Book Title: Jain Moral Doctrine Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas MandalPage 38
________________ THE INDISPENSABLE ASSOCIATES OF ÇARITRA ledge is primarily divided into the 'Śruta' or knowledge derived from the authoritative sources and the 'Mati' which is dependent upon sense-operations, either directly or indirectly. The Śruta refers to knowledge, arising from a study of the infallible scriptures as well as from hearing the teachings of truly wise persons. The Mati or the sensuous knowledge is due to the activities of the senseorgans (Indriyas) as well as of the internal organ (Anindriya) and is of five modes. The Mati proper is perception through the senses, i.e., the visual etc. and includes such internal feelings as that of pleasure, pain etc. The Smrti is the second mode of the Mati or sensuous knowledge which makes us remember an object of previous perception. In Samjñā otherwise called the 'Pratyabhijñā' we perceive the points of similarity or dissimilarity between a thing of present observation and another or a number of them, otherwise observed. The Çintā or the Üha or the Tarka is the fourth form of knowledge which establishes a general relationship between two sensuous phenomena like fire and smoke. Through 'Abhinibodha better known as the Anumāna, we derive a particular truth from the more general conception, yielded by the foregoing inductive knowledge. The Naya is the second method of knowledge according to the Jainas. Its distinctive feature, as indicated already, is that while a thing in its entirety comes within the purview of the modes of the Pramāņa, the Naya takes up for its consideration such of its particular aspects in their exclusiveness as its 'universal aspect', 'general essence', 'points of its particularity' or 'individuality', etc. etc. The Naya is subdivided in various manners. One mode of its classification is into the 'Dravyarthika,' consisting in the exclusive consideration of the essential aspect of a thing and the 'Paryārthika' which looks to its modalities only. Knowledge has for its object, the 'Sva', or the self and the 'Para' which is other than the self; this is the Jaina view. According to the Buddhists, there is neither any permanent self nor any permanent reality outside it. The Vedāntists admit the real existence of a one and the self-same transcendental soul but deny the existence of a real non-self. The thinkers of the Mimāmsā school acknowledge the reality of the self and of the non-self but contend that an introspective knowledge of the self is never possible. The philosophers of the Nyāya-Vaiseșika school point to the reality of an infinite number of selves as well as that of some kinds of the non-self but maintain that the self can be known only indirectly. The thinkers of the Sānkhya-Yoga school accept the reality of an infinite 29 Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.orgPage Navigation
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