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The Dimensions of a Word: Bhartphari's and... : 109
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Țīkā (sanskrit.) - commentary. Kārikā (sanskrit.) --short sentence in a form of a verse explaining philosophical or gram mar doctrine. Bhate, Bronkhorst (1994: 33). Murti (1997: 13). Ibid (1997: 14). Ibid (1997: 14). Ibid (1997: 21). Ibid (1997: 21). Ibid (1997: 22). Ibid (1997: 22). Pandey(1963: 19). Ibid (1963: 19). Pramāņa - from sanskrit. "mā - "to measure”, “to mete out”, “to mark off”, “to measure across”, “to compare with”, “to correspond in measure”, “to apportion”, “to fashion”, "to build”, “to make", "to form”, “to exhibit”, “to erect" etc. The usage of this term during epistemological considerations denotes an activity of measuring a knowledge ac cording to a strict and consequent process of examining its validity and correctness. A thorough investigation and just analysis are supposed to expose objectively verifiable dimensions of a particular object but also its very reality and truth. Sivaraman underlines that pramāņa is a peculiar balance to measure the truth and reality of a concrete thing and untruth and the lack of reality of non-existent. He realizes also that a definition of the cognition criterion under stood as a path to a gain of a valid knowledge (pramitisādhanam)is taken from a suffix -ana in the word pramāņa, which functions as a very important tool in measuring a right knowledge. Cf. Sivaraman (1973: 298). This word denotes the most important knowledge factor, its dominant cause and right measure which helps a human being with making a statement, that they possess a concrete set of informa tion, so that they are a cognizable person (pramat). It Buddhists and followers of Prabhakara have chosen this first meaning treating this term as expressing: "cognition which is free from illusion“ (avisamvādi-jñāna) or "right cognistion” (samyagjñāna). Cf. Dreyfus (1997: 289). The members of the materialistic school cārvāka/lokāyata accept only one means to the right knowledge- a perception. The Buddhists and vaiśeșika school -- a per ception and an inference. Sāṁkhya adds to them a verbal testimony (āgama or sabda). The continuators of Prabhakara enumerate five of them -- perception, inference, thinking through an analogy, a verbal testimony and a presupposition (arthāpatti). The successors of Bhatta and vedantins to those include the sixth- a non-existence (abhāva) and find out the seventh and eighth criterion - a probability (sambhava) and a gossip (aitihya). Cf. Narayanan (1992: 76): The Jain logicians accept the knowledge based on recollection (smaraṇajñāna), belonging to the type of knowledge devoid of perceptual background (parokca). The Buddhist reject all the knowledge engaging a thought (vikalpajñā namātra). Coseru trans lates the termpramāņa as follows: "a source of knowledge", "an unfailing, reliable cognition "or” epistemic validation and guarantee“. Cf. Coseru (2012: 5). Bhate, Bronkhorst (1994: 67).
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