Jain Moral Doctrine

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal

Page 86

JAINA ÇARITRA AS BASIS OF UNIVERSAL RELIGION AND MORALITY
But the question in connection with such 'other-pointing' standards always is: why should one feel tempted to do an act which is useful to others? Unless the act which does good to others is also directly useful to one's own self, its practice cannot be voluntary. The 'other-pointing' standard must needs be ‘self-pointing ultimately. Even in the case of an act being considered as moral on the ground of its being the Arhat's commandment, the standard was 'self-pointing' also, in as much as the act was believed to lead, as in the case of the Arhat, to the self-realisation of the doer.
The moral standard is thus ultimately and essentially 'selfpointing', which means that an act is moral, if it effects the doer's self-development. Without entering into the intricacies of metaphysical discussions here, we may safely refer to their yield and recognise the distinction between the empirical self or the self of fleeting experiences and the essential self i.e. the self, the features of which do not change. If then, self-development or self-realisation is the standard or the test of the moral-ness of activities, it must mean that an act is morally good which satisfies, not the self of the moment but that permanent self. The essential attributesapprehension, cognition, power and bliss—are inherent in the soul; but in the soul's empirical state, the infinitude of these four-fold attributes, is limited, suppressed and weighed down. The effect of a moral act which is a religious one also, according to the Jainas, is just to remove the dust and dirt that has accumulated in the soul and made it finite and to enable it to appear in its essential attributes with all their infinitude. The aim and goal of all moral acts is thus the realisation of the true self and perfection of its innate infinite nature. This is the Jaina contribution to the doctrine of the moral test. This connection between the essence of the self and a moral act, as conceived by the Jainas, leads to their view of morality in its another aspect.
In the previous chapters, we have enumerated the moral acts, as inculcated by the Jainas. We have already hinted that all these numerous acts are but forms of the five Vratas and Sub-vows ancilary and auxiliary to or preparatory for them. The five vows of non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, renunciation and sex-control are thus the essence of morality or moral acts par excellence.
It is to be noted that in this process of subsumption, an attempt is further made to reduce the five Vratas into one viz. to that of the Ahimsā or non-violence. Thus, in connection with Parigraha or appropriation, it is said that although it is not identical with Himsā or violence, it generates what is called the 'Mamatva-pariņāma' or a
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