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4.3.a
Anek nt Metaphysical-Spiritual Perspectives Prof. Dr. Kamal Chand Sogani
It is incontrovertible that metaphysics deals with the problem of reality. Philosophers have endeavoured to expound the world of phenomena in a consistent manner. For Jaina thinkers, reality is constituted of apparent contradiction. So its one-dimensional exposition is not possible. It is an inalienable complex of permanence and change, existence and non-existence, oneness and manyness, universality and particularity etc.[1] Because of this complexity reality is styled 'Anek ntic'. It is thus multidimensional possessing antagonistic dimensions of permanence and change, one and many etc. these antagonistic dimensions are infinite in number, of which we know only a few of them. Thus the Jaina philosopher differs from all absolutists in their approach to the enfoldment of the inner nature of reality. The Jaina advocates change to be as much ontologically real as permanence. Being implies becoming and vice versa. This conception of reality reminds us of the Greek philosopher Parmenides who regarded 'Being' as the sole reality wholly excludent of all becoming, as also of Heraclites, for whom, permanence being an illusion, 'Becoming' or perpetual change constitutes the very life of the universe. It also makes us reminiscent, of the Buddhist philosophy of universal flux and of the unchanging, static, permanent absolute of Ved nta. But all these point to the one-sided approach to reality. It may be said, "If the Upani adic thinkers found the immutable reality behind the world of phenomena and plurality, and the Buddha denounced everything as fleeting, Mah v ra found no contradiction between permanence and change, and was free from all absolutism."[2]
Problem of reality implies the problem of substance. In consonance with the Anek ntic view of reality already discussed substance is characterized by simultaneous origination destruction and persistence or is the substratum of attributes and modes. [3] Permanence signifies persistence of substance along with the emergence of the new modes and the disappearance of the old once at one and the same time [4]. To illustrate, gold as a substance exists with its modifications and qualities. Now after making an ornament, what changes is the mode.
Substance and Quality
Substance as different from the general and specific qualities and modification are nothing but abstractions. Qualities are incapable of being existent by themselves even for a moment. They necessitate the simultaneous existence of substance, and are denied any isolated character: and they are themselves bereft of qualities [5]. As regards the relation between them; we may say that they are non-separate and non-identical. Non-separateness results owing to their subsistence in the same spatial extent, and non-identity issues because of the fact that one of the fact that one is not the other. The assertion that substance is not quality and that quality is not substance serves only to emphasis the non-identical character of both substance and quality. It does not mean the absolute negation of substance in quality and vice-versa.[6] Thus the relation between Dravya and Gu a substance and quality is one of identity and difference in point of nomenclature, number, characterization, and purpose and not difference with reference to spatial extent.[7 [7]
Substance and Modification
The notion of Pary ya is peculiarly Jaina.[8] In conformity with the nature of as permanence in mutability, Pary ya alludes to the variable aspect of a thing which is due to the external and internal inducements. Every quality transmutes its state every moment: and this mode of being is called Pary ya, which is incessantly transforming itself into the next, though the quality as such is never abrogated. It is on this account alleged that substance is in a state of perpetual flux. However incessant and infinite the transformations may be, the underlying substantiality and permanency can never part with existence. Substance and Pary ya are not to be distinguished like two different things, for it is substance through qualities, which because of its flowing nature attains the qualification of Pary ya. Substance and modes are neither exclusively identical nor exclusively difference, which is in perfect harmony with the non-absolutistic attitude upheld by the Jaina. Thus origination and destruction are applicable to Pary yas and persistence to qualities along with substance.
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STUDY NOTES version 4.0
