Abhidha

Author(s): Tapasvi Nandi, Jitendra B Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/001534/1

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ABHIDHĀ
L. D. Series : 131
General Editor Jitendra B. Shah
Prof. Tapasvi Nandi
L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY AHMEDABAD - 380 009

Follate 8 Fersonal use only
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ABHIDHĀ
L. D. Series: 131
General Editor Jitendra B. Shah
-
I
L. D. INSTITUTE OF INDOLOGY
AHMEDABAD
380 009

Prof. Tapasvi Nandi

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L. D. Series : 131
Abhidhā
Dr. Tapasvi Nandi
Published by Dr. Jitendra B. Shah
Director L. D. Institute of Indology
. Ahmedabad
First Edition : February, 2002
ISBN 81-85857-13-X
Price : Rs. 120
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अभिधा
प्रो. तपस्वी नान्दी
लालभाई दलपतभाई भारतीय संस्कृति विद्यामन्दिर अमदावाद (गुजरात राज्य)-३८०००९.

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ला. द. ग्रंथश्रेणी : १३१
अभिधा
•
डों. तपसी नान्दी
प्रकाशक
डॉ. जितेन्द्र बी. शाह नियामक
लालभाई दलपतभाई भारतीय संस्कृति विद्यामंदिर अहमदाबाद
प्रथम आवृत्ति : फरवरी २००२
•
ISBN 81-85857-13-X
:
·
मूल्य : रु.१२०
•
टाईप सेटिंग :
श्री स्वामिनारायण मुद्रण मंदिर
३, विजय हाउस, नवावाडज, अहमदाबाद - १३.
फोन : ७४३२४६४, ७४१५७५०
: मुद्रक : नवप्रभात प्रिन्टींग प्रेस घीकांटा रोड, अहमदाबाद - १. फोन: ५५०८६३१. ५५०९०८३

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PREFACE
Āgam Prabhākar Muni Shri Punyavijayji was a profound scholar of the Jaina āgamas and agamic literature. He had lent significant contribution to the manuscriptology and to the methodology of editing the ancient works. He, moreover, had edited several rare works in an ideal way. Sheth Shri Kasturbhai Lalbhai founded L. D. Institute of Indology in the fifties; thanks to his inspiration.
The L. D. Institute, since its inception, is an important centre for the studies concerning Indological subjects. As one of its academic activities, the Institute organizes lecture-series, one being in the memory of Muni Shri Punyavijayji. For this series, learned scholars are invited to deliver lectures on the subjects of their specialization. In this series, Dr. Tapasvi Nandi, professor Emeritus (U.G.C.) and a scholar of Sanskrit Language and literature was invited to deliver lectures in February 2002. We are indeed deeply grateful to him for accepting our invitation and discussing the topic of 'Abhidhā' from the rhetorical angle. Therein, he has also discussed different viewpoints of the ancient ālamkārikas, including Ācārya Hemacandra on this subject. We hope that these lectures, now appearing in print, will prove useful to the students of alamkāraśāstra.
L. D. Institute of Indology Ahmedabad-380009 February 2002.
Jitendra B. Shah
Director

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37f9
...
I am thankful to the L. D. Institute of Indology and its Director Dr. Jitendra B. Shah for having arranged my three lectures on 'Abhidhā' under the “Muni Punya-Vijayajeesmộti-vyākhāna" series, this year.
What follows in this small monograph is only a portion from a chapter on Abhidhā in my project on hand viz. “Sahrdayaloka or Thought-currents in Indian Literary Criticism” - some eight chapters covering 1100+ pages of which have been already drafted. Kindly give me lots of your good wishes so that this project is completed and it also sees the light of the day.
Abhidhā of course, as considered by literary aesthetes is the power of word yielding the expressed or conventional sense, i.e. the dictionary meaning. This is a normally accepted view and is projected by the Kashmere School of litarary aesthetics headed by Anandavardhna and ably supported by Abhinavaguptapāda and Vāgdevatāvatāra Mammața. They were followed by a host of brilliant writers on poetics, beginning with Ācārya Hemacandra, Vidyādhara and Viśvanātha and ending with the great Appayya Dixit and the greatest Punditarāja Jagannātha. But the course of Abhidhā, as also that of other thought-currents did not run smooth and Anandavardhana had to face some opposition and also challange from other great names, such as Mukula, Kuntaka, Mahimā and Bhoja. These ācāryas had their own idea about abhidhā which was either broader or narrower and Mahimā, a strong protegonist of Kāvyānumiti was not prepared to go beyond abhidhā and tried to subsume whatever went under the name of gaunī, laksana and even vyañjanā under poetic inference. But these voices were once again silenced by Mammata and his followers who chose to accept Anandavardhana's lead and follow the

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dictates of the Kashmere School of literary aesthetics. But Ācārya Hemacandra though a loyalist, had absorbed something from Bhoja, the lone voice who projected what we may call the Mälava School of literary aesthetics. He tried to project 'gauni' as a separate and independent śabda-vịtti in keeping with the original tradition of the pūrva-Mīmāmsā and also one supported by Bhoja, of course slightly differently, as we will go to see in course of these lectures. So, we have tried to consider in course of these lectures the views of those who do not fall in line with the Kashmere School of thought and also the views of Ācāraya Hemacandra who strikes a different note, of course not a discordant note, in projecting 'gaunī, as a separate vstti.
If the learned find what follows as interesting, then my task is done. At the same time may I remind the learned not to expect absolutely original ideas from me, as the great Naiyāyika Jayanta has ably stated : "kutósti nūtanam vastu”, and prior to him the great Abhinavagupta had stated :
"ürdhvordhvam āruhya yad-arthatattvam dhiḥ paśyati śrāntim avedayanti, phalam tad ādyaiḥ parikalpitānām
viveka-sopāna-paramparāņām.” So, this is an effort to go up the ladder, the viveka-sopānaparamparā, as laid down not only by the ancient masters, but also by the great modern ālamkārikas, such as Dr. De, Dr. Kane, Dr. Raghavan, Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, Dr. Rama Rañjana-Mukherjee, my gurus Prof. R. B. Athavale, Prof. R. C. Parikh and Prof. Dr. Kulkarni and my most respected and beloved friends and best among learned, Dr. Revaprasad Dwivedi, Prof. Dr. R. C. Dwivedi, and Dr. N. P. Unni. Thanking all concerned,
Tapasvi Nandi Aum Ma Aum.

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Mukula and Kuntaka Mukula
We may compare Bhoja's approach, to that of Mukula-Bhatta, Kuntaka and also Mahima Bhatta, because these three writes also do not fall in line with the so called Kashmira school of thought. Though of course Mukula and Kuntaka were definitely Bhoja's predecessors, Mahimā was perhaps almost a senior contemporary. The consideration of these writers also is taken up due to the reason that they also do not fall in line with the Kashmir tradition. As it is, they are all pre-Mammata but of course unique in their approach and Bhoja was under their influence. We examine Mukula Bhatta first.
Mukula Bhatta to the best of our knowledge, has contributed a single work called the “Abhidhā-vrtta-mātrkā.” Mukula virtually accepts two śabda-vrttis such as abhidh, and laksanā, but the latter is also an extension of, and therefore part of abhidhā for him, and is broad enough to include even vyañjanā. In the very first kārikā he observes :
"sabdavyāpārato yasya
pratītis tasya mukhyatā arthāvaseyasya punar
laksyamānatvam ucyate.” - AVM. I. pp. 2
(Edn. Dr. R. P. Dwivedi, Chowkhamba Vidyābhavan, '73) He further observes : (pp. 2, ibid) : “sabda-vyāpārād yasyāvagatis tasya mukhyarvam. sa hiyathā sarvebhyo hastādibhyo'vayavebhyah pūrvam mukham avalokyate, tādvad eva sarvebhyaḥ pratīyamānebhyah arthāntarebhyaḥ pūrvam avagamyate tasmān mukham iva mukhya iti śākhādiyāntena mukhya-śabdena abhidhīyate. tasya udāharaṇam, 'gaur anubandhya' iti. atra hi go-śabda-vyāpārāt yāga-sādhana-bhūtā go-tva-lakṣaṇā jātir avagamyate. atas tasyāḥ mukhyatā tad evam sabda-vyāpāra-gamyo mukhyorthaḥ.” i. e. - The apprehension of which is derived through the function of employment of a word is termed mukhya i. e. principal. It is said to be 'mukhya' because as is 'mukha' i. e. face seen first as compared to hands and other limbs, in the

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same way that meaning also is apprehended first in comparison with all other meanings apprehended. So, 'that which is like 'mukha' or 'face' is termed 'mukhya' i.e. principal, which is formed with the help of Pāṇini sūtra 5/3/103, viz. “śākhādibhyo yah", which recommends 'ya' suffix which is in the sense of comparison and seen in words such as 'śäkhā' etc. The illustration is, "gaur anubandhyah” i. e. 'the cow / ox may be fixed for a sacrifice.' Here, 'go' is a word, and due to its employment gotva-jāti is apprehended as instrument for performing a sacrifice. So, the mukhyatā or principality will be fixed with reference to 'go-jāti'. From this illustration, it is understood that the meaning viz. 'gotva-ādi-rūpa' which is derived by the function of the word 'gauḥ' is mukhya i.e. principal meaning.
But, observes Mukula, that is called 'lāksanika' or secondary whose apprehension follows the examination of a meaning derived through sabdavyāpāra "yasya tu sabda-vyāpāra-avagamyārtha-paryālocanayā avagatis tasya lākṣanikatvam yathā pūrvasmin eva udāharane vyakteh.” — Mukula thus holds that the meaning of go-vyati or individual cow follows the first apprehension of go-jāti, and therefore the go-vyati-jñāna is lāksanika for him. Mukula holds that -- (pp. 2, 3, ibid) : "sā hi na śabda-vyāpārād avasiyate, 'višesyam nābhidhā gacched ksīna-śaktir viśesane' iti nyāyāt sabdasya jātimātra-paryavasitatvāt. jātis tu vyaktim antarena yāga-sadhana-bhāvam na pratipadyate iti śabda-pratyāyita-jāti-sāmarthyād atra jāter aśraya-bhūtā vyaktir aksipyate. tena asau lāksanikī. evam ayam mukhya-lāksanikāt visayopa-varnana-dvāreņa sabdasya abhidhā-vyāpāro dvividhaḥ pratipădito, nirantarātha-nistaḥ, sāntarārtha-nisthaś ca.”
Mukula holds that go-vyakti is not understood through the function of a word, because there is an all accepted dictum that, "abhidhā can express only one of the two, viz. višesana or viśesya. If it conveys visesana then it cannot express višesya, for the whole of its capacity is exhausted in apprehending višesana alone. Following this principle, in the said illustration, the word 'go' has a capacity to convey only 'gotva-jāti'. When the apprehender thinks that jāti' by itself, cannot be instrumental in the act of sacrifice, without its reference to the 'go-vyati, so then this 'go-vyakti' is covered by āksepa i. e.

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[3] implication (= i. e. either by anumāna or inference, or arthāpatti). Thus the meaning of go-vyakti is said to be "lāksanika", according to Mukula. He further observes that thus by the description of two aspects such as ‘mukhya' and 'laksaņika', twofold abhidhāvyāpāra of a word is established. The first (mukhya) flows directly from the word without anything coming in between, and is therefore said to be 'nirantarārtha-nistha' i. e. directly apprehended from a word. The other is termed "sāntararthanistha" as it passes through a veil. It starts from word goes through mukhyārtha i. e. jāti -- and rests in vyakti at the next step. It is 'sāntarartha-nistha' because it has antara=vyavadhāna, in form of first meaning which is jāti-rūpa.
Mukula accepts a four-fold division of abhidhā : (pp. 4, ibid) - samprati mukhyā'bhidhā-vyāpārasya cāturvidhyam abhidhīyate "tatra mukhyas' caturbhedo
jñeyo jātyādi-bhedatah” Mukula says that the Mahābhāsyakāra has suggested a four-fold classification of words in form of jāti-sabda, guna-sabda, kriyā-sabda and yadệcchā-sabda. When words operate to convey their meaning (svārthābhidhānāya pravartta-mānānām), they are coloured by the upādhis i. e. attributes — upadhyuparañita-visaya-vivekatvād upādhi-nibandhanā pravrttiḥ. This upādhi i. e. attribute is twofold, viz. vaktr-sannivesita, i. e. which is grafted by the speaker, i. e. which is not natural to it, and vastu-dharma' i. e. one that naturally resides in an object. The first is illustrated by such words as 'dittha' and the like. The form of such words is collected by the last letter — "antyabuddhi-nirgļāhyam samhịtakramam svarūpam" (pp. 5, ibid). This capacity to yield meaning is injected into a particular word by a speaker, who wants to flash the abhidhā-power of that particular word according to his own choice. — “tat khalu tām tām abhidhāśaktim abhivyañjayatā vaktrā, yadrcchayā tasmin tasmin samjñini upādhitayā samniveśyate.” (pp. 5)
It may be noted that as Mukula was posterior to Anandavardhana, he knew. vyañjanā very well and yet he willingly disowns it. He uses such words as "abhi-vyañjayatā' but he does not encourage 'vyañjanā-sakti' of a word. He only means, “making it manifest, or making it flash something."

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Mukula considers another view point also. Says he — some people hold that no such 'samhịta-krama-svarūpa' is injected into the 'samjñi' because there cannot be such form independent of 'da’kāra, etc. Thus it being 'abhāvātmaka', it virtually does not exist. For these people, the yadrcchaśabdatva of such words as dittha' and the like is also formed because for them also words such as dittha' and the like, having imagined (kalpita) samudāyabhāva, come into exercise for "abhidhāna' of whatever samjñā is desired, through the power manifested through the speaker's desire. The idea is, in the object which is called by the name of dittha, even if some imagined dittha-tva' is not there, in the sense of the meaning conveyed by this particular word, the word dittha itself will be taken as its meaning. (pp. 5): "yesām api ca 'da'kārādi-varņa-vyatirikta-samhịta-krama-svarūpābhāvāt na ditthādi-sabda-svarūpam samhsta-kramam samjñisu adhyavasyate, iti darśanam, tesām api vaktr-yadrcchā'-bhivyajyamāna-saktibhedānusārena kalpanika-samudaya-rupasya ditthädeh sabdasya tat tat samjñā'bhidhānāya pravartamānatvāt yadệcchā śabdatvam ditthādīnām upapadyata eva."
Mukula of course, sides with the earlier view of the vaiyākaranas.
Vastu-dharma-rupa upādhi is also two-fold, ésādhya' and 'siddha'. The former are the words expressing action – i. e. they are kriyāśabdas, e.g. 'pacati' and the like. The latter i.e. 'siddha upādhi' is also twofold such as 'jāti' and 'guna'. Jāti' is said to be prāna-prada-vastudharma. No object can own its form without its relation with “jāti'. So, jāti' is said to be 'prānaprada-siddha-vastudharma'. Mukula quotes Vākyapadiya : "gaur iti; na hi gauḥ svarūpeṇa gauh, näpya-gauḥ gotvábhisambandhāt tu gauh." . Some attribute (upādhi) becomes the cause of viśesādhäna for an object which has obtained its own form : (pp. 5, ibid) : 'kaścit punar upādhir labdha-svarūpasya-vastunah višesādhānahetuh, yathā śuklādir ganah.” - i. e. like 'guna' in form of whiteness etc. These qualities such as whiteness etc. are not responsible for the object to attain its own form. For that only 'jāti' is capable. But after the attainment of its own form, it becomes instrumental in its 'višesādhāna' - i.e. in laying down further its speciality. The 'guna's such as 'paramānutva' - 'atom-ness' or the quality of being an

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atom, which are permanent (i. e. nitya), are also varieties of 'guna' - "teşām api sarvesām guna-jātīyatvāt, they are also of the same type as these, i. e. suklatva and the like. As they are 'nitya' they may be like 'jāti', but because they are 'višesādhānahetu', they are termed gunas, and not jāti. Thus Mukula concludes : (pp. 6, ibid) - "tad evam prāna-pradopādhinibandhanatyam yasya śabdasya sa jāti-sabdo yathā gavādih. yasmāt labdha-svarūpasya vastuno višeşādhāna-hetuḥ arthaḥ pratīyate, sa gunaśabdo yathā śuklādih.”
We may observe that these words are taken up fully by Mammața. So, Mukula not only serves as a shaping influence for Bhoja but also for Mammata to some extent because he, i.e. Mukula follows the lead of the grammarians such as Patañjali and Bhartphari.
Now, Mukula considers pūrva-paksa. It goes like this — Is it not possible that words connoting 'guna', 'kriyā' or 'yadịcchā' — all can be taken as jātiśabdas ? For example take the word śukla. Now the whiteness in milk, conch, balākā (= name of a bird), etc. is really different but a common word sukla' is used for a variety of white colour. Thus jāti-nibandhanatva' - of 'guna-vācī' words is seen. This can be said of kriyā sabdas also. The kriyā of cooking is different in case of molasses, sesamum, rice etc. and yet it is conveyed by the same word viz. pacati.' The yadrcchā words such as dittha' etc. as spoken by humans, parrots etc. are really different and yet because of jāti i.e. 'dittha-śabdatva' they are taken to be one. So, as a result the 'catustayi pravrtti' of words does not hold good : “atasca guna-kriyā yadrccha-śabdānām api jāti-sabdatvāt cațustayi śabdānām pravrttir na upapadyate." (pp. 9, ibid).
The siddhāntin's answer follows : It is not jāti' or 'class' which results in cognition of identity, in case of guna-sabdas or kriyāśabdas. But it is 'samjñi' i.e. the individual who makes for this sense of identity. The difference seen among individuals is the result of their difference in attributes, i. e. the āśraya or substratum. For example, take a face, which when reflected in oil, sword, water or mirror, which are responsible only for the knowledge of the reflections, make for difference seen in the figures seen in them. In the same way, the

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individual quality such as whiteness etc., owing to difference with reference to time, place, and context, and thus due to difference in medium, ‘kāraṇabheda'
appear differt when vested in a conch, and the like. The colour looks, as though different. But thereby 'śuklatva' - jāti' is not proved to have existence. For 'jati' is that one 'dharma' which resides in many. But the substratum of the imagined śuklatva jāti, viz. śukla-vyakti is basically one and identical. Same is the case with such words as 'pacati', 'dittha', etc. Thus the 'vyakti' in form of pāka-kriyā is one and the same, and so also the individual: - samjni named 'dittha'. The illusory manifoldness - nānātva seen in different stages of pākakriyā, or in an individual at different years such as of a child, young boy, young man, etc. etc.- - makes, for this wrong perception of jāti in such cases. This is not real. Says Mukula (pp. 10, ibid) - "atra api ekasyā eva pākādikriya-vyakteḥ, ditthādi-śabda-vyakteḥ, ditthādeśca samjñino yathā-kramam abhivyañjakānām pākādīnām tathā dhvanīnām vayo'vasthā-viśeṣāṇām kaumārādīnām ca yo bhedas tad vaśena nānāvidhena rūpeṇa avabhāsamānatvāt sthitam etat sabda-pravṛtti-nimittānām sabdarthaś caturvidhaḥ iti."
After this Mukula turns to the second variety of abhidha, i.e. lākṣaṇika abhidha. This also is two-fold. The AVM 2B reads: "Suddhopacara-miśratvät lakṣaṇā dvividhā matā."
Because of its being either śuddha or upacaramiśra, lakṣaṇā is two-fold. The illustrations are 'gangayam ghosah' and 'gaur vāhīkaḥ' respectively. The śuddha-lakṣaṇā is also divided two-fold, such as upādāna-lakṣaṇā and lakṣaṇa-lakṣanā (AVM 3A). Mukula suggests that when something else is imposed to support one thing. "sva-siddhyarthatayā” kṣepo yatra vastvantarasya tat (AVM 3B). - This is called upādānam; or 'inclusive' variety the other is the opposite of this (AVM IV A) lakṣaṇam tu tad-viparyāsato matam." This is exclusive type. We know that all this has been accepted by Mammata without challanging. But the illustration that Mukula cites for upādānalakṣaṇa viz. "gaur-anuvandhyaḥ" is rejected by Mammata. It is taken as 'arthāpatti' or presumption or inference from circumstances, i.e. implication, for in the illustration cited by Mukula we cannot show either rudhi or prayojana which is the basis of lakṣaṇā. Mammața also feels that sabda

