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106 Śramana, Vol 64, No. III, July-Sept. 2013
"O Giver of the Most Excellent (varada)! Because of the dual nature (ubhayasvabhäväd), consisting of positive and negative aspects (vidhi-niyama), inherent to all existents (vastūnām), (even) words which possess the power of (literal) expression (pariņata-Saktayah) (invariably) fail (skhalantah) with regard to one (ekämse) of these two (aspects). But those (very) words (Sabdah) can, by you grace (anugrahāt te), express (vedanty) the full meaning of reality (tattvärtham) when they are strongly supported by (prasabha-samarthanena) the qualification 'maybe' [syäd-väda]" (1) [401].
A single word is not able to touch and penetrate the very core of the absolute meaning. It can cast light on singular aspect or elucidate a surface of the sense relating to concrete object but without blearing ontic chasm between denoted object and denoting expression.
"Although a word (sabdopi) (functions to) render (nayan) the three worlds (trailokyam) an embodiment of positive aspects (vidhim-ayatäm), it does not (na) itself (svayam) attain (gähate) to the nature of the object (casau'rtharūpam). If this were to happen (satyevam), then the obvious (drstam etat) distinction (bhinnatvam) (which exists) between words (vācakānām) and their innumerable objects (niravadhi-vacya) would disappear (vilayam)" (5) [405].
Amṛtachandra repeats his intuition in the next passage, underlying this crucial difference resembling somehow the Derridian concept of differance. The boundary between words and objects is real. One can only imagine a state of destroying, leading to identifying a thing and its name but such a phantasy belongs to an illusionary perspective.
"If one imagines that words (sabdānām) themselves (svayam api) are (kalpite) (identical with) the objects ('rthabhave) (to which they refer), then the (distinction between) word and referent (vacya-vacakatvam) would be (bhävyeta) an illusion (bhrama). And in (such an) illusion, the obvious (drsto) distinction (yam vibhedaḥ) (which exists) between the word 'pot' and a pot itself (ghata-pata-Sabdayor) could never (na jātu) be established, since there would be no fixed basis (niyaman rte) upon which to distinguish them (asmin siddhya)" (6) [406].
The author of Laghutattva-sphota analyses the main Jain conception of different points of view. He makes an effort to explain that even if we consider the whole universe as really existent and we ascribe all positive qualities of the supreme entity to it, there is always possibility that someone situated in different position will attribute opposite characteristics.
"Although (api) the expression 'sat' (etat sad iti vaco) comprehensively refers (cumbi) to the entire universe (viśva), in truth (sat) it does not render (na hi vidhatte) everything (sarvam) completely positive (sakalätmana). For although (this 'sat') is supreme (tat varol), it still anticipates negative aspects (asad 'py apekcÖm), from the point of view of other (parasvarüpät), fixed in (kuryan niyatam) (all) existents (arthänām)" (7) [407].
The world of objects in consciousness of human beings is divided into two main parts one consisting of objects belonging to them and the other consisting of objects belonging to the other, not me. Such division can also be regarded as having positive aspect of belonging and negative one of non-possessing. All the differences and divisions are possible because of this
