absence of the middle term (hetu).1 79 In this verse, it is mentioned that in a dharmi (thing possessing qualities, e.g., a jiva), existence has inseparable connection with non-existence. "For instance the negative statement (that we are not dust, for example) is tacit when making a positive statement (that we are immortal souls, for example)."2 This inseparable connection is similar to sadharmya (homogeneouness) and vaidharmya (heterogeneousness) in the middle term (e.g., smoke in the example of syllogism already given). Akalanka has given this in the shape of a syllogism.3 nAstitvaM pratiSedhyenAvinAbhAvyekadharmiNi / fastquciturf genstafaqueun ||18||| nastitvam pratisedhyenavinabhavyekadharmini, visesanatvad-vaidharmyam yatha'bheda-vivaksaya. 18. As we express heterogeneousness with the desire of establishing non-difference, so according to qualification, (there is) non-existence in a single substance 1. " sAdhyasAdhanayorvyAptiryatra nizcIyatetarAm / sAdharmyeNa sa dRSTAntaH sambandhasmaraNAnmataH // sAdhye nivartamAne tu sAdhanasyApyasaMbhavaH / e folla a za: " Nyayavatara, verse 18 and 19. "yo yo dhUmavAnasAvasAvagnimAn yathA mahAnasaH iti sAdhamryodAharaNam / yo yo'gnimAnna bhavati sa sa dhUmavAnna bhavati, yathA mahAhradaH, iti vaidhamryodAharaNam // " Nyaya-dipika, Prakasa III. 2. Jainism (H. Warren), p. 21. 3. " tasmAd yad vizeSaNaM tat pratiSedhyavinAbhAvi kvacid dharmiNi, yathA sAdharmyaM bhedavivakSayA, kRtakatvAdau vizeSaNaM cAstitvaM tataH pratiSedhyadharmapratibandhi / "

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APTA-MIMAMSA which is co-existent with its opposite. COMMENTARY If someone says that as you accept existence inseparably connected with non-existence, so when its opposite will come, viz., non-existence will be predicated, you will have to accept its contrary, viz., existence. Thus, when a substance does not absolutely exist, such as flowers in the sky or horns of a hare, you should also accept its existence. A reply is given that by inference we establish the reality of substances capable of our understanding and our example of homogeneousness or heterogeneousness applies to the establishment of such substances only.2 The non-existence of horns of a hare can be proved by inferential process, but it does not mean that its real existence arises from Saptabhangi. A dharmi is known sometimes by pramana, sometimes by vikalpa (imagination) and sometimes both by vikalpa and pramana.3 An example of the first is "this mountain has fire"; that of the second is "there exists an omniscient being"; that of the third is "sound is not eternal."4 When we see smoke and infer fire, the object in which the fire is (e.g., the mountain) is known by pratyaksa pramana. But in the case of our belief in the existence and non-existence, viz., "the omniscient exists" or "horns of the ass do not exist", the sadhya consisting 1. "bhavatu tAvadastitvaM jIvAdau naastitvenaavinaabhaavi| nAstitvaM tu kathamastitvAvinAbhAvi, a-go4it sussegueritafa RIHTI TIE: 1" Asta-sahasri. 2. "na hi svecchApraklRptadharmadharmivyavasthAyAM paramArthAvatAraH syAt tadasamIkSitatattvArthe rlokapratItivazAd bhedAbhedavyavasthitistattvapratipattaye samAzrIyata iti bAlAbhilApakalpaM 746T41014 TTCI" Astasati. 3. "prasiddhatvaM ca dharmiNaH kvacit pramANAt, kvacid vikalpAt, kvacit prmaannviklpaabhyaam|" Nyaya-dipika. 4. "tatra pramANasiddho dharmI yathA dhUmavattvAdagnimattve sAdhye parvataH khalu prtykssennaanubhuuyte|. .. 344f het erf en great forrit hang FRETE: " Nyaya-dipika.

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CHAPTER I 81 of existence or non-existence is preceded by our such belief. So these are cases of vikalpa-siddhi of the dharmi. Refutation of a non-existent thing by argument does not therefore lead to its existence by Sapta-bhangi. vidheyapratiSedhyAtmA vizeSyaH shbdgocrH| HTTTT ngregat ||1911 vidheyapratisedhyatma visesyah sabda-gocharah, sadhya-dharmo yatha hetur-ahetuschapyapeksaya. 19. The minor term is understood by sound, as it comprises the major term and its opposite. (This is) as, according to the desire of a speaker, the relationship of the major term is or is not with the middle term. COMMENTARY In the example of inference "the mountain has fire as it has smoke", the mountain is the paksa (minor term), fire is the sadhya (major term) and smoke is hetu, linga or sadhana (middle term). Now the word vidheya in the verse may be taken to mean astitva (existence). Its pratisedhi (opposite) will be nastitva (non-existence). A substance which has these qualities, viz., jiva etc. might be considered as a paksa (minor term) in a syllogism. The qualities of sadhya would be its manifestation etc. These qualities are considered hetu (middle term) when we desire to establish their non-eternal aspect and ahetu (not the middle term) when we consider their eternal aspect. The example will be "Where the substance exists. the exists, the qualities 1. "vikalpasiddho yathA, sarvajJaH asti sunizcitAsaMbhavabAdhakapramANatvAd ityastitve sAdhye srvjnyH| athavA kharaviSANaM nAstIti nAstitve sAdhye khrvissaannm| sarvajJo hyastitvasiddheH prAG na pratyakSAdipramANasiddhaH / api tu pratItimAtrasiddha iti vikalpasiddho'yaM dhrmii| tathA kharaviSANamapi nAstitvasiddheH prAga vikalpasiddham / " "vikalpasiddhe tu dharmiNi sattAsattayoreva HTETAR F14:!" Nyaya-dipika.

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82 APTA-MIMAMSA exist" or "where the substance does not exist, the qualities do not exist." In this manner, existence and non-existence can be predicated in the same thing as it can be established by process of inference as shown above. In the familiar example, when the major term is fire, smoke becomes hetu but when the major term is water, smoke becomes ahetu. As in the same substance, the existence or absence of fire is established by different syllogisms, viz., through inseparable connection of fire and smoke or inseparable connection of absence of smoke in water, so there is no absurdity in holding existence and non-existence in the same substance by Sapta-bhangi. By a similar process of inference it can be established that substances, jiva etc., can be known by words.2 zeSabhaGgAzca netavyA ythoktnyyogtH| na ca kazcidvirodho'sti munIndra tava zAsane // 20 // sesabhangascha netavya yathokta-naya-yogatah, na cha kaschid-virodho'sti munindra tava sasane. 20. According to the connection of proper nayas, the remaining categories also are to be applied. O ! the best of the Kevalins, in your doctrine, there is no fault whatever. COMMENTARY The categories syad-asti and syan-nasti have been fully explained regarding their application. The other five categories, syad-avaktavya etc. (as mentioned before), are 1. "vidheyamastitvam, pratipathyaM nAstitvam... to AtmAnau svabhAvau yasya sa vidheyapratiSedhyAtmA, arthaH sarvo jIvAdiriti pkssH| vizeSyatvAditi hetuH, vizeSya iti hetunirdezAt / ... sAdhyo dharmI sAdhyadharmAdhAratayA tasya sAdhyavyapadezAt, tathopacArasya dRssttaantdhrmivyvcchedaarthtvaat| tasya dharmo vivartta utpttimttvaadiH| sa yathA heturanityatvasAdhyApekSayA, nityatvasAdhyApekSayAhetuzca, gamakatvAgamakatvAyogAt, tathA sAdhyAvinAbhAvetarasadbhAvAditi dRSTAntaH / ityanumAnAt sattvetarAtmakaH kathaMcit jIvAdyarthaH siddhytyev|" Astasahasri. 2. "zabdagocaro jIvAdiH vizeSyatvAt tadvat, ityanumAnAttasya saadhnaat|" Astasahasri.

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CHAPTER 1 to be applied in a similar manner according to the different standpoints of a speaker. Owing to difference in nayas, different categories will arise. So it is urged that there is no contradiction in Jain doctrine. In doctrines defects like contradiction, doubt etc. arise because the propounders only insist upon one aspect of things, refusing to admit the different aspects of objects, which really is the true nature of substances. 112111 evaM vidhiniSedhAbhyAmanavasthitamarthakRt / neti cenna yathAkArya bahirantarupAdhibhiH // 21 // evam vidhi-nisedhabhyamanavasthitamarthakrt, neti chenna yathakaryam vahirantarupadhibhih. 21. In this manner, a substance understood by existence and non-existence becomes the cause of an effect. If you say no, the proper cause of an effect can not exist. COMMENTARY "The Bauddhas who are known in philosophy as Ksanika-ekanta-vadins... emphasize upon the fleeting nature of all existence... Thus the Bauddhas are exactly our 'flowing philosophers' holding everything to be 'mere currents of incessant change'. Jainism waged a fierce war with them in old times, although by some irony of fate, in our own days, distinguished antiquarians piously confused one belligerent with the other... Nothing is; but everything is not as soon as it is. The moment that it lives, is also the moment that it ceases to live. There is no being; all is always becoming. But is becoming possible for what is not being? Cause and effect are in reality two phases of one and the same thing. The two are relative terms, with their solidarity so vital that the negation of the one is the negation of the other. But Ksanikavada makes the relation fictitious and consequently there is neither cause

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84 APTA-MIMAMSA nor effect in any case. Causation is thus reduced to mere sequence in time. But even this idea of mere time relation is untenable in Buddhism. If there is no cause, if there is nothing in the cause that is necessarily productive of the effect and if there is no essential relation between the two, all certainty in the natural order vanishes and there remains no uniformity even for bare time-successions, as the Ksanikavadins in ancient India or Comte and Mill in modern Europe tried to hold. The Ksanikavadins were not satisfied with these arguments and they rejoined by insisting that the 'unity of nature' between cause and effect as understood by Jainism was a fictitious or aupacharika one. It is, said they, an illusion, or as Mill would say, a mental habit and not a real fact. What is an illusion or mental habit? We think a cat as being 'a lion' or 'like a lion' by illusion or mental habit; but is this possible without our ever having seen some lion? Even an illusion pre-supposes a reality of which it is an illusion. The fiction of causal relation is therefore founded upon unquestionable facts."1 In this verse it is urged that it is only when a substance is understood by two categories, viz., existence and non-existence, that it can become cause of an effect. For example, gold, when transformed into an ear-ring, becomes an upadana karana of an ornament. In denial of this aspect of categories, the proper cause of an effect will cease to exist. dharme dharme'nya evArtho dhrminno'nntdhrmnnH| fra samh glHT THAT 1122|| dharme dharme'nya evartho dharmino'nanta dharmanah, angitve'nyatamantasya sesantanam tadangata. 22. The implication of infinite qualities of a substance 1. An Introduction to Jainism, A.B. Hatthe, pages 113-116.

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CHAPTER I 85 is different in each category. When one among these is given prominence, the others become subsidiary. COMMENTARY "A naya deals with only the particular aspect in view of the speaker but it does not deny the existence of the remaining attributes. When we speak of the colour of gold, we make no mention of its weight, touch, taste, smell and other attributes, but our statement does not mean that gold is devoid of all the other attributes besides colour. When speaking from a limited point of view, Jaina scholars prefix the word 'syat' to every such predication to signify that the object is of a particular type from a particular standpoint but it is not so from other points of view. Syat suggests the existence of other attributes but does not give primary importance to them. Nayas deal with the various aspects of reality from their particular angles of vision but they do not predicate the non-existence of other points of view. When one point of view becomes primary, the others become of secondary importance. It is incorrect to suppose that only a particular naya is correct and others are erroneous. As a matter of fact all those standpoints are equally true and valid and lead to correct knowledge, provided that they do not deny the existence of the other points of view, for one will be wholly untrue without the existence of others. In other words, the valid nayas are interdependent and when they become independent, the result is that their very nature is annihilated. For example, the inter-dependence of cotton threads is possessed of the potentiality of warding off cold and providing comfort to the body, but if each of these threads become independent of others, these will not be able to serve the aforesaid purpose. This principle is applied to the doctrine of nayas. Acharya Amrtachandra Suri has mentioned that as a milk-maid draws part of the rope of the churning rod

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APTA-MIMAMSA by one hand loosening the other part to get butter out of curd, so the Jaina doctrine of naya gives prominence to a particular attribute leaving aside the other views and by this means chunrns the nectar of reality (tattva): "ekenAkarSantI zlathayantI vastutattvamitareNa / antena jayati jainI nItirmanthAnanetramiva gopI // " ( Purusarthasiddhyupaya, verse 225.1) 86 ekAnekavikalpAdAvuttaratrApi yojayet / prakriyAM bhaGginImenAM nayairnayavizAradaH // 23 // ekaneka-vikalpadavuttaratrapi yojayet, prakriyam bhanginimenam nayairnayavisaradah. 23. One adept in the use of naya should apply this method consisting of categories, as in the divergence of one or the many etc. COMMENTARY This method of the application of different categories will be shown further on, as the author will proceed to criticise the theory of Advaitavada etc. It will then be seen that the theory of Syadvada, will refute the onesided theories of Advaitavadins. End of Chapter I 1. See Pariksamukha (S.C. Ghoshal) Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. XI, page 199-204.

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Chapter II advaitaikAntapakSe'pi dRSTo bhedo virudhyate / kArakANAM kriyAyAzca naikaM svasmAt prajAyate // 24 // advaitaikantapakse'pi drsto bhedo virudhyate, karakanam kriyayascha naikam svasmat prajayate. 24. Also, according to Advaitaikanta view, the perceptible differences, e.g. of instrumental cause, predicates etc. become impossible. One cannot be born (or produced) of itself. COMMENTARY The view of those who follow the doctrine of Advaitavada is refuted in this verse. The doctrine of Advaitavada as preached by the celebrated Sankaracharya is that all the phenomenal universe and all the spiritual world is one homogenous spirit (Brahma) containing and absorbing all the illusory manifestations in the universe. Two objections are raised in this verse to oppose this view. The first is, self cannot create the self. "That means that Advaitism cannot explain without some duality to help how the all-in-all gave rise to itself or to the otherthan-itself." The second objection is that if we follow Advaitavada, the universally accepted duals like the doer (karaka) and its action (kriya), the things inferred (parichhchedya vastu) and the inference (pramana) cannot exist. As visible differences cannot be accounted for by adoption of only Brahma, a doctrine of Maya had to be introduced by the Advaitavadins to explain such differences. The Jaina view is that the acceptance of Maya at once does away with the absolute. Brahma and as soon as Brahma begins to work, its essential characteristic

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88 APTA-MIMAMSA vanishes. In other words, the Jaina doctrine urges that the attempt of Advaitavadins to connect the ideal with the real world has failed. karmadvaitaM phaladvaitaM lokadvaitaM ca no bhvet| faenlaag 7 RIC ETHIETEI TT 112511 karma-dvaitam phala-dvaitam loka-dvaitam cha no bhavet, vidyavidya-dayam na syat bandha-moksa-dvayam tatha. 25. If we accept the Advaitavada, there will not be the two kinds of karmas (good and evil), the two kinds of results of these karmas, (viz., punya, papa, virtue and vice), the two kinds of loka (mundane and the other world). Even vidya (the true knowledge) and avidya (absence of true knowldege) will cease to exist. There will also be nonexistence of bandha (bondage) and moksa (liberation). COMMENTARY The argument against Advaitavada which is mentioned in this verse is that if we accept this view, there would be no distinction between an auspicious and an inauspicious action (subha and 'asubha karmas). virtue (punua) and vice (papa), the mundane world (ihaloka) and the other world (paraloka), the true knowldege (jnana) and ignorance or absence of true knowledge (ajnana), bondage (bandha) and moksa (liberation). All these different kinds of conceptions are admitted even by Advaitavadins. But by accepting Brahma as the only real thing in existence, these distinctions will disappear. hetoradvaitasiddhizced dvaitaM syaaddhetusaadhyyoH| hetunA ced vinA siddhidvaitaM vAGmAtrato na kim // 26 //

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89 CHAPTER 11 hetoradvaita-siddhisched dvaitam syaddhetu sadhyayoh, hetuna ched vina siddhir-dvaitam vanmatrato na kim. 26. If the establishment of Advaita be from hetu (the middle term), there will be duality of hetu (the middle term) and sadhya (the major term). If the establishment -be without the middle term, why not Dvaitavada be accepted from mere words? COMMENTARY In this verse, another argument against Advaitavada is advanced. Can Advaitavada be proved by logical process of reasoning or do you say that Advaitavada is not proved by any logical process of reason but is its own justification? Both these qustions are taken up and. decided in this verse. Now, in an inference, we prove a thing through universal concomitance (vyapti) which is a kind of relationship between the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sadhya). For example, we infer fire (which is the major term or sadhya) from smoke (which is the middle term or Hetu) through the relationship of universal concomitance, viz., where there is fire, there is smoke. If you say that Advaitavada is established by inference, you must accept a major term and middle term. This is against the view that there is nothing but one (Advaita). Hetu (the middle term) and sadhya (the major term) being used in a reasoning to establish Advaitavada, it must bring in duality (Dvaitavada), the very opposite of Advaitavada. If you say, that Advaitavada is not established by reason but by itself, the reasoning will be absurd. Nothing can be its own proof. If from mere words, a thing is established, anybody can establish anything by mearly uttering it in words ("PI614491effectief Hofer FACETT." -- Astasati). Further, if Advaitavada can be proved by itself without the help of any reasoning, Dvaitavada can also

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APTA-MIMAMSA be said to be established in this manner, which will give a deathblow to the former. advaitaM na vinA dvaitAdaheturiva hetunaa| Hista: ufattet 7 gradeco parera 1127|| advaitam na vina dvaitadaheturiva hetuna, sanjninah pratisedho na pratisedhyadste kvachit. 27. As without ahetu, (there is) no hetu, so without dvaita, there cannot be advaita. Regarding every thing there cannot be refutation, if there be no object to be refuted. COMMENTARY In this verse, it is urged that Advaitavada must accept Dvaitavada on the principle that to establish a thing by refuting another, there must be an object to be refuted. Without Dvaita, there cannot be Advaita as without an ahetu there cannot be a hetu. "It is a universal law of the mind to have its negative ideas based upon the knowledge of its positive ideas. You know a 'flower' and it is because you know it that you can say that there is no 'flower in the ky'. You know that fire is inferred from the existence of smoke (hetu) and only from this knowledge it is that you can say that you cannot draw the same inference from the existence of water (ahetu). Similarly when you know that there is dualism (Dvaita) in the universe, then and then only, you can imagine its negative, the absence of dualism (Advaita)."1 pRthaktvaikAntapakSe'pi pRthktvaadpRthkkRtau| qerara 7 Letohrai Pia nt mit Tor: 1128|| prthaktvaikantapakse'pi prthakatvadprthakketau, prthaktve na prthaktvam syadanekastho hyasau gunah. 1. An Introduction to Jainism by A.B. Latthe. p. 122.

