________________
136
ĀPTA-MĪMĀMSĀ
described in the previous verses and now the way to attain that goal is discussed.
In this verse the view of that school of Buddhists who say that everything is only established by anumāna (inference), is refuted. To accept this view would be to discard other pramāņas like pratyakşa and āgama. It is our everyday experience that we get knowlege of objects through the senses (pratyakşa). We also get knowledge of things beyond the immediate perception of the senses through āgama, viz., of the existence of distant countries like Malaya or Kashmir. There are many persons who urge that without the logical process of reasoning of anumāna, we would not accept the proof, even if it be seen by our eyes?. For example, we may see a mirage but the water there is not true. To these the reply is that there may be fallacies of pratyakşa pramāṇa as of other pramāņas, but from this example, you cannot say that you would not accept any pramāņa other than anumāna.
Again, to establish everything by āgama, would lead to the difficulty of accepting the conflicting views of scriptures of every school, for each regards his own scripture as authoritative. So the ekānta view of anumāna alone or āgama alone as proof is not acceptable.
The Jaina view is that pramāņa is of two kinds, pratyaksa and paroksa (the latter including smrti, pratyabhijñāna, tarka, anumāna and āgama).?
विरोधान्नोभयैकात्म्यं स्याद्वादन्यायविद्विषाम् । अवाच्यतैकान्तेऽप्युक्तिर्नावाच्यमिति युज्यते ॥77॥ virodhānnobhayaikātmyam syādvāda-nyāya
vidviņām, avāchyataikānte'pyuktirnāvāchyamiti yujyate. 1. "युक्त्या यन्न घटमुपैति तदहं दृष्ट्वापि न श्रद्धधे इत्यादेरेकान्तस्य बहुलं दर्शनात् ।”
Asta-sati 2. The reader is referred to Pariksāmúkha by S.C c. Ghoshal, Chapters
II and III, for a detailed description of these pramānas.
