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122
ĀPTA-MĪMĀMSĀ
COMMENTARY
A pitcher and a cloth, for example, are accepted as separate by the Naiyāyikas not only from themselves but also from their parts (avayava). The result would be that the parts and the objects having parts might be said to exist in different place and time which is absurd. If they try to escape by saying that we accept existence in the same place we urge that even this is not possible for things having form (avayavi) which cannot exist with their parts (avayavas) in the same place. These will occupy different space, like an ass and an elephant.1
Yutasiddha and ayutasiddha are special terms used in Nyaya and Vaiśesika philosophies. Among two things, if one cannot exist without the other, both of these are known as ayutasiddha. Yutasiddhi is separate or interdependent existence. This co-inherence (samavāya) will further be illustrated in the next verse. According to Nyaya philosophy this co-inherence exists between the whole and its parts, the class and the individual, substance and qualities, agent and action, the ultimate atom and its viseṣa.
Samavāya will be mentioned in the following verse. In the Bhāṣya by Prasastapāda on the Vaiseṣika philosophy "Samavāya is defined by the notion ayuta-siddhi and yutasiddhi with the help of samavaya. yutasiddhi is (1) the independent possession of movement of two or one of two eternal things; thus a moving atom is yutasiddha in comparison with another atom or physical space; and (2) the relation of samavaya in separate existences in the case of transient substances; thus a stick and (the body of) the bearer of the stick are yutasiddha, since they are both transient and inhere in separate groups of atoms. On the other hand, samavāya exists between objects which are not yutasiddha, and one of which is that which contains (ādhāra), whilst the other is that which is
1. “अवयवावयविनोः समानदेशे वृत्तिर्न भवेत्, मूर्तिमत्वात् खरकरभवत् ।” Astaśati.
