Pramanas And Language Dispute Between Dinnaga Dharmakirti And Akalanka

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
data, memory and conceptual framework imposed on the perceptual data by the language; such conceptualisation conveys a generalised object, be it an arrangement of various perceptual data that have been independently apprehended by different sense organs and subsequently correlated with each other into one 'whole', or a set-up of abstracted features, the essential nature of which are its relations with other conceptual entities." It is precisely what facilitates acquisition, or expansion of knowledge of a conceptual object B; of which we have no direct knowledge, on the basis of an object A, which has already become the contents of our cognition and of which we know that it is related to the object B by a certain relation R. Dinnāga maintains, that the rules governing acquisition of knowledge and co-ordination of its contents are the same wherever any system of symbols is involved. All cognitive processes based on symbols, including verbal communication, can be therefore classified as inference, and for this reason
Verbal cognition is not an additional cognitive criterion, different from inference, because it names its object through (the procedure known as] "exclusion of the other" in the same way as (the inference: "x is impermanent, because it is produced", determines its object to have the quality of "impermanence" on the basis of the already known quality of] "being produced" etc.20
For Dinnāga all our knowledge can be organised in two disconnected compartments, the latter of which is defined by two coextensive and inseparable ideas: conceptualisations and speech. Whether we reach the conclusion that there is fire on a mountain by relying on fire's specific mark, or symbol, viz. smoke which we directly perceive, or by relying on the term 'fire', which is verbally communicated to us, both these procedures are essentially not distinct from each other: a symbol triggers the knowledge of its bearer to which it is 'attached'. Both reliable statements referring to things invisible to us and phenomena perceived by us, of which we know are attributes of other objects, serve the same purpose in precisely the same manner: 'Since
18 Cf. Herzberger (1986: 106-144), Hayes (1988: 133-144). As regard the historical background which influenced the development of the idea of the unique particular (svalaksana) as the object of perception see: Singh (1984: 117-135).
19 Cf. e.g., Hayes (1988: 173-219).
20 PS 5.1: na pramāņântaram sābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat/ krtakat vadivat svärtham anyâpohena bhāşate // The original acc. to TSaP 1513-1514. Cf. the translation in: Hayes (1988: 300) and Herzberger (1986: 145-146).