Pramanas And Language Dispute Between Dinnaga Dharmakirti And Akalanka

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz

Page 3

A DISPUTE BETWEEN DINNAGA, DHARMAKĪRTI AND AKALANKA 345
thinking (and) determined cognition, (and occurs before the association with name (speech). The remaining [kind of cognition) is testimonial (mediated) cognition on account of the application of speech".13
3 TÁVA, 239: jñānam ädyam smrtih samjñā cintā câbhinibodhikam prāg-nama-sarvrtar sesam śrutam sabdânuyojanät // atrákalanka-devāh prāhuh - jñānam adyam smrtih samjna cintā câbhinibodhikam/ pran nama-yojanac chesam śrutam sabdânuyojanāt // These two verses are followed by Vidyānanda's comment, which is additionally interesting in term of the qualitative usage of the particle eva (TSVA, p. 239-240): tatrêdam vicaryate - mati-jñānād ādyad ābhinibodhika-paryāntāc chesam śrutam śabdânuyojanād evêty avadhāranam, śrutam eva sabdânuyojanād iti vā? yadi śrutam eva sabdanuyojanād iti pūrva-niyamah tada na kaścid virodhah, śabda-samsrstajñānasya aśruta-jnanat va-vyavacchedāt. atha sabdanuyojanād eva śrutam iti niyamah tadā śrotra-mati-pūrvakam eva śrutam na cakşur-ādi-mati-pūrvakam iti siddhantavirodhah syāt. sārvyavahārikam šābdam jnanam śrutam ity apeksayā tathā-niyame tu nêsta-bädhästi cakṣur-ādi-mati-pūrvakasyāpi śrutasya paramarthato 'bhyupagamat sva-samaya-pratipatteh. - As regards the idea, it is (now) examined. The remaining [kind of cognition different] from sensuous cognition, which is the first [kind of cognition), (with its varieties) up to determined cognition, is testimonial cognition. Is it the restriction of the following kind: [1] "Testimonial cognition farises) exclusively on account of the application of (articulated] speech" or (2] "Exclusively testimonial cognition (arises) on account of the application of [articulated] speech"? [Ad 2) If it is the foregoing restriction: "Exclusively testimonial cognition (arises) on account of the application of [articulated] speech", then there is no contradiction, because [in this way) it is excluded that the cognition connected with (articulated] speech is non-testimonial cognition. (Ad 1] If the restriction is: “Testimonial cognition (arises) exclusively on account of the application of (articulated) speech", then testimonial cognition is exclusively (such a cognition) that is preceded by sensuous cognition derived from the organ of hearing, it is not (a cognition) preceded by sensuous cognition derived from the organ of seeing and other (senses]; [and] that would yield a contradiction with the doctrine. But if (we assume] such a restriction in dependence on the rule that "testimonial cognition is conventional verbal cognition", then there is no accepted (sc. legitimate) subversion, because testimonial cognition is (then) ultimately accepted - in accordance with the contention of sour own doctrine -as also (a cognition) preceded by sensuous cognition (derived from all sense-organs such as the eye, etc.' For Vidyānanda's further comments that follow this passage see n. 85. To explicate Akalanka's idea, Vidyānanda Pātrakesarisvāmin adds in the same spirit in TSVA, p. 243: śabdânuyojanāt tv eşā śrutam asty akşa-vittivat / sambhavabhāva-sarvittir arthâpattis tathânumā // nāmâsamsrsta-rūpā hi matir eşā prakirtitā / nâtah kaścid virodho 'sti syād-vādâmrta-bhoginām // -
- "But if this (sensuous cognition were to arise) on account of the application of speech, then let it be testimonial cognition (sc. indirect cognition), like cognition derived from sense-organs, and other cognitive criteria such as) equivalence, apprehension of absence (as negative proof) as well as inference (which arise on account of the application of speech). However, this sensuous cognition has been declared to have the form which is disconnected from name (speech). Therefore, there is no contradiction for those who take delight in the nectar of the doctrine of modal description.'