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pramāṇa is resorted to only when other pramānas do not operate. Here, govyakti in the present illustration of 'gaur-anuvandhyaḥ' is known through implication. So it is no use utilizing a sabda-vrtti here.
Laksana-laksaņā occurs when one's meaning is sacrificed to obtain the other sense, as in "gangāyām ghosah”.
Mukula proceeds to give a four-fold division of upacāra-miśrā laksanā (AVM. 4B-5A). He says :
āropā'dhyavasānäbhyām
śuddha-gaunopacārayoḥ (4B) AVM. pratyekam bhidyamānatvāt
upacāras' caturvidhah.” (5A) AVM. Thus superimposition (āropa) and introsusception (adhvasāna) make for these varieties. Thus in all four-fold upacara-metaphorical imposition is available.
Thus Mukula first begins with upacāra or identification as suddha and gauna. Suddha is that which has no upamāna-upameya-bhāva or similarity at its basis. The guna in form of similarity is absent here. This is illustrated by such examples as 'āyurghỉtam' where kārya-kāraṇabhāva -- is at its base. Gauna upacāra, or identification based on guna such as similarity between upamāna and upameya which results in superimposition of the śabda and artha describing upamāna on that concerning upameya, is illustrated as in "gaur vāhikah".
Now this two-fold upacāra or identification is also two-fold on the basis of adhyāropa or superimposition and adhyavasāna or absorption, i. e. partial and complete identification. Adhyāropa or partial imposition occurs when the difference between the object superimposed and the basic object on which superimposition is done, is not concealed, i. e. the difference between the two is not eroded. Here a lesser object whose identity is not covered up is seen clearly and on this object, another object of superior quality is superimposed. This is called 'adhyāropa'. This is illustrated in both the illustrations i. e. 'āyur ghrtam' and 'gaur-vāhikah cited above. Prior to this

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[8] Mukula had made one remark that : kecit tu upacāre śabdopacāram eva manyante, na arthopacāram. tad ayuktam. śabdopacārasya arthopacāraavinābhāvitvāt.” (pp. 16) i.e. only śabdopacāra is not possible as believed by some, because it necessarily involves 'arthopacāra'. It may also be observed that when Mukula says (pp. 16), dvividhaḥ upacāraḥ, śuddho gauņasca. tatra śuddho yatra mūla-bhūtasya...” This suggests that Mukula is in favour of taking only upacāra based on similarity as real upacara. In Mammața's mind this impression was lying at the root. It is therefore that by the end of his discussion on upādāna-laksaņā and laksana-laksanā, he writes : "ubhayarūpā ca iyam suddhā, upacarena a-miśritatvāt”. So, for Mammața also ‘upacāra' is basically rooted in similarity. Precisely for this, Mammața does not use the term 'upacāra' while treating sāropā and sādhyavasānikā. Mammața also did not favour the upacara which was sabda-gata.
Mukula explains faropa' and 'adhyavasāna' as : (pp. 18, ibid): “yatra adhyāropya-āropa visayayor bhedam anapahnutyaiva vastvantare vastvantaram upacaryate tatra an-apahnuta-svarūpa eva vastvantare vastvantarasya adhikasya āropyamānatvād adhyāropah.” - We have explained it as above. Adhyavasāna is said to be there - When, “yatra tu upacaryamāņa-visayasya upacaryamāne antar-līnatayā vivaksitatvāt svarūpāpahnavaḥ kriyate, tatra adhyavasānam.”
The suddha-upacāragata-adhyavasāna is seen in, "pañcālāh”. The word 'pañcāla’ through lakṣita-laksaņā, it being the place for stay of a child of pañcāla, is itself used in the sense of a village : "atra-hi pañcālāpatyanivāsādhikaranatvāj janapade lakṣita-lakṣaṇayā pañcala-sabdah prayujyate." (pp. 18, ibid). Gauna upacāragata-adhyavasāna is illustrated as in, ‘rājā”. Here 'gaunatva' does not come to mind immediately, but only after some thought is given to it. So, it looks as it were it is ordinary - bhrastam iva', for the importance of rūdhi is more powerful here. Thus we have 'adhyavasāna-yukta-gauna-upacara' here.
When to these four upacara-based varieties two as stated above are added, we have in all six varieties of laksaņā - "etena caturvidhena upacāreņa saha pūrvoktau dvau laksaņābhedau samkalayya șaț prakārā laksaņā vaktavyā” — observes Mukula (pp. 18, ibid).

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[9]
Now this lakṣaṇā is said to be 'tri-skandha' (i. e. having three basic varieties) on account of its śuddhatva, adhyāropa and adhyavasana: "eṣā ca lakṣaṇā triskandhā, śuddhatvāt, adhyāropād, adhyavasānāt ca." (pp. 202, ibid) Thus when these three each are divided into two we have a scheme of six-fold lakṣaṇā. Mammaṭa also has the same observation : "lakṣaṇā tena ṣad-vidhā" (K.P.II). Mukula explains the sub-divisions such as -
"taṭasthe lakṣaṇā śuddhā
-
syad āropastvadūrage || (AVM-VB) nigirne'dhyavasānam tu
rūḍhyāsannataratvataḥ | (AVM VIA)
i. e. suddha lakṣaṇā will be with reference to tatastha (i. e. independently present), 'āropa' i. e. superimposition is with reference to 'a-dūraga', and 'adhyavasana' or complete identification is in 'nigarana' i. e. swallowing up. This is two-fold; either through rūḍhi or asannatarata i. e. nearness."
The idea is lakṣaṇā is said to be two-fold such as 'upādāna' and 'lakṣaṇa'. Now wherever this occurs, the lakṣya object is not covered up (anuparaktatvāt taṭasthatayā pratīyamāne) by the 'lakṣaka' object, and so it remains 'taṭastha' i. e. independent of the other object.
This means that the 'lakṣya' object is not apprehended as covered up by the 'lakṣaka' object, e.g. "gangāyām ghoṣaḥ". Here 'tata' or the bank of the river Ganges is in mind and so,"gangāyām" is used, not 'vitastāyām'. So, 'taṭa' is not realized as completely covered up by a special flow of water, because that special flow is restristed to the limit of only indicating the bank from a distance. So, the apprehension of the bank takes place independently, and not as identified with the Ganges. We have to accept the same situation in case of upādāna lakṣaṇā also, e.g. in "The fat Devadatta does not eat by day.". "tatha hi- 'gangāyām ghoṣa' iti atra ghoṣádhikaraṇa-bhūta-taṭopalakṣaṇábhisamdhanena 'gangāyām ghoṣo na vitastāyām' iti gangā-śabde prayujyamāne tatasya sroto-viseṣena-upalakṣakatva-mātropayuktatvena uparāgo na pratīyate, tatasthatvena eva tasya tatasya pratyayāt. evam upādāne'pi vācyam - yathā, 'pino devadatto diva na bhuńkta' iti." (AVM pp. 20, ibid)

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[10]
Mukula further observes that when it is required for the tata to express itself as covered up by the special flow and yet its own form is also to be revealed, then in the illustration viz. 'gangāyām ghosah', first there is superimposition i.e. āropa, for in such an āropa there is apprehension of tata as coloured by the flow. So, the apprehension takes this form : "ghosa or dwelling is on such a bank which as it is in proximity of a special flow of water, is itself of the form of the flow itself.' As against that when the idea is to convey extreme proximity — ‘atyanta asannatā', and when the particular statement is used to convey this extreme proximity, then the bank is presented as completely covered up by the special flow. So, it is shown that the dwelling is, directly on the Ganges, not anywhere else.' There it is the case of complete identification or swallowing up -- 'adhyavasāna' : "yadā tu gangā-sabdābhidheyasya sroto-višeșasya a-vidūra-vartitayā taţam anapahnutasvarūpam sroto-viśesoparaktayā vivaksitam bhavati tadā pūrvasmin udācharane adhyāropo bhavati. srotovišesoparaktasya tatasya pratīteḥ sroto-višeșa-avidūra-vartitvāt srotovišeşa-rūpe tate ghosa iti. yadā tu atyantam āsannatām ghosam prati srotoviśeșasya pratipādayitum etad vākyam sroto-viśesanigīrnatayā taţam apahnutya prayujyate 'gangāyām eva sāksād ghosaḥ na tu anyatra iti', tadā adhyavasānam. (pp. 20, 21, ibid)
Thus, “gaur vāhīkah” and “gaur eva ayam”, are illustrations of gaunaupacāra-mülaka, sāropā and sādhyavasānikā, respectively. Just as adhyavasānalaksaņā is possible with reference to proximity, similarly it is possible with reference to rūdhi also : "yathā ca asannataratvena adhyavasānam pūrvam pravibhaktam tathā rūdhatvena api pravibhaktavyam” (pp. 22 ibid). The illustrations are pañcālāh' and 'rāja'. Precisely for this the kārikā said, "rūdhyāsannataratvatah” rūdhatvāt āsannataratvāt ca nigirne arthe adhyavasānam syād ityarthaḥ.” (pp. 22, ibid). Thus rudhi is also based on a forgotten relation, while prayojanavati has its sambandha fresh in mind. Mukula has not counted 'prayojana' as the hetu of lakṣaṇā.
Mukula here discusses a prima facie view. The objector's contention is — "The ‘mukhyārtha' i. e. primary meaning is necessarily, conveyed by word itself. As against this, the lāksanika' i.e. secondary meaning is not collected through the word. To put it more clearly, it can be said that, the

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[11]
kārya-kāraṇa-relation of a particular meaning with a particular word is ascertained through 'anvaya-vyatireka'. Again this apprehension is with reference only to the four-fold primary meaning such as jāti, guna, kriyā and yadrcchā. But this is not so in case of the six-fold lākṣanika i.e. secondary meaning. This again is in the fitness of things, for if the word is connected directly even with the secondary sense, then even this ‘lākṣaṇika' also will be branded as 'mukhya'. Again, as the lāksanika artha is connected with the mukhya i.e. primary sense, and in that case if it is held that this secondary sense is also derived through the agency of the word itself, then the question which arises is that when a word also conveys the secondary sense along with conveying of its primary sense also, is it so that this secondary sense is conveyed in a sāpeksa way or with some expectancy or nir-apeksa i.e. in an independent way without expectancy ? — If it is conveyed independently i.e. (nirapeksah), then its apprehension should take place for all time. If on the other hand its apprehension occurs in a correlated way (sāpekṣaḥ), then the question is what is expected here ? "atha sabdasya mukhyo yo'sāvarthas tena saha sambandho laksyamāṇasya arthasya drsta iti tad-dvāreņa tasya avagatir iti abhidhīyate, evam sati yadi nirapekṣaḥ svārtha-pratipādana-dvāreņa laksyamāņam artham avagamayati tadā sarvadā tam artham avagamayet, atha sāpekṣaḥ, kim tasya apeksanīyam iti āśańkya āha” - (pp. 24, ibid)
With reference to the above objection, Mukula observes that — "vaktur vākyasya vācyasya rūpabhedāvadhāraṇāt laksaņā sat-prakāraisā vivektavyā manīsibhiḥ.” (7A) (pp. 24, ibid)
"The learned divide this lakṣaṇā, in a six-fold fashion, keeping in mind the formal varieties of vaktā i.e. speaker, vākya i.e. the sentence and vācya i.e. the sense conveyed." The idea is that each of vaktā, vākya and vācya are either staying independently or with one of the other two : (i) 'Vaktā' is that person, who utters a sentence to convey some sense to someone else. (ii) Vākya' is the use of words having expectancy and which jointly convey a single sense. (iii) Vācya' is the meaning which is the object of a word either through its primary or secondary function. All these three have two sub

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[12]
divisions each- i. e. samasta or vyasta i. e. each one stays either with either of the other two, or stays independently. The idea is that with reference to the different situations caused by space and time, these factors are united either in a 'samasta' or 'vyasta' form. As a result there occurs a difference in their nature. Due to this difference in nature, the experts have thought of the six-fold division of lakṣaṇā: "eteṣām trayāṇām vakrādīnām vyasta-samastabheda-bhinnänām deśa-kālāvasthā-vailakṣanya-gata-samasta-vyasta-bhedasamyojitānām yaḥ svabhava-bheda-prapañcaḥ, tata eṣā ṣat-prakārā lakṣaṇā paramarśa-kuśalair vivecanīya." (pp. 24, 25, ibid). Through this six-fold meaning only, a word causes the apprehension of the secondary sense. Thus, through the agency i. e. karana-samagri such as vaktā or speaker and the rest, the word is connected with the secondary sense and then becomes capable to give the secondary sense. The idea is that the word has expectancy with reference to these six-fold vaktā, vācya etc., when it gives its primary sense. Then, through usage - - vṛddha-vyavahāra through this primary sense, it fixes its relation with the secondary sense. Through the said six-fold meaning the word conveys the secondary sense. So, a word does not give a secondary sense, till its relation with secondary sense is not comprehended. This relation is not brought about naturally, but only through the agency or kāraṇa-samagri such as vaktā or speaker etc., and also only after the primary sense is collected. As is said by Sabarasvamin - "Then, how is it that a different word (= say, Ganga) is used for a different sense (i.e. say, tata) ? The answer is - In our opinion, through the medium of conveying of one's own meaning." (Mi. Su. I.4.12) Here, the secondary sense is intended through the primary sense. Śabara has further stated, (Mi. Sü. I. IV. I) that lakṣaṇā is from day to day usage, i. e. laukiki. Through this it is suggested by him that, when a word proceeds towards the secondary sense, it has an expectancy of a sort of relation. By 'loka' is meant the means of knowledge that come into function in day to day affairs. So, 'laukiki' means 'that which is known in ordinary parlance', i. e. that which is known through popular usage, i. e. that which is established by a word which carries some relation "etad uktam bhavati. na śabdānām anavadhārita-lākṣaṇikārthasambandhānām lakṣaṇikam artham prati gamakatvam, na'pi ca tatra sākṣāt

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[13]
sambandha-grahanam, kim tarhi ? vaktrādi-sāmagry-apeksayā svārthavyavadhānena iti. yad uktam-ācārya-śabarasvāminā” -- katham punaḥ paraśabdaḥ paratra vartate ? svārthābhidhānena iti brūmah." --- iti. atra hi svārtha-dvārena laksyamāņārthā'bhinivesitā sabdānām uktā. punaśca asau eva āha — “laksanā'pi laukiki eva”, iti. atra hi sambandhāvadhāranasāpekśāņām sabdānām laksyamāṇe arthe pravịttir uktā. vyavahāropārūdhāni hi pratya-kşādīni pramāṇāni loka-śabdena abhidhīyante. loka eva viditā laukikī, vyavahāragamyā, parigrhīta-sambandha-sabda-nisthā iti arthaḥ.” Mukula here also quotes from Kumārila -
"nirudhā laksanāḥ kāścit
samarthyad abhidhānavat, kriyante sāmpratam kāścit
kāścin naiva tv aśaktitah." - iti. i.e. Some laksanās are based on usage. They carry the strength of conveying a meaning like the primary function (= abhidhānavat). While some (other) laksanās are formed on the spot. Still others are not formed at all (i.e. they are not acceptable at all), because they are bereft of the power to convey sense." (Tantravārtika-3/1/6 arunādhikarana).
The first one is illustrated by ‘rāja' and the like. The second variety which is floated on the spot, i. e. the 'tātkālikī, is the result of the context of vrddha-vyavahāra, vaktā (i. e. the speaker) etc. such as seen in the verse, "snigdha-syāmala.” etc. In this verse the word 'lipta' has its primary sense contradicted because lustre or känti has no inherent capacity to smear anything as is done by saffron powder. This is so with reference to words such as 'suhrd', 'rāma', etc. also. The third variety is such which is not marked even in the vỊddhavyavahāra or practice of the seniors and the like. Nor, do we find such situation as in case of words such as 'lipta' and the like. So, this third type is unacceptable. They cannot be put into practice. What Mukula drives at is that laksaņā is possible only in cases of such words as are put into practice by seniors, or which are similar to such practice. Laksaņā is not possible anywhere and everywhere. For in that case any word will be able to deliver any sense, and this we do not find

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[14]
in reality "tad evam, vaktrādisāmagrī-anupraveśena śabdānām svārtham arpayatām arthantaram prati svarupa-dvāreņa sajātīya-śabda-dvāreņa vā gamakatayā avadhāritānām lakṣakatvam iti sthitam." (pp. 30, ibid). The principle established is that, in the context of the instrumentality (samagri) of the speaker etc., a word becomes indicator (lakṣaka) only when through the same instrument (such as vaktā etc.), they are accepted as conveying meaning through their very form either in the practice of the seniors or through such other device."
After dealing with the four-fold 'mukhya artha' and the six-fold lakṣaṇā Mukula discusses a fresh problem. He discusses the four views concerning (i) abhihitānvaya, (ii) anvitābhidhāna, (iii) the samuccaya of these two and (iv) the 'abhava' of these two. He discusses the position of lakṣaṇā with reference to these four alternatives. Says he
"anvaye' bhihitānām sā
-
vācyatvad urdhvam isyate (7B)
anvitānām tu vācyatve, väcyatvasya puraḥ sthitaḥ, dvaye dvayam, akhande tu
-
väkyārtha paramarthataḥ - 8 nastyasau kalpite'rthe tu
purvavat pravibhajyate." - 9A
i.e. In abhihitānvayavāda lakṣaṇā is believed to take place after vācyatva is over. In anvitābhidhānavāda it is believed to occur prior to the primary i.e. vācyatva. In the two (together), at both the places (i.e. earlier and later), and where 'akhandata' is accepted with reference to sentence sense lakṣaṇā does not take place at all. It is believed and divided as done earlier in an imagined sense such as word-sense (because in reality only the sentence-sense exists)."
Mukula observes (pp. 48, ibid).: akhande tu 'vākyarthe'sau lakṣaṇā paramārthena nāsti. bhinnānām padārthānām paramārthato'bhidheya-bhāvasya anupapadyamānatvāt, tad āśritatvācca lakṣaṇāyāḥ kalpita-padarthāśrayeṇa tu sā lakṣaṇā yathā-ruci pūrvavad abhihitānvaya-anvitābhidhāna-tat-samuccaya

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kalpanaya vibhaktavyabhāge niveśyā, parasparasya deśa-kālāvacchedenā'śeṣa
[15]
vyavahartṛ-nisthatayā rūḍhatvāt.
Mukula observes that in all the four abhihitānvayavāda and the rest, wherever it is primary sense, the functioning of lakṣaṇā is according to Mukula functions when
(i) the primary sense, being contradicted by any other means of knowledge becomes impossible,
(ii) the lakṣārtha being closer to mukhyārtha,
(iii) and also when this acceptance of the secondary sense - 'sāntarārthagrahana' - rests on some 'prayojana' or reason :
--
"ya ca iyam ṣaṭ-prakārā lakṣaṇā pūrvam uktā, sā -
(i) mukhyārthasya pramāṇāntara-bādhitatvena-a-sambhavāt,
(ii) lakṣyamāṇasya ca arthasya mukhyārtham prati āsannatvāt,
(iii) sāntarārtha-grahanasya ca sa-prayojanatvāt iti evamvidha-kāraṇatritayātmaka-sāmagrī-samāśrayeṇa vṛddha-vyavahāre paridṛśyate.
Now, says Mukula, the 'asannatva' or nearness of lakṣyartha with mukhyārtha is five-fold, according to Bhartṛmitra-such as,
"abhidheyena sambandhāt

sādṛśyāt samavāyataḥ
vaiparītyāt kriya-yogāt
alternatives such as the not proper to accept the suggested. This lakṣaṇā,
lakṣaṇā pañcadhā matā” iti. (pp. 50, ibid)
i.e. through (i) relation with the primary meaning, (ii) through similarity (iii) 'samavāya' i. e. intimate relation, (iv) opposition (iv) relation with verbkriyāyoga; lakṣaṇā is said to be five-fold. Thus, says Mukula, the 'prayojana' is also two-fold. One 'prayojana' is such which depends on vṛddhavyavahāra which is beginningless in accepting the meaning that is conveyed and therefore depending on the established custom. This is as good as 'rūdhi' or convention, e. g. in case of words such as 'dvi-refa' etc. This word is having two 'ra'-kāras, as the word 'bhramara', meaning a bee, consists two 'ra'kāras.

