Practical Path

Author(s): Champat Rai Jain
Publisher: ZZZ Unknown

Page 22

TIIE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY.
(2) Our second illustration is intended to emphasize the effect of confounding the different standpoints. Suppose we say : ‘Here is a jar of iron ; if we remove its iron-ness, it will cease to exist.' This is a perfectly true statement, as any body can see for himself. But if we now say: 'Here is a jar of 2; if we remove its x-ness, it must cease to exist.', the conclusion might be true in some cases, and not in others, for x may represent only such non-essential qualities or things as butter, or some living being's name. Obviously, a jar containing butter would never cease to exist by the removal of its contents, nor would one belonging to a person ever become a non-entity by changing hands; and yet it is perfectly permissible, in speech, to say 'a jar of butter' and ' a jar of John.' This one instance suffices to illustrate the nature of confusion which is likely to result in philosophy by indiscriminately mixing up, or confounding, the results of research made from different points of view. This is a jar of iron', is a statement which is true from the point of view called the dravyârthika naya, which takes into consideration the substantive attributes of things, while' the jar of butter,' "the bucket of John,' and the like, have no reference to the nature of the substance or substances of which the jar or the bucket might be made, but only describe them in respect of their contents or owner's name.
There are seven principal stand-points which are employed by men in their description of things. These are:--
(1) Naigama (the non-distinguished) which describes things without distinguishing between their general and special properties.