Aapta Mimansa

Author(s): Saratchandra Ghoshal
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith

Page 93

CHAPTER II
28. Also, in the one-sided view which holds the separate existence (of many objects), there will not be individuality owing to non-separation of an object and its qualities. Further, there will be no separate existence, if the object and its qualities are held to be inseparable. It is certain that a quality can exist (in many objects).
COMMENTARY
Refutation of the Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika views, viz., that there is separate existence of different properties and of their qualities is made in this verse. If we urge that everything is separate from everything else, we come to a view insisting on many being true as opposed to Advaitavada which insists on only one being true. As Jainism fights against all one-sided (ekānta) views, a refutation of this view follows the refutation of the Vedanta view (Advaitavāda). "If every individual is independent, at least this individuality is a comman property of all, e.g., materiality (a guna) is the property common to guņins, ghata (a pitcher), pața (a cloth) etc. If not so, being devoid of individuality their independence also will be lost. Although individuals are separate, individuality is a property residing in common and hence, even individuals are homogeneous by their common property. Thus even the individualism of the Nyāya (and Vaiseṣika school) is vitiated by the very presuppositions of their own school."1
सन्तानः समुदायश्च साधर्म्यं च निरंकुशः । प्रेत्यभावश्च तत्सर्वं न स्यादेकत्वनिणवे ॥29॥ santānaḥ samudāyaś-cha sādharmyaṁ cha
91
nirankuṣaḥ,
pretyabhāvaścha tatsarvam na syādekatva-nihṇave.
29. If we deny similarity or identity (in one sense) there will not be any gradual flow consisting of cause 1. An Introduction to Jainism, A.B. Latthe, p. 118.