ISJS Jainism Study Notes E5 Vol 04

Author(s): International School for Jain Studies
Publisher: International School for Jain Studies

Page 319

Let us now illustrate the doctrine of seven - fold propositions by taking an example of the attribute existence or permanence or oneness etc. in respect of pen.
1.
The first proposition is: Sy t pen exists. This means that the existence of pen is contextual, the context being its own Dravya (substance), Ketra (Space), Kla (time) and Bh va (state). It is by virtue of this context that the pen derives its individuality and becomes meaningful. In fact this context is interwoven into the constitution of the pen itself, so it cannot be separated from the object. This proposition controverts the possibility of unqualified existence of a thing without the consideration of substance, space, time and state. The second proposition is: Sy t pen does not exist. The proposition does not, as it seems, negate the existence of pen referred to in the first propositions, but it states the nonexistence of pen in respect of other Dravya, Ketra, Kla, and Bh va. Thus it strengthens the first propositions rather than cancels it. The pen is pen only because it is not pen. In other words the existence of pen in respect of its own Dravya, K etra, Kla, and Bh va cannot maintain its identity, if non-existence of pen in respect of other Dravya, K etra, Kla, and Bh va is not considered the concomitant aspect of pen. Thus both existence and nonexistence is co-present in the pen without any contradiction. According to the Jaina, nonexistence is as much constitutive of the nature of thing as existence. The critics fail to see that contradictory statement can be made about a thing, if context is changed. The conviction of the Jaina is that if this proposition is denied, it shall be difficult for us to account for the differences of things. Hence, by asserting this proposition. We come across a new aspect of thing, which is not given in the first proposition. The third proposition is: Sy t pen exists and does not exist. In this proposition the two attributes of existence and non-existence in their relevant contexts are successively predicated of the pen. Thus this proposition, which appears merely the summation of the first two propositions is not really so. It expresses a new aspect of pen under consideration. This aspect is not present either in the first or in the second proposition considered separately. If mathematics is our guide, the third proposition is nothing but a summation of the first two. But according to the Jaina experience, which is our sole guide, tells us that the combination or separate units give rise to a distinctive meaning, not apprehended in any of its constituent elements The fourth proposition is: Sy t pen is inexpressible. In this proposition the two attributes of existence and non-existence instead of being asserted successively as in the third proposition, are asserted simultaneously. The need for simultaneous assertion of these appositive attributes is man's desire to express in words the apprehension of pen as such. Since words are incapable of expressing this apprehension of pen the pen is inexpressible. It may be noted here that inexpressibility is a novel and factual characteristics of pen. The distinction between the third and fourth propositions is that in the former the novel attribute is the result of consecutive togetherness of the elements of existence and non-existence, whereas in the latter it is the result of simultaneous presentation of the two elements in question. It goes without saying that this inexpressibility is not absolute, it is only so in the context of the two opposite attributes being together synchronically. "The common sense principle implied in its recognition is that what is given cannot be rejected simply because it is inexpressible by a single positive concept". The fifth, sixth, and seventh propositions are: Sy t pen exists and in inexpressible. Sy t pen does not exist and is inexpressible. Sy t pen exists and does not exist and is inexpressible.
7.
All these propositions according to the Jaina, represent a new aspect of the real. It may be noted here that the Jaina texts have not discussed these propositions clearly. Now the question arises: What is the basis of regarding the number of propositions as seven, neither more nor less than this? The answer of the Jaina is that since affirmation and negation are possible in regard to the real, there are only seven questions possible in regard to the real. These questions know a thing, which in turn is dependent on the seven objective aspects of the real. In fact, the enquiry starts upon the initial doubt, for example does a pen exist or not? Or is a thing permanent or changing? And the answer is seven distinct propositions or Bha gas.
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STUDY NOTES version 4.0