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CHAPTER II 28. Also, in the one-sided view which holds the separate existence (of many objects), there will not be individuality owing to non-separation of an object and its qualities. Further, there will be no separate existence, if the object and its qualities are held to be inseparable. It is certain that a quality can exist (in many objects). COMMENTARY Refutation of the Nyaya and Vaisesika views, viz., that there is separate existence of different properties and of their qualities is made in this verse. If we urge that everything is separate from everything else, we come to a view insisting on many being true as opposed to Advaitavada which insists on only one being true. As Jainism fights against all one-sided (ekanta) views, a refutation of this view follows the refutation of the Vedanta view (Advaitavada). "If every individual is independent, at least this individuality is a comman property of all, e.g., materiality (a guna) is the property common to gunins, ghata (a pitcher), pata (a cloth) etc. If not so, being devoid of individuality their independence also will be lost. Although individuals are separate, individuality is a property residing in common and hence, even individuals are homogeneous by their common property. Thus even the individualism of the Nyaya (and Vaisesika school) is vitiated by the very presuppositions of their own school."1 santAnaH samudAyazca sAdharmyaM ca niraMkuzaH / pretyabhAvazca tatsarvaM na syAdekatvaniNave // 29 // santanah samudayas-cha sadharmyam cha 91 nirankusah, pretyabhavascha tatsarvam na syadekatva-nihnave. 29. If we deny similarity or identity (in one sense) there will not be any gradual flow consisting of cause 1. An Introduction to Jainism, A.B. Latthe, p. 118.

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92 APTA-MIMASA giving rise to an effect, or the existence (of different qualities) in a single object, or similarity or birth following death, for all of these would become impossible. COMMENTARY In this verse the view of the Buddhists, who hold existence to be separate and momentary, is refuted. We know that gradual change happens from one substance to another, e.g., milk changes into curd. The flow of cause producing effect in such cases shows that there is a continual connection between the two. Momentary existence of two separate substances in such cases would be opposed to reality. Further we know that in an object, there are different qualities, form, colour etc. But if we accept like the Buddhists the theory of changes following each other in succession, all these qualities become fictitious for there would remain nothing stable of which these can be properties. "If knowledge consists of passing sensations without the unity of apperception to cannect them, there is no pratyavijna or recognition, e.g., this house as being the one that I visited yesterday." There will also be no knowledge of similarity on the same principle. If nothing remains stable, the persistence of human personality after death which is accepted by the Buddhists becomes impossible by their own doctrine. So the Jains do not accept the Buddhist view that in our mind we get unconnected but successive sensations received fro sadAtmanA ca bhinnaM cet jJAnaM jJeyAd dvidhaapyst| jJAnAbhAve kathaM jJeyaM bahirantazca te dviSAm // 30 // sadatmana cha bhinnam chet jnanam jneyad dvidhapyasat, jnanabhave katham jneyam bahirantascha te dvinam. 1. An Introduction to Jainism, A.B. Latthe, p. 118.

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CHAPTER II 93 30. If knowledge be different from the object known, these will be separate in their real existence. It will cease to exist in twofold manner. To those who are against this view, how can there be an object known internally or externally in absence of knowledge. COMMENTARY Another argument is adduced to refute the view of those who accept the reality of seperate existence of different things. If you say that everything has a separate real existence, you must accept the separate existence of knowledge and the object known. The result would be that both would become non-existent, for how can there be knowledge if there be not the thing known? There might be internal or external object of knowledge. But every such object would become non-existent, if there be no knowledge.1 Again, if knowlege be non-existent, the object of knowledge will also become non-existent as the object of knowledge depends on knowledge.2 So the view of the Buddhists like that of the followers of the Vaisesika system of philosophy who hold the one-sided view of separate existence, is refuted.3 In the verse, "your opponents" mean those who are opposite to Jain Anekantavada. The Apta is adored as 'You' as in previous verses. sAmAnyArthA giro'nyeSAM vizeSo nAbhilapyate / sAmAnyAbhAvatasteSAM mRSaiva sakalA giraH // 31 // samanyartha giro'nyesam viseso nabhilapyate, samanyabhavatastesam mrsaiva sakala girah. 1. " sadAtmanA satsAmAnyAtmanA bhinnameva jJAnaM jJeyAt iti cet, dvidhApyasadeva prAptaM jJAnasya asattve jJeyasya asattvaprasaMgAt / tato bahirantazca na kiMcit kathaMcidapi jJeyaM nAma tvadviSAM "Asta-sahasri. 2. " tadabhAve bahirantarvA jJeyameva na syAt, tadapekSatvAt / " Astasati. 3. "tataH zreyAnayam upAlambhaH pRthaktvaikAntavAcAM tAthAgatAnAM vaizeSikavat / " Astasati.

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APTA-MIMAMSA 31. The doctrine of those who profess generalization, does not touch the differentiation. All of their words become false for absence of generalization. 94 COMMENTARY All objects have two kinds of properties, viz, samanya (general or generalizing) and visesa (specific or differentiating). The general properties express the genus (jati) etc. and the specific properties describe the species, differences and distinctions. From general properties, we get the idea of jar-ness in hundred pitchers and from specific properties people distinguish their own pitchers from others.1 In this verse, the view of the Buddhists who suppose a general property (Samanya) without reference to the specific properties of a thing is refuted. It is urged that this view is absurd as everything becomes non-existent being devoid of its differentiating quality. For example, 'the horn of an ass' is without any differentia because it is totally non-existent. In the same way a thing is without its differentia only when it is considered to be totally non-existent. By the word Anyesam and Tesam in the verse the Buddhists are meant. It is laid down that all their words are false as in absence of differentiation, generalization cannot exist and without generalization, no process of inference can proceed. 1. arthAH sarve'pi sAmAnyavizeSA ubhayAtmakAH / sAmAnyaM tatra jAtyAdi vizeSazca vibhedakAH // aikyabuddhirghaTazate bhavet sAmAnyadharmataH / vizeSAcca nijaM nijaM lakSayanti ghaTaM janAH // Naya-karnika, verses 3 and 4.

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95 CHAPTER II virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syaadvaadnyaayvidvissaam| avAcyataikAnte'pyukti vAcyamiti yujyate // 32 // virodhannobhayaikatmyam syadvada-nyaya vidvisam, avachyataikante'pyuktirnavachyamiti yujyate. 32. The particular view of those who are antagonistic to the doctrine of Syadvada that a thing can have both aspects together (cannot stand) as it is an impossibility. The view of those who hold that a thing is inexpressible cannot stand, being indescribable. COMMENTARY Akalanka explains this verse as follows: It is not possible that an object possessing qualities should have two natures opposed to each other existing at the same time. For example, existence and non-existence, oneness or many-sidedness, cannot be jointly predicated of the same thing, as one will oppose the other and existence of both will be self-contradictory; barren woman and a child cannot be connected together.1 Again, those who maintain the avaktavya view, viz., that everything is unknowable, are inconsistent with themselves. Some knowledge about a thing must exist before we can call it unknowable. So Jainism urges that uncertainty in knowledge is not an acceptable position. anapekSe pRthaktvaikye hyvstudvyhetutH| dai Tera o FITAS: HTETT TETT 1133 il anapekse prthaktvaikye hyavastu dvayahetutah, tadevaikyam pothaktvam cha svabhedaih sadhanam yatha. 1. "astitvanAstitvaikatvAnekatvavat pRthaktvettara-parasparapratyanIkasvabhAvadvayasaMbhavo'pi mA bhuudviprtissedhaat| na khalu sarvAtmanA viruddhadharmAdhyAso'sti tadanyonyavidhipratiSedhaTAYICI&FEZITUACI" Astasati.

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96 APTA-MIMAMSA 33. Because of two reasons, those which are not related or are entirely separate, cannot become anything. Just as in the case of a sadhana, there is unity and diversity according to its variety. COMMENTARY There might be an argument like this. Diversity is not existent because it is not connected with or related to unity. Again, unity alone cannot be in existence, because it is void of diversity. Though by showing the absurdity of such a reasoning the view of those who hold the Ekanta view can be refuted by our previously showing the twofold reasoning based (i) on unity and diversity as well as (ii) on neutrality. As fire is established from the existence of paksa, smoke, and nonexistence of water (which is vipaksa), so substances like jiva are established by a dual process of reasoning, e.g., substances like jiva become one when regarded through the existence of paksa, and they are regarded as different when they are established through difference.2 A thing has different varieties and different qualities. Without a noun there cannot be adjectives such as "horns of a hare." Again without qualifying adjectives differentiating a substance, we cannot have an idea of the latter. To meet both these points, acceptance of Anekantavada is necessary, that is to say unity and diversity are not absolute realities.3 satsAmAnyAttu sarvaikyaM pRthg-drvyaadibhedtH| tarafa HR414HTER TECET 1134|| sat-samanyattu sarvaikyam prthag-dravyadi bhedatah, bhedabheda-vivaksayamasadharana-hetuvat. 1. See Verse 24 and the following. 2. "yasmAdavastvevAnapekSe pRthaktvaikye aikyapRthaktvanirapekSahetudvayAt pratipAdite prAk, tasmAttadevaikyaM pRthaktvaM ca jIvAdivastu kthNcidektvpRthktvprtyyhetudvyaadvsiiyte| yathA sAdhanaM sattvAdi THETHYS Hra-fa HTH FIFTET: Pafgreitt utsy927:1" Astasahasri. 3. "ehrane art Atcha: 7: tenifefartenfafa paruldi" Ibid

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CHAPTER II 97 34. The unity is regarding existence which is inherent (in everything) and the diversity is regarding the difference in dravya etc. This is like the uncommon hetu when one wishes to speak about unity or diversity. COMMENTARY By the word hetu employed here, the hetu as employed in inference (anumana) is to be understood. Such a hetu is of two kinds: jnapaka (that which makes a thing known, viz., smoke leading to the knowledge of fire) or karaka (that from which a thing is made, viz., clay from which a pitcher is manufactured). We have different intentions when we speak of these different kinds of hetu. So when we intend merely to speak of existence, all substances (jiva etc.) are the same, but when we wish to express the difference according to dravya, ksetra, kala and bhava (already explained before, they are different. vivakSA cAvivakSA ca vishessye'nntdhrminni| Hat fastaRIE Hartfristeffy: 113501 vivaksa chavivaksa cha visesye'nanta-dharmini, sato visesanasyatra nasatastaistadarthibhih. 35. Those wishing for it, want to speak or not about an existing quality of a substance possessing infinite qualities, and not of non-existing (qualities). COMMENTARY This verse attempts to refute the view of the Buddhists who say that unity and divergence cannot be established by one's desire to speak or not about a 1. "satsAmAnyaM vizeSaNamAzritya sarveSAM jIvAdInAmaikyamiti naikatvapratyayo nirviSayaH, tasya satsAmAnyavizeSatvAt, pRthak sarvaM jIvAdi drvyaadipdaarthbhedmaashrityaanubhuuyte| tato na pRthaktvapratyayo'pi nirviSayaH, tasya dravyAdibhedaviSayatvAditi niveditaM boddhvym| heturatra $11905: 10.97 Joa" Astasahasri

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98 APTA-MIMAMSA certain quality of a substance, as both of these are unreal. For example, when we speak about unity, we deny the existence of diversity and vice versa. The reply is that when we want to speak about anything, we accept its existence. We never want to speak about anything which is non-existent. Otherwise we cannot have any action performed. By merely saying "a man, and fire" we cannot get cooking. There must be action to get cooking. The connection between qualities which we hold to be non-existing, when we want to speak about it, is merly an analogy. In reality existence or non-existence of qualities are not opposed to proof. For, when we establish identity of substance on certain qualities, we overlook other qualities leading to diversity; and when we establish diveragence we overlook the qualities leading to unity on a certain basis. Absolute existence or non-existence of qualities cannot happen. These are employed as one intends to emphasize one or the other. pramANagocarau santau bhedAbhedau na sNvRtii| aragallanesat a T erra 1136 II pramanagocharau santau bhedabhedau na samvsti, tavekatravirudhau te gunamukhya-vivaksaya. 37. Unity and diversity are real and can be established by pramana. These are not imaginary. These are not opposed to in their existence in a single substance as we desire to speak either about the primary or secondary (qualities). COMMENTARY The one-sided view that substances are different or the same, that everything is one, cannot be maintained. By employment of syllogism, it can be proved that oneness or many-sided-ness of substances are real and not 1. "vidhipratiSedhadharmANAM satAmeva vivakSetarAbhyAM yogastadarthibhiH kriyeta, anythaarthnissptterbhaavaat| JYERHET I RICI 7 auftraforach seylarta Yhterguyvadli" Astasati.

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CHAPTER II 99 illusory or imaginary. It is when we want to establish the primary qualities showing unity, we speak about one-ness; and when we want to emphasise the secondary qualities showing divergence, we speak of many-sidedness. It is therefore not impossible that both of these can be predicated of a substance. The Anekantavada of the Jainas accepts these different ways of expression in preference to Ekantavada of the Vedantists or others. End of Chapter 2

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Chapter III nityatvaikAntapakSe'pi vikriyA noppdyte| prAgeva kArakAbhAvaH kva pramANaM kva tatphalam // 37 // nityatvaikantapakse'pi vikriya nopapadyate, prageva karakabhavah kva pramanam kva tat phalam. 37. In the view of those who hold absolute permanent existence, there cannot be any modification. For, at the beginning there is want of an instrumental cause. How can there be a cause or its effect? COMMENTARY This verse discusses the Sarkhya view holding that a Purusa exists without any kind of change. If it be accepted beforehand that the eternal Purusa is void of change, then there cannot be any modification arising from it. There must be a cause giving rise to an effect. By denying the cause we also deny the effect. So the theory of the Sankhya that the substances with all their varieties are created by the conjunction of the Purusa with Prakrti is not maintainable. For, one devoid of change, cannot give rise to any modification. pramANakArakairvyaktaM vyaktaM cedindriyaarthvt| te ca nitye vikAryaM kiM sAdhoste zAsanAdbahiH // 38 // pramanakarakairvyaktam vyaktar chedindriyarthavat, te cha nitye vikaryam kim sadhoste sasanad-bahih. 38. If these be revealed by pramanas and karakas like substances known by the senses, these are also eternal.

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CHAPTER III 101 How can these be subject to modification? These inconsistencies, O Lord! are excluded from your doctrine. COMMENTARY If it be argued that even if we do not admit modifications, we can hold that mahat, ahankara etc., as accepted by the Sankhya system of philosophy, are things established by pramanas (pratyaksa, anumana etc.) or by karakas (karti-subject, karma-object etc.). To support this, we might urge the example that by senses we get knowledge of objects as by the eye we see things. In reply to this, we say that pramanas and karakas being accepted as eternal by the followers of the Sarkhya view, modifications cannot arise owing to absence of cause. In Anekantavada, however, there being no adherence to any absolute view-point, such defects are not possible. yadi sat sarvathA kAryaM puNvnnotpttumrhti| pariNAmapraktRptizca nityatvaikAntavAdhinI // 39 // yadi sat sarvatha karyam punvannotpattumarhati, parinama-praklcptischa nityatvaikantavadhini. 39. If the effect is always in existence, it cannot come into being (as it will be) similar to Purusa (whose eternal existence is admitted by the followers of Sarkhya). If there be an idea of modifications, it will entirely oppose (the view of) its eternal existence. COMMENTARY If the effects be held to be always eternal, there cannot by any question of their happening in existence from causes, for these effects are accepted as eternal like the Purusa of the Sankhya view. The idea that we may consider the existence of modification by change is untenable, for that would be opposed to its eternal existence. That is to say, by accepting effects to be eternal, their causes are denied,

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102 APTA-MIMAMSA and if modification by changes is admitted, it bars eternity. puNyapApakriyA na syAt pretyabhAvaH phalaM kutaH / bandhamokSau ca teSAM na yeSAM tvaM nAsi nAyakaH // 40 // punya-papa-kriya na syat pretyabhavah phalam kutah, bandha-moksau cha tesam na yesam tvam nasi nayakah. 40. There will be no virtuous or sinful acts. How can there be re-birth as fruits (of the same). O Lord! whom you do not guide cannot (establish) bondage or liberation. COMMENTARY If Prakrti be accepted as eternal like Purusa, there will be no virtuous or sinful acts, for, Prakrti being eternal, cannot have these variations. And the view that re-birth happens according to good or bad acts done in this life, then becomes untenable because if the cause of being born in different manner in the next life be absent, how can the effect take place? Naturally, bondage or liberation will become untenable under this view. This point has already been discussed in verse 8 where it has been shown that to accept the view of the Ekantvadins would lead to denial of virtuous or sinful acts and the next life.1 kSaNikaikAntapakSe'pi pretyabhAvAdyasaMbhavaH / pratyabhijJAdyabhAvAnna kAryArambhaH kutaH phalam // 41 // ksanikaikantapakse'pi pretyabhavadyasambhavah, pratyabhijnadyabhavanna karyarambhah kutah phalam. 41. In the view of those who accept Ksanikaikanta 1. "kuzalAkuzalaM karma" (Verse 8 ) / " ityatra tadasaMbhavasya smrthittvaat|" Astasahasri.

