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30: śramana, Vol 64, No. III, July-Sept. 2013
The third significant difference is found in Nemi's response when asked why he performed the act of freeing the animals. His response was commensurate to his action, saying, "How can we humans rejoice when so many animals are suffering? How can we humans feast on these innocent animals and birds we are meant to protect? What use is happiness if it is built on the suffering of so many?" The difference here between the first and second story is this: in the first story, in witnessing the freeing of the animals, prince Nemi equated freedom with happiness and thus went through his own process of freedom as performed by Jain monks, which is cessation of the self in the world. In the second story, happiness is not equated to freedom in the same way; freedom can never be individually recognized if their are others in the world who are suffering. Also, if happiness is built on the suffering of others, then happiness is not true happiness. Thus, the connections are not connections of hierarchy and therefore happiness is not found at the uppermost echelon, but rather at its removal.
Vallely, however, critiques the diaspora version for its loss of ascetic values. Because it estranges ascetism, the notion of ahiṁsā in its orthodox version is lost and the focus is on the avoidance of suffering. A preoccupation with the avoidance of suffering is a very modern take, one which holds that suffering is meaningless, opposite of what orthodox Jains would state. For Jains, it may be abominable, but never meaningless, for the universe has a moral order. The idea of suffering presupposes that nature has no moral law and it is the responsibility of humanity to bring moral order to the world of nature. 15 Vallely's final reflection gets at the core of the Jains of North America, that they have shifted its roots from the traditional orthodox Jain ontology and redefined in ways that reflect the concerns of the modern diaspora community.16
Although Vallely is correct in her assessment, I would not agree with her entirely. It is because of the interrelationality of western with eastern motifs which suggest a struggle, rather than clear and fully thought out metaphysics and religious system. In the next portion of this paper I suggest several parts of Whitehead's philosophy of organism that work well in this emerging diaspora Jain religion. In the intermingling of two thoughts and ideas, it leads to an experience, an experience that forms a habit. In this case it is the development of a social ethic which takes seriously the ideas of ahiṁsā, aparigraha and anekāntavāda. But the grounding on which this is built, the religious system, has changed to one of active involvement in the world. The western understanding of suffering, the idea of being this worldly instead of other worldly and the inter-relationality of all things seem tantamount to diaspora Jains.
The question from here is this: Can the philosophical and religious system of orthodox Jainism be able to cradle the emergent diaspora Jain community? What are some areas that can be redefined, rethought, in order that the notion of anekāntavāda can be expanded to invite the diaspora Jain community to grow? What will allow the diaspora Jain community to be grounded in their traditions, yet able to have wings to engage other worldly systems in light of anekāntavāda? A return to the past is not the response for diaspora Jains, but amove towards the future requires both roots and wings. 17
