Book Title: Jain Moral Doctrine Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas MandalPage 21
________________ JAIN MORAL DOCTRINE phenomena and acts are morally judged, independently of their instrumental value, i.e., apart from their affective effects. Moral values are not always 'extrinsic', in the sense of being based upon consideration of sensuous utility, but in all real cases, as we shall see hereafter, are 'intrinsic'. In these latter cases, valuation consists in the valuation of the activities as such and not as conducive to individual or social welfare in the empirical sense—in other words, the value is absolute here. This view may be taken to be implied in the contention of Shaftesbury, according to whom the moral sense like the sense of beauty, consists in a fundamental regard in the human mind for harmony and proportion-or, in the words of Hutcheson-"a natural and immediate determination to approve certain affections and actions consequent upon them or a natural sense of immediate excellence in them.” The recognition of the above absolute moral values of acts involves the recognition of the most essential nature of man, which transcends in a sense his affective states and even his empirical dispositions, as the true ground and basis of the moral judgements. This fundamental human nature is the norm or the logical d which all moral acts are called upon to fulfil. Kant's Practical Reason which goes beyond the conclusions of his Pure Reason and gives an idea of the inmost self laying down the Categorical Imperative as the ultimate basis of all true moral valuation is an express recognition of this. He condemns all theories which regard any inducement other than pure reverence for the absolute moral law of the self as a moral motive. Kant's theory has been criticised as extremely rigoristic. Hegel attempted to concretise this transcendental self of Kant by conceiving it as of the nature of an 'idea' and connecting it indissolubly with its empirical expressions and Schopenhauer, by identifying it with a fundamental 'blind will’, which energises towards satisfaction and ultimate tranquility. But the fact remains that moral judgements depend on the essential nature of man, A morally good act is thus explained not as one that satisfies the passing affective aspect of the individual mind or that of the race. It is neither explained as an act consisting in the free flow of conative activity either of the individual or of the community. Neither is it dependent on the more stable side of human nature viz. its empirical disposition. According to Aristotle, a morally good act consists in doing well i.e. in activity leading to the attainment of the highest excellence, culminating in a life of pure speculation. Even the validity of this view of Aristotle may be doubted. Aristotle 12 Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.orgPage Navigation
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