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CHAPTER III 103 (absolute transitoriness), existence after death etc. is impossible. As there will be no Pratyabhijna etc. there cannot be any beginning of any effect leading to any fruit. COMMENTARY This verse is to refute the view of the Buddhists who hold the transitory nature of knowledge. For, to accept this transitory nature, we shall have to deny memory etc. Because, as soon as knowledge disappears, being transitory, it cannot remember what it had experienced before and comparing it what it experiences now. It cannot say that it remembers the same as experienced before. Existence after death is accepted to be regulated by the action and intentions of a being in this life. But if everything disappears as transitory, such actions and intentions cannot be causes in regulating rebirth which is accepted by the Buddhist philosophy. Innumerable stories are current in Buddhistic literature regarding the previous lives of Buddha. If a man does not remember his previous experience, how can he act to satisfy his desire by doing necessary acts. One collects firewood, cooking pot, rice and water, wishing to cook food. Without pratyabhijna (memory) this action (karyarambha) can never take place, and the fruits of the act (phala) can consequently never happen. yadyasat sarvathA kAryaM tanmA jani khapuSpavat / mopAdAnaniyAmo'bhUnmAzvAsaH kAryajanmani // 42 // yadyasat sarvatha karyam tanma jani khapuspa-vat, mopadananiyamo'bhun-masvasah karyajanmani. 42. If the effect be always non-existent, it cannot in that case ever happen, (as) a flower in the sky (can never get into existence). The rule of (existence according to) material will not in that case exist) and there will be no expectation in the rising of the effect.

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104 APTA-MIMAMSA COMMENTARY Another argument is preferred against the Buddhists in this verse. That which is entirely non-existent like 'a flower in the sky' or 'horns of a hare' cannot come into existence. So it cannot be said that effects are non-existent from before. Again, substances are created from materials, e.g., a pitcher is made from clay, a cloth is made from threads etc. Connection between material and the substances produced will disappear, if effects (like pitcher, cloth etc.) are regarded as asat. Further, we shall not in that case be unable to expect what would be created from which (viz., a pitcher from clay or a cloth from threads). But in our practical experience we find that there is an essential connection between the material and the thing produced from the same. We expect that such and such a thing would be produced from such a material. na hetuphlbhaavaadirnybhaavaadnnvyaat| Walan: Haltirgan: TT 1143 11 na hetuphala-bhavadiranyabhavadananvayat, santanantaravannaikah santanas-tadvatah prthak. 43. Being different and unconnected, relationship of cause and effect cannot exist, as one cannot be like another santana. For, a santana and that having a santana are quite different. COMMENTARY The view of the Buddhist Ksanikavada recognising different moments and substances or knowledge modified by these moments and unconnected with one another, but taking rise one after the other is untenable. For it is accepted that a moment and the substance or knowledge modified according to a particular moment are different. These being quite distinct and unconnected with one

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CHAPTER III 105 another cannot bear the relationship of cause and effect. If all existence is of a fleeting nature, and everything, mere currents of incessant change, how can the relationship of cause and effet exist between unconnected and different substances? anyeSvananyazabdo'yaM saMvRtirna mRSA kthm| mukhyArthaH saMvRtirnAsti vinA mukhyAnna saMvRtiH // 44 // anyesvananyasabdo'yam samvitirna mosa katham, mukhyarthah samvstirnasti vina mukhyanna samvstih. 44. This word without difference is applied to others .in fiction. (If so) why this fictitious application is not false? The real object cannot be fictitious and without a real object there cannot be any application by analogy. COMMENTARY This is another argument to refute the Buddhists who hold the view of Ksanikavada. It is urged by the Buddhists that there is no being. Everything is always becoming. To refute this view it is mentioned by the Jainas that becoming is not possible for what is not being. "Cause nd effect are in reality two phases of one and the ame thing. The two are relative terms with their solidarity So vital that the negation of the one is the negation of the other. But Ksanikavada makes the relation fictitious and consequently there is neither cause nor effect in any case. Causation is thus reduced to a mere 'sequence in time'. But even this idea of mere time relation is untenable in Buddhism. If there is no cause, if there is nothing in the cause that is necessarily productive of the effect and if there is no essential relation between the two, all certainty in the natural order vanishes and there remains no uniformity even for bare timesuccession."} 1. Introduction to Jainism, pages 114-115.

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106 APTA-MIMASA Again, if it be urged that the word meaning the present moment (ananya-sabda) is applied to other moments (anyesu) only by a fictitious application is an illusion or a mental habit and not a real fact. In answer it is urged that an illusion presupposes a reality of which it is an illusion. When we speak of a man to be like a lion, we must have seen a lion. The lion (mukhyartha) cannot be an illusion and without it (vina mukhyat) a comparative application based on fictitious application is not possible. The fiction of causal relation is founded upon unquestionable facts. catuSkoTervikalpasya srvaantessuuktyyogtH| tattvAnyatvamavAcyaM ca tayoH santAnatadvatoH // 45 // chatuskotervikalpasya sarvantesuktyayogatah, tattvanyatvamavachyam cha tayoh santana-tadvatoh. 45. As it is not fit to speak about the fourfold alternation regarding all qualities, nothing can be said about one-ness or many-ness of santana and a substance possessing santana. COMMENTARY The Buddhists might resort to the argument of unknowability. "The (causal) relation is (i) either true or (ii) untrue, or (iii) is both true and untrue, or (iv) is neither true nor untrue. If cause and effect are one, there is no reason why we should distinguish them. If they are distinct, it is useless to find out relations as there is no certainty in the relations. To say that both the alternatives are true, is opposed to experience. Lastly, to deny both the alternatives, would be to deprive everything of its nature. So, they conclude that nothing can be said on the point. The answer to this... is that if you call all relations to be unknowable, the things of which they are the relations also become unknowable by the same mode of reasoning. Again, the four-fold alternation (chatuskoti-vikalpa) by being called unknowable becomes immediatly known. And also, if

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CHAPTER III 107 everything changes totally every moment, what reason have we to accept an opinion that also changes with every passing moment?" (Introduction to Jainism, pages 116-117.) avaktavyacatuSkoTivikalpo'pi na kthytaam| asantimavastu syAdavizeSyavizeSaNam // 46 // avaktavya-chatuskoti-vikalpo'pi na kathyatam, asarvantamavastu syadavisesya-visesanam. 46. Do not say the indescribability of the fourfold alternation. For, then, (the result) will be non-existence of all qualities as well as substances possessing qualities and nothing can then be said to exist. COMMENTARY In the commentary to the previous verse, the point taken up here has been explained. The Buddhists are told "Do not say that fourfold alternations are unknowable." For then the distinctions will disappear, as one thing will overlap another. The qualifying attributes will be absent and the substances qualified in this manner will also totally disappear. This theory of the Buddhists will lead to the destruction of all knowledge, as all properties of objects become fictitious for the reason that nothing will remain stable of which they may be the properties. dravyAdyantarabhAvena niSedhaH saMjJinaH stH| asadbhedo na bhAvastu sthAnaM vidhiniSedhayoH // 47 // dravyadyantara-bhavena nisedhah sanjninah satah, asadbhedo na bhavastu sthanam vidhi-nisedhayoh. 47. Denial of qualities of other objects regarding dravya etc. is made only in case of an existing object. The distinction regarding non-existent substances cannot become subject matter of affirmation or negation.

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108 APTA-MIMANSA COMMENTARY It has already been explained that existenece of every substance is taken with respect to its own dravya, ksetra, kala and bhava, that is to say, it exists with regard to these four limitations, but it does not exist in relation to dravya, ksetra, kala and bhava of another substance. The point is that existence and non-existence in such a case are connected with a thing which has existence and not with a thing which has no existence. Limitations of a non-existing substance can never become a determinant regarding existence or non-existence. avastvanabhilApyaM syAt sarvAntaiH privrjitm| attaralgai afa yfir fagfira 1148 II avastvanabhilapyam syat sarvantaih parivarjitam, vastvevavastutam yati prakriyaya viparyayat. 48. Void of all qualities, everything would become nonexistent, being indescribable. By a reversion of the process (of reasoning), non-existence is affirmed of existent objects only. COMMENTARY By affirming absolute indescribability, the result would be that every substance, being devoid of differentiating qualities, would become non-existent. We establish the existence of a pitcher by a negative process of reasoning that it is not a cloth or another object. So the adoption of the view of absolute indescribability is opposed to all reason and experience. sarvAntAzcedavaktavyAsteSAM kiM vacanaM punH| Hiqrasataqda Rurffauti na 1149 11 sarvantaschedavaktavyas tesam kim vachanam punah, samvitis-chen-mssaivaina paramartha-viparyayat.

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CHAPTER III 109 49. If all the qualities are indescribable, how can we even speak of the same? If (you say) that it is illusory, then it must be false, being opposed to reality. COMMENTARY Before we call a thing 'unknowable', we must have some knowledge about it. We cannot say all qualities or properties to be unknowable because it is for the above reason a self-contradictory position. The very affirmation of unknowability cannot take place. If anyone tries to avoid this by saying that this is not real but fictitious, the result would be that it is false. Without any real substance being in existence, there cannot be any illusion or fictitious appliance of the same. The Avaktavya-vadins are therefore inconsistent with themselves. azakyatvAdavAcyaM kimabhAvAt kimbodhtH| AdhantoktidvayaM na syAt kiM vyAjenocyatAM sphuTam // 50 // asakyatvadavachyam kii abhavat kimabodhatah, adyantokti-dvayam na syat kim vyajenochyatam sphutam. 50. Is indescribability due to want of power, or for non-existence, or for want of knowledge? The first and the third (alternatives) cannot happen. What is the use of evasion? Speak clearly. COMMENTARY The person holding the view that everything is indescribable is asked a question in this verse. There can be three possibilities in indescribability. The first is want of power. The Buddhists say that Buddha is possessed of the power of ten thousand elephants. It cannot therefore be said by the Buddhists that indescribability arises out of want of power. It cannot again be said that it is non-existent for the very proof

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110 APTA-MIMAMSA will become non-existent in such a case, and non-existence cannot therefore be established by any process of reasoning. Thirdly, if you say that indescribability is due to want of knowledge, this also is open to objection as the Buddhists accept Buddha as omniscient. So none of those three alternatives are tenable to establish indescribability. In Asta-sahasri, it is mentioned that want of tongue etc. which are the vocal organs may lead to absence of power. Again, a man who has taken the vow of silence or one who does not utter any word through modesty or fear might be said to be wanting in power. But all persons at all times are not affected by such disabilities. So this cannot establish indescribability. hinastyanabhisandhAtR na hinstybhisndhimt| badhyate tadvayApetaM cittaM baddhaM na mucyate // 51 // hinastyanabhisandhatr na hinasty-abhisandhimat, badhyate tad-dvyayapetam chittam baddham na muchyate. 51. One who does not determine to kill, will kill. The man who determins to kill does not kill. A soul cannot get bondage in both these cases and being in bondage cannot be liberated. COMMENTARY The Buddhists hold that mind is formed of unconnected but successive sensations from objects. If this view is accepted, we are faced with this absurdity. When a butcher kills an animal, the mind that determines upon the killing is not the mind that kills the animal at the next moment. So the mind at the latter moment commits an act without any motive or responsibility. Again, if we hold that all killing is sin, and the butcher 1. In Asta-sahasri, the ten powers of Buddha are enumerated as ksama, maitri, dhyana, dana, virya, sila, prajna, karuna upaya and pramoda.

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CHAPTER III 111 will have to suffer the consequences of his act, we may say that cannot be possible for the mind that planned the act and that which executed the act are quite different from the mind that has to suffer the consequences. "The Buddhistic theory of changes following each other in unbroken succession being so changing without cause, the killing of animals by a butcher is not caused and therefore implies no responsiblity."1 Bondage from karma cannot therefore arise from such circumstances and there cannot also be liberation because all knowledge and volition will be without the unity of apperception to connect them. This is another argument against the Ksanikavadins. ahetukatvAnnAzasya hiMsAheturna hiNskH| cittasantatinAzazca mokSo nASTAGgahetukaH // 52 // ahetukatvannasasya himsaheturna himsakah, chittasantatinasascha mokso nastanga-hetukah. 52. Because destruction is without any cause, the person causing injury cannot be the cause of injury. There would be no nirvana or destruction of chain of minds. There will be no liberation by eight causes. COMMENTARY The Buddhists accept that destruction takes place of itself. To accept such a view would be to deny that a person injuring another is the cause of such injury. Further, the nirvana as also liberation resulting from eight causes? as accepted by the Buddhists will also become untenable for these also being without any cause cannot happen. In other words, it is urged that you accept that nirvana is caused by the disappearance of the chain of minds and that moksa (liberation) is caused by eight 1. Introduction to Jainism, A. B. Latthe, p. 118. 2. The eight causes of moksa are (i) samyaktva, (ii) sanjna, (iii) sanjni, (iv) vakkayakarma, (v) antarvyayama, (vi) ajiva, (vii) smrti, (viii) samadhi.

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112 APTA-MIMAMSA things. But by denying any cause at all of destruction, you preach against your own supposition regarding causes of destruction producing nirvana or causes producing liberation. virUpakAryArambhAya yadi hetusmaagmH| AzrayibhyAmananyo'sAvavizeSAdayuktavat // 53 // virupakaryarambhaya yadi hetu-samagamah, asrayibhyam ananyo'savavicesadayuktavat. 53. If cause comes in to produce unconnected effects, it will become one with its effects, for there will be ng distinction, as (this will be) like unconnected (ideas). COMMENTARY The Buddhist view is attacked in another way. Suppose a pitcher is broken by a man. The act produces destruction of the pitcher as well as production of broken parts. Now the cause of destruction and production is one and the same in such cases. This will make the view of the Buddhists, viz.: destruction arises of itself and is not caused by anything, untenable. The cause (asau' in the verse) is equally and solely connected with the effects ("asrayibhyam' in the verse), viz., the distruction of the pitcher and creation of the shred. The destruction and production in such a case are identical (avisesad' in the verse). When we see a simsapa tree, we form an idea that it is a tree as well as that it is simsapa. Again when we see a picture, we have a knowledge of it simultaneously with the knowledge of its colour, blue etc. In these cases, the separate entities of knowledge become welded together and the causes are not different. If different causes be accepted in such cases, the fault would be loss of coherence. 1. "yathaiva hi ziMzapAtvavRkSatvayozcitrajJAnanIlAdinirbhAsayorvA tAdAtmyamApannayorayuktayoH kAraNasannipAto na bhinnaH saMbhavati, ekakAraNakalApAdeva AtmalAbhAdanyathA dicieRTatar" Astasahasri.

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CHAPTER III 113 skandhasantatayazcaiva sNvRtitvaadsNskRtaaH| sthityutpattivyayAsteSAM na syuH kharaviSANavat // 54 // skandha-santatayaschaiva samvstitvadasamskrtah, sthityutpattivyayastesam na syuh kharavisanavat. 54. The connections of skandhas also are unreal, being illusory. These cannot arise, exist or disappear just as in the example of "horns of an ass." COMMENTARY The Buddhists accept five skandhas: (1) rupa, (2) vedana, (3) vijnana, (4) sanjna and (5) samskara.1 These being regarded as fictitious applications will necessary be illusory and unreal. There are three stages of a substance- its natural state, e.g., clay; its appearance in a particular form, e.g., a pitcher; and its destruction, e.g., breaking of the pot into shreds. Horns of a hare cannot have these stages being entirely non-existent. The five skandhas of the Buddhists also will become the same, being unreal and illusory. Fictitious relation of cause and effect between the skandhas cannot be conceded if the Buddhist wants to take his stand on this point, because all fictions or illusions are unreal and cannot have sthiti, utpatti and vinasa. The Ksanikaikanta view is thus refuted like the Nityaikanta view.2 virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyukti vAcyamiti yujyate // 55 // virodhannobhayaikatmyam syadvada-nyaya ___vidvisam, avachyataikante'pyuktirnavachyamiti yujyate. 1. "rUparasagandhasparzaparamANavaH sajAtIyavijAtIyavyAvRttAH parasparAsaMbaddhA ruupskndhaaH| sukhaduHkhAdayo vedanAskandhAH / savikalpakanirvikalpakajJAnabhedA vijJAnaskandhAH / vRkSAdinAmAni (zabdAH) sNjnyaaskndhaaH| jJAnapuNyapApavAsanAH sNskaarskndhaaH|" Pandit Bansidhar in his note on Astasahasri. 2. "tato na kSaNikaikAntaH zreyAnnityaikAntavat sarvathA vicaaraashtvaat|"

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114 APTA-MIMASA 55. The view of those who do not follow the logic of Syadvada and hold that opposites can be inherent in a substance, is not tenable as it is self-contradictory. The view of those who accept the view of indescribableness without any limitation is also not tenable. COMMENTARY It cannot be urged by the Buddhists to escape the absurdity of their position that permanence and nonpermanence should jointly be accepted. For this would be impossible as simultaneous existence of life and death. Absurdity will arise in accepting indescribability as in the case of a man who says "I am under the vow of silence and never speak."2 nityaM ttprtybhijnyaanaannaaksmaattdvicchidaa| fordi manara a realora: 115611 nityam tat-pratyabhijnanannakasmattadavichchhida, ksanikam kalabhedat te buddhyasancharadostah. 56. That (jiva etc.) is permanent, from pratyabhijnana. It is not sudden, having a connection. Owing to difference in time they are momentary, for otherwise there would be the fault of non-flowing of knowledge. COMMENTARY After refuting the view of Ekantavadins, the Anekanta view is now established. We see a man named Devadatta and subsquently we recognise him as such. This process is pratyabhijnana. The seven tattvas of Jainism, jiva, ajiva, asrava, bandha, samvara, nirjara and moksa are eternal. These are recognised by pratyabhijnana when the same is without 1. "Aid Chlutar 4stohet, farteng yoyillanuevaa" Astasati. 2. "sarvathAnabhilApyaM tattvam ityabhilapata eva vacanavirodhAt sadA maunivatiko'ham Fruitcaa" Astasahasri.

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CHAPTER III any hindrance. A wrong recognition is known as recognition without any basis (akasmat).1 It is not possible to know one substance and another at the same time, denying the movement through inclination of mind passing from one to the other. Avoiding this fault, the Anekanta view is that according to modifications, the seven tattvas may in one sense be recognised as transitory for there is a difference in time in seeing and recognition.2 115 na sAmAnyAtmanodeti na vyeti vyaktamanvayAt / vyetyudeti vizeSAtte sahaikatrodayAdi sat // 57 // na samanyatmanodeti na vyeti vyaktamanvayat, vyetyudeti visesatte sahaikatrodayadi sat. 57. It does not come into existence or go out of existence according to samanya svabhava (common nature). This is clear from its existence in a general way. It comes into existence or goes out of existence according to its visesa svabhava (nature peculiar to itself). Sat is simultaneous possession in one of udaya (birth) etc. COMMENTARY According to Jainism "everything has its natures, both those peculiar to itself and those in common with other things." "Any substance, any real, concrete, existing thing or being can be looked upon in a general way or in a particular way; that is to say, it has natures in common with other things (samanya svabhava) and at the same time it has natures peculiar to itself (visesa svabhava). For instance, this book is matter, in common with all other material things, and at the same time it is a 1. "sarvaM jIvAditattvaM syAnnityameva pratyabhijJAyamAnatvAt / na akasmAt tat pratyabhijJAnaM tasya avicchedena anubhavAt / nirviSayaM hi pratyabhijJAnaM akasmAditi prasiddham / yathA tAdRze tadevedam iti, tatraiva vA tAdRzamidamiti bhrAntaM pratyabhijJAnam / " Astasahasri. 2. "tataH kSaNikaM kAlabhedAt darzanapratyabhijJAnasamayayorabhede tadubhayAbhAvaprasaGgAt / " Astasati. 3. Jainism, H. Warren, p. 18.

