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1. The nature of self. 2. The goal of human pursuance. 3. The doctrine of Karma. 4. The meaning of spiritual awakening (Samyagdar ana). 5. The incentives to spiritual life. 6. The spiritual perspective of Ahi s. 7. The practice of devotion. 8. The observance of Sallekhan as the spiritual welcome to death. 9. The stages of spiritual development known as G asth nas. 10. Moral practices like A vrata, Mah vrata etc.
2.1 Ethics Now the question is: Is ethics possible without religion in Jainism? According to Jainism those who are not spiritually awakened can lead a moral life. Thus in Jainism ethical living is possible without religious living. The equivalent expression in Jaina ethics for the term 'right' and 'good' is ubha. We all know that ethics deals with right and wrong, good and bad. Here the question that confronts us is this: How to determine according to Jainism, what is morally right for a certain agent in a certain situation? Or what is the criterion of the rightness of action? The interrelated question is what we ought to do in a certain situation or how duty is to be determined? The answer of Jaina ethics is that right, ought and duty cannot be separated from the good.
2.2 Teleological Theory of Right Accepted in Jaina Ethics The criterion of what is right etc. is the greater balance of good over bad that is brought into being than any alternative. Thus, the view that regards goodness of the consequences of actions as the right-making characteristic is termed the teleological theory of right as distinguished from the deontological theory of right which regards an action as right simply because of its own nature regardless of the consequences it may bring into being. The Jaina ethics holds the teleological theory of right (Maximum balance of Ahi s over his as the right-making characteristic).
2.3 Act-Teleology accepted: Rules as Guiding Moral principles The question now arises whether Jaina ethics subscribes to act-approach or rule-approach in deciding the rightness or wrongness of actions. It seems to me that though the Jaina C ryas have given us moral rules, yet in principle they have followed that every action is to be judged on the goodness of the consequences expected to be produced. Since to calculate the consequences of each and every action is not practically possible, Jaina have given us guiding moral principles in the form of A vratas and Mah vratas, G avratas and ik vratas and so on. This means that Jaina ethics accepts the possibility that sometimes these general moral principles may be inadequate to the complexities of the situation and in this case a direct consideration of the particular action without reference to general principles is necessary.
May be, keeping this in view, Samantabhadra argues that truth is not to be spoken when by so doing the other is entangled in miseries: Sv mi Kum r in the K rttikey nuprek disallows the purchase of things at low price in order to maintain the vow of non-stealing. According to moral rules exceptions can not be allowed. This implies that Jaina ethics does not allow superstitious rule-worship but at the same time, prescribes that utmost caution is to be taken in breaking the rule, which has been built up and tested by the experience of generations. Thus according to Jaina ethics, acts are logically prior to rules and the rightness of the action is situational.
2.4 Teleological Nature of Duty: It is of capital importance to note here that according to Jaina ethics, duty is not self-justifying; it is not an end in itself. "The very nature of duty is to aim beyond itself. There can no more be a duty to act, if there is no good to attain by it." Thus, duty is an extrinsic good, good as a means; this does not deprive duty of its importance in ethical life, just as health does not become unimportant by its being extrinsic good. (The pursuance of A uvratas for the householder and Mah vratas for the Muni may be regarded as dutiful actions)
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STUDY NOTES version 4.0
