Jain Moral Doctrine

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal

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JAIN MORAL DOCTRINE
thing's attaining that state as also to the spatial intervals between two or more things. (7) 'Alpa-bahutva' or 'relativity': a correct cognition of a thing involves a comparative estimate of it in relation to other things as regards number, magnitude etc. (8) 'Bhāva' or 'modification'; the nature of a thing is variously modified by its coming in contact with other things; the Jaina philosophers classify the modifications in a thing generally under five heads which are as follows:-(1) First of all, we have the 'Audayika' or the originative' modification, brought about in a thing when it is under the influence of a foreign thing. (2) When the influence of that foreign thing upon the thing under observation is mitigated to a certain extent, we have a corresponding modification in the latter thing, which is called the 'Aupaśmika or ‘mitigative'. (3) The thing under observation has in it the modification called the 'Miśra' or 'mixed', when the influence of the said foreign thing upon its nature is not only mitigated but is partially destroyed. (4) The complete elimination of all foreign influences from the nature of the thing under observation gives rise to a state in the latter which is termed the 'Kṣāyika' or the 'annihilatory'. (5) The nature of a thing is dynamic, according to the Jainas; its substance is not an unchanged and eternal identity but is essentially self-preservative, through its ceaseless passing modifications; there are again modifications in the nature of a thing, even when it is established in its own pure nature and these modifications in the substance of a thing continuously evolving from within itself and independently of the influence of anything foreign or external to it are its 'Pāriņāmika' or the 'essential' Bhāvas or modifications.
Now, as regards the processes evolved by knowledge for the determination of its object in its above mentioned aspects, it refers to the 'Pramāņa' and the 'Naya'. The former grasps the thing as a whole while the latter confines itself to the consideration of it in one of its particular aspects. The Pramāna is either direct' (Pratyakşa) arising directly from within the knower's self or 'indirect' (Parokşa). Under the direct knowledge come the cognitions known respectively as (1) the 'Avadhi' or the 'Clairvoyant', by which we perceive the non-sensuous aspects of a material thing, (2) the 'Manah-paryaya' or the 'telepathic', which gives us the knowledge of other men's minds and (3) the 'Kevala' which consists in consciousness or knowledge of all things, of all times and of all places, with all their attributes and modes. The Parokşa knowledge is so called because besides the internal psychical activity, it is dependent on the operation of other factors also. The indirect know
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