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APTA-MIMAMSA particular matter, viz., paper. According to Jainism there is no such thing as matter (pudgala) or any substance (dravya) only in general; wherever there is matter, it is matter of a particular kind; paper for instance, not stone; or wherever there is substance (dravya) it is substance of a particular kind; matter (pudgala) for instance, not space." Space is substance according to Jainism. Now, sat (being or is-ness) is the differentia of substance.2 Sat is simultaneous possession of utpada (birth or coming into existence), vyaya (death, decay or going out of existence) and dhrauvya (permanence or continuous sameness of existence).3 116 From the point of view of the permanent nature of the thing (Dravyarthika naya-samanyatmana in the verse), there is no birth or death (existence or disappearance). From this point of view we hold that differences of time, space and modifications inhere together in a substance and though there might be differences in the units making up the mass of any substance, there is always unity in the mass. Again, from the view of Paryayarthika naya we hold that substance is the subject of qualities (guna) and modifications (paryaya). "The quality stays with the substance and is constant; the modifications succeed each other. A particular piece of clay always has form, but not always the same form. It is never without form; form is a constant quality; it may be now round, then square; these are modifications."4 From the two previous points of view taken together, we define that substance is that in which there are origination, destruction and permanence. "With the origination of a new mode of existence there was the destruction of the old mode of existence, while the substance has remained permanent. With the destruction 1. Jainism, H. Warren, p. 17. 2. "I" Tattvarthadhigama-sutra, V. 29. 3. "utpAdavyayadhrauvyayuktaM sat / " Ibid, V. 30. 4. Jainism, Herbert Warren, p. 15-16.

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CHAPTER III 117 of a house, there is the origination or coming into existence of a heap of debris, while the bricks etc. are the same. The substance is neither destroyed nor originated, only the mode of existence; only the relations between the parts, in this case."l "The important matter is this: birth or death (utpada and vyaya) are of a condition of a dravya (substance). The dravya is uncreated and indestructible; its essential qualities remain the same (dhrauvya); it is only its paryaya or condition, that can and does change. And it is logically neccessary from the first position taken up by Jainism, namely, that substances and attributes are distinguishable but not distinct. The attributes are not all fixed; they come and go (utpada, vyaya) but the substance remains (dhrauvya)." kAryotpAdaH kSayo hetorniyamAllakSaNAt pRthak / qat urRHAIGHT: ayoyaa 1158|| karyotpadah ksayo hetor niyamallaksanat prthak, na tau jatyadyavasthanad-anapeksah kha-puspavat. 58. The appearance of karya is the cause of destruction of cause. But surely according to differentia these are separate. Because jati etc. exists in both of these, they cannot be said to be (non-existent) like 'a flower in the sky' because they are not absolutely interdepenent. COMMENTARY To give a familiar example, a potter prepares a pitcher of clay. The potter is the instrumental cause, but the clay is the material cause (upadana karana). When a pitcher is produced, this karya necessarily means destruction of clay in its original form (upadana karana). But the inherent qualities of existence, being capable of being perceived by the senses exist both in the pitcher 1. Jainism, Herbert Warren, p. 16. 2. Outlines of Jainism, J.L. Jaini, pages 11-12.

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APTA-MIMAMSA as well as in clay. It cannot be urged that there is no connection between the original clay and the pitcher. So utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya cannot be said to be nonexistent like a flower in the sky.' The above example will show that in some respect these are identical, while in another respect these are different. This appreciation of different aspects in a single substance is the bedrock of Anekantavada of the Jaina philosophy. 118 ghaTamaulisuvarNArthI nAzotpAdasthitiSvayam / zokapramodamAdhyasthyaM, jano yAti sahetukam // 59 // ghata-mauli-suvarnarthi nasotpada-sthitisvayam, soka-pramoda-madhyasthyam jano yati sahetukam. 59. A person wishing a pitcher, ornament or gold gets grief, joy or indifference caused by destruction, creation and permanent existence. COMMENTARY An example is given how from a cause the three, utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya can arise. Suppose, there is a golden pitcher. It is broken and transformed into an ornament or it is kept only in its material, named gold. A person who wishes for a pitcher feels grief when it is broken (vyaya or nasa or destruction). He who wishes for ornament becomes joyful when it is manufactured (utpada) with the gold of the pitcher. And one who is satisfied merely with gold, remains unaffected whether the pitcher be destroyed or ornament be not manufactured. Gold as a material always remains the same (dhrauvya). It appears in the form of an ornament (utpada) disappearing as a pitcher (vyaya). All substances have these threefold qualifications. (See verse 57.) payovrato na dadhyatti na payo'tti dadhivrataH 1 agorasavrato nobhe tasmAt tattvaM trayAtmakam // 6 //

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CHAPTER III 119 payovrato na dadhyatti na payo'atti dadhi-vratah, agorasa-vrato nobhe tasmat tattvam trayatmakam. 60. One who has made a vow to drink only milk, does not drink curd. One who has taken a vow to drink curd only, does not drink milk. The person who has taken a vow not to drink anything yeilded by a cow, does not drink either. So substances possess threefold qualifications. COMMENTARY Another example is given to elucidate the Jaina view that all substances have threefold qualifications, viz., utpada, vyaya and dhrauvya. Milk is derived from a cow, curd is prepared from milk. One who will drink only milk, disregards curd and one who will only drink curd, disregards milk, though curd is produced from milk. Again, one who will not drink either of these, disregards them both. Now though the same thing is changed by a process, it is not equally acceptable to all. So prominence is given to one aspect of substances, disregarding the other aspects, though it must be understood that by doing so, the other aspects are not at all denied. End of Chapter III.

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Chapter IV kAryakAraNanAnAtvaM guNaguNyanyatApi c| sAmAnyatadvadanyatvaM caikAntena yadISyate // 61 // karya-karana-nanatvam guna-gunyanyatapi cha, samanya-tad-vadanyatvam chaikantena yadisyate. 61. If those holding Ekanta view, accept difference of cause and effect or qualities and things possessed of the same and difference between common existence, and dravya, guna and karma. (The answer is given in the next verse). COMMENTARY In this chapter the Ekanta view of the followers of Nyaya and Vaisesika schools of philosophy, viz., everything is separate from everything else, is refuted. The view opposed to Jainism is laid down in this verse. The Ekanta view is that a karya (pitcher) etc. is different from its causes (e.g., its upadana cause, clay). Again the quality, e.g., form etc. (guna) of a thing is different from the substance having the same (gunin). Further, the existence features common to one genus (samanya) are different from those possessing it (tadvat, viz., cow etc.). If this view is held, the result will be faulty as shown in the next verse. ekasyAnekavRttirna bhAgAbhAvAd bahUni vaa| nificare are trei stata le 116211 ekasyaneka-vyttirna bhagabhavad bahuni va, bhagitvad vasya naikatvam doao vitteranarhate. 62. In the non-Jaina view the fault would be-one would not have application to many as there will be no

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CHAPTER IV 121 differentiation. There would be many (karyas). Again owing to difference, there would be no one-ness. COMMENTARY The fault would be this. A pitcher (which is an avayavi, having form) will have no application to the forms (avayavas) giving rise to it. Because there will be absence of parts. If absolute separation of parts be accepted from the thing made up of the same, viz., that of threads from the cloth, then one (viz., cloth) cannot have connection with many (threads) forming its parts. Again, being separate, its one-ness cannot be affirmed. "If every individual is independent, at least this individuality is a common property of all, e.g., materiality is the common property of ghata (a pitcher), pata (a cloth) etc. If not so, being devoid of individuality, their independence also would be lost. Although individuals are separate, individuality is a property residing upon all in common and hence even individuals are homogeneous by their common property. Thus even the individualism of the Naiyayikas (and Vaisesikas) is vitiated by the very presupposition of their own school."l dezakAlavizeSe'pi syAd vRttiryutsiddhvt| HARSTATT RIFL Latarupareat: 1163||| desa-kala-visese'pi syad vittiryuta-siddhavat, samanadesata na syan murta-karana-karyayoh. 63. There will be existence like things separate in time and place. There will not be oneness in place in the case of cause and effect having form. 1. An Introduction to Jainism, p. 125

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122 APTA-MIMAMSA COMMENTARY A pitcher and a cloth, for example, are accepted as separate by the Naiyayikas not only from themselves but also from their parts (avayava). The result would be that the parts and the objects having parts might be said to exist in different place and time which is absurd. If they try to escape by saying that we accept existence in the same place we urge that even this is not possible for things having form (avayavi) which cannot exist with their parts (avayavas) in the same place. These will occupy different space, like an ass and an elephant.1 Yutasiddha and ayutasiddha are special terms used in Nyaya and Vaisesika philosophies. Among two things, if one cannot exist without the other, both of these are known as ayutasiddha. Yutasiddhi is separate or interdependent existence. This co-inherence (samavaya) will further be illustrated in the next verse. According to Nyaya philosophy this co-inherence exists between the whole and its parts, the class and the individual, substance and qualities, agent and action, the ultimate atom and its visesa. Samavaya will be mentioned in the following verse. In the Bhasya by Prasastapada on the Vaisesika philosophy "Samavaya is defined by the notion ayuta-siddhi and yutasiddhi with the help of samavaya. yutasiddhi is (1) the independent possession of movement of two or one of two eternal things; thus a moving atom is yutasiddha in comparison with another atom or physical space; and (2) the relation of samavaya in separate existences in the case of transient substances; thus a stick and (the body of) the bearer of the stick are yutasiddha, since they are both transient and inhere in separate groups of atoms. On the other hand, samavaya exists between objects which are not yutasiddha, and one of which is that which contains (adhara), whilst the other is that which is 1. "avayavAvayavinoH samAnadeze vRttirna bhavet, mUrtimatvAt kharakarabhavat / " Astasati.

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CHAPTER IV 123 contained (adheya); thus there is samavaya between the aggregate and its portions, the quality and the substance, the genus called substance (dravyatva) and the particular substance, existence and the thing existent."l AzrayAzrayibhAvAnna svAtantryaM smvaayinaam| gut: # HETT 7 : Hah: 116411 asray asrayi-bhavan-na svatantryam samavayinam, ityuktah sa sambandho na yuktah samavayibhih. 64. If it be said that one being dependent on another there is no difference of samavayins, (we reply) that that relation of coinherence is not connected with samavayins. COMMENTARY Samavaya (co-inherence) in Nyaya philosophy is described as 'intimate relation'. It exists in things which cannot exist separately. Two things which cannot exist separately are those of which two, the one exists only as lodged in the other. Such pairs are, parts and what is made up of the parts, qualities and the thing qualified, action and agent, species and individual, different and eternal substances.? The Naiyayikas might say, the samavayin (a cloth, for example) is not separate from its parts (threads) because these have co-inherence. The Jaina view is that this view cannot be made relevant with the doctrine of cause and effect. As the Naiyayikas accept that from the material threads, (upadana karana) a cloth is woven by a weaver, (instrumental karana), the view of co-inherence will destroy the theory of causation. 1. Pravachana-sara, B. Faddegon, p.70, note 1. 2. "nityasaMbandhaH smvaayo'yutsiddhvRttiH| yayordvayormadhya ekamaparAzritamevAvatiSThate taavyutsiddhau| Bauarculant quruforait fabulerant Hilda fastes t gi" Tarkasangraha.

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124 APTA-MIMAMSA sAmAnyaM samavAyazcApyekaikatra smaaptitH| antareNAzrayaM na syAnnAzotpAdiSu ko vidhiH // 65 // samanyam samavayas-chapyekaikatra samaptitah, antarenasrayam na syannasotpadiisu ko vidhih. 65. Samanya and samavaya, being complete in one substance, will not exist without an asraya. So what will be the rule about the causation, destruction etc. COMMENTARY The view of the Vaisesikas is refuted. They hold that in reality the relationship of samavaya is with samanya (that which is the unchangeable substratum in different things) and the relationship of one samavaya with another (having no real connection) is merely a supposed or fictitious relationship. In a permanent thing, the existence of samanya and samavaya will be complete. So each will lose its asraya, and without asraya their existence will be impossible, e.g., a cloth cannot exist without threads, or common properties cannot exist without individuals possessing the same. When existence itself will become impossible in this manner, on what basis will creation, destruction etc. will stand? The Vaisesikas hold that "formerly a thing (pitcher etc.) did not exist in the place of its existence; it does not leave its former recipients after its existence; it itself occupies its place after existence, and being indestructible is not destroyed even after the destruction of asraya and each of samavaya and samanya is complete in the thing :" This view will become untenabale, being unable to explain destruction or creation of a substance. 1. "fetay-pant yra 7 Brita..., a ufa..., Fauna Targuaf..., 3 TSusangt a 7 794f..., orta RHAITI a sta partera." Astasahasri. The following verse laying down the same has been quoted by Pandit Bansidhar: "na yAti na ca tatrAste na pazcAdasti naashvt| jahAti pUrvaM nAdhAramaho vyasanasantatiH // "

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CHAPTER IV sarvathA'nabhisambandhaH sAmAnyasamavAyayoH / tAbhyAmartho na sambaddhastAni trINi khapuSpavat // 66 // 125 sarvatha'nabhisambandhah samanya-samavayayoh, tabhyamartho na sambaddhastani trini khapuspavat. 66. Being in every respect unconnected, samanya and samavaya are also not connected with a substance. So all these three (are non-existent) like a flower in the sky. COMMENTARY There is no possibility of any relationship between samanya and samavaya. So a substance also is not connected with either of these. The Vaisesikas accept samyoga of dravyas only and samavaya as previously explained happens in the case of Ayutasiddhi. The very existence of samanya, samavaya and substances will therefore be impossible. ananyataikAnte'NUnAM saMghAte'pi vibhAgavat / asaMhatatvaM syAdbhUtacatuSkaM bhrAntireva sA // 67 // ananyataikante'nunam samghate'pi vibhagavat, asamhatatvam syad-bhutachatuskam bhrantireva sa. 67. In the ekanta view that atoms are always separate even in fusion there will be non-cohesion, for there will be individual separate existence even in combination just as when they are separate (in division). So the four elements (earth, air, fire and water) would become illusory. COMMENTARY This verse refutes the Buddhist view analogous to that of the Vaisesikas that there are eternal atoms corresponding to the four elements-earth, air, fire and water. Vijnanavadins among the Buddhists cannot be said to accept real atoms as they deny the reality of substance. The Jaina view is that the primary atom is

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126 APTA-MIMAMSA not of four kinds according to the above-mentioned view, but it is only one in nature, though it is the coustitutive basis of the four dhatus (elements ) or modes of physical existence. The atom, according to Jainism, has its own essential nature which is distinct from that of the four elements. Umasvami has mentioned that matter has two chief forms, atom and molecule. Molecules are formed in three ways: (a) by division (bheda), e.g., when a penny will be cut into smallest possible pieces, each piece will retain the composition of the matter of the penny, (b) by fusion (samghata), e.g., when water is formed by two parts of hydrogen and one of oxygen, (c) by both, viz., a mixed process of division and fusion as in cooking. Atom is obtained only by division (to an infinite extent) and molecules can sometimes be decomposed into their visible parts by division and union, e.g., marsh gas treated with chlorine gives methyl chloride and hydrochloric acid. The argument used by the Jains as laid down in this verse is that if it be accepted that atoms have eternal separate existence, then they cannot produce anything by fusion (samghata) by losing their separate entity. So they must be accepted to remain the same in the case of division (bheda) as in the case of fusion (samghata) which is absurd according to experience. By supporting the theory of the divisibility in cases of atoms in fusion, the existence of the elements will become impossible. kAryabhrAnteraNubhrAntiH kAryaliGgaM hi kAraNam / 39444919dfintei Tuoitida 7 116811 karya-bhranteranubhrantih karyalingam hi karanam, ubhayabhavatastatstham gunajatitarachcha na. 68. If karya be illusory, atoms will also be illusory, 1. "300: FREMST I", RIGHETE Srianti", GIGY: 1", "GHETETT ATT:[" Tattvarthadhigama-sutra, Chapter V, Verses 25-28.

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CHAPTER IV 127 because a cause is known from its effect. If both of these are non-existent, then guna, jati and the other (kriya) cease to exist. COMMENTARY The ekanta view that atoms are always separate on the ground that the idea of thickness etc. as gained in the sensation through eyes is illusory, is refuted in this verse. If the things seen be regarded as illusory, the atoms also are illusory, for effect shows the cause. If the effect be illusory, there cannot be any cause in reality and the atoms which are regarded as the cause, cannot be said to exist. Again, if the existence of both, viz., the atoms and the substances produced by them be denied, guna e.g. quilities (rupa, form etc.), jati (genus) and kriya (action) will become non-existent. For, how can these exist, when the very objects are illusory? There cannot be any smell of a flower in the sky'.1 ekatve'nyatarAbhAvaH shessaabhaavo'vinaabhuvH| Paraliaujatega Hiqmaganda HT 116911 ekatve'nyatarabhavah sesabhav'ovinabhuvah, dvitvasankhyavirodhascha samvitischen mrsaiva sa. 69. If there be identity (of cause and effect), each of these will be non-existent. The other will become non-existent as one cannot exist without the other. There will be opposiiton to the number 'Two". (If you say) it is merely fictitious, that must be false. COMMENTARY This verse refutes the Sankhya view about the identity of cause and effect. Cause and effect are not 1. "MA ARTidsla aceptaRUTY4144HT!" Astasahasri.

