Pramanas And Language Dispute Between Dinnaga Dharmakirti And Akalanka

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz

Page 11

A DISPUTE BETWEEN DINNĀGA, DHARMAKĪRTI AND AKALANKA 353
One of the two sources of new Jaina classification, which found its earliest and fullest expression in the Nyāyâvatāra, was Dinnāga's wellknown statement of PS and PSV 1.2:
The two cognitive criteria are perception and inference, [because the cognoscible object has two characteristic... For there is no cognoscible other than the individually marked (unique particular) and the generally marked (universal thing), because we shall further demonstrate that perception has as its datum the individually marked (unique particular), whereas inference has as its datum the generally marked (universal thing)."
The passage introduced a new ground for distinguishing two cognitive criteria: two divergent aspects of reality, which can be known either in terms of absolutely unique sensation, or a sense impression which points to itself only, or in terms of concepts that actually convey a synthetised image, embedded in a set of relations that allow the cogniser to group items, construct hierarchies of objects, draw inferences etc., and, finally, to make use of speech, as the medium of all concepts. It is precisely its application that draws the line of distinction between the two spheres:
Perception is free from conceptual construction, (which, in its turn,) is connected with name, class, etc."
Perceptual data that constitute the contents of perception, such as a particular patch of colour, a unique touch sensed in a particular moment etc., carry the information which does not extend over their actuality: the unique particular communicates nothing but its self, or its presence. The contents of ‘inference', which actually stands for any kind of valid speech- and concept-related piece of cognition, is artificially constructed, generated on the basis of a range of perceptual
16 PS, PSV 1.2: pratyakşam anumānam ca pramāne laksana-dvayam / prameyam... na hi sva-sämānya-lak saņābhyām aparam prameyam asti. sva-laksana-vişayam hi pratyakşam, sāmānya-laksana-visayam anumānam iti pratipadayisyāmah. Quoted in Prajñākaragupta, PVA, p. 169.3, 213.6 and by Simha-sūri in DNCV, p. 88.3-89.1; On this quotation see HATTORI (1968: 76-79, notes 1.11, 1.13, 1.14) and E. Steinkellner's notes 44 (p. 28) and 51 (p. 29–30) PVin 112. Cf. also NM, p. 50: As regards one's understanding there are only two pramānas, I mean: inference and direct perception (pratyak sa and anumāna) since (the other pramäņas admitted by different schools) such as tradition (sabda), analogy (upamāna) etc. are include in these two. Thus there are only pramanas, by which can apprehend the thing in itself (svalak sana) and its generality (sāmānyalaksana). There is no other knowable besides these two, which can be apprehended by a pramāņa different from those [already referred to).'
17 PS, 1.3cd: pratyakşam kalpanapodham nāma-jāty-ādi-yojanā. Cf. Hattori (1968: 83, 85).