Jain Moral Doctrine

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal

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CARDINAL VIRTUES
pleasing the gods. Some upholders of the practice of animal-sacrifice defends it by saying that the Dharma or the moral path is revealed by the gods and that therefore the sentient beings should be offered to them. Some again find no fault in killing goats, lambs or other animals for feeding the guests. Some people beileve that there is comparatively lesser sin in killing a big animal for their dishes than in killing a number of small animals in its place. Some again are of the persuasion that it is always good to kill one being, if it leads to the safety of other beings. Some people think that ferocious animals kill many creatures and that therefore the killing of the ferocious animals is always justifiable.
Some are of opinion that it is good to put an end to the life of a being subjected to pains and miseries, just to end them. There have again been strange thinkers who maintain that happiness in one's life shows that he did many austere acts, so that it is good to kill a happy man, in order that he may continue his enjoyment of happiness, perhaps in an intenser form, in his after-life. There are people who encourage their own death or the death of their gullible followers in the so-called sacred places, by believing or preaching that the death in those places is sure to lead to a happy state in the celestial regions for the person so dying. There have been similar lines of thought, justifying the killing of one's preceptor when he is absorbed in deep meditation, under the belief that the preceptor would have a long and happy state of heavenly existence thereafter. Lastly, there have been people who see merit in injuring their own selves by cutting off the flesh from their bodies in order to feed a hungry creature. The Jainas (e.g. the author of the Purusārthasiddhyupāya) condemn all such practices and moral theories. Injuring life in any form, either in one's own self or in that of others, under any consideration whatsoever is immoral according to them.
The nature and scope of Himsā should thus be carefully grasped by a man wanting to practise the Vrata of Ahimsā. Himsā does not necessarily confine itself within the four corners of an actual act done. Himsā is really a subjective activity. Violence is committed where an overt act is purposively done (Kịta). It is also committed by one when he, instead of himself doing the violent act, has the act done by another person (Kārita). Even when a man does not himself do the act or have it done by others, he is guilty of violence, if he approves (Anumodita) of the act, when it is done. The Jainas point out that as one's doing of an act or having it done by others or approving it when done, may involve the activities of his
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