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128 APTA-MIMANSA identical for in that case, why do you mention the two, viz., the cause (Pradhana) produces the kayas (mahat, aharkara etc.). The effect will disappear, if it is identical with the cause. And with the disappearance of the effect the cause will also disappear; for in the case of cause and effect, one cannot exist without the other. "These two are relative terms with their solidarity so vital that the negation of the one is the negation of the other."] If you urge that the karya is embodied in the cause without having any separate existence and the cause is eternal, the answer is; the use of the number 'two' will become faulty in such a case. The difficulty cannot be avoided by saying that the mention of two' is fictitious, for in that case everything will become illusory. Without number, things counted cannot exist and an object void of all qualities such as being counted, must be nonexistent. So the Sankhya view is as untenable as the Nyaya-vaiseskra view, already discussed, regarding cause and effect virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syaadvaadnyaayvidvissaam| 3791cudan tayfadatareyfifa geed 117011 virodhannobhayaikatmyam syadvada-nyaya vidvinam, avachyataikante'pyuktir-navachyamiti yujyate. 70. For translation, see verse 13. COMMENTARY The simultaneous existence of avayava and avayavi, guna and guni, samanya and that possessing the same 1. An Introduction to Jainism by A.B. Lathe., p. 114 2. "yadi punaH kAryasya kAraNe'nupravezAt pRthagabhAvAbhAve'pi kAraNamekamAste eva nityatvAd sa 6M, GT Parationstestai" Astasahasri. 3. "paramArthataH saMkhyApAye saMkhyeyAvyavasthAnAt, sakaladharmazUnyasya kasyacid vstuno'sNbhvaat|" Ibid.

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CHAPTER IV cannot be established, as the same is opposed to the view of all of those who will accept only ekanta view. They also cannot maintain that these are indescribable form ekanta side. In Syadvada, however, there is no flaw as by the adoption of different nayas, we can say of every substance that they are describable in one sense viz., vyanjana-paryaya and indecribable in another sense, viz., artha-paryaya.1 129 dravyaparyAyayoraikyaM tayoravyatirekataH / pariNAmavizeSAcca zaktimacchaktibhAvataH // 71 // dravya-paryayayoraikyam tayoravyatirekatah, parinama-visesachcha saktimachchhaktibhavatah. 71. There is unity of dravya and paryaya because they do not have vyatireka (divergence). This is also established from particular parinamas and from possession of energy, having the quality of potentiality. COMMENTARY In this verse, the Jaina view of dravya paryaya is given. Umasvami says, "Substance is possessed of attributes and modifications."2 "Gunas or attributes 1. " syAdavAdAbhyuyagame tu na doSaH, kathaMcit tathAbhAvopalabdheH / " Asta-sati. "sarvaM hi vastu vyaJjanaparyAyAtmakatayA vAcyamartha paryAyAtmakatayA vAcyamiti enganfefeferene" Asta-sahasri. Paryaya or mode of existence is viewed from two different aspects artha-paryaya and vyanjana-paryaya. "Dravya is but an entity that is continually changing... Permanancy through births and deaths, through creation and destruction gives to dravya a characteristic mode of existence every moment... This intrinsic change of dravya is known as artha-paryaya... vyanjana-paryaya has a pretty fixed duration of existence. Besides the molecular aggregation and disintegration that take place every moment in a physical object, the object may have a particular mode of existence, as a pot for example, for a certain duration of time. This paryaya of pot is vyanjana-paryaya of pudgala." (Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. III, Panchastikayasara, Introduction, p. xxi) 2. " " Tattvarthadhigama-sutra, V. 38.

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130 APTA-MIMANSA depend upon substance fand are never without it). An attribute (as such) cannot be the substratum of another attribute (although of course, many attributes can coexist in one and the same substance at one and the same time and place). There cannot be any attribute of an attribute"! "The becoming of that is modification. Parinama or modification of a substance is the change in the character of its attributes."2 Gunas or attributes coexist with a substance and paryayas or modifications succeed one another. Dravya is always associated with certain intrinsic and inalienable qualities called gunas. The yellow colour, malleability etc. are the qualities of gold. Dravyas also with their inalienable qualities must exist in some state or form. Paryaya is this mode of existence. The mode might change, a golden ring might be changed into an ear-ring. But this creation of a new mode, e.g., ear-ring and destruction of ring are relevant only to paryayas while the dravya (gold) remains the constitutive substance. Dravya is eternal. It cannot be created or destroyed. Creation and destruction are relevant only to paryaya of any one of the dravyas. Dravya and paryaya are, in this way, identical. One does not succeed the other as we can find from the illustration given above about particular modifications of gold, succeeding one after the other, while the dravya remains the same. There are special energies of every substance. These consist of the power to work continually. From this, it is established that modifications continually take place keeping dravya the same. Thus, through the energies of the sameness which develop the gold and which are a successive procedure in the nature of particular divergences, the gold will become the very modifications, ring etc. 1. "Jupe parfon TOM:1" Tattvarthadhigama-sutra, V. 41. 2. "75417: 11:1" Ibid, V. 42.

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CHAPTER IV 131 saMjJAsaMkhyAvizeSAcca svlkssnnvishesstH| imation T rai T He 117211 sanjna-sankhya-visesach-cha svalaksana-visesatah, prayojanadibhedachcha tannanatvas na sarvatha. 72. Its variety is not absolute, but in accordance with particulars, viz., nomenclature, number etc. and according to its particular distinguishing marks and according to divergence of purpose COMMENTARY This verse is a continuation of the preceding one. Dravya and paryaya are spoken of as different though in reality they are not so, when we intend to emphasise the difference of name or number or when we take into account the different characteristics of a particular thing, distinguishig it from others, or according to different necessities etc. We have one necessity regarding dravya and another regarding paryaya, as we have different necessities regarding the flowers or fruits of a tree. "The substance is one in view of its substantiality, but it comes to be manifold because the modifications pervading it for the time being." "To illustrate: Soul is a substance; manifestation of consciousness is its quality; and its modifications are hellish, sub-human, human and divine embodiments which are caused by Nama-karma, or even the state of a Siddha; behind all these modifications the soul is essentially the same and permanent."l End of Chapter IV. 1. Pravachana-sdra, A.N. Upadhye, p. LXV.

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Chapter V yadyApekSikasiddhiH syAnna dvayaM vyvtisstthte| 371farthest at Melastaan 117311 yadyapeksika-siddhih syanna dvayam vyavatisthate, anapeksika-siddhau cha na samanya-visesata. 73. If dependent existence be accepted, the two cannot exist. If independent existence be accepted, there cannot be the quality of samanya and visesa. COMMENTARY The first line of this verse refutes the Buddhist and the second, the Nyaya-vaisesika view. If we can use the view, the result would first be that owing to dependence on relation (apeksa), the two, viz., a thing possessed of qualities and the qualities, cannot have simultaneous existence. Such will also be in the case of cause and effect. If on the contrary, we take the Nyaya-vaisesika view of the independence, the existence of anvaya (samanya) and vyatireka (visesa)" accepted by them will disappear. The existence of one of these is related to the other. Diveregence and identity are only relative. They are connected with samanya and visesa?. This point will be elucidated further in verse 75 where the Jain view will be mentioned. 1. "anvayo hi sAmAnyaM, vyatireko vizeSaH / tau ca parasparApekSau vyvtisstthte| tayoranApekSikasiddhau a 7 Haritat." Astasahasri. 2. "tasyAnapekSApakSe'pi nAnvayavyatireko syAtA, bhedAbhedayoranyonyApekSAtmakatvAdvizeSetarabhAvasya / " Astasati.

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133 CHAPTER V virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syaadvaadnyaayvidvissaam| avAcyataikAnte'pyukti vAcyamiti yujyate // 7 // virodhannobhayaikatmyam syadvada-nyaya vidvisam, avachyataikante'apyuktir-navachyamiti yujyate. 74. For translation, see verse 13. COMMENTARY The Ekanta view that apeksa and anapeksa as shown in the two lines of the previous verse, are both applicable simultaneously, is not tenable. Nor we can say that it is indescribable. dharmadharmyavinAbhAvaH siddhytynyonyviikssyaa| na svarUpaM svato hyetat kArakajJApakAGgavat // 75 // dharmadharmyavinabhavah siddhyatyanyonya viksaya, na svarupam svato hyetat karaka-jnapakangavat. 75. The non-difference of dharma and dharmin and not their ownself, is established from one being dependent on the other. They have no separate manifestation. This is established from itself like limbs implying a karaka. COMMENTARY Before we speak of dharma (quality) or a dharmi (substance possessed of a quality), their own nature has already been established. These are established through dependence of one on the other. This is established by themselves, as we have knowledge of samanya and visesa (anvaya and vyatireka)".- We express universal 1. "dharmadharmiNoravinAbhAvo'nyonyApekSayaiva siddhyati, na tu svarUpaM, tasya puurvsiddhtvaat| svato hyetat siddhaM sAmAnyavizeSavat / " Astasahasri.

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134 APTA-MIMAMSA concomitance in two ways, affirmatively called anvaya, e.g., 'wherever there is smoke there is fire' or negatively called vyatireka, e.g., 'where there is no fire there is no smoke. Samanya is self-established and is known from anvaya dependent on vyatireka. Visesa also is selfestablished and is known from vyatireka dependent on anvaya. The identity where one looks at the other is accepted in Jainism and this will be further clear from the illustration given below; The example is given of a relation expressed by a grammatical case. The function of a grammatical nominative (kartatva) is not inter-dependent of the relation of the accusative towards the verb (karmatva) because the nominative ends in settlement of an accusative and the relationship of an accusative also is derived from the knowledge of the nominative. But the real nature of the nominative or the accusative is not dependent one on the other.3 End of Chapter V. 1. "sAmAnyaM hi svataH siddhasvarUpaM bhedaapekssaanvyprtyyaadvgmyte| vizeSo'pi svataH siddhasvarUpaH saamaanyaapekssvytirekprtyyaadvsiiyte|" Astasahasri. 2. "nApi kartRtvavyavahAraH karmatvavyavahAro vA parasparAnapekSaH, kartRtvasya krmnishcyaavseytvaat| karmatvasyApi krtRprtipttismdhigmymaantvaat|" Ibid. 3. "na hi kartRsvarUpaM karmApekSaM, karmasvarUpaM vA ktrpekssm|" Ibid. Vidyanandin has given the Sapta-hharigi thus: "(1) spAdApekSikI siddhiH, tathA vyvhaaraat| (2) syAdanApekSikI, puurvprsiddhsvruuptvaat| (3) syAbhayI krmaarpitdvyaat| (4) syAdavaktavyA, shaarpitdvyaat| (5) syAdApekSikI cAvaktavyA ca, tathA nizcayena shaarpitdvyaat| (6) spAdanApekSikI cAvaktavyA ca, puurvsiddhtvshaarpitdvyaat| (7) spAdubhayI cAvaktavyA ca, krmaakrmaarpitobhyaat|"

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Chapter VI siddhaM ceddhetutaH sarvaM na pratyakSAdito gtiH| siddhaM cedAgamAt sarvaM viruddhArthamatAnyapi // 76 // siddham cheddhetutah sarvam na pratyaksadito ____gatih, siddham chedagamat sarvam viruddhartha-matany api. 76. If everything be established by anumana, there cannot be any knowledge through pratyaksa etc. If everything be established by agama, the views of the opposite schools are also established. COMMENTARY Vidyanandi says that in this world the thing to be obtained is first mentioned and then the means to obtain that thing is discussed. Without necessity, even a fool does not work. So the necessity is first established. To get crops we must do works like ploughing etc. To have moksa (liberation) we must also pursue the proper path, which, according to Jainism, consists of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. It is only the Charvaka school of philosophgy that does not recognise the next world or liberation. All other schools of Indian philosophy keep liberation as their goal. In this verse, the goal has been 1. "iha hi sakalalaukikaparIkSakaiH upeyatattvaM vyavasthApyopAyatattvaM vyavasthApyate, kRSyAdiSu pravartamAnAnAM vyavasthita-zasyAyupeyAnAmeva tadupAyavyavasthApakaprayatnopalambhAt, 'prayojanamanamuddizya na mando'pi pravartata' iti prasiddhaH, mokSArthinAM ca prekSAvatAM vyavasthitopeya-mokSasvarUpANAmeva tadupAyavyavasthApanavyApAradarzanAt, avyavasthitamokSatatvAnAM tadupAyavyasthApanaparAGmukhatvAt cArvAkAdivat / " Astasahasri.

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136 APTA-MIMAMSA described in the previous verses and now the way to attain that goal is discussed. In this verse the view of that school of Buddhists who say that everything is only established by anumana (inference), is refuted. To accept this view would be to discard other pramanas like pratyaksa and agama. It is our everyday experience that we get knowlege of objects through the senses (pratyaksa). We also get knowledge of things beyond the immediate perception of the senses through agama, viz., of the existence of distant countries like Malaya or Kashmir. There are many persons who urge that without the logical process of reasoning of anumana, we would not accept the proof, even if it be seen by our eyes?. For example, we may see a mirage but the water there is not true. To these the reply is that there may be fallacies of pratyaksa pramana as of other pramanas, but from this example, you cannot say that you would not accept any pramana other than anumana. Again, to establish everything by agama, would lead to the difficulty of accepting the conflicting views of scriptures of every school, for each regards his own scripture as authoritative. So the ekanta view of anumana alone or agama alone as proof is not acceptable. The Jaina view is that pramana is of two kinds, pratyaksa and paroksa (the latter including smrti, pratyabhijnana, tarka, anumana and agama).? virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 77 // virodhannobhayaikatmyam syadvada-nyaya vidvinam, avachyataikante'pyuktirnavachyamiti yujyate. 1. "yuktyA yanna ghaTamupaiti tadahaM dRSTvApi na zraddhadhe ityAderekAntasya bahulaM darzanAt / " Asta-sati 2. The reader is referred to Pariksamukha by S.C c. Ghoshal, Chapters II and III, for a detailed description of these pramanas.

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CHAPTER VI 137 77. Translation in verse 147. COMMENTARY The ekanta view that both anumana and agama are simultaneously capable of being pramana, is untenable. Neither can it be said that the same is indescribable. vaktaryanApte yaddhetoH sAdhyaM tddhetusaadhitm| 31147 am agairic H814114HIETTA 117811 vaktaryanapte yaddhetoh sadhyam taddhetu sadhitam, apte vaktari tad-vakyat sadhyamagamasadhitam. 78. What is known by a process of reasoning in the case of a speaker who is not reliable, is established by anumana. That which is established from the word of a reliable person is done by agama. COMMENTARY The Jaina view is that anumana and agama are two among other varieties of paroksa pramana. The words, signs etc. of a person who has no motive for deceiving or misleading any one, are reliable. Such a person is known as apta and the knowledge derived from words etc. of an apta is called agama. It is mentioned in this verse that where the speaker is reliable, we get a thing established by agama pramana. But where the speaker is not reliable we employ the process of reasoning known as anumana and establish sadhya (e.g., fire) from hetu (e.g., smoke). The anekanta view is not one-sided as criticised in verse 76. End of Chapter VI.

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Chapter VII antaraGgArthataikAnte buddhivAkyaM mRSAkhilam / pramANAbhAsamevAtastatpramANAdRte katham // 79 // antarangarthataikante buddhivakyam mrsakhilam, pramanabhasamevatas-tat pramanadrte katham. 79. In the ekanta view of the reality of thought alone, anumana and agama must be false. From it there will be a fallacy, but how can there be a fallacy without pramana? COMMENTARY This verse refutes the view of Vijnanadvaita-vadins among the Buddists who hold that thought only is real. In that view there is no necessity of any play of knowledge, deriving from external objects either through the process of inference or through agama. For everything else than thought, is un-real. You cannot urge that we accept these as fallacies. We reply that they must first accept pramanas (anumana, agama etc.) before our accepting their fallacies. "The opposite of it is abhasa of the same." There must first be acceptance of the nature, number, object and result of pramanas before we can proceed to speak the opposite of the same. But by denying the reality of anything beyond one's own knowledge, the necessity of the existence of pramana itself is denied. So fallacies of the same must also be said to be non-existent. Consequently this ekanta view of the Vijnanavadins is not tenable. The view of the Vijnanandins is that the inward world is only real. This world consists of five groups (skandhas), 1. Parniksamukha, VI, 1.

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CHAPTER VII 139 viz., the group of sensation (rupaskandha), the group of knowledge (vijnanaskandha), the group of feeling (vedanaskandha), the group of verbal knowledge (sanjnaskandha) and the group of impressions (samskaraskandha). These taken together contain the basis of all personal existence. sAdhyasAdhanavijJapteryadi vijnyptimaatrtaa| THIEZI 7 7 ulasilegalaa: 118011 sadhya-sadhana-vijnapter-yadi vijnapti-matrata, na sadhyam na cha hetuscha pratijna-hetu-dosatah. 80. If the knowledge of sadhya and sadhana be merely thought, there will be no sadhya or hetu owing to fault of pratijna. COMMENTARY If you say that everything internal or external (mental process or material objects) are all thought realities, defects will arise as follows. In Pararthanumana (inference for the sake of others), the following may be taken as an instance : 1. This hill (paksa) is full of fire (sadhya). This is the proposition or pratijna. 2. Because it is full of smoke (sadhana), this is hetu. 3. Whatever is full of smoke is full of fire, just as the kitchen, this is drstanta (example). 4. So is this hill full of smoke. This is upanaya (application). 5. Therefore, this hill is full of fire, this is nigamana (conclusion). The Jaina logicians hold that the first two links are sufficient; but they have described the others as the same might be necessary for understanding of persons of limited knowledge. 1. See Sacred Books of East, Vol. XXXIV, p. 403.

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APTA-MIMAMSA Now there will be a fault in the proposition of Vijnanavadins when they will establish the quality of non-manifest Visesya and Visesana.1 For example, the word 'blue' and the knowledge arising from this word will be identical or different. Identity cannot be accepted as the Vijnanavadins maintain the difference of qualities and objects possessing qualities and a difference between hetu and drstanta. Again acceptance of reality of knowledge only will be barred by the maintenance of its divisions. By accepting difference of the word 'blue' and the knowledge arising from it, and the qualities (visesana), there will be opposition to their own proposition2. So it has been mentioned in this verse that sadhya, hetu and drstanta will not exist following fault in pratijna, if it be conceded that thought only is the cause of knowledge of sadhya and sadhana. 140 bahiraGgArthataikAnte pramANAbhAsanihravAt / sarveSAM kAryasiddhiH syAd viruddhArthAbhidhAyinAm // 8 // // bahirangarthataikante pramanabhasanihnavat, sarvesam karya-siddhih syad viruddharthabhidhayinam. 81. In the ekanta view of (the reality of) everything outside (knowledge), fallacies are denied. So all that expresses the opposite thing will be established. COMMENTARY If all external things be accepted as real, there cannot be any fallacy. The result would be that such a sentence, 1. "vijJAnavAdino'prasiddhavizeSyatvamaprasiddhavizeSaNatvaM ca pratijJAdoSaH syAt, nIlataddhiyovizeSyayostadabhedasya ca vizeSaNasya svayamaniSTeH / " Astasahasri. 2. "pratijJAdoSastAvat svavacanavirodhaH sAdhyasAdhanavijJAnasya vijJaptimAtramabhilapataH prasajyate / ....svoktadharmadharmibhedavacanasya hetudRSTAntabhedavacanasya cAdvaitavacanena virodhAt, saMvidadvaitavacanasya ca tadbhedavacanena vyAghAtAt, tadvacanajJAnayozca bhede tadekatvasAdhanAbhilApavirodhAt, tadabhilApe vA tadbhedavirodhAt / " Ibid.

