Jain Moral Doctrine

Author(s): Harisatya Bhattacharya
Publisher: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal

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THE INDISPENSABLE ASSOCIATES OF ÇARITRA
spread a sheet of canvas over the cavity and may thus make a habitation for the time being within that cavity; here the cavity is not destroyed but only its absoluteness is mitigated (Upaśama) by the canvas spread over it and the temporary shelter may be described as the result of the mitigation of that absolute cavity. (ii) In the next place, let us suppose, a person erects a strong room deep down in a part of the cavity; the room here certainly puts an end to a part of the cavity and yet the entire cavity is not destroyed; for, over and above the room, there is still a portion of the vacuum left; the strong room in this case may thus be described as the result of the mitigation (Upaśama) and the partial destruction (Kşaya) of the original cavity. (iii) Lastly, let us suppose that an underground cell is constructed in the place of the cavity, which occupies the entire area of the cavity; here the entire cavity is destroyed (Kşaya) and is replaced by the cell. It is thus that the mode of the origin of a thing under observation reveals its nature. In the example of the house, we see that it is either an improvised temporary habitation or a small strong room or a complete underground cell, according as it mitigates or partially fills up or completely replaces the original cavity.
Right knowledge determines the above six aspects of a thing under its scope in the right manner. For the correct determination of the nature of the object, the above six aspects of it may be re-grouped under the following eight considerations, viz., (1) 'Sat' or the aspect of 'existence'; according to the Jainas, the existence of a thing implies that it comes into being (utpāda), that it vanishes (vyaya) and that its underlying substance persists (dhrauvya) through all its modifications, e.g., the processes of continuous origination, annihilation and persistence; valid knowledge considers the correct manners in which these three aspects of a thing come into operation. (2) 'Samkhyā' or 'number'; the determination of a thing by correct knowledge gives the number of things similar to it. (3) 'Kșetra'—the 'place' or the 'locus of the thing. (4) 'Sparśana' or the 'extent'; correct knowledge determines the area within which its object may live, move and have its being. (5) Kāla' or the 'duration of the existence of a thing. (6) 'Antara' or the 'interval'; it means that a thing may lose its nature and yet regain it after some time; correct knowledge directs itself to a consideration of this interval between the thing's losing its nature and then regaining it; Antara, however, is not confined within the conception of temporal interval between a thing's two particular states only; it may refer to the interval between one thing's attaining a state and another
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