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So, 'dvi-refa' — i. e. one having two-'ra'kāras, also conveys the same sense without dragging in the word 'bhramara’. Thus, this is as good as 'rūdhi' or convention. Now Mukula has suggested that 'following a rūdhi' is a 'prayojana' here.
The second prayojana is different from the above rūdhi-tulya-prayojana. Mukula observes (pp. 50, ibid): "aparam tu rūdhyanusaranātmakam yat prayojanam uktam, tad-vyatirikta-vastvantara-gatasya samvijñāna-padasya rūpa-višesa-pratipādanam nāma, yathā pūrvam udāhstam, “rāmo'smīti”.
This second prayojana is in form of establishment of a special form of an object, which is concealed in that object, but the conveying of which is intended. The illustration is, “rāmo'smi...” etc.
Both these purposes or aims (i. e. prayojanas) are to be determined through the secondary meaning arrived at, with the help of the above mentioned five-fold relation, when the primary meaning is set aside, it being in-appropriate.
Now it may be observed here, that in nirūdhā laksaņā Mukula tries to find a 'prayojana' in form of 'following convention" as established by usage made current by seniors. But accepting or imagining a 'prayojana' in rūdhimūlā, does not look possible to us. Dr. Rewaprasad observes that even if we accept what Mukula holds here, greater charm is caused by such usages as dvi-refa' in place of the direct mention of 'bhramara'. Thus, causing a greater charm could be a prayojana here. But we feel that it is better to hold only rūdhi as the cause of laksanā here and such rūdhi in itself carries its own charm, for ultimately laksanā or say, poetic deviation of any kind causes charm. So, rūdhi laksaņā has an inherent charm which does not stand in need of any prayojana.
Mukula provides illustrations for this five-fold laksanā. At the end of it he observes that in this five-fold laksaņā the expressed meaning is at times (i) atyanta-tiraskrta i. e. completely lost, or (ii) The expressed is either intended or unintended (vivaksita / a-vivaksita) : (pp. 58, ibid) “idānīm pañcavidhasambandha-nibandhanāyām āsattau pūrvopavarnitāyām kvacid vācyasya atitiraskārah, kvacid vivaksitatvam, kvacicca a-vivaksitatvam iti evam vidham

Page #26

[17] trayam yat sahṛdayair upadarśitam, tasya viṣaya-vibhāgam upadarśayitum äha -
sādṛsye vaiparītye ca vācyasya ati-tiraskriya-(10 B) vivakṣā ca avivakṣā ca, sambandha-samaväyayoḥ, upādāne vivakṣā, tra lakṣane tvavivakṣaṇam tiraskriya kriyāyoge, kvacit tad-viparītatā (12 A)
i.e. The expressed is totally abandoned in case of the relations such as sādṛśya and vaiparītya. There is intended and un-intended expressed sense in varieties based on 'sambandha' and 'samavāya'. In 'upādāna' we have only the vivakṣā of the expressed, i.e. it is always expected, and in 'lakṣaṇa' there is only a-vivakṣā, while in 'kriya-yoga' the expressed is either abandoned (tiraskriya) or not. Mukula explains this with reference to the illustrations cited by him, but we feel there is overlappings in these cases and his treatment is not as scientific as either of his predecessor Anandavardhana or of his successor Mammata.
Mukula also observes (pp. 66, ibid): "lakṣaṇāmārgāvagāhitvam tu dhvaneh sahṛdayair nutanatayopavarnitasya vidyata iti diśam unmilayitum idam atra uktam. etacca vidvadbhiḥ kuśāgrīyayā buddhyā nirūpaṇīyam, na tu jhagityeva asuyitavyam iti alam atiprasangena."
i. e. "This is just to suggest that the newly advocated dhvani by the connoisseurs falls into the region of 'lakṣaṇa' only. The learned with very sharp intelligence have to brood over our observation and that it need not be immediately discarded. So now, enough of further elaboration."
Mukula thus tries to incorporate 'dhvani' under lakṣyärtha and thus for him vyañjanā is part of lakṣaṇa which again is abhidha itself because it i.e. lakṣaṇā is only an extension of abhidhā.
Mukula concludes to his satisfaction that the word-element which is in itself undivided in form of pure sabda-tattva, i. e. prior to its being classified into the four-fold scheme of jātivācaka, etc. the word-element which is 'a-bhinna' in its original form, attains to the 'vivarta' i. e. illusive change in form of 'sabda', 'artha' and 'sambandha'. i. e. word, its meaning and their relation later, then only the abhidha-śakti is said to be ten-fold. In its original non-dualistic form of word, there is no scope for this ten-fold division: (pp. 69, ibid)

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"idānīm sakala-śabda-a-vibhāgātmakasya śabda-tattvasya yadā sabdārthasambandha-tritaya-rūpatayā rajju-sarpatayā vivarta-mānatvam tadā etad abhidhāvsttam daśa-vidha-vyavahāro-pārohitayopapadyate, na tu samhịtārthavāk-tattva-visayatayā iti darśayitum äha -
vivartamānam vāk-tattvam
daśadhaiva vilokyate. - 12 samhrta-kramabhede tu
tasmin teşām kuto gati).” - 13A ityetad abhidhāvrttam
daśadhātra vivecitam. 13B mukhyasya abhidhāvịttasya prakārāścatvāraḥ lākṣanikasya tu sad iti evam daśaprakārakam abhidhā-vṛttam atra vivecitam.
This treatment of Mukula's views suggests how he has influenced Bhoja in taking abhidh, as three-fold such as mukhyā, gauni and laksanā. We know that this approach is different from the one seen in the Kashmir school the highest expression of which we notice in Jagannātha. But prior to that we have also to take note of Kuntaka and Mahimā also, who influenced the Mālava school like Mukula. The flowering of the thought as seen in the Kashmir school is to be traced in Anandavardhana, who discusses abhidh, only from the angle of its difference from vyañjanā, and then in the treatment of Mammata and his followers. Jagannātha of course comes last but in him we see the highest flight of abstract thinking and the final word on śabda-vịttis. Mukula and Kuntaka are viewed as shaping influences for the Mālava tradition as seen in Bhoja and also for the Kashmir tradition as seen in Mammata, for the K. P. is influenced by both the Dhy, and also the Abhidhāvrtta-matrkā of Mukula. Hemacandra we will go to observe follows Mammata, but absorbs the teaching of Mukula and Bhoja also, while Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha, Visvanatha and Keśava follow the lead of Mammata. So, now we will consider Kuntaka who like Mukula had his share in shaping the views of Bhoja, because for Kuntaka also, abhidha' has a connotation wider than permitted by the Kashmir school of thought.

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[19] Kuntaka
After explaining the general definition of poetry and before explaining the special definition of it, Kuntaka first of all explains the form of word and meaning. He observes : evam kāvyasya sāmānyalaksane vihite višesalaksanam upakramate. tatra śabdārthayos tāvat svarūpam nirūpayati - 'vācyo'rtho vācakah sabdah
prasiddham iti yadyapi, tathā'pi kavya-mārge'smin
paramārtho'yam etayo)"
– V J. I. 8 (pp. 13, Edn. K. Krishnamoorthy) i.e. 'After the general explanation of poetry, the question of its detailed definition is taken up. First of all, the nature of word and meaning is examined :
That 'meaning' is what is signified, and word is that which signifies, is so well known that it needs no elaboration. Yet, in the province of poetry, their true nature is as follows :" (V.J.1.8) (Trans. K. Kri.) (pp. 300, ibid)
Kuntaka goes on observing that the general meaning of the terms, 'word' and 'meaning' is of course, well known. The 'word' is the signifier and the 'meaning' is the signified : "yo vācakaḥ pratyāyakaḥ sa śabdah, yo vācyaś ca abhidheyaḥ so'rtha iti' (pp. 14, ibid). Thus the word for Kuntaka is that which causes apprehension of meaning, and the meaning is that which is expressed i. e. apprehended. Now, let us first make it clear that Kuntaka also does not attempt any scientific definition of abhidhā, vācaka sabda and vācyārtha here. He does not have a fool-proof scheme as is seen in the K.P. of Mammața. Or, it may be that he knowingly defies the ruling of Anandavardhana who clearly distinguished between abhidhā, laksaņā and vyañjanā, and vācya, laksya and vyangya senses which are rendered in English generally as the expressed, indicated and suggested senses. No; he has his own approach and is closer to Mukula in the sense that he names only ‘abhidhā' as the 'sabdavrtti or say, višistā abhidhā, which is wide enough to include laksaņā and vyañjanā in its fold, provided this deviation is poetic.

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[20] It is this trend which is perhaps inherited by Bhoja also. We will see that it is Bhoja who tries to furnish illustrations, not from worldly usage only, but from pure poetry to illustrate the main three divisions of what he calls abhidhā, with its any number of sub-divisions. This trend is perhaps inherited by Bhoja both from Mukula to some extent and Kuntaka to a greater extent. For Kuntaka, as far as poetry, the result of the effort of a poet, is concerned, there is only one function of the poetic word and it is ‘abhidhā' which is not to be confused with the abhidhā or power of expression of a word giving the conventional meaning only, as is seen in the Kashmir school of thought, but it is the power of poetic expression', which includes poetic usages such as laksaņā or indication and vyañjanā i.e. suggestion, provided they carry the stamp of being pure and beautiful poetic expression, i.e. artistic expression only.
Kuntaka, as Dr. Krishnamoorthy wants us to believe uses such terms as dyotaka', 'dyotya' and vyañjaka', 'vyanjya' in the sense of indicatorindicated (i.e. laksaka-laksya) and suggestor-suggested. But we are not convinced. It is only in a very loose sense that the terms dyotaka-dyotya are used by Kuntaka, and we fail to ascertain the exact import of these terms. Normally in the Kashmir school, these terms are taken as synonyms, but Kuntaka does not do it. Whether he takes it to mean laksaka-laksya is also not clear. But it is clear that he is out to include dyotaka-dyotya and vyañjaka-vyangya under his wider vācaka-vācya. He raises an objection and then silences it to his satisfaction thus. (Under V. J. I. 8 pp. 14, ibid) :
"nanu ca dyotaka-vyañjakau api śabdau sambhavataḥ, tad asamgrahāt na avyāptih, yasmāt artha-pratīti-kāritva-sāmānyad, upacārāt, tau api vācakau eva. evam dyotya-vyangyayor api arthayoḥ pratyeyatva-sāmānyāt upacārād vacyatvam eva. tasmāt vācakatvam vācyatvam ca śabdārthayor loke suprasiddham yadyapi laksanam tathā'pi asmin alaukike kāvyamārge, kavikarma-vartmani ayam etayor vaksyamāṇaḥ paramārthaḥ kim api apūrvam tattvam ityarthah.”
Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy translates : (pp. 300, ibid) : “The general meaning of the terms 'word' and 'meaning' is quite well known indeed. The 'word' is

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[21]
the signifier and the meaning' is the signified. One might object that the indicative and suggestive words too which have their own signification may yet be termed word' and the above statement would illustrate the fallacy of "too narrow”. Our reply is that they are expressive words by implication, the metaphorical application being based on their similarity with denotative words. Similarly, the meanings alluded to are as good as denoted meaning because of the similarity in point of being understood. Thus, although 'signifying' and 'being signified' are enough qualifications to mark off the nature of word and meaning everywhere in the practical world, they do not serve the purpose of poetry whose province is supra-mundane. Therefore, their essence in the world of poetry deserves to be pointed out clearly as is done in the next verse.”
One thing is clear. Kuntaka knows the difference between pure abhidhā, gaunī, laksaņā and vyañjanā. But he refuses to accept any scheme of śabdavrttis as is done by the Kashmir school. Bhāmaha had rejected certain alamkāras as 'vārtä', and promoted the cause of "vakrābhidheya-sabdoktiḥ”. Ānandavardhana had also advised the poet to be in search of 'special word and sense that make for poetry : “yatnataḥ pratyabhijñeyau, tau sabdārthau mahākaveh” Dhv. I. 8. Kuntaka therefore chooses to concentrate only on the poetic use of word and sense and as he has to give some name to this special poetic power of a word, he gives the name 'abhidhā' to it, which is not the technical abhidhā of the Kashmir school.
Kuntaka, it seems, has no concern for the fool-proof scheme of word / meaning / word-power, as seen in the Kashmir school of thought. He is concerned only with the poetic. On the otherhand we saw Mukula carrying on from grammar and Mimāmsā, but ending in poetry. Bhoja has a much broadbased scheme as we will go to observe and he is trying to absorb both nonpoetic and poetic literature. His scheme with twelvefold relationship of word and meaning of course aims at the poetic in the end. He takes care to illustrate the varieties and sub-varieties of first eight varieties of sähitya from poetic literature and many of his illustrations are read as this or that variety of dhvani in the Dhv. So, clearly we have two trends of thought. One represented by

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[22]
Anandavardhana and his followers who present a perfect scheme and the other by such writers as Mukula, Kuntaka, Bhoja, Mahimā, Dhanañjaya and Dhanika and some others who do not fall in line with the Kashmir school of thought. We will continue with Kuntaka who also forms part of the shaping influence that moulds Bhoja's thinking, Mukula being the earlier one.
As seen above Kuntaka, though not accepting the thinking of the Kashmir school in a sense that he does not welcome the fool-proof scheme of the functions of a word, on the otherhand follows the author of the Dhv. when he talks of 'the unique expression' as 'word'. He observes: (VJ I. 9 pp. 14, ibid)
"sabdo vivakṭitārthaikavācako' nyeṣu satsu api, arthaḥ sahṛdayahlādakāri
sva-spanda sundaraḥ."
"That unique expression which alone can fully convey the poets' intended meaning out of a hundred alternatives before him is to be regarded as 'word'. Similarly that alone which possesses such refreshing natural beauty as to draw the appreciation of delighted readers is to be marked as 'meaning'. (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 300-301, ibid)
That Kuntaka's scheme is broad enough to embrace vyañjanā and vyangyārtha is borne out by the famous illustration from Kumārasambhava, viz. "dvayam gatam..." in which he pin-points the use of the special word "kapalinaḥ", that is the source of beauty. He observes (pp. 15, ibid)
"atra, parameśvara-vācaka-sabda-sahasra-sambhave'pi kapālina' iti bībhatsarasa-ālambana-vibhāva-vācakaḥ śabdaḥ jugupsä"spadatvena prayujyamānaḥ kām api vācaka-vakratām vidadhāti." "Though a thousand and one synonyms are possible to refer to the Almighty Lord Siva, the poet has chosen here the word, "One whom only skulls adorn", in order that, it may suggest disgust through a word which serves here as a pointer to the primary sentiment of the 'horrid'. And he succeeds in endowing the verse with artistic beauty of expression." (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 302, ibid)

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[23]
Kuntaka (V.J.I., vṛtti) further remarks "kavi-vivakṣita-viśeṣābhidhānakṣamatvam eva vācakatva-lakṣaṇam yasmāt pratibhāyām tat-kālollikhitena kenacit parispandena parisphurantāḥ padarthāḥ prakṛta-prastāva-samucitena kenacit utkarsena vā samacchādita-svabhāvāḥ santo vivakṣā-vidheyatvena abhidheyatāpadavīm avatarantaḥ tathāvidha-viśeṣa-pratipadana-samarthenaabhidhänena-abhidhīyamānāś cetas camatkāritām āpadyante."
"Therefore, the proper definition of 'signification' is that capacity to convey the particular shade of thought intended by the poet. In fact, in the world of the poet's creative imagination, things come to life with a touch of original invention; or their real nature gets veiled by a rich afflatus calculated to present the subject in a most attractive light; as such, the process of communication is a slave to the poetic intention. Only when the right verbal correlative for the particular has been found, the delight of the reader is assured.
-
From this it becomes absolutely clear that Kuntaka accepts only one power of word and that is abhidha, or say, 'vicitra abhidha' meaning 'beautiful or artful expression.' It is not the abhidha which signifies only the conventional meaning. But it is that abhidhā - which conveys any meaning intended by the poet, be it lakṣya, dyotya or vyangya. So, his is the 'vicitrā abhidha' which covers up the lakṣaṇā and vyañjana also. So, we may say, Kuntaka, has a definite approach, but no definite scheme. He wants to convey the poetic only.
After mentioning the unique features of words and meanings in poetry as distinct from their commonplace aspect, Kuntaka proceeds to show that there should also be the presence of positive artistic beauty. He observes (V.J.I. 10 pp. 20, ibid) -
"ubhau etau alamkāryau

tayoḥ punar alamkṛtih,
vakroktiḥ eva, vaidagdhya
bhangi-bhanitiḥ ucyate." - (V.J.J. 10)
"Both these are "the adorned". Their adornment consists in the poetic

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[24]
process known as 'artistic turn of speech." (trans. K. Kris. pp. 308, ibid). Thus 'word and sense' are 'alamkārya' and 'vakrokti' is the alamkāra' for Kuntaka. This is what he calls "vicitrā abhidhä" :
"ubhau etau sabdārthau alamkāryau, kenápi sobhātiśayakāriņā alamkaranena yojanīyau. kim tat tayor alamkaranam iti abhidhīyatetayoḥ punaḥ alamkrtiḥ - tayoḥ dvitva-samkhyā-visistayoḥ api alamkrtiḥ prasiddhā-bhidhāna-vyatirekinī vicitrā eva abhidhā.” (vrtti on V J. I. 10 pp. 20, ibid)
"Both these refer to words and meanings which deserve to be looked upon as the subjects of ornamentation for the enhancement of their appeal. "What then is their ornament ?" One might ask. The answer is that though they are two in number, they have only one common ornament.
What exactly is this common ornament. “Artistic turn of speech” is the reply. It stands for a charming and novel utterance peculiar to poetry and distinct from familiar usage. In other words, artistic utterance itself is the ornament in question.” (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 307, ibid)
That Kuntaka is thus a 'kevala-abhidhāvādin”, or better say, “kevalavicitra-abhidhāvādin” is now clear. This follows even from the treatment he presents concerning paryāya-vakrată and upacāra-vakratā as well. In the former he incorporates what we call śābdi vyañjanā.
For upacara-vakratā Kuntaka observes (V.J.II. 13, 14) (pp. 93, ibid)
"yatra dūrāntare'nyasmāt
sāmānyam upacaryate leśenā'pi bhavat kāñcid
vaktum udrikta-vịttitām.” (V.J. II. 13) and, “yan mūlā sarasollekhā
rūpakādir alamkặtih, upacara-pradhānā'sau
vakratā kācid ucyate.” (V.J. II. 14)

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[25]
i. e. "wherein even when the two are far apart from each other, a common attribute, however slight, is metaphorically superimposed in order to indicate that the resemblance is very close.. (13)
and which forms the basis for various pleasing and inventive figures of speech headed by metaphor - such a type of poetic beauty is designated - by the name, 'beauty of metaphorical expression" - (II. 14) (Trans. K. Kris. pp. 381, ibid)
Kuntaka's upacāra-vakratā is 'prayojanavatī gauni laksanā itself. So, he seems to accept laksaņā-mülā-vyañjanā under 'upacāra-vakratā'.
In this context, the author of Ekāvalī, Vidyādhara, observes that, “etena yatra Kuntakena bhaktau antarbhāvito dhvanis tad api...” - But we may say that Kuntaka has only partly subsumed dhvani under bhakti'. Moreover, when Kuntaka on one hand holds that 'word and sense' are ‘alamkāryau', and on the other hand when he rejects the case of 'rasavad alamkāra' on the ground that 'rasa' is always 'alamkārya' and never an ‘alamkāra', he seems to contradict himself. On the otherhand, Anandavardhana has, a perfect scheme, which holds the whole of ‘alamkāra' field as "vācya-vācaka-rūpa”. In short Kuntaka has no perfect scheme and his vicitra-abhidhā is a loose concept thus rendering his approach unscientific.
'Bhoja' as will be observed by us is influenced by Mukula and Kuntaka and carries his own concept of fabhidhā'. But Mahima Bhatta is also an important name who defies the scheme of śabda-vịttis as presented by Anandavardhana and the whole of the Kashmir school of thought.