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CHAPTER VII viz., "One hundred elephants are standing at the tip of the finger", will have to be accepted. For examples of all kinds of fallacies, Samuddesa VI of Parinksamukha1 may be referred to. Even things seen in a dream will be true in following the Ekanta view of the reality of everything external. virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 82 // virodhannobhayaikatmyam syadvada-nyaya vidvisam, avachyataikante'pyuktirnavachyamiti yujyate. 82. Translation in verse 13. 141 COMMENTARY The ekanta view of the simultaneous reality of both internal thoughts and external objects is untenable. The person holding such a view cannot also escape by saying that he is unable to describe it. bhAvaprameyApekSAyAM pramANAbhAsanihnavaH / bahiH prameyApekSAyAM pramANaM tannibhaM ca te // 88 // bhavaprameyapeksayam pramanabhasa-nihnavah, bahih prameyapeksayam pramanam tannibham cha te. 83. In accepting knowledge as the only object, fallacy is denied. Your pramana and pramanabhasa (fallacy) deal with external objects only. COMMENTARY According to the Buddhists, rupaskandha comprises the senses and their objects, colour etc. The sense organs 1. Sacred Books of the Jainas, vol XI

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142 APTA-MIMASA and the objects perceived by the senses are called bhautika. The vijnanaskandha comprises the series of selfcognition and in addition the knowledge interminate and indeterminate, of external things. The vedanaskandha comprises pleasure, pain etc. The sanjnaskandha comprises the cogntion of things by their names. The samskaraskandha comprises passion, aversion etc. The vijnanaskandha is chitta, the other skandhas are chaitta. The Buddhists accept that pratyaksa is knowledge of itself of all chittas and chaittas. So they admit that whenever there is knowledge of a substance by itself, it is pratyaksa. In that case there cannot be any fallacy as everything will become pratyaksa, because all knowledge from its own illumination will become pramana. Pramana and its fallacy can only exist in connection with the external objects. jIvazabdaH sabAhyArthaH sNjnyaatvaaddhetushbdvt| hru HH FIT97 Re: Re: yollana 1184|| jiva-sabdah sabahyarthah sanjnatvaddhetu-sabda vat, mayadibhranti-sanjnascha mayadyaih svaih pramoktivat. 81. The word Jiva is connected with its external object, because it has a name like the word hetu. The names denoting delusion like illusion etc. (are also connected) with their own illusory (objects) as the words of pramana (express their own meaning). COMMENTARY This verse is in reply to the argument of those who say that jiva is non-existent. We say that the existence of jiva can be established by proof. A word has three connections: an external object, form like that of a pitcher etc., and knowledge of its meaning. So because jiva bears

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CHAPTER VII 143 a name, it is connected with an external object. The example is that of the word hetu which establishes the above mentioned connection of three kinds. The Buddhists also accept hetu in establishing fire from smoke. If you urge, what should then happen in cases where the names are given of delusions, such as dream, magic? The reply is, in those cases there is a connection betwen the word and the object which is attempted to be conveyed by it, though we understand their real falsity through fallacy. The view that all words express merely their meaning and do nothing else is thus refuted. buddhizabdArthasaMjJAstAstisro buddhyaadivaacikaaH| gm ca tega percufafa-scht: 118501 buddhi-sabdartha-sanjnastastisro budhyadi vachikah, tulya buddhyadibodhas-cha trayastatpratibimbikah. 85. The nomenclatures of buddhi (apprehension), sabda (word) and artha (object) express buddhi etc. (respectively) and are therefore three. Knowledge of apprehension etc. is the same. The three reflect these. COMMENTARY A word is connected with the object it denotes, and the apprehension which it causes. This threefold relation must be remembered. For example, when one says 'cow', the apprehension of a cow is the mental idea of a cow. The man who hears it has knowledge of the import of the word. If one says "he has spoken the word 'cow'", the speaker is concerned merely with the word 'cow' and the person hearing the same would confine his apprehension merely to the word and nothing else. Thirdly, when a man says "Bring the cow for milking", the hearer has knowledge of the external object denoted by the word, viz., a particular animal having udder etc.

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144 APTA-MIMAMSA Thus the knowledge of apprehension, the word itself and the object expressed by the word reflects each of the three, viz., buddhi, sabda and artha'. vaktRzrotRpramAtRRNAM vAkyabodhapramAH pRthak / frida 441941 Trerit arestart 1186|| vaktr-srotp-pamatnnam vakyabodha-pramah prthak, bhrantaveva prama-bhrantau bahyarthau tadTs Letarau. 86. The true knowledge arising from knowledge due to words is different in case of the speaker, the hearer and the person who resorts to proof (to ascertain its nature). In delusion the external object will be connected with correct knowledge and fallacy according to that or its opposite. COMMENTARY . One utters words and another hears the same. The latter or any other person finds out the reality of the sense of the word by pramana (pratyaksa or proksa). If the speaker has no knowledge of the words he speaks, how could he utter the same? Without words, the hearer cannot have any knowledge. The man requiring proof of the word deals in a different way, from the speaker and the hearer. So we must accept the threefold nature of knowledge in such cases. When there is true and false knowledge, the external object is also true or false. Some cases of apprehension will be valid and others invalid by reference to external factors. The theory of intrinsic validity or the reverse is not accepted in Jainism. 1. "vakturabhidheyabodhAbhAve kuto vAkyaM pravarteta? tsyaabhidheybodhnibndhntvaat| vAkyAbhAve ca zroturabhidheyajJAnAsaMbhastasya tnnimittktvaat| pramAtuH pramityabhAve ca zabdArthayoH prameyayoravyavasthAnAdiSTatattvAnupapattervaktrAditrayasya bodhAditrayaM pRthgbhuutmupeym|" Astasahasri.

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CHAPTER VII buddhizabdapramANatvaM bAhyArthe sati nAsati / satyAnRtavyavasthaivaM yujyate'rthApatyanAptiSu // 87 // 145 buddhi-sabda-pramanatvam bahyarthe sati nasati, satyanrta-vyavasthaivam yujyate'arthaptyanaptisu. 87. The correctness of the apprehension and word happens when there is external object; otherwise not. The establishment of truth and falsity is appropriate when an object is got or not. COMMENTARY Pramana or fallacy can only happen when there are external objects. A word or knowledge proceeding from it results in getting a desired object, when there is such an external object. When there is no such object, it cannot be attained. This lays down a view which is opposed to the doctrine of Mimamsa philosophy, the cardinal doctrine of which is the intrinsic validity of apprehension. The Jaina view is that words become true only when it leads to external objects meant by it and are false when there are no such objects. When mother-of-pearl is mistaken for silver, or in the dream-state the cognitions are erroneous having no real external object corresponding to the same. End of Chapter VII.

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Chapter VIII daivAdevArthasiddhizced daivaM pauruSataH kthm| Tanahia: uti faci na 1188|| daivadevartha-siddhisched daivam paurusatah katham, daivataschedanirmoksah paurusam nisphalam bhavet. 88. If objects be attained by Daiva, how can Daiva arise from Purusakara? If Daiva be said to arise from Daiva, it cannot be established. Purusakara then becomes useless. COMMENTARY In this chapter the question of respective power of Daiva (predestination) and Purusakara (attempts by self) is discussed. If you say that objects are attained only according to what has been preordained, the question arises, does this preordination result from Purusakara or from Daiva? We see a man ploughing a field, cultivate crops on the same and harvest it. It cannot be said that in this case predestination results from the attempts of the man (Purusakara). The object attained here, viz., crop is clearly due to the efforts of the man and does not depend on Daiva. So we cannot say that in such a case Daiva results from Purusakara. If you say that Daiva arises from another Daiva, Purusakara becomes useless and we see actually in the world that things are attained by efforts of men. pauruSAdeva siddhizcet pauruSaM daivataH kthm| atbaidahla Pira Hayford 1994 118911

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CHAPTER VIII paurusadeva siddhischet paurusam daivatah paurusachchedamogham syat sarvapranisu katham, paurusam. 89. If (you say) objects are attained only through Purusakara, how can Purusakara result from Daiva? If results follow only from Purusakara, there would be infallible attainment of objects through efforts by all beings. 147 COMMENTARY It cannot be said that objects are attained only through personal effort without being affected in any way by predestination. For we see, that all efforts of every being do not succeed. There must then be something to prevent Purusakara in such cases. virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 90 // virodhannobhayaikatmyam syadvada-nyaya 90. See verse 13. vidvisam, avachyataikante'pyuktir-navachyamiti yujyate. abuddhipUrvApekSAyAmiSTAniSTaM svadaivataH / buddhipUrvavyapekSAyAmiSTAniSTaM svapauruSAt // 91 // COMMENTARY The one-sided (ekanta) view that attainment of objects proceeds only from Daiva or only from Paurusa is untenable. It cannot be said to be indescribable. The Syadvada view is given in the next verse. abuddhi-purvapeksayamistanistam svadaivatah, buddhi-purvavyapeksayamistanistam svapaurusat.

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148 APTA-MIMASA 91. When desired or undesired objects are attained without there being any known action, this is one's own Daiva; and when desired or undesired objects are attained by action, it is from one's own paurusa. COMMENTARY The Jaina view is that when one engages in discriminating good or bad actions and begins to act accordingly, the results flowing from it are caused by Paurusa and when things (for or against us) happen without there being even any thought of the same (not to speak of efforts) the result is from Daiva. End of Chapter VIII. 1. cansaladife Tayflogei ufaragni at dagoci, afguitai at591914 !" Astasati.

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Chapter IX pApaM dhruvaM pare duHkhAt puNyaM ca sukhato ydi| 1190 pit o aterai Aftag: 119211 papam dhruvam pare duhkhat punyam cha sukhato yadi, achetanakasayau cha badhyeyatam nimittatah. 92. If there be sin from pain caused to others and virtue from happiness (caused to others), the unconcious instruments and those free from kasayas, will get bondage being instrumental cause. COMMENTARY In this verse the view of those, who hold that sin arises from causing pain to others and virtue from happiness caused to others and not from predestination, is refuted. It is urged that to hold this view, the unconscious objects, viz., poison or weapons which are used to kill others will be the cause of bondage. If you say that only animate beings are meant, the fault would be that even a Jina, free from all kasayas will become subject to bondage for bondage results from happiness and misery. If you say that he has no intention (manahsankalpa), it cannot be accepted that bondage from punya and papa fesults from happiness or misery caused to others. Kasayas are of four kinds: krodha (anger), mana (pride), maya (deceit) and lobha (greed). A Jina is free from all these. The Jaina view is this. Yoga is the name of a faculty of the soul itself to attract matter, under the influence

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APTA-MIMAMSA of past karmas. The activity of mind, body and speech brings this faculty into play.1 This Yoga is the channel of asrava or inflow of karmic matter into the soul.2 Asrava is of two kinds-subha or good which is the inlet of punya (virtue) or meritorious karmas; and asubha or bad which is the inlet of papa (vice) or demeritorious karmas.3 In Asta-sahasri, it is mentioned, Daiva is of two kinds, punya and papa, which cause good or evil to beings. In Tattvarthadhigama-sutra, it is mentioned "Punya or meritorious Karmans are the following (1) pleasure-bearing (sadvedya or satavedaniya) (2) producing good age (subhayu), (3) good body-making (subha-nama), (4) determining high family (subha-gotra). The karmas other than these are papa (or demeritorious karmas)."4 To remove the doubts as to the cause of asrava of punya and papa, the subject is taken up in this chapter.5 150 puNyaM dhruvaM svato duHkhAt pApaM ca sukhato yadi / vItarAgo munirvidvAMstAbhyAM yuJjyAn nimittataH // 93 // punyam dhruvam svato duhkhat papam cha sukhato yadi, vitarago munir-vidvans-tabhyam yunjyan nimittatah. 93. If it be certain that punya (virtue) results from pain caused to oneself and papa (vice) from happiness caused to oneself, a soul void of raga and dvesa (such as a Jina), a learned muni, would become attached by these causes. 1. ":" Tattvarthadhigama-sutra, VI, 1. 2. "I" Ibid VI, 2. 3. 'zubhaH puNyasyAzubhaH pApasya', Ibid, VI, 3. See, S.B.J., vol. II, page 124. 4. Chapter VIII, Verses 25 and 26 5. "dvividhaM hi daivaM, puNyaM pApaM ca prANinAmiSTAniSTasAdhanamuktaM 'sadvedyazubhAyurnAmagotrANi puNyam', 'itarat pApam' iti vacanAt / tadAsravanimittavipratipatti-vipattyarthamidamuktam / " Astasahasri.

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CHAPTER IX 151 COMMENTARY A person practising penances and void of raga (attachment) or dvesa (aversion) often causes pain to his body. To hold that from this pain, there would be punya, will mean that he will have bondage from this punya and would not be able to attain liberation. Further, a learned muni has pleasure from equanimity resulting from knowledge of realities. To hold that papa results from one's own happiness would mean that such a person would have bondage from this cause. The view that punya and papa are derived from causing pain or pleasure to oneself is untenable. The result would be that no one would attain liberation which happens only when there is no possibility of any bondage resulting from punya or papa." virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syAdvAdanyAyavidviSAm / avAcyataikAnte'pyuktirnAvAcyamiti yujyate // 94 // virodhannobhayaikatmyam syadvad-nyaya vidvisam, avachyataikante'pyuktir-navachyamiti yujyate. 94. For translation, see verse 13. COMMENTARY It cannot be said by those opposing the Syadvada view, that the view of verse 92 and verse 93 is not maintainable separately. They can be asserted jointly. It cannot also be urged that it is indescribable (from the ekanta view) without considering the various aspects as laid down yadvada. 1. "AtmasukhaduHkhAbhyAM pApetaraikAntakRtAnte punarakaSAyasyApi dhruvameva bandhaH syaat| tato na framuntetied, 79144147HYATT!" Astasati.

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152 APTA-MIMANSA vizuddhisaMklezAGgaM cet svaparasthaM sukhAsukham / puNyapApAsravau yuktau na ced vyarthastavArhataH // 95 // visuddhi-sanklesargam chet svaparastham sukha sukham, punya-papasravau yuktau na ched vyarthastav arhatah. 95. It is proper that asrava influx) of punya (virtue) and papa (vice) happens through pleasure or pain caused to others or one-self, if the same consists of visuddhi or sarklesa. Otherwise, the view of the Arhats will be untenable. COMMENTARY The Jaina view, regarding the influx of karma (asrava) consisting of punya and papa, is that the cause of such influx depends on visuddhi and sarklesa relating to happiness or misery of one's own or of others. Sarklesa is the result of arta and raudra dhyana and its absence is visuddhi, i.e., the existence of the soul in its innate nature.2 Dhyana or concentration is confining one's thought to one particular object.3 Dhyana is of four kinds : arta, raudra, dharmya and sukla. The last two are the causes of liberation. The first two are the causes of bondage. Arta-dhyana (painful concentration) is of four kinds. The first is repeatedly thinking about separation from an unpleasant object (anista samyogaja).5 The second arta-dhyana is repeated thinking of reunion with a pleasing object on being separated from it. 1. "344: RRT AT Hog:aut: failes H etrura que91972CEG HI" Astasati. 2. "HARTGEZET4R014 TT, T TC fagles inha: Ficha 41" Ibid. 3. "...gerufe TIIRTEN 164...!" Tattvarthadhigama-sutra, 1-27. 4. " TSERISTAI 1" wote wali" Ibid, IX, 28-29. 5."1444 Fister Agent alagutin mfTHIER:1" Ibid IX, 30

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CHAPTER IX 153 This is the opposite of the first and is known as istaviyogaja as explained above. The third arta-dhyana is repeated thinking about becoming free from troubles, e.g., a disease.? The fourth is constant thought of gaining objects in future life, being not able to get these in this life.3 Raudra-dhyana (wicked concentration) is also of four kinds: delight in causing hurt (himsananda); delight in falsehoods (anstananda); delight in theft (steyananda) and delight in preserving objects of sense-enjoyment (visayasamraksanananda). According to Jainism there are different stages of spirituality (gunasthanas) of a man. Arta-dhyana is possible in persons in the first four : fourth (avirata), fifth (desavirata) and the sixth (pramatta-samyata) stages.5 In the avirata stage, a person is without any vows. In the desa-virata stage, he has only partial vows and in the pramatta-samyata he keeps the vows imperfectly. In pramattasamyata stage, however, there is no nidana (the fourth kind of arta-dhyana). Dharmya-dhyana is of four kinds: (a) contemplation of the principles taken on the faith of the scriptures which are the teachings of Arhats (ajna-vichaya); (b) contemplation about the way in which the wrong belief, knowledge and conduct can be removed (apaya-vichaya); (c) contemplation about the fruition of different kinds of karmas (vipakavichaya); and (d) contemplation about the nature and constitution of the universe (samsthana-vichaya). Dharmyadhyana is possible for persons who are in the fourth to seventh spiritual stages of development 1. wysta FISIRTI" Tattvarthadhigama-sutra, IX, 31. 2. "GIRAITSTI" Ibid, 1X, 32. 3. u ri al" Ibid, 1x, 33. 4. "Hartefaepercitaromit stufararaanfaaet: 1" Ibid, IX, 35. 5. "AfacramfarayuaHUAHIHI" Ibid, IX, 34. 6. "31Tsurf4HRISTIERUIR ERHEI" Ibid, IX, 36.

