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104: Śramana, Vol 64, No. III, July-Sept. 2013
As in the case of Western philosophical schools also in the Indian field there was a controversy if this particular word is the individual (vyakti) or the universal (jāti). Bhartṛhari analyzes this problem focusing on sphota notion and phenomenon. Bhaṭṭoji-dikṣita ascribes him a view according to which sphota is the universal and quotes the following passage of Vakyapadiya: "The division into cows and other objects through differentiation of those things, to which the relation is ascribed, it is an Entity called the Class and all the words exist in it". Brough does not agree with this presupposition. Both sides of the controversy accept the "class" notion. One school underlines that sphota is the class consisting of sphotas and non-sphotas. Second one wants to see sphota within the individual. There is severe probability that Bhartṛhari chooses this last option, because -- regarding the definition of a sentence-- he treats a sentence as unique, one-fold and integral linguistic symbol (eko'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ), more vyakti-sphota than the class situated in the position of terms (jätiḥ samghatavartini)". This theory has had a great impact upon Kaplan or Copilowish who define a sign as "a class of sign-vehicles all having one and the same law of interpretation"
The Jain philosophers underline that the word is neither absolute universal nor absolute individual but it denotes universalized particular. These two factors cannot be empirically separated. According to Sagaramal Jain's example manusyatva (humanity, mankind) cannot be separated from manucya (single man). The subject of experience is individual possessed of universal (jätyänvitovyakti) and therefore it is the denotation of the concrete term. Some words are of the nature of jāti (kind, genus, species, class, the generic properties), some of vyakti (specific appearance, distinctness, individuality, the individual)
A Refutation of the Sphota Theory
Jaina thinkers rejected the sphoma-vada on the condition that its existence cannot be proved, especially Prabhācandra, who underlines that the last letter manifests the meaning of the word supported by dispositional tendencies (samskära) of the previous letters, therefore the theory formulated by Bharthari is not necessary. The resemblance of latent disposition of the previous letter and the utterance of last letter are capable of denotation of the term and the sentence, and in consequence there is no need to apprehend and conjecture an indirect cause for the same doctrine16
The second argument concerns the aspect of a lack of possibility to manifest the meaning by letters-- individually or collectively. If it is really so, how they can manifest the sphota? It is also not sure whether the dispositional tendency of the letters produced from letters itself is named as sphota or it is a quality of sphota? If the dispositional tendency of the letters is sphota, then it is product of letters and therefore eternal. "If the samskära is not sphota in itself but a quality of sphota, then the question arises where the latent dispositions is identical with the sphota or it is different from the sphota. If we accept the dispositional tendency as a quality of sphota and thus identical with sphota, then we must accept the emergence of the quality through letters and in that case sphota will be non-eternal (anitya). If the quality (dharma) produced from latent disposition is different from the sphota then their mutual relation will not be possible and in that case manifestation of sphota from phoneme (letters-sound) will be impossible.
