Pramanas And Language Dispute Between Dinnaga Dharmakirti And Akalanka

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz

Page 19

A DISPUTE BETWEEN DINNĀGA, DHARMAKĪRTI AND AKALANKA 361
Significantly, the general divisionary binary scheme, traditionally accepted, has been preserved by Siddhasena in NA, albeit nominally, for he has invested it with a new contents that was more consistent with current terminology of the day, and pratyakṣa began to mean *perception' the way it was mostly understood.
cognitive criteria (pramāņa)
indirect cognition (parokşa)
direct cognition (pratyakşa)
verbal cognition (sābda) -
inference (anumāna) -
conventional perception (sāṁvyavahārika-pratyakșa) absolute perception (kevala-pratyakşa)
other
inference for oneself (svârthânumāna) inference for others (parârthânumāna)
perception for oneself
(svârtha-pratyakşa) perception for others (parârtha-pratyakșa)
Model 2
Akalanka adopted the overall model proposed by Siddhasena Mahāmati and presented it at the outset of the Laghiyas-traya: Perception is clear cognition, (divided) into primary and conventional, [whereas) indirect cognition (comprises all] remaining (types of] cognition. Thus, by way of summary, there are two cognitive criteria.36
(Foonote 35 Continued). It should be noted that Siddhasena speaks of two kinds of "[ways of] determination of the cognoscible (me ya-viniscayāt), or two procedures of cognising, and not merely of two kinds of the cognoscible' (* me yāt = 'corresponding to the cognoscible'). That is a different approach from Dinnäga's who as a justification for the number of cognitive criteria mentions two cognisable aspects of reality, not two different ways of cognizing these two aspects, see PSV2 1.2: dve eva yasmād laksana-dvayaṁ prameyam --...there are only two (cognitive criteria), because the cognoscible object has two characteristics.
36 LT 3: pratyakşam visadam jñānam mukhya-samvyavahäratah/ parokşam sesa-vijñānam pramane iti sangrahah //