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154 APTA-MIMAMSA Sukla (pure) dhyana is of four kinds: (a) absorption in the meditation of the self but unconsciously allowing its different attributes to replace one another (prthaktvavitarka); (b) absorption in one aspect of the self without changing the particular aspect concentrated upon (ekatvavitarka). (c) the very fine vibratory movements in the soul, even when it is deeply absorbed in itself in a Kevalin (suksma-kriya-pratipati); (d) total absorption of the soul in itself fixed steadily and undisturbably without the least motion or vibration (vyuparata-kriya-nivstti).1 The first two kinds of sukla-dhyana are possible in those who know the fourteen Purvas and are present in the eighth to twelfth spiritual stages. The last two kinds are peculiar to Kevalins (who have perfect knowledge.)3 The third arises in the thirteenth and the fourth in the fourteenth or the highest stage of development. It will now be understood how according to Jainism influx of karma leading to papa happens through arta and raudra dhyanas and how the opposite punya comes from its absence. The soul gradually develops itself through different stages and sheds off impurities. Influx (asrava) of impure karmas is stopped, shedding off those which have already got connection with the soul (nirjara) and then liberation (moksa) is attained. From sukla-dhyana, no impurity can arise. "Who so, having destroyed the stains of infatuation and being detached from sense-objects, restrains his mind and abides in his innate nature, becomes a contemplator of the self.934 Amotachandra in explaining this verse of Kundakunda says: "To the self whose stains of infatuation are destroyed belongs detachment from sense-objects, because 1. "pRthktvaiktvvitrksuukssmkriyaaprtipaativyuprtkriyaanivrtiini|" Tattvarthadhigama sutra, IX, 39. 2. "gant are yafas: 1" Ibid, IX, 37. 3. "op? Data:1", Ibid, IX, 38. 4. Pravachana-sara by B. Faddegon. II, 104.

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CHAPTER IX 155 it abstains from activity towards the 'other' (substance) whereof that infatuation is the root. Then comes restraint (nirodha) of the internal sense which has nothing else for refuge because there is no other substance which could be its resting place (adhikarana), like a flying bird for which there is only one bark in the mid-ocean. Thereupon, through the disappearance of flightiness, whereof that (not-restrained internal-sense) is the root, comes steadfastness in his innate nature, which is unlimited innate intelligence. And that, because of being an unperturbed, deeply attentive thoughtfulness, proceeding (pravitta) from its own nature, is entitled 'contemplation' (dhyana). Hence contemplation, as being an abiding in one's inborn nature is the self, since it is not anything other than the self."l End of Chapter IX. 1. Pravachana-sara by B. Faddegon. II, 148.

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Chapter X ajJAnAcced dhruvo bandho jJeyAnantyAnna kevlii| starrilarg faster dastrar CEMTS-TTT 1196|| ajnanachched dhruvo bandho jneyanantyanna kevali, jnana-stokad vimoksaschedajnanad bahuto'anyatha. 96. If bandha (bondage) be certain from ajnana (want of knowledge), a kevalin (can never be liberated) for knowable things are infinite. If you say that there is liberation with a little knowledge, there will be liberation by other means from greatness of ajnana (ignorance). COMMENTARY This verse refutes the view that ajnana is the cause of asrava of punya and papa. According to Jainism, when there is an influx of matter into the soul, certain energies (karmas) are produced which consist of bondage of the soul with matter. This bondage is called bandha. First of all there is an influx of karmas through asravas. Then follow some activities of conciousness which attach themselves to the soul and produce a peculiar kind of bondage which is called bhavabandha. Bhava-bandha is followed by a union of jiva with actual karmas consisting of interpenetration of the soul by the karmas and the bondage resulting from this is known as dravya-bandha. Excited by kasaya (attachment and aversion) a jiva assimilates pudgalas fit for karmas and this is known as bandha. In the Astasahasri, it is mentioned that this verse 1. "Hal4allwita: font utrera gamHIGH H FRET: 1" Tattvarthadhigama sutra, VIII, 2.

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CHAPTER X 157 refutes the Sankhya view that liberation happens from jnana and bandha (bondage) from ajnana. According to the Sarkhya view, when there is knowledge that the soul is different from the prakrtis and vikytis, there is liberation and ignorance of this leads to bondage. It is urged that as there are innumerable things, it is not possible to have a knowledge of everything and in that case even a Kevalin cannot get liberation. It cannot again be said that a slight knowledge will do and full knowledge of everything is not necessary. The fault will remain that in case of limited true knowledge, of only certain objects, there will be false knowledge regarding a large number of other objects, and as false knowledge will lead to bondage, liberation can never take place. Akalarika says: "If the view that bondage follows from ajnana, be accepted, no one will attain liberation, for in everyone ajnana might sometimes arise, the knowable things being infinite. The other view, viz., that liberation might result from a little knowledge, is also untenable for there will be ajnana on various points which must oppose liberation and cause bondage".? virodhAnnobhayaikAtmyaM syaadvaadnyaayvidvissaam| 37aastaseinafaraftfa quedt 197|| virodhannbhayaikatmyam syadvada-nyaya-vidvisam, avachyataikante'pyuktir-navachyamiti yujyate. 97. For translation, see verse 13. 1. Vide : "ma allait fagetuiend ET: 1" Sarkhyakarika of Isvarakrsna, verse 44. 2. "yadi bandho'yamavijJAnAnnedAnI kazcinmucyate, sarvasya kvcidjnyaanopptterjeyaanntyaaditi|" Before becoming a Kevalin, a soul cannot become omniscient. ufa punarjJAnanirhAsAd brahmaprAptisjJAnAt sutarAM prsjyet|"

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158 APTA-MIMASA COMMENTARY The position that both the views in verse 96 might be amalgamated or that it is unknowable, is untenable. ajJAnAnmohato bandho nAjJAnAd viitmohtH| straia HT: RICHTER en smerett|198|| ajnanan-mohato bandho najnanad vitamohatah, jnana-stokachcha moksah syadamohan mohiton yatha. 98. Bandha follows from ajnana if there be moha, but not from ajnana where moha has disappeared. When there is no moha, moksa (liberation) takes place even from little jnana but not where moha exists. COMMENTARY The Jaina view is expounded in this verse. It is urged that moha decides everything in this case. Svami-Kartikeya has said that asravas are certain movements of jiva resulting from actions of speech, mind and body either accompanied by or bereft of moha-karma. We have mentioned in the commentary to verse 96 that karmas take possesion of a soul through asravas. There are eight kinds of karmas, viz., jnanavaraniya, darsanavaraniya, mohaniya, antaraya, ayu, nama, gotra and vedaniya. When a person wants to have liberation he attempts to have right faith, right knowledge and right conduct.2 When he attains these three, he becomes free from the first four kinds of karmas known as ghatiya (destructive) karmas. The influx of karmas can be stopped by samvara. By this stoppage fresh karmas cannot enter the soul. But even after stopping the entrance of fresh karmas, it is necessary to purge the soul of karmas which have already taken possession of the same. 1. "maNavayaNakAyajoyA jIvapayesANa phNdnnvisesaa| mohodayeNa juttA nijuttA vi ya AsravA Erfall" Svami-Kartikeyanupreksa, Verse 88. 2. Vide verse 39 of Dravya-sargraha, S.B.J., vol. I.

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CHAPTER X 159 This can be done by nirjara. Then only the karmas, vedaniya, nama, gotra and ayu which cause wordly existence, disappear and a being attains liberation. Mohaniya are "energies, the nature of which is to infatuate us so that we cannot distinguish between right and wrong belief (darsana-mohaniya) and so that we are prevented from acting rightly (charitra-mohaniya). Thus there are two chief kinds of these forces; first that which obstructs our faculty of realising and relishing the truth, and secondly that which in its operation makes us unable to act rightly; it is moral unclearness and non-perception of what is right. Right action as here meant is right action accompanied by the conviction that it is right."2 The Delusive karmas are of twenty-eight kinds. 3 When moha (infatuation) disappears, liberation can take place even if ajnana in some matters exists. If there be infatuation, there must be bondage. "He who has become and remains pure according to his power by means of psychic-exertion, i.e., evolution of his intelligence, obtains an excellent efficacy of purity which springs up at every step, and an intelligence completely free from blemish, because the very strong knot (granthi) of infatuation bound together all the samsara through, is untied; he obtains an efficacy of self expanding without obstacles, because he has thrown aside all karmas which obscure knowledge and faith (jnanavaraniya and darsanavaraniya) and those karmas which obstruct (antaraya); having himself become thus, he reaches the boundary of all things which can be known. Here then the innate nature of self is knowledge; and knowledge is nothing less than the things knowable; so then the self owing to its pure exertion, reaches the self, which in innate nature consists of 1. " HORTO IT for SATTTET Hecho 1 Tauracionit que to do that." Parishastikaya-sara, verse 153. 2. Jainism, H. Warren, p. 34 3. See Outlines of Jainism, p. 32.

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160 APTA-MIMANSA knowledge, which knowledge again, pervades everything that is knowable."] kAmAdiprabhavazcitraH krmbndhaanuruuptH| tacca karma svahetubhyo jIvAste zuddhyazuddhitaH // 99 // kamadiprabhavaschitrah karma-bandhanurupatah, tachchha karma svahetubhyo jivaste suddhya sudditah. 99. According to the bondage of karma, the results of kama (attachment) etc. are varied. That karma arises from its own cause. The jivas are from suddhi (purity) or asuddhi (impurity). COMMENTARY According to Jainism, matter is concrete and possessed of sensory qualities to its last unit and the world is full of material bodies. "The universe is in all directions densely packed as room filled, with material bodies fine and gross, unadaptable and adaptable."2 Possession of potentiality for evolving karmic matter exists only in cases of not excessive fineness or grossness. "Aggregates adaptable to karma-condition, when they meet with a soul's evolution, attain the state of karmas; but they are not made to evolve by the soul."3 That is to say the molecules of matter which are capable of becoming karmas come into contact with developments of the soul which is without passion and are transformed into karmas. The Jaina view is that the soul is associated with matter from time immemorial and both are eternal and not created by any supreme being. The rise of kama (attachment) etc., as mentioned in this verse, is various 1. Pravachana-sara, by B. Faddegon, page 9. 2. Pravachana-sara, II. 76. 3. Ibid VI, 77.

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CHAPTER X 161 and happens from the eight kinds of karmas, Jnanavaraniya etc. As seeds produce a plant and plant produces seeds so this eternal chain of bondage and the cause of bondage goes on. "Actions of the soul cause the assimilation or binding (bandha) of fresh karmic matter in the karmic body which envelops the soul. This karma, thus bound, is for a longer or shorter time in a latent condition (satta); every moment when the soul is in action some of this gets collected. Karma is used and is then said to be in a rising condition (udaya); but simultaneously and in consequence fresh karma is bound". 1 "Karma particles in the origination stage are declared by the best of Jinas (to come forth) necessarily. He who is filled with infatuation, attachment or aversion for them, experiences bondage. The soul abiding in the cycle of existences of necessity possesses particles of material karma in the origination stage. And he who being conscious of their existence evolves into infatuation, attachment or aversion, joins himself with action, which consists in evolution into the knowable thing. Therefore he experiences bondage, which is the fruit of action. So then action and the fruit of action originate from the arising of infatuation, but not from knowledge."2 There are two kinds of mundane (samsari) jivas according to Jaina view. These are suddha (pure) or asuddha (impure) or according to another nomenclature bhavya or abhavya, i.e., qualified or not-qualified for being at sometime liberated from sarsara. "The not-qualified (abhavya) do not believe, when they hear that among joys the highest happiness is that of those whose destructive karmas have vanished; but the qualified admit it. To those who have abundance of infatuating and other karmas there may be here a semblance of joy; but because of hindrances to their 1. Pravachana-sara by B. Faddegon, p. 26 2. Ibid, pages 26-27

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APTA-MIMAMSA inner nature and because of perturbation it is an unreal (aparamarthika) 'joy.' But the holy absolute sages, whose destructive karmas are annihilated being free from repungnance to their innate nature and from perturbation have a joy supremely real, since the above-described cause is present and the definition applies. But those not-qualified who have not this belief are far from the nectar-beverage of the joy of liberation and only see the water-mass of a mirage.1 162 zuddhyazuddhI punaH zaktI te pAkyApAkyazaktivat / sAdyanAdI tayorvyaktI svabhAvo'tarkagocaraH // 100 // suddhyasuddhi punah sakti te pakyapakya-sakti vat, sadyanadi tayorvyakti svabhavo'tarka-gocharah. 100. The quality of suddhi and asuddhi are again like the power of being cooked or not. Their manifestations are having a beginning or eternal. Its nature cannot be established by process of reasoning. COMMENTARY It has been mentioned in the previous verse that some jivas believe and some not. This quality is like that of some pulses which can be cooked and which cannot be cooked. There are some pulses which cannot be made edible by cooking inspite of all efforts. This is compared to asuddha or abhavya quality of a jiva which hinders their belief and prevents their liberation. On the other hand there are jivas having suddha or bhavya quality who easily believe and can proceed to the path of liberation without any hindrance. The power (sakti) is with reference to its appearance, being considered only in respect of its modification (paryaya). It may be said to have a beginning. According 1. Pravachana-sara by B. Faddegon, p. 41

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CHAPTER X 163 to its dravya-bhava, it is eternal. The manifestation is accordingly of these two kinds according to different view points. tattvajJAnaM pramANaM te yugapat srvbhaasnm| kramabhAvi ca yajjJAnaM syAdvAdanayasaMskRtam // 101 // tattvajnanam pramanam te yugapat sarvabhasanam, kramabhavi cha yaj-jnanam syadvada-naya samskrtam. 101. The knowledge of realities and pramana at once illuminates every object. The knowledge which is derived gradually is purified by naya of Syadvada. COMMENTARY Upto this, the subject of prameya (knowable) has been treated. Now pramana is established. One who has thrown aside all karmas, which obscure knowledge and faith (avaraniya), which obstruct (antaraya) and which infatuate (mohaniya), reaches the summit of all things knowable?. "Here then the innate nature of self is knowledge; and knowledge is nothing less than the things knowable. So then the self owing to its pure exertion, reaches the self, which in innate nature consists of knowledge, which knowledge again, pervades everything that is knowable."3 "This omniscience is supersensuous; therein the apprehension of the objectivity takes place directly by the soul without the aid of sense-organs; there are no sensational stages, but the apprehension is sudden and simultaneous; it is endowed with the potencies of all the senses together as it were; and there is nothing that is 1. "zakteH prAdurbhAvApekSayA saaditvm| tataH zaktiya'ktizca syAtsAdiH, syAdanAdi f arfars: 1" Astasahasri. 2. Pravachana-sara, B. Faddegon, I. 15. 3. Ibid, p. 9.

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164 APTA-MIMAMSA not visualised in omniscience."] "The object of knowledge is a huge complexity constituted of substances, qualities or modifications extended over three times and infinite space, and simultaneously subjected to origination, destruction and permanence. Such an object of knowledge can be comprehended only in omniscience. The senses are the indirect means of knowledge and whatever they apprehend is partial like the perception of an elephant by several blind persons, each of whom touches only different part of its body and forms a wrong idea. The ordinary human being cannot rise above the limitations of his senses; so his apprehension of reality is partial, and it is valid only from a particular view-point : this leads to the Nayavada of the Jainas. When ordinary human knowledge is partial, a new method of stating our approach to the complex reality had to be derived and that is Syadvada, the doctrine of conditional predications. Thus the doctrine is a direct result of the strong awareness of the complexity of the object of knowledge and of the limitations of human apprehension and expression. The substance is subjected to a constant flux of modifications, and we always look at it through one modification or the other, present or absent. When we are looking at its present modification, we should not absolutely deny the past or future ones; this peculiar position leads us to conditional affirmation, conditional negation and conditional indescribability which by their combination give rise to seven possible statements (Sapta-bhangi). upekSAphalamAdyasya shesssyaadaanhaandhiiH| pUrvaM vA'jJAnanAzo vA sarvasyAsya svagocare // 102 // upeksa-phalamadyasya sesasyadanahanadhih, purvam vajnana-naso va sarvasyasya svagochare. 102. The result of the former is indifference and that 1. Pravachana-sara, A.N. Upadhye, p. LXXIV. 2. Ibid, page LXXXIV.

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CHAPTER X 165 of the latter is desire to get or leave. The result of the former might again be said to be destruction of ignorance in all substances connected with it. COMMENTARY The substance of this verse is summarised in Pariksamukha thus "the result is the dispelling of false knowledge and leaving (the undesirable things), acquirement (of desirable things) and indifference (to other things)".In Nyayavatara it is mentioned that "the immediate result of pramana is the removal of ignorance. The mediate effect is happiness and indifference or equanimity to a Kevalin (possessed of omniscience) and to others a desire to accept (desirable objects) and leave (undesirable objects)". In Sarvartha-siddhi we have "The result (of pramana) is said to be the absence of false knowledge resembling darkness, on the destruction of false knowledge."3 Hemachandra says "When pramana arises in a person, the correct knowledge of an object is established. The immediate result is therefore the destruction of false knowledge or the idea of leaving (the undesirable) etc.94 The primary result is correct knowledge. The secondary result arises after we ascertain an object correctly by Pramana. vAkyeSvanekAntadyotI gamyaM prti-vishesskH| Fiyasefiiftara na partirefo 010301 vakyesvanekanta-dyoti gamyam prati-visesakah, syannipato'rtha-yogitvat tava kevalinamapi. 1. "375114fqitet 114166-198799 6614I" Verse V, 1. 2. "WIRT HEsinfractal ___ kevalasya sukhopekSe shesssyaadaanhaandhiiH||" 3. "3-TOARm41516-1974: 3514419it ar gadi" 4. "RII HR HU IM Pramana-mimamsa, I, 1, 38. "3sti fafarafi" Ibid, I, 1, 39. "Tagat. #", Ibid, I, 1, 41.

