________________
What I feel here is that the Jaina in propounding the seven propositions are making use of mathematical knowledge, which necessarily leads to these seven BhA gas. Out of these the first four are empirically verifiable or understandable and the last three are mathematical possibilities. That is why the Jaina texts have not explained the first four ones. But there is nothing wrong in saying that they are possibilities confirmed by mathematics. So if one speaks of more than seven Bha gas, there will either be duplicated or assertion of propositions neither confirmed by mathematics nor by experience, if one speaks of less number of propositions, there will either be omission or suppression of the aspect of the real given to us either mathematically or experientially.
It may now be argued that since Jaina philosophy is known as Anekant v da (non-extremism and non-absolutism) does the seven-fold prediction apply to Anekant v da itself? The answer of Jaina is in the affirmative. Sy t Anekant v da, Sy t Ek ntav da and so one will be the seven propositions (SaptabhA gas). Knowledge which takes into account the nature of the real as consisting of an infinite plurality of attributes is called pram a and this is non-absolutism, knowledge which takes into account one attribute without negating the order attributes present in the real is called, Ny ya and this is Ek ntav da. In other words the Anek nta can not be sub stained without admitting Ek nta as its opposite, just as a tree can not he saved if the branches are taken out.
Of the many charges alleged against the doctrine of Sy dv da, the most fundamental is that of selfcontradiction. In other words, the charge is that the Jaina doctrine flagrantly violates the law of noncontradiction which says that A cannot be both A and B at the same time. Thus how can pen have the characteristics of both existence and non-existence? Before answering this objection, let us first discuss the attitude of the Jaina towards the law of non-contradiction propounded by formal logic. The conviction of the Jaina is that the law of non-contradiction is a priori and thus does not state any facts about reality. If it were asked what is the criterion of contradiction the reply of the Jaina would be that it is experience and not pure thought. It is by the former that the notion of contradiction should be decided. Two facts are contradictory, if they are not found to coexist in experience just as light and darkness, heat and cold, and the like. On the contrary, if experience confirms the coexistence if seemingly contradictory attributes in a thing it should be regarded as valid. Thus the Jaina insists that the source of the law of non-contradiction should be sought not in a priori thought, but in experience of the behaviour of things. Following this mode of logic, the Jaina finds no empirical contradiction in asserting that the pen has the characteristics of both existence and non-existence, as has been explained above.
Page 310 of 556
STUDY NOTES version 4.0
