Jain Moral Doctrine

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal

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JAIN MORAL DOCTRINE
number of conscious selves and that of one ultimate non-self but they do not admit that the conscious transcendental souls have a real connection with the Prakřti or the principle of the non-self. Obviously, all these views are opposed to the theories of the Jaina thinkers.
The Jainas hold, of the above two objects of knowledge, the self and the non-self each has an infinite number of attributes and that they are ceaselessly undergoing infinite modifications. The 'Vastu' or the object of experience is thus possessed of infinite aspects. This, however, does not mean that the object of knowledge is necessarily unknowable. The Jainas, as we have hinted above, believe in the possibility of omniscience. Even when knowledge falls short of omniscience, some sort of true knowledge about the things is still possible. It consists in taking up a particular aspect or quality of the thing under observation and finding out in what relations this stands to the thing. It is obvious that these relationships between a thing and one of its modifications or attributes hold good as regards the thing in its other particularities also. True knowledge culminates in the discovery of these fundamental relationships between an object and its quality or mode. The Jainas' investigation of the nature of a thing thus concerns itself with a study of these relationships and finds expression in their famous theory of the 'Saptabhanga? or the seven modes of predication.' Shortly speaking, these seven predications consist in relating the thing to one of its given aspects in no less than seven manners. (1) Thus, the first predication shows how in some respects, that particular aspect can be positively attributed to the thing. (2) The second predication would indicate how in other respects, that aspect cannot be predicated of the thing. (3) The third predication would consist in a successive affirmation and negation of that aspect in connection with the thing, in some respects, while (4) The fourth Bhanga applies simultaneous affirmation and negation of it to the thing, in some respects. (5) In the next mode of predication the fourth and the first forms of predication are combined and (6) the sixth Bhanga is similarly a combination of the second and the fourth Bhangas. (7) The last form of the predication consists in combining the third and the fourth Bhangas together. The Jainas point out that Samyak-jñāna or true knowledge about the object involves a correct application of the above Sapta-bhangas or seven modes of predication in respect of it, through the methods of the Pramāņa and the Naya.
All knowledge is evidently not right knowledge, just as all faith is evidently not right faith. Save and except the telepathic and the omniscient forms of knowledge, which by their nature cannot be
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