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Mahimā
Mahimā accepts sādhya-sadhana-bhāva in any verbal function. He not only does not accept Anandavardhana's scheme of the three functions of a word such as abhidhā, laksanā and vyanjanā, but positively denounces it and installs only one function of the word, i.e. only abhidhā and leaves all other meaning to be collected by what he calls 'anumiti' or 'kävyānumiti' i.e. 'poetic inference to be precise. We will have to examine his approach in greater details as below.
While refering to the powers belonging to word and sense, Mahimā, observes Prof. Dr. C. Rajendran (pp. 67, “A study of Mahimabhatta's Vyaktiviveka" pub. Calicut, '91), discusses the various aspects of language like word and sentence. According to him, all verbal expressions should be considered as inference since they consist of establishing something (sādhya) by means of something else (sādhana). The fact that language is used to persuade the hearer to do or not to do something, implies that the hearer has to be convinced of the logic of the speaker's arguments. The hearer has to grasp the connection between sabda and artha, the sādhya and sādhana, through inference and then only he is convinced of the soundness of the speaker's idea :
(vy.viveka, pp. 26, 27, Edn. Dr. Rewāprasāda Dwivedi, Chowkhamba Sktseries, office, Varanasi, '64) - "sarva eva hi śābdo vyavahārah sadhyasādhana-garbhatayā prāyena anumānarūpo'bhyupagantavyaḥ, tasya parapravrtti-nivrtti-nibandhanatvāt, tayońca sampratyaya-asampratyayātmanor anyathākartum aśakyatvatah, na hi yuktim anavagacchan kaścid vipaścid vacana-mātrāt sampratyayabhāg bhavati.”
Mahimā divides sabda into two such as 'pada' or word and 'vākya' or sentence. Word is further subdivided into (i) naman i.e. noun, (ii) ākhyāta or verb, (iii) upasarga i.e. semantic prefix, (iv) nipāta or preposition and (v) karmapravacanīya i.e. adverb. - "dvividho hi śabdah, pada-väkya-bhedāt; tatra padam aneka-prakāram nāmākhyātopa-sarga-nipāta-karmapravacanīya-bhedāt (pp. 27, ibid). 'nāmā' denotes an existing object, which is qualified by either jāti i.e. class, guna, i.e. quality, kriyā i. e. action or dravya i. e. substance. -

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[27] Mahimā observes : (pp. 28, ibid) : 'tatra sattva-pradhānāni nāmāni tāni api bahuprakārāņi sambhavanti. jāti-guna-kriya-dravyāņām tat-pravstti-nimittānām bahutvāt.” Thus jāti, guna etc. are the pravstti-nimittas.
'Artha', for Mahimā, is two-fold, viz. 'vācya' and 'anumeya'. The 'vācya' or expressed is the object of verbal functioning and it is this which is termed ‘mukhya' or principal. He observes : (pp. 47 ibid): "arthopi dvividho, vācyo’numeyaśca. tatra śabda-vyāpāra-visayo vācyaḥ. sa eva mukhya ucyate." yad āhuḥ -
"śrutimătreņa yatrāsya
tādarthyam avasīyate, tam mukhyam artham manyante
gaunam yatnopapāditam." - iti. tata eva, tad anumitād vā, lingabhūtād yad arthāntaram anumīyate so'numeyah. sa ca trividhah vastumātram alamkārā rasadayaśca, iti. tatra ādyau vācyau api sambhavataḥ anyaḥ tu anumeya eva iti. tatra padasyārtho vācya eva, na anumeyah, tasya - niramśatvāt, sādhya-sādhana-bhāva abhāvataśca. (V. V. pp. 47 ibid) -
Mahimā classifies meaning into two viz. (i) expressed (= vācya) and (ii) inferred (i.e. anumeya). The former is called 'mukhya' i.e. principal and is collected by word-power (i.e. abhidhā). It is said, "It is believed to be ‘mukhya' i. e. principal sense, the essence of which is collected immediately on hearing (the same, i.e. the word). That which is collected by (a special) effort, is the secondary one.
The latter, i. e. anumeya or inferred sense is that which is either directly collected from the principal sense (i.e. mukhyārtha), or from the meaning inferred from it. This anumeya artha is again threefold viz. (i) vastu i.e. idea or a matter of fact, (ii) alamkāra i. e. a figure of speech and (iii) rasādi, i. e. aesthetic rapture or sentiment etc. The first two could be met with at expressed level also (= vācyau api), while the third type is necessarily only inferred.
Mahimā holds that the direct meaning of a word is always vācya or expressed, because there is no sādhya-sadhana-bhāva between a 'pada' and

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[28]
its meaning. It means there is no inferential relation between a pada and its artha. The 'pada' is without parts so sadhya-sadhana-bhāva cannot exist.
We have to examine this position minutely. We feel that a sort of selfcontradiction can be read in Mahimā's position. At the outset Mahima had declared that : "sarva eva hi śābdo vyavahārah sādhya-sadhana-garbhataya prāyeņa anumānarūpo'bhyupagavtavyaḥ, tasya para-pravịtti-nivịtti - nibandhanatvāt, tayosca sampratyaya - a-sampratyayātmanor anyathākartum aśakyatvät” (pp. 26, 27 ibid). Here Mahimā suggests that the vācyārtha which is collected from a pada having no parts, is directly expressed as the sādhya sādhana-bhāva is not possible in this case. So, there is apparent contradiction. But this contradiction is easily removed when we remember even Anandavardhana's remarks while advocating the cause of vyañjan, even for the Naiyāyikas under Dhv. III 33. Mahimă has also derived inspiration from Dhv. here. The point is that when somebody speaks he wants to convey something. So, a man resorts to śābda-vyavahāra to convey something and to make somebody else do or undo something. So, this verbal practice is resorted to for accomplishing some object. This becomes clear through inference. The inference is simple. It proceeds like this --- "When A speaks, he intends to convey something." That there must be something behind A.'s activity of speaking, is a matter of inference. This becomes clearer when we hear someone shouting in a language not known to us. We infer that he wants to convey to us something for our good or bad. This much is inferred. But what he actually conveys through the words utterred follows directly, through the power of expression, from the word itself. This is what Mahimā wants to suggest. So, there is no contradiction in his statements.
Thus, here, with the acceptance of the 'mukhya' artha, Mahimā accepts, the power of direct expression, i.e. abhidhā'. Mahimā accepts only one word-power i.e. abhidhā. All else is ‘anumiti' for him. In his 'vyakti-vivekavyākhyāna', Ruyyaka puts it thus : (pp. 48, ibid) : "arthópi iti. śabdasya vyāpārāntara-nirākaraḥārtham, artha-dvaividhya-ghatanam. tathā hivrddhavyavahārāt, samketāt vā, śabdesu artha-nirnayah tesām ca yatrārthe vidyamānatvam tasya vācyatvam eva. anyasya tu teşām abhāvād arthasamarthyad avagatih na ca asambaddho'rthas tam artham pratyāyayati.

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sambaddhācca arthāntara-pratipattau anumānam eva. tena lakṣaṇāyāḥ anumānāntarbhāvaḥ pratipädito bhavati. tasya ca vyāpakatvāt...... na ca laksanāyām anumānasya antarbhāvaḥ iti vācyam, tasya tat parihāreņa vịtter vyäpakatvāt. vyañjakatvam anumānam eva iti vaksyate vitatya. ta vācyānumeyatva-bhedena arthasya dvaividhyam."
Ruyyaka explains that in order to eliminate the possibility of the word having any other (i. e. even a second) power, 'meaning' is said to be twofold. Meaning is decided in case of a given word with the help of either the vrddha-vyavahāra, i. e. practice of the seniors, or through 'samketa' i. e. convention. In whichever meaning these factors reside, that meaning is called the 'vācya' i. e. expressed. In case of any other meaning where either of these two does not stay at the basis, the other meaning is collected through implication. If the primary meaning is not connected (i. e. is asambaddha) with the other meaning, the latter is not conveyed at all. And when through connection, the first meaning yields the second meaning, this apprehension is nothing else but ‘anumāna' or 'inference only. So laksaņā is covered up by 'anumāna', the latter having a wider scope... . ...It cannot be said that ‘anumāna' is covered up by laksanā, because even in the absence of laksanā, anumāna can take place. (Thus, anumāna has a wider field). That (the so called) suggestion is nothing but only inference i. e. 'anumāna' will be discussed in greater details (by Mahimā).”
So, for Mahimā there is only one śabda-vyāpāra and that is ‘abhidhā'. All else - i. e. laksana and vyañjana' fall in the province of anumāna or inference. This means that though not accepting these two functions, Mahimā accepts the meanings derived through these functions and subsumes these meanings - viz. the so-called 'laksyārtha' and 'vyangyārtha in the terminology of the kashmir school of thought, under anumeya artha' i. e. inferred meaning arrived at through 'anumiti' or precisely 'kävyānumiti', and certainly not by any function or vyāpāra of a word.
For Mahimā, the vācya' is the meaning of a 'pada' i. e. word, arrived at through 'abhidhā' on the strength of either 'samketa' or 'věddha-vyavahāra'. But the vākyārtha, or sentence-sense can be either (i) a fact which is already

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[30] known and which is not required to be substantiated, and (ii) a fact, which is unknown, expecting to be substantiated. This unknown fact is always established with the help of a known fact with which it is invariably related. Their invariable concomitance is realized from means of valid knowledge i. e. pramānas which are three, such as, (i) 'loka' or worldly context, (ii) veda or revealed literature, and (iii) direct experience i. e. adyātma.
Mahimā observes : (pp. 49 ibid) : "vākyārthas tu vācyasya arthasya amsaparikalpanāyām, amśānām vidhyanuvāda-bhāvena-avasthiter, vidheyāmśasya siddha-asiddha-tayā upapādana-anapekșa-sāpekṣatvena dvividho boddhavyaḥ.
Mahimā had suggested that the meaning derived from a pada is without parts i. e. nir-amśa. But the sentence-sense is having 'amśa' or parts. Some part is 'vidheya' and some is ‘anuvādya'. i. e. some part is 'newly enjoined i. e. it is predicated, and some is 'anuvādya' i. e. which is the 'subject' part and hence already known. The vidheya-amśa is also either 'siddha' or 'sādhya'. The former does not stand in need of being substantiated, the latter needs substantiation. Thus vākyārtha is two-fold, when the vidheya-amsa is 'a- siddha', it takes the form of sādhya-sādhana-bhāva, the 'anuvāda' portion turning into a 'sadhana'. This sādhya-sādhana-bhāva is decided through invariable concomitance i. e. avinābhāva-sam-bandha. And this depends on means of knowledge which are three-fold : "asiddhau sādhya-sādhana-bhāvarūpah, anūdyamānasya amsasya sādhana-dhurā-adhirohāt.” (pp. 49, ibid)
(pp. 52, ibid) sādhya-sādhana-bhāvasca anayoḥ avinābhāvāvasāya-krto' vagantavyaḥ. sa ca pramāņa-mūlah. tat ca trividham - yad āhuḥ -
'loko vedastathā'dhyātmam. pramānam trividham smrtam” iti.
Mahimā holds that 'loka' pramāna depends only on wellknown worldly matters – "tatra loka-prasiddhārtha-visayo lokah. (pp. 52, ibid). “śāstra-mătraprasidhārtha-visayo vedah. (pp. 53 ibid) i.e. veda-pramāṇa is that the subject of which is known in śāstra only i. e. in various disciplines. Mahimā adds that by mentioning 'veda', other sources such as itihāsa, purāņa, dharmaśāstra etc. are also to be understood, as they all rest on veda : vedagrahaņam itihāsa-purāņa-dharma śāstrādi-upalaksanam, tesām tan-mūla

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tvopagamāt.” (pp. 53, ibid). And, "adhyātmikārtha-visayam adhyātmam" - (pp. 53 ibid) : “The adhyātma-pramāṇa has spirituality as its subject.” This means that it is self-apprehended.
This sādhya-sādhana-bhāva is two-fold (i) śābda i. e. that which is expressly stated, and (ii) 'ārtha' or that which is implicit. Again both the sādhya and sādhana may be expressed either by means of words or by sentence : sa hi dvividhaḥ śābdaś ca ārthaśca, iti. so'pi ca sădhya-sādhanayoh pratyekam padārtha-vākyārtha-rūpatvāt...... yathāyogyam anyonya-sankaryāt bahuvidha iti, tasya din-matram idam upadarśyate.” (pp. 54, ibid) - i.e. words that convey the sādhya-sādhana-bhāva could be jāti-vācaka, gunavācaka, etc. The meaning of the word again can be an attribute - i.e. dharma, or a substratum, i. e. dharmin. Dharma again can be samānādhikarana, or vaiyadhikarana as when both sādhya and sadhana reside either in the same substratum or not. The sādhya-sadhana-bhāva expressed by a sentence differs on the basis of kārakas used.
One thing that emerges very clearly from this is that Mahimā accepts only abhidhā, and that too in the normal accepted sense of the term as a word-power that yields the conventional meaning which is called primary or mukhya. All else is collected by inference, i. e. all other meaning is ‘anumeya' for Mahimā. So, he refutes other sabdavrttis such as gunavịtti, laksaņā, tātparya and vyañjanā.
The trend of incorporating other śabda-vịttis such as laksaņā and vyañjana in abhidhā was traced by us in Mukula, a near successor of Anandavardhana. Kuntaka also without rejecting positively any other śabda-vịtti advocated the case of his vicitrā-abhidhā which as observed by us is not the same as ‘abhidhā that gives the primary meaning, but it is only a 'poetic expression' in general. Bhoja also as we will go to see, does not name vyañjanā and incorporates gauni and laksanā under his threefold abhidhā, the mukhyā being the first variety equivalent to our normal ‘abhidhā’. Mahimā does not subsume other sabda-vịttis under abhidhā but he totally rejects them as sabda-víttis as such and advocates the case of only abhidhā that gives the primary sense, as sabda-vịtti, one and only.

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The rest for him is 'anumāna' i. e. kāvyānumiti. We will examine how he presents his case.
Mahimā proceeds as follows. In such an example as, "upodharāgena vilola-tārkam" etc. we have double-meaning statements. Here, the apprehension of the second meaning takes place according to Mahimā, in the following way :
(pp. 113, 114 ibid): "Yat punah asya aneka-sakti-samāśrayatvāt vyāpārāntara-kalpanam, tad arthasya eva upapadyate, na sabdasya, tasya aneka-sakti-samāśrayatva-asiddheh” – i. e. when a word (in such illustrations as quoted above) is said to have such functions that deliver several meanings, and when based on such a premise an additional word-power called vyañjanā is postulated with reference to a word, virtually it is only the meaning which promotes other meanings and not the word, for a word can never be proved to be the substratum of many functions.
Mahimā further argues : "tathā hi, ekāśrayāḥ hi śaktayah anyonyaanapeksa-pravșttayah aprāksta-paurvāparya-niyamā, yugapad eva svakāryakārinyo drstāḥ yathā dāhakatva-prakāśakatvādayo'gneh" - i. e. Those more than one powers residing in a single substratum, have their functions independent of each other and there is no sequence of earlier and later seen with reference to them. The idea is that these powers operate independently of one another and also simultaneously, or at least without a fixed sequence. For example fire burns a substance and also gives light. But the imagined other functions of words are not such. - "na ca sabdaśrayāḥ saktayas tathā drśyante, abhyupagamyante vā, niyogataḥ abhidhāśakti-pūrvakatvena itarasakti-pravrtti-darśanāt. tasmāt bhinnaśrayā eva tā na sabdaika-samāśrayā iti avaseyam - i.e. In case of word-powers this not so, because other powers (such as laksaņā and vyañjana) function after abhidhā's function is over. Thus there is no simultaneity but sequence. So, it is better that different objects should be imagined as their substratum and not just 'word.
Now this bhinna-āśraya or different substratum could be 'artha' i. e. meaning and not śabda or word. Mahimā observes (pp. 114, ibid) : yaś cāśau aśrayo bhinnah sa 'artha' eva iti tad vyāpārasya anumānāntarbhávo'

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bhyupagantavya eva." - This different substratum could be 'meaning', and the functions of this 'meaning' element, should be subsumed under 'anumāna' or inference alone.
Before we proceed with Mahimā's contention, we have to evaluate his conviction. He gives the illustration of fire which has different powers operating simultaneously. But we can have instances of objects having different powers not operating simultaneously, but only in sequence and such powers may not be absolutely independent of each other. For example a cricketer can also be a singer and a performing artist and his different powers may not operate simultaneously. Sachin can be a good batsman and also a modest speaker. Sunil Gavaskar, we know was a great batsman, a captain of the team and now also a good critic and a very good commentator also. When he bats he does not comment. So, Mahima's illustration proves something which is partially true. Even fire, when it gives heat and light does not help in cooking when not so required.
Now let us see how Mahimā further argues : "tathā hi - (pp. 114, ibid) - gaur vāhīka ityādau tāvad gavādayo'rthaḥ bādhita-vāhīkādyarthāntaraikātmyāḥ tādrūpya-vidhāna-anyathā-aupapattyä kenacid amsena tatra tattvam anumāpayanti, na sarvātmanā."
Now this other separate substratum is nothing else but 'sense'. So, its function has to be subsumed under inference. In such illustrations as, “The vāhīka is a bull”, the meanings such as 'go' i.e. 'bull' etc., are not identified with other meaning such as that of vāhīka. For Mahimā the process involved is 'anumāna'. In order to establish abheda' - superimposition when no other means is available, the meaning such as 'go' makes us infer the superimposition through some portion of it, and not through the whole of it.
No speaker, who is not out of his mind, goes for superimposition of one thing over the other, without realizing any element of similarity between the two. - So any intelligent listener, who has knowledge of the speaker's mind, accepts similarity as the basis of superimposition. He does not hold mere physical expression of identity as the basis. Mere physical expression of identity is refuted on the first count by itself, for we can see that 'vāhika', the man cannot be a 'bull'.

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[34] So, the expression of identity by the speaker, is only to make the listener apprehend the similarity. The 'prayojana' behind this expression is to cause apprehension of such qualities as inertia (jādya) etc. which are associated with 'go', as also seen in the vāhīka. This sort of an expression - to use different word for conveying a different substance - is called an 'atideśa'. Here 'go' is used for “jādyādi (i.e. dullness and stupidity). For, it is said,
“jātiśabdo'antareņāpi
jātim yatra prayujyate, sambandhi-sadřśād dharmāt
tam gaunīm apare viduh” - (v.v.45, pp. 115) i. e. when a word denoting “jāti' or class, is used with reference to something else than itself (i.e. sva-vācya), it is done when in that other object there is a quality of similarity. Others call such a usage as, "gauni".
The idea is that in such instances as "upodha-rāgena” etc. the word, through abhidhā power gives only the vācya i.e. expressed sense. The power that makes for the apprehension of another sense (arthāntara), rests in the 'sense' i. e. ‘artha' and not in the word i. e. sabda. Now this apprehension of another sense, through sense, is, according to Mahimā, through 'anumiti' or inference only. So, the power seen in sense should be taken as inference. In the illustration viz. "gaur-vāhīkah” etc., as there is an apparent diff between 'go-tva' and 'vahika-tva', the identity through 'ekadhikarana' i. e. the use of same case-termination, does not click to sense. Then it makes us infer the identity of qualities such us jādyādi-inertness-etc. So the identity is based on the qualities of vāhika, which are similar to gotulya-jadyādi i. e. inertia and the like that are associated with vahika are similar to those resting in the bull. It is clear that any speaker who is not out of sense, never asserts identity between two separate objects without sensing common qualities between the two. Again, the prayojana or the reason behind such awkward or artful expression as calling a human being a bull, is the existence of such qualities as inertia etc. that normally go with the objects such as bull etc. in the object called 'vāhika' on which go-tva is superimposed.

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[35] It may be noted that Mahimā has expressed such terms as 'sadrsya' and 'sādharmya', simultancously. He has observed : (pp. 114, ibid) “na hi anunmattaḥ kaścit, kvacit, kiñcit, kathamcit, sādharmyam an-utpaśyan eva akasmāt tattvam āropayati" - i. e. without perceiving 'sādharmya' i.e. the state of having similar or common qualities in any way whatsoever, nobody goes for superimposition of any object on any other object. So the cause of superimposition is apprehension of similarity alone. 'Sādņśya' i. e. - similarity, and 'sādharmya' or having common qualities, are two important terms used in literary criticism. Dr. Rewaprasad observes (pp. 115, ibid) that Mammața has accepted 'upamā' i. e. simile as : 'sādharmya resting on difference", wh his followers (such as Visvanātha) have defined it as similarity (based on difference of objects). Vāmanācārya Jhalkikar in his Bāla-bodhini commentary on the K. P. has discussed at length with reference to both 'sādharmya' and 'sādrsya'. Between these two he accepts “prayojya-prayojaka' bhāva-sambandha" i. e. the relation of promoter and promoted; here sādharmya being the promoter and ‘sādịśya' being promoted thereby. For Bhartrhari 'sādharmya' stands for 'samāna-dharma-sambandha', i. e. - relation based on similar or common qualities. The etymology of the term 'sādharmya' goes as, "samāno dharmo yayos tau sa-dharmānau, tayor bhāvaḥ”. BhartȚhari explains the taddhita-pratyaya conveying 'bhāva', and used after a compound, as 'sambandha' or relation. “krt- taddhitasamāsebhyaḥ sambandhābhidhānam bhāva-pratyayena" - In the term 'sādharmya', the 'syan pratyaya is in the sense of bhāva' only. In the notes attached to the 'kāma-dhenu' commentary on Vāmana, Kaiyata's words are quoted. There the explanation of 'bhava' as - "prakrti-janya-bodhe prakārībhūto bhāvah" — is also useful in the present context. The meaning of this expression is that, “by bhāva' is meant that 'dharma' or quality, which is lying inside that portion, of a word, to which a pratyaya is attached. In the word 'sādharmya', the pratyaya 'syan' is attached to the word 'sa-dharma' or 'sa-dharman'. Its meaning is that which has similar (or common) qualities." Thus here 'samāna-dharma' is the višeşana and the vyakti or person adorned with this is 'visesya'. 'syan' suffix is used in the sense of 'bhāva'. So, it means, "samāna-dharma.” But the apprehension of “samāna-dharma" is caused by

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'samāna-sabda' as well. By 'sādharmya' we have apprehension not only of the equality, but also of the vyakti or person in whom this similarity rests, and also of the relation with it. So, Bhartphari's view as quoted above is more authentic.
To point out the relation between 'sādrśya' and 'sādharmya', Jhalkikar (pp. 541, bālabodhini on K.P.) observes : "yaḥ sãdhāraṇa-dharma. pratiyogikah, upamānopameyo-bhayānuyogikah, sambandaḥ, sa sādharmyam iti ucyate; yasca upamāna-pratiyogikah, upame-yānuyogikaḥ sambandhah, sa sādrśyam iti ucyate.” – iti sādharmya-sādrśyayor bhedah.” – This explanation in ‘navya-nyāya'-style pertains to this much that - "the relation that simultaneously rests in both upamāna and upameya, is called sādharmya." "Sadęsya' is different from this. It does not stay simultaneously in two, but it rises from one and settles in the other. 'Sādrsya' or similarity is of one into the other, it is not resting in the two - vice versa. In fact, with reference to sādharmya, we cannot call the substratum as upamāna and upameya, because in the apprehension caused by 'sādharmya' the qualities of the two objects are found to be equal. In sādịśya there is ‘nyūna-adhikarva' between the two i. e. there is difference in quantity of the qualities. In case of one we apprehend 'utkarsa' and in case of the other, 'apakarsa'. So, upamāna-upameya-bhāva rests on this ‘utkarsa-apakarsa' or more and less quantity with reference to the dharma i. e. quality. That having higher degree of quality, dharmot-karsa' is termed upamāna, and that having dharmāpakarsa' is termed upameya. The 'sādrśya' resting in object having utkarsa travels into that having 'apakarsa'. The sādrśya of both does not go into eachother. Thus 'sādharmya' suggests equality with reference to qualities while sādrsya suggests equality in which the 'upamāna' - element is having a greater quantity of equal quality. The dissimilarity between sādharmya and sādrśya rests on normal worldly usage. In ordinary parlance it is stated that, "there is 'sādharmya' between these two objects, while there is 'sādrśya' between those two."
But actually this difference is not exactly borne out by such normal usages also. For the normal usage can take the form of such expression also

