Pramanas And Language Dispute Between Dinnaga Dharmakirti And Akalanka

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz

Page 1

Journal of Indian Philosophy (2005) 33: 343-400 DOI 10.1007/s10781-004-6673-6
© Springer 2005
PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
PRAMANAS AND LANGUAGE: A DISPUTE BETWEEN
DINNAGA, DHARMAKĪRTI AND AKALANKA*
In Three Simple Chapters (Laghiyas-traya, LT), a concise though seminal work on epistemology written by a Digambara Akalanka Bhatta (c. 720-780), we come across a verse that contributed to some controversy and to a variety of interpretations. It reads (LT 10cdllab):
jñānam adyam matih samjñā cintă câbhinibodhikam/ prän näma-yojanāc chesam śrutaṁ sabdânuyojanāt //
Its contents is rather lucid and straightforward, it would seem. At first attempt, we could render it as follows:
Int. I 'The first [kind of) cognition (comprises) sensuous cognition (here: memory), recognitive cognition, and inductive thinking (and) determined cognition, (and occurs) before the association with name (speech). The remaining (kind of cognition) is testimonial (mediated) cognition on account of the application of speech.'
The interpretation of the verse should not be very problematic. In it Akalanka continues his exposition of his epistemological ideas. Here he iterates the idea that there are only two cognitive criteria (pramāna),' divided into perception (pratyakşa) and indirect cognition (parokşa). The first variety comprises four subtypes: (1) sensuous cognition (matijñāna), which embraces all cognitive processes that are directly based on the activity of sense organs and that culminate in the act of retention (dhāraṇā), or saving the directly perceived image of an object to the residue memory; (2) recognitive cognition, the idea
* The present paper is a part of my research subsidised by the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung.
For the reasons why I consistently render pramāna as 'cognitive criterion' see: Balcerowicz (2001a: 140-145, n. 4).