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led astray (vyatikrama), and when he breaks the rule (aticāra) – for example if he listens to the offer of an impure alms, if he goes out of bis way to receive it, if he accepts it: sthavirakal pikānām trişv atikram'adişu padeşu prāyaścittam bhayati (Vav Ţ II 88 a, cf. Vay Pith Bh 107 f.). But up to this point his transgressions are considered minor; and so long as he has not gone as far as a grave infraction (for example using the forbidden alms), it is sufficient for the sthavirakalpika, to expiate the tbree types of offences just defined, to express his full and sincere repentance : mithya duşkıta-mātra-pradānenäpi sudlyati (T II 88 b 1 f.).
Should he persist in his error to the extent of violating the code of religious conduct, he expiates, at the same time as the anācāra, the three moments of sinfulness above-mentioned which have led bim into "misconduct", for the anācāra is inevitably conditioned by the moments which preceed it, in such a way that they are naturally taken into account in the calculation of the parihara. Thus without being explicitly mentioned in the Nisīha, in effect they do figure in it, by implication (cf. Ţ II 88 a-6).
The apalysis and discussion just undertaken show the Jaina teachers as being anxious to correct more than just the comportment of the monks. They try to redeem and reform even the very impulses and intentions of their flock.
The pastors take trouble to divine these intentions correctly and to appreciate exactly the responsibility of the offender.
It will be recalled that the Jainas, like other ladiacs, distinguish between what is done in act, in word, and in thought (supra 90 and n. 3); and that they distinguish even further in differenciating the actions that the agent does personally, those which he causes someone else to do, and those in whose execution he helps. One cannot then take the accusations of the Buddhists literally when they accuse the nirgrontha of not according
any value to the intentions which motivate the individuall. P, 127 Let us refer rather to the Vavahāra Bhāsa and the Tīkā.
1 The Abhidharmakosa says: "According to the Nirgranthas, from murder-even when
committed unwittingly and unwillingly (abuddhi-pārvāt)- there results, for the person who committed it, sin, just as a burn results from contact with fire. On this score, a person is guilty (papa-prasanga) when he sees or touches involuntarily someone else's wife. [....] On the other hand, whoever causes the murder to be committed by someone else is not guilty, because one is not burnt when one causes someone else to touch the fire. Since no account is taken of the intention (buddhi-visesa), the wood and the other materials, although bercft of consciousness are capable of murder when a house collapses and living beings perish."
The passages of Uttar and Sūja adduced by La Vallée Poussin (IV 155 p. 2 n 3, are not conclusive.
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