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as, "there is sādharmya of this into that object, and between them is sādịśya”. In the usage quoted above, where the praksti of the term 'sādharmya' was taken as ending in daul (dvi-vacanānta), and wherein that of sādņśya as ending in singular (i. e. eka-vacanānta) the opposite can also follow in the present usage.
In different disciplines there is difference with reference to the concepts of 'sādharmya' and 'sādrśya'. The discipline of grammar takes them as different, while the nyāya-darśana takes them as identical and this is acceptable to Mahimā, he being closer to the nyāya discipline.
So, in expressions like 'gaur-vāhīkah', taken as 'gaunī-vstti' and, like 'gangāyām ghosah', taken as laksanā, Mahimā accepts only 'anumāna'. As noted above in the case for the former, Mahimā holds that no sensible person will identify one object with a totally different object without seeing some similarity between the two. The expression 'gaur vāhīkah' cannot be taken literally as it is perceived directly as incongruous, we infer that vāhīka is a bull in some respects. This secondary sense which is not given by the word directly is only inferred. In the same way the fact of a hamlet being situated on the flow of the river Ganges being contradicted by direct perception, we infer the qualities of coolness and purity of the hamlet from the expressed meaning. Mahimā does not accept dhvanivādin's observation that the meaning of the hamlet being situated on the bank of the Ganges is derived through laksanā, and the qualities of coolness and purity of the hamlet are derived through the suggestive power i. e. vyañjanā. For Mahimā both the secondary and suggested senses are arrived at through anumiti kriyā - or inference and so the distinction observed by the Dhvanikāra between bhakti and dhvani is uncalled for.
Mahimā observes (pp. 118)
"tasmād yo'yam vāhīkādau gavādi-sādharmyāvagamaḥ, sa tattvāropaanyathā-anupaptti-parikalpito'numānasya eva vișayah na śabda-vyāpārasya, iti sthitam." .
He further observes (pp. 119, ibid) : “gangāyām ghosa ityādau api gangădayórthāh svātmani-anupapatti-bādhita-ghosādyadhi-karana-bhāvāḥ, tad

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upādāna-sāmarthyāt sambandha-mātra-parikalpita-tattvāropam tad adhikaranabhāvopagama-yogyam arthāntaram eva taţādi-rūpam anumāpayanti.
Mahimā further observes that only similarity cannot be the cause of identification or superimposition. Other relations such as 'samyoga' or conjunction, etc. also can be the cause. So, through 'Gangā' etc. the objects such as the bank etc. are inferred, and not through any other vịtti or function of a word, because the fact of being the substratum of the hamlet cannot be understood by any other way : (pp. 119, ibid)
“na hi tat sādrśyam eva ekam tattvāropa-nibandhanam isyate, kim tarhi ? tat-sambandhădir api, iti tat-sambandha-mātra-samāropita-tadbhāvas tatādir eva ghosādyadhikaranabhāvopādāna-anyathā-anupapattyā gangādīnām arthānām anumeya eva bhavitum arhati.
Mahimā accepts only one power of the word and that is the power of direct expression viz. abhidhā. He rejects anything else than that and whatever other meaning is comprehended, he holds, is through 'anumāna' or inference. He firmly believes that the power of a word is exhausted after giving its expressed sense. So, it has no capacity even to know about the existence of the secondary sense, such as the 'tata' or bank, in this case. What to think of actually touching this secondary sense ? The metaphorical expression is resorted to only to convey the knowledge of the existence of coolness and purity of the Ganges resting in the hamlet, the object of superimposition, and not similarity, as in the first illustration. The cause viz. 'tattvāropa' i. e. superimposition is identical in both the cases. Mahimā holds that similarity of the object which is superimposed or its samyogādi relations are manifold. He quotes a famous kārikā here, with a difference in reading from the same quoted by Abhinavagupta in his locana on Dhv. i. e. with reference to the expression, "bhāktam āhuḥ tam anye.”
Mahimā observes : (pp. 119, ibid) : "śabdah punah svārthābhidhānamātra-vyāpāra-paryavasita-sāmarthyo na arthāntarasya tatāder vārtām api veditum utsahate, kim punah samsparsam iti uktam.
prayojanam punah asya evam-vidhasya ukti-vaicitrya-parigrahasya tatādau āropa-visaye vastuni āropyamāna-gangādi-gata-punyatva-sitalatvādi

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dharma-pratipattiḥ na sadrśyam iti pūrvasmād asya višesaḥ. ubhayatra api ca tattvāropa eva hetuḥ. sa hi tat-sāmya-tat-sambandhādi-nibandhanatvād bahuvidha drstah-yad āhuh
"abhidheyena sambandhāt
sādrśyāt samavāyatah, vaiparītyāt kriyāyogād
laksanā pañcadhā matā” – iti. In the locana, we have, "abhidheyena samyogāt" and also, "sāmīpyāt" for 'sādrśyāt' of Mahimā.
In locana, we have 'abhidheyena samyogāt. The idea is that 'samyoga' or conjunction is a type of 'sambandha' i. e. relation in general. Abhinavagupta explains 'samyogāt' as 'bhramara-śabdena yasya samyogaḥ sambandhah'. Mahimā does not like this usage of a specific term to denote a general term. So, he goes for the reading 'samyogāt, retaining the term denoting a general relation. Similarly, in Locana we have 'sāmīpyāt', while Mahimā reads 'sadrśyāt'. Abhinavagupta has explained 'samavāya' as 'sambandha-mātra' i. e. any relation whatsoever. The relations such as 'sāmīpya' or proximity could be believed to be covered up by 'samavāya', so Mahimā opts for sādrśya. Actually, we can say that not only 'sāmīpya', but even 'sādrsya', 'vaiparītya' or any other relation could be contained in 'samavāya'. Because of this only, later naiyāyikas such as Gadādhara and the rest have taken only "abhidheyena sambandha", as definition of lakṣaṇā, which they choose to define as "sakya-sambandho laksanā”. The expression of special relations such as sādịśya, vaiparītya etc. is covered by 'sambandha' only, but they are mentioned only to make things clearer. This way, argues Prof. Rewaprasad, the reading of Locana as 'samyogāt, is more acceptable. The reading 'sādịśya' is not preferred to 'sāmīpya' by Locanakāra, because by using the term 'gauna', the explanation of laksanā based on similarity is already covered up by him. Virtually 'sambandha' being manifold, lakṣaṇā may not be taken as five-fold only.
Mahimabhatta also incorporates what is known as tātparya-sakti under abhidhā only. Some people hold that to convey the correlated meaning of

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[40] different words in a sentence, there is a separate power called the tätparya śakti which rests in a sentence. Tātparya sakti is thus advocated by some to explain the apprehension of the intention of the speaker from a sentence or a statement. Mahimā feels that the import of the speaker is inferred by the hearer from the expressed sense. When someone says, "eat poison, but do not eat at his house”, the hearer infers that taking food at his house is more despisable than eating poison. The inference follows the commonsense that, without some special reason, a friend or a well-wisher will never stop anyone from taking food at some person's place. The hearer understands, thus through inference, that eating food will be more harmful than taking poison. Mahimā observes : (pp. 133 ibid) .
"visabhaksaņānujñānāder vākyārthasya aprastutasya eva upanyāso hi pūrvoktena nayena prastutātiriktārthāntara-pratipādana-paratvāt, tatra hetutayā avagantavyaḥ, iti na sabdasya tatra vyāpāraḥ parikalpanīyaḥ.
“vișabhakşaņād api parām etad
grhabhojanasya dārunatām, vācyād ato'numimate
prakarana-vaktr-svarūpajñāḥ.” - 67 visabhaksanam anu manute
na hi kaścid akārida anu manute
na hi kaścid akānda eva suhțdi sudhīh, tena atra arthāntaragatir ārthi
tātparya-saktija na punah." 68 iti sangrahārye.
Mahimā, who accepts only ‘abhidhā' as word-power further rejects the views of those who hold a 'dirgha-dīrghatara-vyāpāra' of a word, like that of an arrow. The pūrva-paksin argues as follows :
Starting with the expressed sense, till the implied sense is collected, the powers of the word extends further and further like an arrow. There is no separate power of a word for collecting the other implicit sense. Like an arrow shot by a brave bow-wielder cuts through the armour, rips through

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the chest and takes the breath away of an enemy, and there is no difference seen in the function of this single arrow, similarly, a word used by a clever poet, in sequence, conveys its primary meaning through abhidhāna (i. e. abhidhā-vyāpāra), and makes the apprehension of the second implied sense by the same power of the word used. There is no difference in the power of function of one and the same word. Again, argues the objector, that ultimate meaning should be taken as the meaning of a given word, for conveying which it is used. Thus, this is the power of the word only and not that of the sense : kiñca yatparah sabdah są śabdārtha iti sabdasya eva asau vyāpāro nyayyo na arthasya." (pp. 137, ibid). The objector here seems to be the commentator Dhanika, the brother of Dhananjaya, the author of Dasarūpaka. This is suggested by Dr. Rewaprasad Dwivedi (pp. 140, ibid)
Mahimā does not accept this. He argues as follows : "This is not correct : (pp. 140 ibid) tad ayuktam. sāksāt-sabdasya artha-pratītihetutva-asiddheh." The word cannot be taken as cause of the implied) sense. If it is held as cause through sequence (pāramparyena), there will be difficulty in placing some objects as effect and others as cause, for there is no regulation to that effect - "pāramparyena tu tasya hetutvopagame vastūnām hetu-phala-bhāvavyavahāra-niyamo na vyavatișthate.” (pp. 140, ibid)
Mahimā observes : This cannot be accepted. The reason is that in arriving at the sense, word is not the direct cause. It cannot be taken as a cause in sequence also for it will be difficult to name something specific as cause and also something as effect. In case sabda is held as a paramparāhetu, then as in case of the spring season being held as the cause of flowering, we will also have to hold a potter who fashions a pot used in watering a plant, as the main cause of flowering. So, it is wiser to accept 'artha' or sense as the cause of further sense, and not 'word'. It is not proper to say that when some function is carried out by a son, his father also is considered the chief substratum of the function concerned. For, in such cases there will follow the contingency of 'sānkarya-dosa', - 'na hi yatra putrasya vyāpāraḥ sa pituḥ eva iti mukhyatayā sakyate vaktum, tayor anyonya-vyāpāra-sānkarya-dosa-prasangāt.” (pp. 140, ibid). The fault will be of mixing up of activities of different agents.

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Mahimă further argues that this illustration of an arrow is also not congruent with the situation : "kiñca ayam visamaḥ śara-drstāntopanyāsaḥ (pp. 140, ibid). The line of his argument proceeds as below : This 'saradrstānta' is a mis-fit, because as the arrow on its own does the activities of cutting, piercing, etc. through a single power, the word does not. The word executes its function with the help of 'sanketa' or convention. The word has its function only at places where convention is fixed. So, the function of the word is limited upto the expressed sense only, not upto any ‘arthāntara' i. e. sense beyond the expressed one, as no 'sanketa' or convention is fixed with reference to the other extra sense. In case we accept the capacity of a word to give 'arthāntara' also, i. e. added sense also, then people will be able to apprehend any sense with the help of any word. So, for a meaning which stands in need of convention, to that only the function of a word is limited, and it does not extend further upto any added sense, in absence of any convention. For the added sense, the function not of word, but of the expressed sense only should be accepted : tataśca abhidheyārtha-visaya eva asya vyāpāro yuktah, na arthantara-visayah, tatra sanketābhāvāt. tad abhāve'pi tatra tat parikalpane sarvaḥ kutaścid abhidheyārthavad arthāntaram api pratīyāt, tasmad yatra sanketāpeksā, tatra eva asya vyāpāra iti avagantum yuktam, na arthāntare; tatra vaksyamāna-nayena arthasya eva tad-upapattisamarthanād iti.” (pp. 140, 141, ibid)
We may observe with Dr. Rewaprasad that Mahimā here pushes two arguments in favour of his thinking. First, he holds that a word cannot convey another sense directly, as it does with reference to its conventional sense, and secondly, a word can convey only that sense with reference to which a convention is fixed. Mahimā is of the opinion that the formation of a pot is the result of coming together of the two halves, and not the potter, as the joining of halves immediately preceeds the formation of a pot. Similarly in case of added sense, i. e. farthantara' the immediate predecessor is the expressed sense, and not the word itself. So, being an immediate cause the primary sense is the cause of any additional sense, and not the word.

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Mahimā also argues that the functions of the arrow and word are not identical. The function of the arrow, in cutting, ripping through and taking the breath away, is its own, i. e. it is an independent power of an arrow. But for the word it is not so. It conveys meaning remaining dependent on the convention. So, the function of the word is not independent but is dependent on something else. Thus a word has a limited capacity to convey only that meaning with reference to which convention is made. It cannot proceed to an added target, like an arrow. It cannot proceed to an added sense of its own. The added sense is collected only by the function of the primary sense, which should be taken here as the cause. So, the added sense has to be accepted as inferred only.
But, we may say that Mahimā's thinking is faulty. The arrow also, when placed in a sheath does not have any capacity even to pierce the softest thing on earth. Only when it is discharged by a mighty shooter, it does the said tricks. So, even the function of an arrow has its capacity, originally borrowed from the shooter's strength. Similarly, a word when used by an expert poet attains the added function to convey an added sense also. But, this is not to justify 'dirgha-dirghatara-vyāpāra'. Actually, as explained by Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, we have to accept difference in function to explain difference in meaning, otherwise we will get into a mess where any word will start giving any meaning !
Mahimă, as stated above believes only in one power of word and that is abhidhā. For him ‘artha' or meaning is two-fold viz. vācya or expressed and ‘anumeya' or inferred. He quotes a kārikā -- "That whose significance is cognised on hearing alone, is believed to be the primary meaning, and the gauņa or secondary meaning is that which is collected as a result of (special) effort.” He observes : (pp. 47, ibid)
"artho'pi dvividho, vācyon'umeyaśca. tatra śabda-vyāpāra-visayo vācyaḥ. sa eva mukhya ucyate. yad āhuḥ :
śrutimātrena yatrāsya
tādarthyam avasīyate, tam mukhyam artham manyante
gauņam yatnopapāditam."

.

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'Anumeya' or inferred meaning is that, in whose apprehension, the
y meaning or vācyārtha serves as 'hetu' or 'linga' i. e. cause, or the ‘hetu' can also be that meaning which is derived from the primary sense. -- "tata eva, tad anumitad vā linga-bhūtād arthāntaram anumiyate, sah anumeyah.” (pp. 47, ibid). We know that Bhartặhari incorporates all meaning other than the primary in 'gauna' or secondary, but for Mahima all meaning else than primary is 'anumeya'. The primary meaning for Mahimā is also the 'mukhya' or principal sense. Mahima accepts the relationship between word and meaning as conventional. Word gives meaning only when there is convention to that effect. He rejects the view that a word can ever convey such a meaning which is other than primary, i. e. one with reference to which a convention is not formed. He feels that any other meaning, beyond the primary one, can never be collected by the function of a word
hat such added sense is arrived at by inference, the primary sense serving as 'hetu' or cause in it. We have seen that Mahimā therefore rejects all other functions such as lakṣaṇā, tātparya and vyañjană as functions of a word and subsumes them under anumāna' or inference.
Mahimā of course accepts the added sense or what may be called the unexpressed sense. This, for Mahimā is threefold viz. (i) vastumātra i. e. of the form of vastu' or a mattor of fact or idea, (ii) alamkāra i.e. figures of speech or artful expression, and (iii) rasādayaśca, i. e. the emotive stuff such as feelings, sentiments etc. The first two could be directly expressed, but for Mahimā, the third variety is 'anumeya' or 'inferred only, The direct meaning of a word is always expressed, it being without parts and there being no relation of 'sādhya' or that which is to be established, and ‘sādhana' or the instrument with which it is established, between the two i.e. vācya artha' and 'śabda'. He observes : (pp. 47 ibid) : "sa ca trividhah. vastumātram alamkārā rasādayaśca. iti. tatra ādyau vācyau api sambhavataḥ. anyas tvanumeya eva iti. tatra padasya artho vācya eva, na anumeyaḥ, tasya nir amśatvāt, sadhyasādhana-bhāvā'bhāvatah'. Mahimā, like Anandavardhana, also believes that the vācya or expressed is not so charming as is the unexpressed or inferred : "vācyo hyartho na tathā camatkāram ātanoti yathā sa eva vidhi-niședhādiḥ kākväbhidheyatām anumeyatām và avatirnah iti svabhäva eva ayam

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arthānām." The expressed is not as charming as the same when presented through artful intonation or conveyed through inference. This is in the nature of a meaning. The meaning conveyed through simple assertion is also less charming than the same conveyed through double negation. He substantiates his observation by quoting Anandavardhana who observes :
"sararūpo'hyarthaḥ sva-sabda-anabhidheyatvena prakāśitaḥ sutarām śobhām avahati. prasiddhiśca iyam asti eva vidagdha-parişatsu yad abhimatataram vastu vyangyatvena prakāśyate na vācyatvena” iti.
The sequence i. e. krama, observes Mahimā, in the first two varieties such as vastu or matter of fact and alamkāra or artful expression, is self-evident and is clearly observed. So, if we resort to vyañjakarva to explain this sequence it is of no use at all. He rejects vyangya-vyañjaka relation between dhvani (i. e. word) and so called sphoța also. Similarly on this analogy the promulgation of dhvani vis-a-vis kāvya which is of the form of word and meaning placed together, is also not acceptable to Mahimā. He accepts 'gamya-gamaka-bhāva' instead.
Mahima Bhatta does not accept Anandavardhana's idea of three types of meaning such as the expressed or vacya, the indicated or lakskya and the suggested or vyangya. For Mahimā the indicated or laksanika i. e. metaphorical or secondary sense and the suggested or vyañgya fall in the category of the inferred or 'anumeya' only and thus for Mahimā there is a scheme of twofold meaning only; the vācya and the anumeya. Thus he seems to reject Anandavardhana's observation that the indicated — laksyamāna and the suggested i. e. the vyanjyamāna are also different from each other. For Anandavardhana the secondary function or a-mukhya vyavahāra is only an extention of the primary function and it is resorted to when the primary meaning is found to be non-congruent with the context. This secondary sense may not be charming also, and is arrived at only when the primary sense is rejected. This abandonment of the primary sense, in the opinion of Anandavardhana, could be either partial or total. This secondary function is seen only when we use language. The suggestive function, for Anandavardhana, is of wider scope and travels beyond language. When use of language is concerned, then also this suggestive function completely

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differs from either the primary function of a word in language, i. e. abhidhā, or the secondary function i. e. gunavștti or laksaņā or a-mukhya-vyāpāra, both from the point of view of nature and scope i. e. “svarūpatah visayatah ca." Suggestivity, as noted above travels beyond the medium of language and is seen in any other art-form such as drama, music, painting and what not, taking the form of abhinaya or acting, or notes i. e. śuddha svara, or colours etc. as the case may be. Thus for Anandavardhana the suggestivity has to be completely distinguished from laksaņā or secondary function of a word.
Not so with Mahimā. He rejects the very basis on which the concept of laksaņā rests. He rejects any other power or function beyond abhidhā or the direct expressive power in case of a word. Mahimā is of the opinion that the fact of ‘krama' or sequence in the functioning of powers called abhidhā, laksaņā and vyañjanā goes against them belonging to the same substratum, i.e. word. As seen earlier, he feels that if more than one power belongs to the same thing, these powers should function simultaneously like heat and light emanating from fire. But we had observed earlier that his analogy is not applicable in case of a word, as there is no hard and fast rule that all powers belonging to the same thing should function simultaneously only. Even in day to day life we see agents using their various powers as and when the situation so demands. A bi soldier enjoys life also to the full and also fights against the enemy as and when required. A man may be gifted with a number of special capacity which he chooses to exhibit or utilize only when the situation so demands But Mahimā is satisfied with his own argument and his own illustration of fire oozing light and heat simultaneously, and therefore concludes that word has only one power-abhidhā—that gives the primary sense alone and whatever added sense follows, - call it laksyārtha, tātparyārtha or vyangyārtha-call it by any name, it follows from the primary sense alone as an inferred sense, and the word has nothing to do with it. The other meaning follows from the primary sense due to the relation of linga-lingibhāva only. Mahimā observes. (pp. 121, ibid): "kiñca upacāravrttau śabdasya ma bhud atiprasanga iti avaśyam. kim api nimittam anusartavyam. anyathā anyatra prasiddha-sambandhaḥ katham asammitam (= sanketa

