Jain Moral Doctrine

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal

Page 89

JAIN MORAL DOCTRINE
his Darśana, Jñāna and Çāritra will not lead him to Mokṣa. In such a case, even if he devotes himself to the reverence to the Arhat, he is still a 'Para-samaya-vato' i.e. given up to externalities. It is definitely said that 'one who has knowledge about and reverence for the Arhat, the Siddha, their representations, the religious Assembly, the Scriptures (without concentrating himself upon himself), will only attract bondage for him with the Punya or meritorious Karmas and not be able to effect the destruction of all the Karmas' (173, Pançāstikaya-samaya-sära). It is Raga or the feeling of inclination towards things external to one's own self, that estranges him from his self and thus stands in the way of his emancipation. "He in whose heart there is an iota of affection towards an external object (even though the external object is the Arhat or God himself), does not know his own self, even though he is well-versed in all the scriptures". Acts which are generally regarded as meritorious may lead to the evolution of self-knowledge but unless and until an attitude of unperturbed self-concentration is generated and permeates all acts, visions and cognitions, one cannot be said to be put on the way to liberation. It is said : (177-Pançastikāya-samaya-sāra) "One may understand the Tirthamkara; the nine realities, constituting the universe; one may be possessed of the correct scriptural knowledge; he may have practised penances, even self-control; but (unless and until he has the true self-realisation in him), the Nirvāņa is far away from him." Accordingly, the fundamental basis for all morality (and for all religious activities, religion and ethics on ultimate analysis being found to be identical) is embodied in the advice of the Jaina moralists-(179, Pançastikāya-samaya-sāra), "If you want to have the final liberation, do not have attachment, any the least, for anything whatsoever."
The above close connection between one's subjective attitude and the morality of actions leads to a re-orientation of our ordinary views about religious and moral acts. The basis of these ordinarily held is of course the command of God; it is so, even according to the Jainas, although they do not believe in a transcendental worldcreating God. As we have seen, the Tirthamkara, the man who developed his nature to perfection, is the God, to whose all-knowing nature, the secrets of religion and morality were crystal-clear and who revealed them to his bearers for the good of mankind. Yet, this is after all, the Vyavahāra or the 'other-pointing' view. According to the Jaina Niśçaya doctrine, not the Arhat alone but all souls who have attained perfection are Gods-each self being a potentiality of God. From the Niśçaya or the 'self-pointing' view, religious or a moral act is a divine command, in the sense that it ema
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