Book Title: Abhidha Author(s): Tapasvi Nandi, Jitendra B Shah Publisher: L D Indology AhmedabadPage 14
________________ [5] atom, which are permanent (i. e. nitya), are also varieties of 'guna' - "teşām api sarvesām guna-jātīyatvāt, they are also of the same type as these, i. e. suklatva and the like. As they are 'nitya' they may be like 'jāti', but because they are 'višesādhānahetu', they are termed gunas, and not jāti. Thus Mukula concludes : (pp. 6, ibid) - "tad evam prāna-pradopādhinibandhanatyam yasya śabdasya sa jāti-sabdo yathā gavādih. yasmāt labdha-svarūpasya vastuno višeşādhāna-hetuḥ arthaḥ pratīyate, sa gunaśabdo yathā śuklādih.” We may observe that these words are taken up fully by Mammața. So, Mukula not only serves as a shaping influence for Bhoja but also for Mammata to some extent because he, i.e. Mukula follows the lead of the grammarians such as Patañjali and Bhartphari. Now, Mukula considers pūrva-paksa. It goes like this — Is it not possible that words connoting 'guna', 'kriyā' or 'yadịcchā' — all can be taken as jātiśabdas ? For example take the word śukla. Now the whiteness in milk, conch, balākā (= name of a bird), etc. is really different but a common word sukla' is used for a variety of white colour. Thus jāti-nibandhanatva' - of 'guna-vācī' words is seen. This can be said of kriyā sabdas also. The kriyā of cooking is different in case of molasses, sesamum, rice etc. and yet it is conveyed by the same word viz. pacati.' The yadrcchā words such as dittha' etc. as spoken by humans, parrots etc. are really different and yet because of jāti i.e. 'dittha-śabdatva' they are taken to be one. So, as a result the 'catustayi pravrtti' of words does not hold good : “atasca guna-kriyā yadrccha-śabdānām api jāti-sabdatvāt cațustayi śabdānām pravrttir na upapadyate." (pp. 9, ibid). The siddhāntin's answer follows : It is not jāti' or 'class' which results in cognition of identity, in case of guna-sabdas or kriyāśabdas. But it is 'samjñi' i.e. the individual who makes for this sense of identity. The difference seen among individuals is the result of their difference in attributes, i. e. the āśraya or substratum. For example, take a face, which when reflected in oil, sword, water or mirror, which are responsible only for the knowledge of the reflections, make for difference seen in the figures seen in them. In the same way, the Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.orgPage Navigation
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