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virahita) eva arthāntaram pratyāyayet ? yat ca tannimittam tad eva asmābhir iha lingam iti ākhyātam. yuktam caetat. śabdasya tatra vyāpārābhāvāt. vyāpārābhāvasca sambandhābhāvāt. lingăt ca linginah pratītir anumānam eva; na guna-víttau arthāntara-pratītiḥ śābdi iti tasyāḥ vācakāśrayatvam asiddham eva." Mahimā (pp. 122) further observes in samgraha verses : “yah satattva-samāropah
tat-sambandha-nibandhanah, mukhyārtha-bādhe so'pyārtham
sambandham anumāpayet.” (46) and, “tat-sāmya-tat-sambandhau hi
tattvāropaika-kāraṇam, gunavịtter dvirūpāyāḥ
tat-pratītir ato'numā.” (47) i. e. 'tat-sāmya' and 'tat-sambandha' -- these two are the causes of 'tattvāropa' i. e. superimposition of one object over the other. So, in two types of gunavịtti (or laksanā) the apprehension of the cause --- i. e. prayojana — is through inference only.
Thus, Mahimā accepts two types of gunavrtti : (i) based on 'tat-sāmya', as in 'gaurvāhikah' and (ii) based on 'tat-sambandha' as in 'mañcāḥ krośanti'.
He further observes that abandoning of mukhya-výtti is not possible in case of a word. So, only a meaning superimposed on a (primary) meaning causes inference of similarity.
“mukhya-vítti-parityāgah
na śabdasya upapadyate, vihito'rthāntare hyarthaḥ
sva-sāmyam anumāpayet.” (48) Thus, when the function of a word is not established with reference to another sense, how can we hold śabda as 'skhalad-gati' with reference to a

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[48] result (phala, i. e. another sense) which follows through inference from a given linga or mark i. e. cause ?
"ittham arthāntare sabda
vịtter anupapattitah, phale lingaika-gamye syāt
kutaḥ śabdaḥ skhalad-gatiḥ.” (50) (pp. 122, ibid) Thus, observes Mahimā, that whatever factors are considered in favour of gaunī vịtti, are taken by us as promoting anumāna -
“guna-víttau girām yāvat
sāmagrī-īstā nibandhanam, saiva lingatayā’smābhir
isyate arthāntaram prati."-(55) (pp. 123, ibid) "na hi tat samayābhāvāt
vācyam śabdasya kalpyate pratīyamānatāyām ca
vyaktasya anumeyatā.” (56) "tasmāt svārthā'tirikteņa
gatir na arthāntare girām, vācakatvās'rayenā'to
gunavrtter asambhavah.” (57) Mahimā suggests that when we resort to metaphorical expression or guna-vịtti, the secret underlying this activity is that it is the natural linguistic habit of people that they identify similar or mutually connected objects. When we see a person with long neck and ugly figure we call him “karabha' or a youngone of a camel. Again on seeing children crying in a cradle, we describe the cradle as crying : (pp. 121, ibid) : “loko hi tat-sadrśam tatsambaddham ca tattvena vyavaharan drśyate, tad yathā dirgha-grīvam vikata-kāyam ca kamcit paśyan 'karabha' iti vyapadiśati, mañca-sambaddhān ca kāmścit krośato mañcāḥ krośanti iti.” On hearing such sentences which

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are non-congruent by nature, an intelligent person concludes that such an incongruous identification has some valid reason as its basis. This he decides through reasoning. Mahimā does not accept arthāpatti' as a separate means of knowledge — i. e. pramāņa and subsumes it under ‘anumāna' or inference — "arthāpatter anumānāntarbhāvā'bhyupagamät iti uktam.” (pp. 118 ibid)
Mahimā classifies gunavrtti or metaphorical expression into two such as (i) based on similarity, and (ii) based on some other connection : "tat-sāmyatat-sambandhau hi tattvā-ropa-eka-karanam” (pp. 122, 47a, ibid). For him the apprehension of metaphorical meaning is only logical deduction from literal sense. It is a case of inference where the sadhya-sādhana-bhāva is collected from loka i.e. worldly parlour. We have noted that for Mahimā, as both bhakti' i.e. metaphorical expression and dhvani are covered up by inference, there is no cause to distinguish between the two as is done by Anandavardhana. Secondary meaning and the so-called suggested sense are, for Mahimā, arrived at by the same process of 'anumiti' i. e. inference, because both are collected from the primary meaning. For Mahimā, even terms involving 'faded metaphors' i. e. rūdhimālā laksanā, have consideration of second meaning and are therefore collected by inference. In that case they are, in the opinion of Mahimā, not different from Dhvani : (pp. 124, ibid)
rūdhā ye visaye'nyatra
śabdāḥ sva-visayād api, lāvanyädyāḥ prasaktās te
na bhavanti padam dhvaneḥ (61) (pp. 124, ibid) Mahimā as observed earlier, also rejects tātparya sakti, which for him falls under anumiti. It may be noted that for Abhinavagupta 'tatparya' is a sentence-function, as explained by the Abhihitānvayavādins, which makes for the correlated meaning of various 'pada's or words in a given sentence. Thus this can be equated with samsarga-maryādā of the later navya-naiyāyikas, and the laksaņā of the Bhāțțas (Ref. : Dr. K. Kunjunni Raja, p. 222, ibid). But Dhanika's tātparya travels farther than mere sentence-sense as a result of the total of word-meanings. It is wider enough to cover Anandavardhana's vyangyārtha also. The famous words of Dhanika are, “tātparyam na

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tuladhṛtam", for "it extends upto any limit till the speaker's intention is collected 'yāvat-kārya-prasāritvāt." Dr. Raja observes (pp. 216, ibid) It can, "cover the whole range of the speaker's intention and cover all implications coming up in the train of the expressed sense."
But we have seen above how Mahima rejects the case of tātparya-vṛtti and how he subsumes it under 'anumiti'. Thus Mahima's concepts of 'abhidha' and 'anumiti' are powerful enough to digest all other concepts such as gauni, lakṣaṇā, tātparya, vyañjanā and even the broad concept of 'vakrokti' involving 'Vicitra abhidhā' of Kuntaka. This is how Mahima takes kuntaka to task. Kuntaka holds such 'sabda' and 'artha' to be Kavya, as are charged by charming function of a poet and delight those who know (poetry). So, for Kuntaka such artful expression is the life of poetry which is different from the practice of word and sense as seen in various disciplines. But all this is not correct according to Mahima. He argues as follows :
Is this special arrangement of word and sense merely the proper usage (aucitya-mātra) of word and sense, or is it only the suggestion of the implicit sense which is different from the expressed sense as experienced by all? Because, no third alternative is possible it has got to be either of the two.
The first alternative is not acceptable as the mention of such propriety is useless, because it stands refuted by the very assertion of the form of poetry. The point is that it is the poet's business to arrange vibhāvādi, i. e. determinants, etc. It is not different from this. The determinants make for 'rasa' only when presented in a special way, and not otherwise. Again, only that theme makes for poetry, which is charged with rasa. So, no question of impropriety ever arises. In other words Mahima accepts only that as poetry which is charged with rasa, and this rasa is caused only by proper arrangement of vibhavadis. Thus 'anaucitya' has no scope in genuine poetry, worth its name. He observes (pp. 142, ibid)
"te ca yathāśāstram upanibadhyamānā rasābhivyakter nibandhanabhāvam bhajante. na anyathā. rasātmakam ca kavyam iti kutas tatra anaucitya

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samsparśaḥ sambhavyate yan nirāsārtham ittham kāvya-laksanam acakšīran vicakṣaṇammanyāḥ ?"
Mahimā says that in case you opt for the second alternative, then you are quoting only the definition of dhvani in different words, for the content of thought is one and the same. Now as far as this dhvani-laksana goes, it has been already refuted by us. Mahimā sticks to his gunas and concludes : (pp. 143, 144, ibid)
"atro'cyate'bhidhā-samjñaḥ
sabdasya artha-prakāśane, vyāpāra eka eva istah yas tu
anyo'rthasya so'khilah." - (71) tatasca,
"vācyād arthāntaram bhinnam
yadi tallingam asya sah, tan nāntariyakatayā
nibandho hyasya laksanam.” - (72) (pp. 143, ibid) "abhede bahutā na syad
ukter mārgāntarāgrahāt, tena dhvanivad esā'pi
vakroktir, anumā na kim ? - (73) (pp. 144, ibid) Mahimā also rejects suggestivity - vyañjakarva-as word-power, for there is no other power of the word except 'abhidha': (pp. 146, ibid) - Mahimā observes” - nā'pi śabdasya abhidhā-vyatirekena vyañjakatvam vyāpārāntaram upapadyate, yena arthāntaram pratyāyayed; vyakteḥ anupapatteh, sambandhāntarasya ca asiddheh. Even in the absence of 'vyakti' or 'sambandhāntara', if suggestivity is accepted with reference to a word, then no fixed scheme will hold good in that case — "tad abhāve'pi tad abhyupa-game tasya artha-niyamo na syād, nibandhana-abhāvāt. (pp. 146, ibid) - Word cannot have any direct relationship with suggested meaning. If word had any natural, relationship with suggested sense in form of ‘rati'

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and other emotions as in case of songs (i. e. music), then one and all could have been able to apprehend the same — "na hi asya, geyasya iva ratyādibhir bhāvaiḥ svābhāvika eva sambandhaḥ sarvasya eva tat-pratītiprasangāt.” (pp. 146, ibid)
No relation of a word with the suggested sense can be believed to be born of convention as suggestion is 'aupadhika' and 'upādhis' are innumerable and uncertain. One and the same word may suggest different meanings under different contexts. So, to fix a particular suggested sense in case of a fixed word, like convention in case of expressed sense, is impossible.
Mahimă also examines the possibility of prefixes (= upasargas) being suggestive. He is clear that if suggestivity is totally denied in case of a word, the prefixes can never be accepted as suggesting any meaning. Dr. C. Rajendran in a ft-note (no. 58, pp 72, ibid) observes : "Here the assumption of MB (i.e. Mahima Bhatta) is that Dyotakatva of the grammarians is the same as the vyañjakatva of the Dhvani theorists. There is however, no supporting evidence adduced.” It may be noted that on an earlier occasion we have also noted that the 'manifestation of sphota cannot be taken as identical with the suggestion of the dhvanivadins. Mahimā holds that the prefixes are said to be 'dyotaka' i. e. suggestive only in a metaphorical sense. Actually they are capable of expression only and not suggestion.
Mahimā argues that in fact when we use such words as 'ghata' or pot and the like, for directly conveying the meaning of the object called a pot, even there these words such as 'ghata' should be held not as directly, expressive of a meaning but only as 'dyotakas' or suggestive, for the meaning of 'ghatapadārtha' is already existent in our mind and is only revealed by the expression of the word 'ghata'. Thus even the whole vācya vācaka-vyavahāra' the business of expression and expressed will be negated. So, it is better to accept metaphorical suggestivity here. Says he - (pp. 153, ibid) :
"evam ca antar-mātra viparivartitayā siddha-sadbhāvānām ghatādīnām ghatādiśabdā api dyotakā eva syuh, na vācakā it, vācya-vācaka-vyavahāro'stam iyāt tasmāt bhāktam eva dyotakatvam upagantavyam na mukhyam.

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bhakteh ca prayojanam vācyasya arthasya sphuţatvapratipattiḥ, nimittam ca, višeșana-višesya-pratītyor-ās'ubhāvitayā kramānupalaksanāt sahabhāvapratitih."
Mahimā holds that it is only to describe the clarity of the meaning derived from a root modified by a prefix, that the prefix is figuratively stated as suggestive. If it is argued that actually a prefix manifests a particularity i.e. viśesa---already existent in a verb and so they are suggestive and not denotative of a 'višesa' in a verb, than Mahimā's reply is that you cannot cognise the exact form of višesa i. e. particularity manifested by a prefix. The meaning invariably apprehended should be taken only as 'expressed' meaning--if we do not accept this dictum then an adjective applied to a noun will also have to be regarded as 'dyotaka'. If taken to its extreme end, this would take us to believe that words like 'ghata' are also dyotakas as they manifest objects that are in the mind. So also will be the case of words such as ‘nīla' etc. which are taken as višeşanas as a rule. - "sāmānyāni ca garbhīksta-višesāni bhavanti iti teşām tatra sadbhāva-siddhau satyām nīlādi-sabdā api tat-tat-dyotanamātra-vyāparāḥ prādi-vad dyotakā bhavitum arhanti, na abhidhāyakā iti.” (pp. 152, ibid)
Thus, Mahimā emphatically denies the existence of what is termed as vyañjakatva. He thus accepts only ‘abhidhā' as word-power and all sense, other than the expressed is collected, according to him by 'anumāna'. He declares (pp. 157, ibid) : (samgrahaślokas)
"svābhāvikam dhvaner yuktam
vyañjakatvam na dīpavat, dhūmavat kintu krtakam
sambandhāder apeksaņāt.” - (74) “prādīnām dyotakatvam
yat kaiścid abhyupagamyate, tad bhāktam eva, tatra istam na
mukhyam tad asambhavāt." - (75)

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yathā hi yasya śabdasya
bhāvā'bhāvānusāriņī, yad arthabuddhiḥ tasya asau
vācyo'rtha iti kathyate.” - (76) "go-śabdasya iva gaur arthah
sā'nyathā tvávyavasthitā vācyatva-vyavahārasca
na syād arthasya kasya-cit." - (77) "prādi-prayogā’nugama
vyatirekānusāriņi, prakarsādau matis tena
tasya tad-vācyatā na kim” - (78) “višeşāvagamasyāśu
bhāvād anupalaksanāt kramasya sahabhāvitvam
bhramo bhakter nibandhanam." - (79) (pp. 158, ibid) We have seen how there was a stiff opposition to the Kashmir school of thought that advocates a fool-proof scheme of chiseled concepts of abhidhā, laksana and vyañjanā. The challengers were great names such as Mukula, Kuntaka, Mahima and Bhoja. But this challenge was taken up by the Kashmir-school again with a successful counter attack by Mammata, Hemacandra and their followers, culminating in the efforts of Appayya and Jagannātha, and the road to him is bedecked by efforts of such greats as Mammața and his followers.
What necessitated this rethinking and re-establishment from Mammata and his followers is creating again a conceptual clarity which originated with Anandavardhana who established vyañjanā as a distinct power of word and explained how abhidhā and laksana were different from it on account of visaya-bheda and svarūpa-bheda. But Ānandavardhana's attempts were challenged by some anti-vyañjană thinkers and again they mixed up abhidhā,

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laksanā and vyañjanā also in an incurable way. Kuntaka, though not an antidhvani thinker, was also slightly different from Anandavardhana in the sense that he cared only for the poetic expression and so his concept of vicitrā abhidhā was more ambitious and less clear. Nobody except Mahimā cared strictly for visayabheda and svarūpabheda underlying the sabda-vrttis. But Mahimā erred on the other side. He accepted abhidhā as abhidhā pure and simple as taught by the mīmāņsakas, grammarians; naiyāyikas and also Anandavaradhana. But for the extra meaning, the pratīyamāna artha, he postulated kāvyānumiti in place of any word-power. For him, anything beyond expressed sense directly following from the word, was due to inference, and the word never could give any other sense beyond vācyārtha. Thus, even laksaņā--what Mammata calls "āropitā-kriya' also was not acceptable to him. As was laksaņā /laksyārtha so was vyañjanā / vyangyārtha – equally non-acceptable as following from word. So, for him there was no hesitation on accepting dhavni as 'bhākta'. But with all his vehemence he was not convincing for the fact remained that whatever was experienced by a man of taste from poetry, was directly from poetry and not from any other thing such as inference. It was poetry, poetry and poetry alone, with its magic web of word and sense, that delighted the aesthete. Even Mahimā had to concede a point when he accepted that his kāvyānumiti was not congruent, with tarkānumiti. So, once again the balance swung in favour of Anandavardhana, and Mammata and others rediculed Mahimā for rejecting different powers of a word. A clear-cut scheme of three powers of a word was the requirement of the context to explain the experience that accrued from reading of poetry. A change in a word here and there upset the balance of aesthetic experience and therefore it was word and word and word alone that was held responsible for bringing about the pleasure through the richness of its meaning. Thus, once again Mammata an followers laid down the royal road of three word-powers that led to the destination of aesthetic experience from poetry.

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Bhoja and Hemacandra Bhoja
We know that Bhoja represents, according to us, a tradition, which we call 'the Mālava tradition', to distinguish it from the Kashmir tradition as represented by Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta, Mammata, Hemachandra, Vidyadhara, Vidyānātha, Viśvanātha, Appayya and Jagannātha, to mention a few.
This is not to suggest that Bhoja is always at cross-roads with the Kashmir tradition and that he always exchanges swords with Anandavardhana and the rest, but one thing is certain that the tradition Bhoja represents, one which we call the Mālava tradition of literary aesthetics, has certain special traits of its own. It has to be candidly admitted that the views of Bhoja as interpreted by the great modern alamkārika Dr. Raghavan, for whom we have tremendous respect and love, will be our sole friend, philosopher and guide so far as Bhoja is concerned. But with due respect to the great savant of Indian literary criticism, we have to make an humble confession that at times we fail to understand what Dr. Raghavan explains, or at times we feel we can supplement his efforts, or in very rare cases we may even atten correct his impression. In doing this, we will surely go with the text of Bhoja as read in both of his works, viz. the Sarasvati-kanthabharana and the Śrngāra-Prakāśa. Our efforts should not be misunderstood by the world of scholars, for to us, Dr. Raghavan remains, and will remain for a thousand years to come as the greatest interpreter of Bhoja, but we try to approach only in the fashion of a student with his curiosity a little more awakened as compared to a general reader. So, with pranams to both Bhoja and Dr. Rāghavan, who for us is an ‘abhinava-bhoja', we will try to explain the concept of abhidhā as explained by Bhoja.
It has to be noted that Bhoja has not discussed independently the topic of śabda-vrttis in his Sarasvati-kanthābharana, comprising of five chapters.

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However there could be traced stray references to the sabda-vrttis here and there which do not carry any theoretical value, e.g. on pp. 709 (N.S.Edn. 1934 A.D.) we read : "yato rsā”ksepāt-parihāsa-leśoktyā'mangalam, pravisa pindīm, dvāram, bhaksaya, iti nyāyāt prasiddha-adhyāhāraḥ, darī vadati, mañcāḥ krośanti' iti prayogadarśanāt ādhārādheya-yor abhedopacārasca viruddha-laksaņādibhiḥ prayujyamāno na dosāya iti." - Such director indirect references to śabda-vịttis do not carry any value for us. We will have to turn to the other work, the Sệngāra-prakāśa for a comparatively more systematic approach to the topic of śabdavịttis, though it has to be admitted at the outset, that Bhoja, in keeping with the tradition which he seems to have directly inherited from alamkāra writers prior to Anandavardhana, does not treat this topic as systematically as is done by Mammata and other followers of the Kashmir school. We will pick up the thread with the help of Dr. Raghavan. We propose to reach him with honest enquiry as an advanced student.
Bhoja's treatment of śabda-śaktis is part of his larger scheme of explaining what 'sāhitya' is. Dr. Raghavan thus explains : (pp. 87, Bhoja's Śr. Pra, '63) “We have already said that poetry being speech supreme, Sāhitya is, between the two parts of language - sabda and Artha — relation supreme. Thus, sāhitya first means all linguistic expression and the general and inevitable grammatical and logical relations between word and sense; and then it means poetry and the poetic relations between the two. Bhoja means by sahitya both kinds of relation and he not only deals with poetry but with language also. At the lower levels, lies language with its general Sāhitya; higher up, the language has risen above itself and has bloomed in poetry, and here, the Sahitya is poetic relation between word and sense. Bhoja defines kāvya as the Sāhitya or unity of word and sense.
"tat (kāvyam) punah, śabdārthayoh; sāhityamāmananti.” tad yathā - “sabdārthau sahitau kävyam” iti.
It is to a treatment of this sāhitya of sabda and Artha that the Śr. Pra, is devoted. Bhoja calls his work itself Sāhitya Prakāśa in Chapter XI.
yasmin aśesa-vidyāsthānārtha-vibhūtayaḥ prakāśante,

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samhṛtya, sa
sahityaprakāśa etadṛśo bhavati.'
Chap. XI. p. 430, Śr. Pra. Vol. II The scheme of the whole work is contained in the definition, ‘śabdārthau sahitau kavyam', and under the edifice of the Śr. Pra. lies the foundation and system called Sahitya. This has been already pointed out above in Ch. IV (of Śr. Pra. Raghavan). Sahitya is thus defined by Bhoja. It is the relation between Śabda and Artha and is of twelve kinds. Eight of these twelve Sahityas can be called general and the last four, are special and can be classed as the poetic Sahityas.
"kim sahityam ? yaḥ śabdarthayoḥ sambandhaḥ sa ca dvādaśadhā, abhidhā, vivakṣā, tātparyam, pravibhāgaḥ, vyapekṣā, sāmarthyam, anvayaḥ, ekārthi-bhāvaḥ, doṣahānam, guṇopādānam, alamkārayogah, rasa-aviyogaśceti."
Again, at the beginning of chapter VII which begins the treatment of Sahitya, Bhoja repeats these twelve-fold relations between sabda and Artha as constituting Sahitya.
"tatra abhidha-vivakṣā-tātparya-pravibhāga-vyapekṣā-sāmarthya-anvayaekārthibhāva-doṣahāna-guṇopādāna-alamkārayoga-rasa-aviyogarūpāḥ śabdarthayoḥ dvādaśa sambandhāḥ sahityam ucyate." Vol. I. P. 428, Śr. Pra.
Even the earlier work of Bhoja, the S.K.A. contains indications of this conception of Sahitya of Bhoja. The first verse of the work- "dhvanir varṇaḥ padam vākyam etc. covers part of contents of chapters I-VI of the Śr. Pra and the second verse of the S.K.A. gives the last four-fold poetic Sahitya,
""
doṣahāna, guṇādāna, alamkārayoga, and rasaviyoga or rasānvaya; and commenting on the above-said first verse of the S.K.A., Ratneśvara who is acquainted well with Śṛ. Pra. says:
-
tad ayamatra tätparya-samkṣepaḥ. śahitya-nirupaṇāya kila eṣa grantharambhaḥ. sahityam ca sabdarthayoḥ sambandhaḥ tatra sabda eva ka ityapekṣāyām ayam vibhāgo dhvanir ityādi arthastu stambha-kumbha-ādilakṣaṇaḥ loke śāstre ca prasiddhaḥ, sambandhaḥ kaścid anādiḥ, sarvasvāyamānas tu sambandhaḥ nānyatreti asminnayatate. sa caturvidhaḥdoṣahānam, guṇopādāṇam, alamkārayogaḥ, rasābhi(vi) yogaśceti."
Ratnesvara on S.K.Ā.I.

