Pramanas And Language Dispute Between Dinnaga Dharmakirti And Akalanka

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz

Page 21

A DISPUTE BETWEEN DINNĀGA, DHARMAKĪRTI AND AKALANKA 363
To place the above objection and Prajñākaragupta's reply, we should first recall that Dharmakirti in PV, 2.28840 distinguished four kinds of fallacious perception (either following or improving on Dinnāga's varieties, see n. 28) and grouped them according to their character. First three kinds of fallacious perception are conceptual (since they contaminate the perceived data with memory images or impose conceptualised relations on it), and therefore cannot be classified as genuine perception, which is by nature non-conceptual. However, one variety, namely cognition affected by ophthalmological disorder (taimira), turns out to be non-conceptual: it is fallacious because it is erroneous, inasmuch as 'it originates through the impediment in (sensory] substratum (sense-organ).' To say, however, that cognition affected by ophthalmological disorder (taimira) is, nevertheless, perception proper would seem to be in agreement with Dinnāga's definition of perception, which only mentions its non-conceptual nature as the proper criterion. In other words, the definition of Pramāna-samuccaya would allow the following concomitance: 'every cognition free from conceptual construction is perception proper'. That would yield the valid conclusion: 'cognition affected by ophthalmological disorder (taimira) is also free from conceptual construction, hence it is perception proper.'
That seemed improper not only do Dharmakirti, who improved on the definition by explicitly adding the qualifier'non-erroneous (abhrānta, NB 1.4), but also to Jaina thinkers, including Akalanka. The first definiens 'non-conceptual (both in Dinnāga and Dharmakirti) was inadmissible to the Jainas, for it would exclude a number of perceptual processes (vide infra). Also the second definiens 'non-erroneous' in Dharmakirti's definition appeared to the Jainas completely inconsistent with the notion of validity which the definition of all cognitive criteria presupposes. The way Dharmakirti defined it, 'non-erroneousness' (abhrāntatva) was limited to pratyakşa only, and did not extend to anumāna. The first to criticise Dharmakirti's seeming amelioration was Siddhasena Mahāmati who contended: “This finference is non-erroneous because it is a cognitive criterion, just like perception.°41 For the Jainas, 'non-erroneousness' could safely be adapted to qualify pratyakşa, however, it could not be taken as its definiens which should distinguish it from indirect
40 PV, 2.288 trividham kalpana-jñānam aśrayopaplavôdbhavam / avikalpam ekaṁ ca pratyakşabham caturvidham //
4 NA 5cd: tad ( = anumanaṁ) abhräntam pramănatvāt samaksavat.