Abhidha

Author(s): Tapasvi Nandi, Jitendra B Shah
Publisher: L D Indology Ahmedabad

Page 13

[4]
Mukula considers another view point also. Says he — some people hold that no such 'samhịta-krama-svarūpa' is injected into the 'samjñi' because there cannot be such form independent of 'da’kāra, etc. Thus it being 'abhāvātmaka', it virtually does not exist. For these people, the yadrcchaśabdatva of such words as dittha' and the like is also formed because for them also words such as dittha' and the like, having imagined (kalpita) samudāyabhāva, come into exercise for "abhidhāna' of whatever samjñā is desired, through the power manifested through the speaker's desire. The idea is, in the object which is called by the name of dittha, even if some imagined dittha-tva' is not there, in the sense of the meaning conveyed by this particular word, the word dittha itself will be taken as its meaning. (pp. 5): "yesām api ca 'da'kārādi-varņa-vyatirikta-samhịta-krama-svarūpābhāvāt na ditthādi-sabda-svarūpam samhsta-kramam samjñisu adhyavasyate, iti darśanam, tesām api vaktr-yadrcchā'-bhivyajyamāna-saktibhedānusārena kalpanika-samudaya-rupasya ditthädeh sabdasya tat tat samjñā'bhidhānāya pravartamānatvāt yadệcchā śabdatvam ditthādīnām upapadyata eva."
Mukula of course, sides with the earlier view of the vaiyākaranas.
Vastu-dharma-rupa upādhi is also two-fold, ésādhya' and 'siddha'. The former are the words expressing action – i. e. they are kriyāśabdas, e.g. 'pacati' and the like. The latter i.e. 'siddha upādhi' is also twofold such as 'jāti' and 'guna'. Jāti' is said to be prāna-prada-vastudharma. No object can own its form without its relation with “jāti'. So, jāti' is said to be 'prānaprada-siddha-vastudharma'. Mukula quotes Vākyapadiya : "gaur iti; na hi gauḥ svarūpeṇa gauh, näpya-gauḥ gotvábhisambandhāt tu gauh." . Some attribute (upādhi) becomes the cause of viśesādhäna for an object which has obtained its own form : (pp. 5, ibid) : 'kaścit punar upādhir labdha-svarūpasya-vastunah višesādhānahetuh, yathā śuklādir ganah.” - i. e. like 'guna' in form of whiteness etc. These qualities such as whiteness etc. are not responsible for the object to attain its own form. For that only 'jāti' is capable. But after the attainment of its own form, it becomes instrumental in its 'višesādhāna' - i.e. in laying down further its speciality. The 'guna's such as 'paramānutva' - 'atom-ness' or the quality of being an