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This rather long quotation from Dr. Raghavan brings out how ambitious project Bhoja has set himself to. By taking Sāhitya in its widest sense as "coming together of word and meaning", he wants to cover under this banner both poetry (i.e. kāvya) and non-poetry (i. e. śāstra and loka-bhāsā). So, Bhoja first takes sāhitya merely as relation between word and sense in general and includes under it two sets of relations, grammatical and poetical. Among the eight grammatical relations four are classed as kevala-sabda sambandha-śaktis and the other four as sāpeksa-sabda-sambandha-saktis. Dr. Raghavan (pp. 88 ibid) gives the following table to explain Bhoja's classification :
Kāvyam
sabdah (12 types)
arthah (12 kinds)
tayoh sāhityam
(12 kinds)
grammatical 8 kinds of sabda-sambandha-saktis
4 poetical kinds 9-dosahānam 10-gunādānam 11-alamkārayogah 12-rasa-aviyogah.
4-kevala-saktayah 1-abhidha 2-vivaksā 3-tātparyam 4-pra-vibhāgah
4-sāpeksa-śaktayaḥ 5-vyapeksā 6-sāmarthyam 7-anvayaḥ 8-ekārthībhāvaḥ
The first eight go under the name of sabda-sambandha-śaktis. Dr. Raghavan notes that in Bhoja, (pp. 89, ibid) Abhidhā comprises the three vșttis, mūkhyā, gaunī, and laksaņā. Vivakşā is of three kinds - kākvădi-vyañgyā, prakaranādi-vyangya and abhinayādi-vyangyā. In

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tatparya is included the pratīyamāna and Dhvani. These eight sabdasambandhas are treated of in Chapters VII and VIII. Poetic Sahitya begins in Chapter IX.
With this explanation furnished by Dr. Raghavan, we will start our investigation as to what exactly Bhoja wants to cover under ‘abhidhā' and whether his treatment is more, or equally or less scientific as compared to Mammata's scheme.
When it is observed by Dr. Raghavan that Bhoja's abhidhá covers three vịttis viz. mukhyā, gauni, and laksanā, we feel that Bhoja seems to be under the influence of such writers as Mukula and even Mahimā, who take laksanā only as part of abhidhā. For Mukula, the ten-fold abhidhã covered the field of a-mukhyā vrtti also. On the face of it the treatment in the works of Mammața and his followers belonging to the Kashmir tradition seems to be more scientific.
Bhoja (pp. 223, Edn. Josyer, Ch. VII) says : "tatra abhidhā-vivaksā..... dvādaśa samarthāḥ sāhityam iti ucyate." - Then
he proceed
"teșu sabdasya arthābhidhāyinī śaktir abhidhā. tayā svarūpa iva abhidheye pravartamānaḥ śabdo vịtti-trayena vartate, tāśca-mukhyā, gaunī, laksaņā iti tisrah.” - We have a quarrel with the very first statement which is loose. When Bhoja defines abhidhā as, "sabdasya arthābhidhāyini saktih". he fails to discriminate between the directly expressed sense, called samketitārtha, the indicated sense or laksyārtha and the suggested sense called vyangyārtha classified clearly in the Kashmir school of thought. Even Kuntaka's 'vicitrā abhidha' covered all these three under one banner. May be we are in a frame of mind, or we have inherited a mind-set that tends to appreciate more the system as presented by Ananda-Abhinava-MammațaJagannātha-led school of thought.
Bhoja then proceeds as follows : (pp. 223, ibdi)... "tatra sākṣād avyavahitārthā-bhidhāyikā mukhyā. gamyamāna-sauryādi-guna-yoga-vyavahitärthā gauni

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svärthāvinābhūta-arthāntaropalakṣaṇā tu lakṣaṇā iti. tathāhi gaur iti ayam śabdo mukhyaya vṛttyā sāsnādimantam artham pratipadayati, sa eva tisthanmutratādi-guna-sampadam apekṣamāņo yadā bāhlike vartate tadā gaunim vṛttim anuvadati.
So, it is clear that Bhoja's mukhyā is the 'abhidha' proper of the Kashmir school. Gauni and lakṣaṇā are treated by Mammta as part of a-mukhyā vṛtti, i.e. lakṣaṇā which is for him six-fold, sad-vidha. But Bhoja takes these two as extention of his wider abhidha, as done by Mukula. Perhaps even the earlier Mīmāmsakas also took lakṣaṇā (including gauni) as extension of abhidhā. Bhoja keeps gauņi reserved for relations-'tadyoga' as put by the Kashmir school based on similarity, and his lakṣaṇā is characterised by such meaning which is another one following from the svartha - So, 'tadyoga' is accepted even by Bhoja here. He illustrates gauni by the same illustration such as "gaur vähikaḥ" (= bählīkaḥ). One who urinates while standing like a bull is called 'gauḥ', due to similarity. The Kashmir school seeks comparison in 'jäḍya and mandya' - dullness and stupidily as seen in both. Bhoja further observes : tad äha
"rūḍhya yatra sad artho'pi loke śabdo niveśitaḥ
sa mukhyas tat sāmyāt

gauno'nyatra skhalad-gatiḥ."
yadā tu sabdaḥ svarthaṭaḥ kriyāsiddhau sadhana-bhāvam gantum asamarthaḥ, tadā abhidheya-avinābhūtam arthāntaram lakṣayati. tadā sā ca lakṣaṇā vṛttiḥ. yathā gangāyām ghoṣaḥ prativasati. atra ganga-sabdo viśistodaka-pravähe nirūḍhā'bhidhāna-saktiḥ. sa ca ghoṣa-kartṛkāyāḥ prati-vasanakriyāyā adhikaraṇa-bhavam gantum asamarthaḥ, svārtha'vinābhūtam tatam lakṣayati." (pp. 223, ibid).
This means Bhoja is absolutely clear about the concepts of abhidha, and also gauni and lakṣaṇā and surely he had read what Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta had written. But he chooses a different tradition which recognises 'gauni' as an independent vṛtti from lakṣaṇā, as seen later also in

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Hemacandra. But what Bhoja does is still different. Over and above taking gauni and laksanā as separate functions, he clubs them together as extension of abhidhā and thus his abhidh, is wide enough to contain these two in its fold. This is, as observed earlier, like Mukula.
He then quotes from Kumārila viz. "abhidheyā'vinabhūta-pratītir laksanā" and calls it the life of artful expression : “sā esā vidagdha-vakrokti-jīvitam." Now this expression makes it clear that he appreciates the concept of 'vicitrāabhidhā' of Kuntaka, and in the same way he absorbs the influence of Vāmana also, who suggested : "sādrśyāt laksaņā vakroktih". (KSV. IV iii-8)
Bhoja then attempts the classification of the three-fold abhidhā, out of which the first viz. mukhyā, which is pure abhidhā for the Kashmir school, is two-fold : "tatra mukhyā dvidhā, tathā-bhūtārthā, tad-bhāvāpattiśca” (pp. 223, ibid). Then, he proceeds : "tathābhūtārthā şodhā, jāti-visayā, vyaktivisayā, ākṣti-visayā, guna-visayā, kriyā-visayā sambandha-visayāśca iti.”
Now, it may be said that the divisions and subdivisions suggested here and also elsewhere normally are six or twelve. This is Bhoja's special feature. Again, here also, the sub divisions of 'tathābhūtārthā mukhyā' which are six go by the difference in the nature of the objects described. These are broad divisions seen in the world and there is hardly anything special to be noted. Though Bhoja has taken 'sähitya' in a very wide sense and his concept covers śāstra-bhāsā and loka-bhāsā or vyavahāra-bhāṣā i.e. language in general also, we may say to his credit that he has drawn illustrations from poetry only. 'sambandha-visaya' is illustrated from the Vikramorvašīyam where Pururavas is said to be the grandson of the Sun and the Moon. But our observation stands that the varieties enumerated by Bhoja, all follow the nature of the object under description. Thus if a guna is described it is guna-visayā, if a kriyā is described, it is kriyā-visayā and so on. We may say this is just Bhoja's love for hair-splitting.
'tadbhāvāpatti' variety of mukhyā is explained as : "arthasya a-tathātve adhyāsādibhiḥ tathātvāpādanam tad-bhāvāpatti).” (pp. 224, ibid) This again is six-fold such as - "sā'pi şodhā, adhyāsātmikā, kalpanātmikā, vivartātmikā, vipariņāmātmikā, viparyayātmikā, pravādātmikā ca iti."

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The adhyāsātmikā is illustrated by "kamalam anambhasi, kamale ca kuvalaye"... etc. (pp. 225). We know that this is a famous illustration of the figure atiśayokti. Thus, Bhoja has quoted famous illustrations every where which we would put under this or that alamkāra. The Kashmir school, as we know, puts the whole of 'alamkāra' – under vācya-vācaka-bhāva, with some undercurrent of vyañjanā or vyangyārtha in many alamkāras such as samāsokti, āksepa, paryāyokta, aprastuta-praśamsā etc. So, they are a 'vācyavācaka-bhāva-vivarta' for those who follow the Kashmir school of thought. Dr. Raghavan should have gone for such critical and comparative study of Bhoja's concept of Sabda-vrttis. Actually he could have devoted a separate chapter to explain Bhoja's concept of sabda-vrttis.
'Mithyājñāna' seems to be, for example, not different from niscayānta sasamdeha, or bhrāntimān alamkāra (pp. 225, ibid). The 'pravāda variety is illustrated by the famous verse from the Meghadūta, viz. "ratna-cchāyāvyatikara iva...” (pp. 226, ibid), which is for us a beautiful utpreksā in “barhena iva sphurita-rucinā gopa-veśasya visnoh."
Bhoja then proceeds with the second variety of abhidhā, viz. 'gauņi as (pp. 226, ibid) : "gauņi dvividhā. guna-nimittā, upacāra-nimittā ca. tatra yasyām dvayor vacanayoḥ sāmānădhikaranyena vaiyadhikaranyena vā prayogaḥ, višesaņa-višesya-bhāvā'nyathā'nupapattyaikasya pratīyamānaabhidhīyamāna-guna-dvārakah sambandho bhavati, sā guna-vyavahitārthā guna-nimittā.” ... gunah svārtho višesanam pravrtti-nimittam iti ca eko'rthah. sa dharma-guna-kriyā-āksti-jāti-svarūpādi bhedād anantah. tat sambandhena yadyapi tannimittā vịttir ananta-prakārā eva kalpyate, tathā'pi tasyāḥ sad eva vikalpā bhavanti mukhya-visayah, amukhya-visayaḥ, bheda-visayaḥ, abhedavisayah, višesana-visayah, a-višesana-visayah, iti.”
Now this again confirms our observation that the divisions and subdivisions suggested by Bhoja go with the nature of the thing described. There is hardly any logical divide. Bhoja also knows that there can be innumerable varieties that go with difference in the nature of the thing described. But he insists on six only. So, virtually there is no rhyme or rhythm in Bhoja's

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varieties except, of course, the outward system of dividing a point into six or twelve sub-varieties.
The 'upacāra' variety of gaunī which is also six-fold is explained as (pp. 229, ibid), "mukhyayā gaunyā vā anya-viśesanasya sato'nyatra āropanam upacāraḥ tannimittaka-upacāra-nimittā. sā tu gauna-vyavahitārthatvāt gaunī bhavati, tasyā api dharma-guna-āksti-kriyā-svarūpa-jātyādayaḥ pravrttinimitta-tadbhedāt. sā'pi şad-prakāra bhavati-dharma-nimittā, guna-nimittā, ākrti-nimittā, kriyā-nimittā, svarūpa-nimittā, jātinimittā ca."
We are reminded of the words of Visvanātha in his Sāhityadarpana (S.D. II-9 vịtti) viz. "upacāro nāma atyantam visakalitayoḥ padārthayoḥ sādrśyātiśaya-mahimnă bheda-pratīti-sthagana-mātram."
Bhoja holds that lakṣaṇā is basically two-fold : (pp. 233, ibid) - "aksaņā lakṣita-laksanāca. tayor yasyām upātta-śabdasya arthasya kriyāsiddhau sādhanatva-ayogāt svārtho 'vinābhūtam arthāntaram vyavahitam eva laksayati sā laksaņā, tad-vyatiriktā tu vaksyamāņa-anekarūpā laksita-laksaņā iti.
tatra lakṣaṇā sodhā sāmīpya-laksanā, sāhacarya-lakṣaṇā, saha-caritalaksaņā, hetulakṣaṇā, tādarthya-laksaņā, parimāņa-lakṣaṇā ca.
lakṣita-lakskaņā'pi şaddhaiva rūdha-laksanā, pratīka-laksaņā, vivaksitalaksanā, viruddha-laksaņā, tad-anya-laksaņā, prakīrṇa-laksaņā ca.
It is surprising that Bhoja refuses to go beyond laksaņā, especially in varieties called 'vivaksita-laksanā' and viruddha-laksanā' which normally for a follower of the Kashmir school, takes us further to vyañjana and vyangyārtha. Dr. Raghavan has also not discussed all this in details. On the contrary he has not at all chosen to treat the topic of śabdavịttis in Bhoja as an independent topic. Bhoja's illustration of vivaksita-laksaņā follows his explanation of this variety such as : "yatra yathā-kathamcit śabdaprayoge vivaksitam eva laksyānusārato laksyate să vivakṣita-laksanā” - (pp. 235 ibid) - The illustrations cited are - 'manasijajaitra-ratham', etc. and, 'cakita-hariņihāri-netra-tribhāgah'. Bhoja observes (pp. 235 ibid) - atra na ardha-sabdasya tribhāga-śabdasya arthah, kimtu, tābhyām asamagrā-lokanam laksyate. na hi bhavati netra-caturbhāgo netra-şadbhāgo vā iti.”

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Bhoja does not go beyond laksaņā here. We know that Ānandavardhana has quoted the verse viz. vrīdāyogānnata. etc. with its fourth line ending in, "hāri-netra-tribhāgah once under Dhv. III 3, 4 - with the words : "padāvayavena dyotanam yathā.” Thus the part 'tribhāgah' of the whole compound is for him suggestive of 'rasa'. Elsewhere under Dhv. III. 33 also this illustration is quoted to explain how 'cestāvīs'esa' becomes suggestive of śộngāra-rasa. Under I. 19, Kuntaka also picks us this illustration to demonstrate – višeșana-vakratva, a variety of pada-pūrvārdha-vakratā. But Bhoja seems to be satisfied only with the secondary sense here, which is for him only 'a-samagra-ālokanam'. Similarly Bhoja's tad-anya-laksanā, which is illustrated by the famous verse : "suvarna-puspām prthivīm”... etc. also ends with laksyārtha only. Says he — "atra na suvarna-sabdārtho, na api puspa-śabdārthah kimtu suvarna-śabdena sarva-purusārtha-mülam hiranyam, puspa-śabdena ca prasavārtho laksyate. tābhyam ca lakṣitābhyām vyavasāyinām purusa-višesānām vasumatī sarvān kāmān prasūta iti. Bhoja does not go beyond this while we know that this verse is given by Anandavardhana under Dhv. I, 13, as an illustration of "a-vivakṣita-vācyadhvani.' Abhinavagupta in his locana on this explains both laksaņā and vyañjanā such as - (pp. 78, Edn. Dr. Nandi, Ahd. '97-'98) - "suvarṇāni puspyati iti suvarņa-puspā. etacca vākyam eva a-sambhavad-svār-tham iti kṛtvā avivaksita-vācyam. tata eva padārtham abhidhāya anvayam ca tātparya-śakty, avaga-mayya eva, bādhakavasena tam upahatya sādrśyāt sulabha-samțddhi-sambhāra-janatām laksayati. tal laksanā-prayojanam śura-krtavidya-sevakānām prāśastyam a-sabda-vācyatvena gopyamānam san nāyikā-kuca-kalasa-yugalam iva mahārghatām upanayan dhvanyate iti.” We do not know why Bhoja stops at lakṣaṇā only. But one thing is clear that though Bhoja does not mention 'vyangyartha' by name, he very much knows the same. In a number of illustrations of laksita-laksanā this is bourne out. He observes (pp. 236 ibid) - "anye punaḥ lakṣitalaksanām anyathā vyacaksate laksanayā upacaritavrttyā gaunyābhihitärthena yatra arthāntaram laksyate sā laksita-laksanā iti." - He illustrates such a

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variety by "rathānga-nāma', 'pankti-rathaḥ' etc. Then he gives poetic illustrations which for us are charged with vyañjanā also, a name which he does not mention. For example in, “parimlānam pina-stana.".... etc. We have 'vadati bisinī-patra-sayanam'. Bhoja has a note (pp. 237, ibid) : “atra vadati iti anena upacāra-vịttyā jñāpayati iti, parimlānam ityādibhiḥ taddharmaiḥ tanu-sanniveśa-cărutvotkarso laksyate.” Mammața has quoted this verse as an illustration of prasāda-guna (K. P. VIII), while Anandavardhana, under Dhv. I. 14, takes it as an illustration of ‘upacaritaśabda-vịtti'. Says he, “yatra hi vyañjakatva-kstam mahat-sansthavam nāśti tatrā'pi upacarita-śabda-vsttyā prasiddhyanurodha-pravartita-vyavahārāḥ kavayo dịśyante. Read Abhinavagupta (Locana, pp. 82, Edn. Dr. Nandi) on this - "vayam tu brūmaḥ - prasiddhyām prayojanasya a-nighūdhatā ityarthaḥ urtānena api rūpena, tat-prayojanam cakāsan nighūdhatā nidhānavad apeksate iti bhāvah.” Bhoja also cites the verse : 'niśvāsändha ivādarśaḥ candramā na prakāśate and adds (pp. 237, ibid) "atra yathā andhe rupa-višesābhivyaktir na sambhāvyate, evam tamasi api... yo rūpagrahaņāsamarthaḥ sóndha ucyate. tatra upacarita-vịttau yo'andhavat na paśyati sa evāndha iti ucyate. iha yatra kimcit na dřśyate tatrā'pi andha-sabdopalaksita-laksanayā pravartate. We know that Anandavardhana cites this verse (Dhv. II. i) as an illustration of atyanta-tiraskrta-vācyadhvani. With this we come to the end of Bhoja's concept of abhidhā, which includes mukhyā (i. e. abhidhā proper), gaunī and laksanā. Bhoja as observed earlier does not treat it as a special topic as is done by ālamkārikas of the Kashmir school of thought, but it falls under the twelve types of 'sāhitya' or relation of word and meaning in general, and of course as his illustrations suggest, with a special reference to the poetic use of word and meaning also.
With this Bhoja's treatment of abhidhā is screened.