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166 APTA-MIMAMSA 103. The (use) of indeclinable syat in sentences signifies the Anekanta (many-sided view) and qualifies the meaning and being connected with the substance, happens in your case as well as those of the Kevalins. COMMENTARY The seven modes of expression in Jainism (Saptabhargi) have already been described. The word syat is used in the beginning of each sentence laying down one mode of expression. This means that the proposition is true, provided you take it in the right sense, viz., in the correct proposition with other notions. The word syat accordingly warns us that only a partial view is being expressed according to our present intention in applying a particular proposition and it is not an absolute proposition denying the other varied aspects of a substance. In this verse by 'Kevalin' Sruta-kevalins are meant, for by the use of the word 'tava' (your), kevalins are all included. During sixtytwo years after Mahavira (up to 465 B.C.) three Kevalins (Gautama, Sudharma and Jambu) were the propagators of Jainism. After them upto 365 B.C. five Sruta-kevalins, viz., Visnunandi, Nandimitra, Aparajita, Govardhana and Bhadrabahu were the same. syAdvAdaH sarvathaikAntatyAgAt kiNvRttcidvidhiH| 1619 ufagt : ||104||| syadvadah sarvathaikanta-tyagat kimvsttachid vidhih, saptabhanga-nayapekso heyadeya-visesakah. 104. The word 'syat leaves out the absolute onesided view point. (Its interpretations) are words derived from 'kim' and (derivations) 'chit etc. This depends upon the sevenfold Saptabhangi Naya and is distinguished by things to be discarded or acquired.

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CHAPTER X 167 COMMENTARY The Saptabhangi Naya has already been described in detail. The use of 'syat' characterises this. This proves that the absolute one-sided view cannot be accepted. The sense of 'syat' is also expressed by words such as 'kathanchit', 'kinchit', 'kathanchana' etc. These are derived by affixes 'chit', 'chana' etc. to the words 'katham' 'kim' etc. syAdvAdakevalajJAne srvtttvprkaashne| bhedaH sAkSAdasAkSAcca gavastvanyatamaM bhavet // 105 // syadvada-kevalajnane sarvatattva-prakasane, bhedah saksadasaksachcha hyavastva nyatamam bhavet. 105. Syadvada and Kevala knowledge (omniscience) illuminate all the tattvas (principles). Their difference is from pratyaksa and paroksa. That which is beyond these two kinds of knowledge is not a substance. COMMENTARY The seven principles (tattvas) of Jainism are jiva, ajiva, asrava, bandha, samvara, nirjara and moksa. As these are established by Syadvada and Kevala knowledge, these are said to illuminate all tattvas. Immediate perception falls under Kevelajnana and mediate perception falls under Syadvada. There cannot be any substance which is not the subject of perception of either of these two knowledges. sadhaNaiva sAdhyasya saadhaadvirodhtH| RIIGIGYforeffagtaray Bulat 74: 11106|| sadharmanaiva sadhyasya sadharmyadavirodhatah, syadvada-pravibhaktartha--visesavyanjako nayah. 1. "jIvAdayaH sapta padArthAstattvaM, 'jIvAjIvAsravabandhasaMvaranirjarAmokSAstattvam' iti vacanAt / caufauiculaster FIGICODOMshut: Harayonigahelyi" Astasahasri.

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168 APTA-MIMANSA 106. Naya signifies the particular nature of a substance taken (as a proposition) by Syadvada through sadhya (major term) and by drstanta (illustration) the quality of similarity being universally concomitant. COMMENTARY After dealing with pramana, naya is described. Briefly speaking, objects possess many different characteristics and may be taken from different standpoints. By omniscience alone, their entire character is understood. The scope of naya (one-sided method of comprehension) is to take them from a certain stand-point. For a detailed exposition of naya, reference may be made to Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. XI? nayopanayaikAntAnAM trikAlAnAM smuccyH| 3 yrg-919 E Tt sa 4 ETT 1110711 nayopanayaikantanam trikalanam samuchchayah, avibhrat-havasambandho dravyamekamanekadha. 107. Substance (dravya) is the collection of three times (past, present and future) brought by naya and upanaya (branches of naya). Having non-seperate connection of existence, it is one and many (from different points of view). COMMENTARY In this verse, the subject of dravya is taken up. Dravya is a generic name for soul, matter, time, space and the principles of motion and rest. It comes into (utpada) or goes out of existence (vyaya), while its continuous sameness (dhrauvya) remains. The inner nature or essential attributes (dhrauvya) always remains the same through 1. "Brent Hiru ar a: Haifacra | C ontaisiesoi lau Hu:" Ngayanatara, 29. 2. Pariksamukha, Samuddesa VI, V. 74, pp. 198-204

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CHAPTER X 169 its modifications (utpada and vyaya). By naya and its branches we grasp the different modifications in the past, present and future of substances remembering that there is a continuous sameness of existence throughout. "The substance is during the times of its several particularities, not other than the particularity of each time, because it has the nature of it, as in the case of fire which has the nature of the collected (material) of grass, or leaves or wood"l. When one looks at the modification-aspect (paryayarthika) of substances, these are many, but when one looks to the substance-aspect (dravyarthika), it is only one. For a detailed exposition of the subject, see Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. III.2 mithyAsamUho mithyA cenna mithryakAntatAsti nH| ARGET PIHEZ H19 are a serena 11 108|| mithya-samuho mithya chenna mithaikantatasti nah, nirapeksa naya mithya sapeksa vastu te'rthakit. 108. If you say that collection of falsehoods must be false,' we reply that in our view there is not absolute one-sided falsity. The nayas which are unconnected with one another are false, but they being connected imply objects. COMMENTARY The Naiyayika may argue, if you accept sunaya and durnaya (correct and false naya) from a collection of false knowledge, falsity will arise. In reply it is mentioned that in durnaya there is only a refutation of what is not our object to establish. It is in that sense that it is disconnected and false. But when nayas are taken in a connected tissue they are all true and there is no shadow of falsity. 1. Pravachana-sara by B. Faddegon, p. 91 2. Panchastikaya-sara by A. Chakravarti, Introduction, p. XXIII-XXV

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170 APTA-MIMAMSA niyamyate'rtho vAkyena vidhinA vAraNena vaa| CMS-t a Hisagu4fagterratrem ||10911 niyamyate'rtho vakyena vidhina varanena va, tatha'anyatha cha so'vasyamavicesyatvamanyatha. 109. By a proposition, something is affirmed or denied. A substance is regulated thus or otherwise. If this is not accepted, it must become a non-substance. COMMENTARY In this verse, it is mentioned how a substance characterised by many-sidedness, can be established by a proposition so that a person can be induced to act according to it. 1 A substance is established by affirmation or negation. From a merely one-sided view, there will be no difference between existence and non-existence of a substance. As the knowledge is varied according to pramana and naya, its object is also of many kinds.2 tadatadvastu vAgeSA tdevetynushaasti| 7 HIT RIEL Tararat: fer deareftat 1111011 tadatad-vastu vagesa tadevetyanusasati, na satya syan masavakyaih katham tattvartha desana. 110. This proposition implies that or not-that substance, by that only'. If this be not true, how can there be teaching of reality by false proportions? COMMENTARY The one-sided view of the meaning of a propostion 1. "nanvevamanekAntAtmArthaH kathaM vAkyena niyamyate yataH pratiniyate viSaye pravRttirlokasya PUIGCAR CRAGHETTI" Astasahasri. 2. "Tina Houthalilc4542ffa echirara Fafacerar ritafdraau" Astasati.

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CHAPTER X 171 cannot be accepted, for this will be false and how can there be realisation of truth through false propositions? So the Anekanta view that a proposition has connection with itself as well as with its opposite must be accepted. By denying the opposite, a substance is established through pramanas, pratyaksa etc.That is to say, we mention that a substance is 'this, and not this' and do not hold only that it is this for the latter is false and cannot lead to correct knowledge.? vaaksvbhaavo'nyvaagrthprtissedhnirngkushH| Aha ca svArthasAmAnyaM tAdRg vAcyaM khapuSpavat // 11 // vaksvabhavo'nya-vagartha-pratisedha-nirankusah, aha cha svartha-samanyam tadrg vachyam kha puspavat. 111. The nature of a word is that it, without any obstruction, denies the meaning of another word. If only it is said that it expresses the samanya of its own meaning, the interpretation would be (impossible) like a sky-flower. COMMENTARY When we say "bring a pitcher', it necessarily opposes bringing of other things. The inherent nature of a word is therefore its own meaning apart from, and in opposition to the meaning of other words. In every substance there is knowledge of its general and special characteristics. "The objects of pramana are samanya, common qualities, i.e., generic attributes, or visesa, distinguishing attributes, i.e. differentia. This 1. "tranfeuerufalement fargenfem u ruf besar athal ... Teini_ 'viruddhamapi saMsiddhaM tadattadpa vednm| Ac Fruit tad a /?" Astasahasri. 2. "tadevetyekAntena pratipAdayantI mithyaiva bhAratI, kathamanayArthadezanam ? ityekAnte aferent TypeRITETTI" Astasati.

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APTA-MIMAMSA twofold distinction is applied to substances, attributes and modifications." We do not find anywhere samanya without visesa or visesa without samanya.2 The Charvaka view of samanya without visesa is an impossibility. 172 To exemplify, we have a general knowledge that this is a man. A particular man has special qualities, viz., he is a Brahmin, etc. Again he grows up leaving his childhood, youth and becomes old. But throughout his different ages, he maintains his essential characteristics. This acceptance of a change, leading to the manysidedness of a thing, is a peculiarity of the Jain doctrine establishing Anekantavada. "The substance is an existent, the quality is an existent and the modification is an existent"3. "As one pearl necklace extends itself over a triplicity, namely, the necklace, the string and the pearl so the one substance extends itself over a triplicity, viz., the substance, the quality and the modification."4 sAmAnyavAg vizeSe cenna zabdArtho mRSA hi sA // abhipretavizeSApteH syAtkAraH satyalAJchanaH // 112 // samanya-vag visese chenna sabdartho mrsa hi sa, abhipreta-visesapteh syatkarah satya-lanchhanah. 112. The samanya word if not connected with vasesa, will be false. To attain particular object the word 'syat' is the sign of truth. COMMENTARY The two dogmas of Madhyamika philosophers of Buddhism are refuted by the Jain doctrine of Syadvada. 1. Outlines of Jainism, p.115. 2. kUrmaromAdivat na ca sAmAnyaM vizeSaparihAreNa vizeSo vA sAmAnyaparihAreNa kvacidupalabhAmahe / " Astasati. 3. Pravachana-sara by B. Faddegon, Ch-II, Verse 15 4. Ibid, p. 83

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CHAPTER X 173 These are the sunyavada and Apohavada. The former laid down the nothingness, absence, shallowness or contradictoriness of everything; the latter upheld the impossibility even of defining." For genera do not exist in nature, or even in our mind. If you will define a cow, you may say that it is not a horse, not an elephant, in short, not a non-cow, but really you do not get further by that."! The Jain view as laid down in the previous verses refutes these views and lays down Anekantavada distinguished by the use of the word 'syat'. vidheyamIpsitArthAGgaM pratiSedhyAvirodhi yt| petardusuraffa PIIGIGHRufa: 1|113|| vidheyamipsitarthangam pratisedhyavirodhi yat, tathaivadeya-heyatvamiti syadvada-samsthitih. 113. That which is mentioned as the object of our desire, refuting its opposite goes in the same manner as its accep-tance or discarding. Syadvada is established in this way. COMMENTARY When we want to have a pitcher, we say "bring a pitcher.' This necessarily goes to mean that we do not want to have a picture. The acceptance of pitcher and discarding other things necessarily comes from our intention. In this manner, the seven modes of predication (Sapta-bhargi) are accepted by refuting opposites and accepting visesa.? . itIyamAptamImAMsA vihitA hitmicchtaam| samyamithyopadezArthavizeSapratipattaye // 14 // 1. Pravachana-sara by B. Faddagon, Note, p.8. For refutation, see pages 84-85 2. "Tefastauftdurchfastara FIGC: ubudt H T ACI" Astasati.

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174 APTA-MIMANSA itiyamapta-mimamsa vihita hitamichchhatam, samyan-mithyopadesartha-visesapratipattaye. 114. This Apta-mimamsa (establishment of the Omniscient) is composed for those who seek liberation, for attainment of proper objects from correct and false teachings. COMMENTARY Some read Fearofit' meaning the author "with the object of conferring" benefit to the people. But Akalanka accepts the reading 'feartogath' and explains it as " F HChifff" i.e., those who seek liberation. Aptamimamsa is explained by Akalarika as "thorough examination of the omniscient" (Sarvajna-visesa-pariksa). The object of this work is correct teaching (samyagupadesa) which lays down that the path to liberation consists of right faith, right knowledge and right conduct. Liberation cannot happen in absence of one of these. Other views regarding liberation, viz., liberation is attained through knowledge alone, are false teaching. These are refuted. The omniscient is established, refuting the view of those, e.g., Mimamsakas who deny omniscience.2 In ten parichchhedas (chapters) this work is here finished.3 Vasunandi has added a marigalacharana verse after this verse, but this is neither accepted by Akalarika nor by Vidyanandi. This point has been dealt in detail in the Introduction. The End. 1. "samyagdarzanajJAnacAritrANi mokSamArga iti smygupdeshH| tadanyatamApAye mokSasyAnupapatteH smrthnaat| 'jJAnena cApavargaH' ityAdimithyopadezastasya dRssttessttviruddhtvsaadhnaat|" Astasahasri. 2. "pace Haiti Hearden RIUT a Areati" Ibid. 3. "iti devAgamAkhye svoktaparicchedena zAstre (svenoktAH paricchedA daza yasmin tat Failuredena na Raffat)" Ibid.

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INDEX

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INDEX INDEX OF THE VERSES with their series numbers abhavaikanta-pakse'pi abuddhi-purvapeksayam adhyatmam bahirapyesa advaitaikantapakse'pi advaitam na vina dvaitad ahetukatvannasasya ajnanachched dhruvo bandho ajnanan-mohato bandho ananyataikante'nunam anapekse prthaktvaikye antarangarthataikante anyesvananyasabdo'yam asakyatvadavachyam kim asrayasrayi-bhavan astitvam pratisedhyena avaktavya-chatuskoti avastvanabhilapyam syat bahirangarthataikante bhavaikante padarthanam bhavaprameyapeksayam buddhi-sabda-pramanatvam buddhi-sabdartha-sanjnastas chatuskotervikalpasya daivadevartha-siddhisched desa-kala-visese'pi devagama-nabhoyana 177 Non do a a o nho a a gi co ai co co co thi co co 12 91 2 24 27 52 96 98 67 33 79 44 50 64 17 46 48 81 9 83 87 85 45 88 63 1

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178 APTA-MIMAMSA 75 114 84 dharmadharmyavinabhavah dharme dharme'nya evartho dosavaranayorhanir dravyadyantara-bhavena dravya-paryayayoraikyam ekaneka-vikalpadav ekasyaneka-vsttirna ekatve'nyatarabhavah evam vidhi-nisedhabhyam ghata-mauli-suvarnarthi hetoradvaita-siddhisched hinastyanabhisandhat; itiyamapta-mimamsa jiva-sabdah sabahyarthah kamadiprabhavaschitrah karma-dvaitam phala-dvaitam karya-bhranteranubhrantih karya-dravyamanadi syat karya-karana-nanatvam karyotpadah ksayo hetor kathanchit te sadevestam kramarpita-dvayad dvaitam ksanikaikantapakse'pi kusalakusalam karma mithya-samuho mithya na hetuphala-bhavadi na samanyatmanodeti nastitvam pratisedhyena nayopanayaikantanam nityam tat-pratyabhijnana nityatvaikantapakse'pi 58 14 16 108 18 107 56

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INDEX 179 109 92 28 30 15 106 80 31 niyamyate'rtho vakyena papam dhruvam pare duhkhat paurusadeva siddhischet payovrato na dadhyatti pramanagocharau santau pramanakarakairvyaktar prthaktvaikantapakse'pi punyam dhruvam svato duhkhat punya-papa-kriya na syat sadatmana cha bhinnam chet sadeva sarvam ko nechchhet sadharmanaiva sadhyasya sadhya-sadhana-vijnapter samanyam samavayas-cha samanyartha giro'nyesam samanya-vag visese chenna sanjna-sarkhya-visesach santanah samudayas-cha sarvantasched avaktavyas sarvathanabhisambandhah sarvatmakam tadekam syad sat-samanyattu sarvaikyam sa tvamevasi nirdoso sesabhangascha netavya siddham cheddhetutah sarvam skandha-santatayaschaiva suddhyasuddhi punah sakti suksmantarita-durarthah syadvadah sarvathaikanta syadvada-kevalajnane tadatad-vastu vagesa 112 72 29 49 66 34 76 54 100 5 104 105 110

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180 APTA-MIMAMSA 101 102 111 78 86 103 113 19 55 tattvajnanam pramanam te tirthakrt-samayanam cha tvanmatamsta-bahyanam upeksa-phalamadyasya vaksvabhavo'nya-vagartha vaktaryanapte yaddhetoh vaktr-srotr-pamatinam vakyesvanekanta-dyoti vidheyamipsitarthanigam vidheyapratisedhyatma virodhannobhayaikatmyam virodhannobhayaikatmyam virodhannobhayaikatmyam virodhannobhayaikatmyam virodhannobhayaikatmyam virodhannobhayaikatmyam virodhannobhayaikatmyam virodhannobhayaikatmyam virodhannobhayaikatmyam virodhannbhayaikatmyam virupakaryarambhaya visuddhi-sariklesanigam chet vivaksa chavivaksa cha yadi sat sarvatha karyam yadyapeksika-siddhih syanna yadyasat sarvatha karyam 70 74 111 94 97 95 35

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Sarat Chandra Ghoshal Academic researches in ancient Indian literature and philosophy have to depend upon Sarat Chandra Ghoshal's contribution. He was one of the few Indologists who translated the old texts into English. Well-versed in ancient Indian history, culture and archaeology, he is also known for his studies in numismatics and such other disciplines of historical value. Holding the degrees of M.A., B.L., Sarasvati Kavyatirtha, Vidyabhushana and Bharati, late Sarat Chandra Ghoshal was a Jubilee Post-graduate Scholar, Bankimchandra Gold Medallist. Jyotish Chandra Medalist (University of Calcutta); Member of the Numismatic Society of India, Evert Prizeman (Scottish Church College). He authored the Digambara Saints of India, Varuni, Vairagyer Pathe etc. and edited Vedanta-paribhasa, Dravyasangraha, Pariksamukha, Kriyayogasara, Upakatha, Gitavali, Sundarananda, Ramayana etc.

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Bharatiya Jnanpith Aims & Objects To conduct researches so as to bring out the extinct, rare and unpublished works of knowledge and to give impetus to the creation of original literature for the benefit of the people. Founders Late Sahu Shanti Prasad Jain Late Smt. Rama Jain President Smt. Indu Jain Office: 18, Institutional Area, Lodi Road, New Delhi-110 003