Aapta Mimansa

Author(s): Saratchandra Ghoshal
Publisher: Bharatiya Gyanpith

Page 91

89
CHAPTER 11 hetoradvaita-siddhiśched dvaitam syāddhetu
sādhyayoḥ, hetuna ched vină siddhir-dvaitaṁ vānmātrato na kim.
26. If the establishment of Advaita be from hetu (the middle term), there will be duality of hetu (the middle term) and sādhya (the major term). If the establishment -be without the middle term, why not Dvaitavāda be accepted from mere words?
COMMENTARY In this verse, another argument against Advaitavāda is advanced. Can Advaitavāda be proved by logical process of reasoning or do you say that Advaitavāda is not proved by any logical process of reason but is its own justification? Both these qustions are taken up and. decided in this verse.
Now, in an inference, we prove a thing through universal concomitance (vyāpti) which is a kind of relationship between the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sādhya). For example, we infer fire (which is the major term or sādhya) from smoke (which is the middle term or Hetu) through the relationship of universal concomitance, viz., where there is fire, there is smoke.
If you say that Advaitavāda is established by inference, you must accept a major term and middle term. This is against the view that there is nothing but one (Advaita). Hetu (the middle term) and sādhya (the major term) being used in a reasoning to establish Advaitavāda, it must bring in duality (Dvaitavāda), the very opposite of Advaitavāda.
If you say, that Advaitavāda is not established by reason but by itself, the reasoning will be absurd. Nothing can be its own proof. If from mere words, a thing is established, anybody can establish anything by mearly uttering it in words (“PI614491effectief Hofer FACETT." — Astašati). Further, if Advaitavāda can be proved by itself without the help of any reasoning, Dvaitavāda can also