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Hemacandra
Hemacandra gives a four-fold classification of words such as-mukhya, gauna, lakṣaka and vyañjaka.
Kā.s'a (1.15) "mukhya-gauna-lakṣya-vyangyārtha-bhedāt mukhya-gaunalakṣaka-vyañjakäḥ śabdāḥ" (pp. 18, Edn. Dr. T. S. Nandi, Ahmedabad, June 2000, Pub. L. D. Institute of Indology).
He explains 'mukhya' artha as "sākṣāt samketa-visayo mukhyaḥ" (K.S.I. 16, pp. 18, ibid) He adds in this vṛtti - "avyavadhānena yatra sanketaḥ kriyate, sa mukham iva, hastādyavayavebhyaḥ prathamam pratīyate iti mukhyah. sa ca jati-guna-kriya-dravya-rupaḥ, tad-visayaḥ śabdo mukhyo vācakaḥ iti ca ucyate. yatha gauḥ, śuklah, calati, devadatta iti. yad āha - mahābhāṣyakāraḥ - 'catustayī sabdānām pravṛttih' iti.
Hemacandra is clearly under the impression of both Mukula and Mammata. But the chief merit of this ācārya is that he puts things with absolute clarity and lucidity. He observes that the discussion of the nature of 'jāti' and the like is irrelevant to the point and is therefore not discussed here: "jātyādi-svarupam ca prakṛta-anupayogat na iha vipañcyate." He refers in brief to the views on sanketagrahana such as: "jātiḥ eva sanketa-viṣaya iti eke. tadvān iti apare, apoha iti anye."
Though Hemacandra has not elaborated this topic in the body of his text which he calls the kā.śa and alamkara-cuḍāmani, the name given by him to his svopajñā vṛtti, he discusses at length in his 'viveka' a commentary attached to the text, but also written by himself. Obviously, he has written 'viveka' for the more advanced students of this sastra, i. e. literary aesthetics. He says (pp. 1, Edn. kā. śā. with Viveka, by Prof. R. C. Parikh and Prof. Dr. V. M. Kulkarni, Bombay, '64) -
"vivarīkartum kvacid drbdham

navam sandarbhitum kvacit,
kāvyānuśāsanasyāyam
vivekaḥ pravitanyate."

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'to explain something presented, and to add something fresh - this viveka is presented at length.' So, in his 'viveka' on sūtra I. 16 Kā. S'ā he has covered everything that is read in Mammața and Mukula. Hemacandra observes : (pp. 43, ibid)
"catustayī iti. jāti-śabdāḥ guna-sabdāḥ, kriyāśabdāḥ yadệccha-śabdāśca tathā hi-sarvesām śabdānām svārthābhidhānāya pravartamānānām upādhiupadarśita-visaya-vivekatvāt upādhi-nibandhanā pravṛttiḥ.
upādhiśca dvividhaḥ— vaktr-sannivesitaḥ, vastudharmaśca. tatra yo vaktrā yadệcchayā tat-tat-samjñi-visaya-sakti-abhi-vyakti-dvāreņa tasmin tasmin samjñini niveśyate sa vaktr-sanniveśitah. yathā ditthādīnām śabdānām antyabuddhi-nirgrāhyam samhrta-svarūpam. tat khalu tām tām abhidhāśaktim abhivyañjayatā vaktrā yadṛcchayā tasmin tasmin samjñini upādhitayā sannives'yate ataḥ tannibandhanā yadrcchā-sabdāḥ ditthādaya."
Hemacandra now makes an interesting note : yesām api ca da-kārādivarņa-vyatirikta-samhịta-krama-svarūpābhāvāt na ditthādi-sabda-svarūpam samhịtakramam samjñisu adhyavasyata iti darśanam, teşām api vakt?yadrcchā-abhivyajyamāna-sakti-bhedānusāreņa kālpanika-samudāya-rūpasya ditthādeḥ śabdasya tat tat samjñā'bhidhānāya pravartamānatvād yadệcchā śabdatvam upapadyata eva. - This is from Mukula- (pp-5 ibid). Hemacandra then gives the two varieties of vastudharma, such as siddha, and sādhya. He proceeds exactly in the fashion of Mammața and Mukula and also quotes from the Vākyapadīya of Bhartshari ----
He also discusses the views of kevala-jātivādins, jāti-visista-vyaktivādins and apohavādins !
The second opinion - viz. 'tadvān' is explained by Hemacandra as : (pp. 44, ibid) -
“jāter artha-kriyāyām anupayogāt viphalaḥ samketah. yad-āha
"na hi jātir dāha-pākādau upayujyate iti vyakteśca artha-kriya-kāritve api ānantya-vyabhicārābhyām na sanketaḥ kartum sakyate iti jātyupahitā vyaktiḥ sabdārthah."

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Now this can be placed with Mánikyacandra's remark in his sanketa on the K. P. (pp. 15, ibid) :
"vyaktestu arthakriyākāritve api anantya-vyabhicārābhyām na sanketah kartum śakyate iti jātimati vyaktih sabdārtha iti vaiseşikādayah.”
We do not know who has influenced whom as both Hemacandra and Mānikyacandra were almost contemporary. (See Dr. De, Dr. Kane).
On ‘apoha' also H.C.'s remarks are almost identical and then more explanatory with those passed by M. C. - M.C. reads : (pp. 15, ibid)
‘apoha iti - jāti-vyakti-tadyoga-jāti mad buddhyākārāṇām śabdārthatvasya anupapadyamānatvāt gavayādi sabdānām a-go-vyāvsttyādi-rūpaḥ apohaḥ śabdārtha iti bauddhāḥ"
H. C. (pp. 44, ibid) reads :
jāti-vyakti-tadyoga-jātimad-buddhyākārāņām śabdārthatvasya anupapadyamānatvāt gavādi-sabdānām a-go-vyāvịttyādirūpas tad-viśistam vä buddhi-pratibimbakam sarvathā bāhyārtha-sparsa-śunyam anyāpoha-sabdavācyam sabdartha iti."
Clearly H. C. seems to offer better comments. Again M. C. has 'gavayādi śabdānām', and H. C. has 'gavādi sabdānām' which makes better sense. Then the remark - 'tad-viśistam vā....' in H. C. also are further explanatory. Thus, our impression, is that perhaps H. C. had M.C.'s 'samketa' before him, though he may be himself a senior contemporary of M.C.
Ācārya Hemacandra, the author of Kāvyānuśāsana revives a forgotten or better say forsaken tradition of taking 'gaunī' and 'laksana' as independent word-powers, separate and distinct from each other. We had seen earlier how, Bhoja had clubbed 'gauņi' and 'laksaņā as part of abhidhā. We will have to refer once again to Bhoja in brief because Hemacandra seems to come closer to Bhoja in his concepts of 'gaunī' and lakṣaṇā, though of course Bhoja did not give these two any status independent of abhidhā. Bhoja first of all enumerates 12 relations of word and sense./Bhoja (11.223, Josyer Edn.) observes : “tatra abhidhā-vivaksā

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tātparya-pravibhāga-vyapeksā-sāmar-thya-anvaya-ekārthībhāva-dosahāna - gunopādāna - alamkārayoga - rasa-avi-yoga-rūpāḥ śabdārthayor dvādaśa samarthāḥ sāhityam iti ucyate.”
tesu sabdasya arthābhidhāyinī saktir abhidhā, tayā svarupa iva abhisheye pravartamānaḥ śabdah vịtti-trayeņa vartate, tāś ca mukhyā, gaunī, laksanās tisraħ tatra sāksād avyavahitārthābhidhāyikā mukhyā gamyamānaśauryādigunayoga-vyavahitārthā gaunī. Svārtha-avinābhūtā'rthāntaropalaksanā tu laksaneti.”
Bhoja (pp. 226, ibid) continues - "gauni dvidhā, gunanimittā, upacāranimittā ca.
We have discussed these observations of Bhoja on an earlier occasion but here we will once again go through Bhoja's writing for attempting a comparative study of Bhoja and Hemacandra. Bhoja's abhidhā is that power of word which expresses meaning. Now here 'sabdasya arthābhidhāyinī śaktir' can be one which directly expresses the meaning or indirectly also. When it directly expresses the meaning it is termed as ‘mukhyā' i.e. principal. Bhoja observes that a word operates in its meaning (this is strange, because we normally say that a meaning stays in a word) -- "svarūpe iva abhidheye pravartamānaḥ śabdaḥ - in three-fold way. Thus there are three functions. — 'vịttitraya' of a word wherein his ‘mukhyā' which directly and without any interference gives a meaning is the first sub-variety of ‘abhidhā', which is our normal abhidhā of the ālamkārikas of the Kashmere school, Abhinavagupta, Mammața and Hemacandra including.
Bhoja's 'gaunī' is peculiar. He observes: "gamyamāna-sauryādi gunayoga-vyavahitārthā gaunī.” So, for Bhoja 'gauni is that variety of abhidhā which has connection with a meaning which is 'gamyamāna' — implied, and not sākṣāt - or directly connected. Again this meaning is of the nature of such qualities as 'saurya' i. e. bravery and the like. Thus this variety of abhidhā is connected with implied quality.

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Bhoja does not term it as subordinate but it is ‘a-mukhyā' in the sense that his mukhyā variety of abhidhā yields a direct meaning and his 'gauni yields gamyamāna i. e. implied meaning. On the other hand we will go to see that for Hemacandra, and even for the earlier Mīmāmsā thinking which talked of 'gauņa' function, 'gauni' was a secondary function i. e. 'amukhya' in the etymological sense, i. e. not-principal function. Again, Hemacandra's concepts of 'gauni' and 'laksaņā' are not absolutely identical with those of Bhoja and this will be clear from the following discussion. But for the present we continue with Bhoja who observes : (pp. 226, ibid) "gauni dvidhā, guna-nimittā, upacāra-nimittā.”
Thus 'guna' and 'upacāra' are distinct entities with Bhoja. For the Kashmere tradition normally we have a division between sādharmya-müla identification and sădharmyetaramüla i. e. upacāra-mūla identification. But Hemacandra, as we will go to analyse his concepts of gaunī and laksanā does not base his classification on similarity i. e. sādharmya or nonsimilarity. He has some other base of distinction. So, his 'gauni' thus viewed comes closer to that of Bhoja who has a 'guna-nimittā' and ‘upacāra-nimittā' gaunī. Bhoja observes that in his gauņi, words are placed either in 'sāmānādhikaranya' or 'vaiyadhikaranya' and on account of the višesana-višesyabhāva which is not understood otherwise — "anyathāanupapattyā” there emerges a sort of relation between two words through implied and stated quality. This relationship is promoted or caused by guna and hence is termed guņa-nimittā gauņi.
Bhoja explains ‘upacāra' (pp. 229, ibid) as that state of things where someone else's quality is superimposed on someone else. This ‘upacāra' for Bhoja takes place at both the levels i. e. at mukhya and gauna level : "mukhyayā gaunyā vā anya-višeşanasya sato'nyatra āropanam upacāraḥ.” "sā tu gauņa-vyavahitārthatvāt gauņi bhavati.” Qualities of say a solid substance, if superimposed on an abstract thing it is upacāra for Bhoja. Basically anya-dharmasya anyatra-āropana may be or may not be inspired

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by similarity. As noted above in 'gunanimittā gauņi” two words either in sāmānādhikaranya or vaiyadhikaranya are brought together and there has to be established a relationship of višeņaņa-viấesyabhāva, which as there is no other choice — anyathā anupapattyā — has to be substantiated through the qualities these two words convey, in one case implicitly conveyed and in the other directly conveyed. So, a sort of similarity between these qualities is expected by Bhoja. In upacāra there is no comparison but superimposition of say 'A's qualities on 'B'. It may be noted that 'B' has nothing of it, or say, 'B' is incapable of having these qualities. Thus, in “bhavati ruși kathorā, kintu ramyā mțgāksi” or, in "tālaiḥ siñjad-valayasubhagaiḥ, nartitah kāntayā me" - the qualities of "kathora" and "subhaga” go with a physical entity-mūrtimad-dravya and prāņi-višesa, but they are superimposed on anger (rosa), and twinkling bangles (siñjad-valaya).
Now in this ‘upacāra' the meaning is secondarily imposed and hence it is ‘upacāra-nimittā-gaunī for Bhoja.
Laksaņā for Bhoja is also two-fold viz. laksaņā and laksita-laksanā. When for the realisation of meaning of a given word, on account of there being no other instrumentality available, a meaning indicates another meaning which is having a relation of 'a-vinābhāva' it is a case of laksaņā which is six-fold.” tayor (i. e. between laksaņā and lakṣita-laksanā) yasyām upāttaśabdasyārthasya kriya-siddhau sādhanatvā'yogāt svārtho'vinābhūtam arthàntaram vyavahitam eva lakṣayati sā lakṣaṇā, tadvyatiriktā tu vaksyamāṇā'neka-rūpā lakṣita-laksanā, iti. Bhoja says that the ‘arthāntara' which is having a close-connection (= avinābhāva) such as closeness or sāmīpya, comes up in laksaņā. The illustrations are 'gangāyām ghosah 'mañcāḥ krośanti etc. Sāhacarya laksanā is seen in 'kuntān praveśaya', 'chatriņo gacchanti', etc. Bhoja's concept of lakṣita-laksaņā is hazy. It is certainly not laksanā mounted on laksaņā-which is rejected by Mammata. Whatever is not guided by sāmipya, sāhacarya, sahacarita, hetu, tādarthya, and pariņāma — is lakṣita-lakṣaṇā, which includes rūdha-laksaņā as in

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dvirepha – which is only abhidhā for Hemacandra, and pratīka-laksaņā, viruddha-lakṣasā, tad-anya-laksaņā, prakīrṇa-laksaņā etc. But for Hemacandra 'gauni', and 'laksanā' are clearly distinct.
Hemacandra at Kā.Sā. I. 17 explains, 'gauna' artha and at I, 18 explains 'laksya' artha and at Kā.Sā. I. 20 he enumerates the functions of a word. We will examine 'gauni and 'laksaņā' that tend to deliver 'gauna' and 'laksya' meanings respectively as follows.
Kā.Sā 1-17 talks of 'gauna' meaning as : “mukhyārthabādhe, nimitte, prayojane ca bhedābhedābhyām āropito gaunah.” This 'gauna' meaning for Hemacandra is caused when (i) primary meaning is contradicted, (ii) when there is ‘nimitta' i. e. 'tadyoga' and (iii) when there is sprayojana' i. e. motive. This gauna' is superimposed either through non-identity or bheda', or through identity i.e. 'a-bheda'.
Hemacandra explains in his vrtti - 'gaur vāhīkah', 'gaur evā'yam' ityādau mukhyasya arthasya sāsnādimattvād pratyaksādinā pramānena bādhe, nimitte ca sādrśya-sambandhādau, prayojane ca sādrśya-tādrūpya-pratīpattirūpe sati, āropya-āropa-visayayor bhedā'bhedena ca samāropito'tathābhūto'pi tathātvenā'dhyavasito, gunebhya āyātatvād gaunaḥ, tadvisayaḥ śabdo'pi gaunah, upacarita iti co'cyate."
This meaning and the word conveying this meaning are both designated as 'gauna'. It is also called 'upacarita'. The illustrations are 'gaur vāhīkah' and 'gaurevā'yam'. The first illustration clearly mentions both 'gauh' the object superimposed, and the person — vāhīka — the subject on whom the object is superimposed. Thus visaya' and 'visayin' are clearly mentioned -- bhedena'. In the other illustration only the visayin' figures and so this is ‘a-bhedena āropa'. The direct meaning of 'gauh' -- an animal having dewlap, etc. — is contradicted by direct perception or pratyaksa-pramāna as we can see that 'vāhīka' is a human being and not a bull. This superimposition is caused due to 'nimitta' -- others call it tadyoga — in form of similarity in qualities possessed by both the vāhīka and the bull. The qualities are those of dullness and stupidity. They are similar in both the visaya and the visayin. The

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motive is to suggest the extreme similarity or one-ness between the subject and the object. This meaning is derived through 'guna' and is therefore termed 'gauna'. The relation was that of sādrśya.
But when the relation is that of kārya-kārana etc., i. e. anything other than sādrśya, then also 'gauņi takes place, says Hemacandra. Thus kāryakāraṇabhāva is at the base of the illustration viz. āyur ghrtam' (bhedena) and ‘ayur eva idam' (abhedena); tādarthya is illustrated in 'indrāh', for 'indrārthā sthūna', sva-svāmibhāva is in, ‘rājā' for rājakīyaḥ purusaħ', or 'grāmah' for 'grāma-svāmī, agramātre avayave 'agrah' etc. Here, it may be noted that we have all cases of abhedena — āropaḥ as 'visaya' is not separately mentioned. These illustrations are in a way dubious. This will be seen when we discuss Hemacandra's 'laksya' artha and 'laksaņā vrtti'. Kā.S'ā I. 18 says - "mukhyārtha-sambaddhas tattvena
laksyamāno laksyah.” This means that the connected meaning which is indicated as identical with the primary meaning is called 'laksya'. While in 'gauni for Hemacandra there is superimposition of one object over another one either through complete identification i. e. a-bheda or through difference i. e. bheda, in 'lakṣaṇā there is superimposition of 'one meaning' over 'another meaning' through a-bheda or complete identity only. The two meanings denote two objects but they are derived from one and the same word. Say for example 'gangāyām ghosah', wherein there is identity between two objects viz. the current of the 'gangā' and the bank of the gangā. But these two objects are not separately or inseparately mentioned as is the case in 'gaur vāhīkah' or 'gaur eva ayam'. From the word 'gangā' these two are understood and there is superimposition, through absolute identity, of the meaning of the current of gangā on the meaning of the bank of 'gangā' both of which are expressed through one and the same word i.e. 'gangāyām'. Hemacandra observes in his vịtti - (pp. 45, Edn. Kulkarni & Parikh)

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"Mukhyo'rtho gangādiśabdānām srotah-prabhľtih, tena sambaddhah tațādir arthaḥ tattvena abhedena laksyamāno laksyaḥ. tattvena laksyamāna iti vacanād bhedābhedābhyām āropita iti na vartate. sesam tu gauņalaksanam anuvartate eva. tadvisayo sabdo laksakah yathā gangāyām ghosaḥ, kuntāḥ, pravišanti. atra gangāyām ghosādhikaraṇatvasya, kuntānām praveśasya ca asambhavāt mukhyārtha-bādhaḥ sāmīpyam sāhacaryam ca nimittam. gangātaţa iti kuntavanta iti ca prayogāt yesām na tathā pratītiḥ teşām pāvanatva-raudratvādīnām dharmāņām tathā-pratipādanam prayojanam."
Thus, the difference between gaunī and laksaņā for Hemacandra is that while in gaunī there is superimposition of one object over another object, i.e. one thing over another thing. This is realised either through complete identification or through a state where both are separately mentioned. On the other hand in laksaņā there is also superimposition. But it takes place at meaning level. There is superimposition of the meaning of something over the meaning of another thing but both are mentioned through one and the same word. Again this superimposition is through absolute identity, 'gangātata' and 'ganga-pravāha' are not separately mentioned as in gaur-vāhikah, but their meanings are identified through a common expression viz. 'gangā'.
We observed that some illustrations of 'a-bhedena gaunārtha' such as 'indrāḥ', 'taksā', 'ādhakah', 'raktaḥ', 'grāmaḥ, seem to be 'in a way dubious'. This is so because here also the meanings of two separate objects, not directly and separately mentioned, are taken as one; the colour is 'raktaħ', the cloth is 'red cloth' or 'raktaḥ patah', but only one word is used for two meanings. Even in lakṣaṇā this happens. Two meanings of two different words are identified through a common expression. Thus the sacrificial post for Indra is said to be Indra. This is gaunī. But here also meanings indicated by an identical word are identified through complete identity — a bhedena'. It would have been better if like Mammața and many others Hemacandra also had mentioned 'gauni' as a subvariety of laksaņā based on similarity, the rest being śuddhā laksanā.

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May be Hemacandra was guided by one criterian. It can be this. In all illustrations of gauni of two varieties, the two objects were different from each other. In laksanā the object is the same but two things connected with the same object are identified e.g. 'ghosa' and 'praväha' - both belong to Gangā. But this is also not applicable in ‘kuntāḥ pravišanti'. So, it seems there is no logic in his approach. He finally observes (pp. 46) "yatra ca vastvantare vastvantaram upacaryate sa gauņaḥ arthaḥ, yatra tu na tathā sa laksya iti vivekah." Thus the classification of laksanā into gauni and suddha as presented
ata seems more natural. Hemacandra's effort to distinguish between two śabda-vịttis such as gauni and laksaņā which for him are independent of each other, appears to be unnatural or acquired. Thus, the only point of difference is that in laksaņā the meaning indicated is 'tattvena laksyamāṇah', i. e. is indicated through identity, while in 'gaunī it is either through identity or through difference also i. e. 'bhedābhedena'. But the thin line demarceting ‘abhedena gauņi' and 'tattvena laksaņā? remains undefined clearly. For Hemachandra himself says, "sesam tu gauna-laksanam anuvartata eva.” At the same time one thing, for sure, is clear that Hemacandra's 'gauni', is not the same as 'gauni' variety of laksana as conceived by Mammața, or even that of Bhoja. Perhaps in recognising gaunī as a separate vstti, Bhoja's influence was responsible.

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