Pramanas And Language Dispute Between Dinnaga Dharmakirti And Akalanka

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz

Page 48

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
of the data];" (then) one recognises the individual thing etc. and grasps [it] conceptually through (various) stages of sensuous cognition.94
His auto-commentary, in which Akalanka elaborates on the main ideas accommodated in the above verse, is quite 'revealing. At the outset, Akalanka enumerates six sense organs, the mind (manas)
e va yataḥ satyo kante
punah amanam eva vipralain, smaranam smrlari
93 These two initial steps (avikalpya svam anyasmāt sattā-mātràm acetanāt / pasyan) are the sensation of momentary manifestation (vyañjanavagraha), which is not conceptual. Thereupon follows the sensation of the object (arthâvagraha), which is conceptual, and other conceptual steps of perception.
94 SVI 12.4 (p. 742.1-2): avikalpya svam anyasmāt sattā-mātram acetanāt / paśyan vijānāti dravyâdi mati-bhedair vikalpayan / Compare also Anantavirya's relevant comments in SVIȚ ad loc. (p. 742.6-15).
95 SViV1.27 (p. 115.8-18): sparśana-rasana-ghrāņa-caksuh-śrotra-manāmsi indriyāni. taih sva-visaya-grahanam avagrahady-ātmikā matih bahu-bahu-vidhaksiprânih srtânukta-dhruvāņāṁ sêtara-prakārāņām (TS 1.16). ata evânekānta-siddhih. na hi samvitteh bahu-bahu-vidha-prabhrty-ākrtayaḥ svayam asam viditā evôdayante vyayante vā yatah satyo 'py anupalakṣitāḥ syuḥ kalpanāvat, thatêtarâkrtayah. svalaksana-sāmānya-laksanaikānte punah samvedanâkrtih na paśyāmah, tathāvaipaśyantah katham {kalpanayā ātmānam eva vipralabhamahe. tad evam paramarthatah siddhiḥ anekāntāt. manyate (mananam vā it matih, smaranam smrtih, sarjñānam samjñā, cintanam cintā, ābhinibodhanam abhinibodha iti] tathamanati tattvartha-sūtra-kārāḥ-"matih smrtih samjñā cintâbhinibodha ity anarthāntaram" (TS 1.13) iti. mati-smrty-ādayaḥ śabda-yojanām antarena na bhavantity ekānto na yatas tatrântar-bhāvyeran. tad-ekānte punaḥ na kvacid syuh tan-nāma-smrter ayogāt anavasthānâdeh. - 'Touch, taste, smell, vision, hearing and mind are senses. With their help sensuous cognition, which consists in (four stages such as] sensation, etc., is an act of grasping of respective data for each of these (senses), (and it concerns) such divisions as many/much, manifold, quick, unclear, implicit, fixed and their opposites (TS 1.16). Precisely on the basis (of this act of grasping) the multiplexity (of data) is established. For no cognitive episodes (that represent the character) of being many/ much, manifold, etc., arise or cease in the awareness, themselves not becoming the object of awareness, because - although being present - they would not be apprehended, similarly the conceptual state of mind (would not be cognised); in the same way it is the case with the cognitive episodes of their opposites (such as little, simple etc.). On the other hand, we do not perceive cognitive episodes within awareness that concern unique particulars and universal things that are absolutely separate from each other. [The Buddhists are deceived, but] why do we, not perceiving (things) in precisely such a manner (sc. not perceiving that unique particulars and universal features are absolutely separate from each other), allow ourselves to be deceived {by such assumption}" [that we can perceive universal things that are absolutely separate from each other)? Thus, in exactly such a way, (viz. by grasping things as many/ much, manifold, etc., we arrive at) a proof (that), because of multiplexity of appearance], on the level of the ultimate truth (unique particulars and universal features coexist in cognition). It is maintained that sensuous cognition is understanding, memory is recollecting, recognitive cognition is recognising, inductive thinking is associating, determined cognition is determining intentionally. Accordingly, the author of the Tattvartha-sūtra (1.13] considers that: “Sensuous cognition, memory, recognitive cognition, inductive thinking (and) determined cognition are