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English translation by George Baumann
D Not forgetting something (means) dhāraņa "permanent impression” (or
vāsanā "conception"). “ I 1929. A The oggaha is of two kinds since one can
1. perceive molecular stimulation (vanjaņa cp. Vis. I 193'),
2. conceive the thing (attha). " I 203. A 1. The vanjan'oggaha "the perception of the molecular stimulation" is
fourfold, whether the perception is brought about through sense of
hearing, smell, taste or sensation of feeling. “ 1335. Sthān. IV 3 (Ed. fol. 3004). Specifically, only the four mentioned sensory
activities, receive a molecular stimulus from the object, but not the face (and the
intellect manas). [39] Nandi p. 346-354. Āv.-niry. I 16. Viś. I 299, 300°. All other functions (A 2, B, C, D)
are sixfold, because with these all five senses (hearing, face, smell, taste, feeling), or, also none of the senses (only the intellect) can provide for the conveyance. - Then, there are in total 4 + 6 + 6 + 6 + 6 = 28 varieties of spiritual ābhinibohiya-nana."
In the case of the sense of hearing and smell the molecular stimulation is made possible through the transmission of sound and odour. In this connection Viś. I 350 (along with the accompanying tradition) teaches the following:
From its origin sound moves in an instant because of its subtleness, without hindrance in all six major directions (east, west, south, north, zenith, nadir); at the same time, it mixes itself with matter that it pervades, so that it is never pure, but can only reach the ear mixed (miśra). From those major directions the sideward dissemination (parāghāya) also brings sound in all the intermediate directions. — Silānka adds: Also odourmatter, etc. is experienced in a mixture (in the case of smelling, etc., not pure, but during its dissemination along with permeated substances); (but) it is not compelling that the dissemination, indeed, goes in the (six) directions (śreni), because odourous substances are actually coarse-fibred (so that hindrances may arise), similar to a particle of dust (flying through a window screen – but still this (stated) compulsion (will be present like with sound) some (think). - Cp. (sloka 106 in) Kumārila's sabda-theory (Tantrav. I 16).
The reasoning of this argument is, of course, untenable. It reads: I 2037. Only ear, nose, tongue and skin become negatively or benevolently affected [(by the object, e.g. by
touching a rough surface the skin can be injured, but (by touching) a smooth surface, (the skin) feels good; but the eye can look at a pointed object without damage, and even so, the intellect can think of
water without being freed from thirst)). 207'. For example, (through loud sound) deafness and [(through excessive stench)] nose putrefaction or
nose-bleed can result. 208'. (One could object:) (exactly corresponding with the eyes) influences of a good or bad type appear if
one looks, e.g. at water (butter, [black-coloured clothes,] trees or the disk of the moon) [(this refreshes
the eyes)] or looks into the sun (or at a white wall)] (the eyes water)]. 209. [(Then it has to be countered: we do not claim that the eyes are completely uninfluenceable; we only
deny that at the first perception a molecular stimulus takes place.)] They (the eyes), upon contact, (i.e. when [looking somewhere for a long time) a molecular contact happens), become burned by the sun's rays, just like the skin. What harm does it do (from our point of view, since what is seen cannot be damaged*)?
*dsstasya bādhitum asakyatvāt. - An incomprehensible argument! In the preceding Jinabhadra confuses the effects of heat and light! The still odder confusion of light and touch in the commentary-passages on 2037 (recognizable by means of brackets), indeed, has to be blamed on
Hemacandra since it is lacking with Silānka (as the square brackets show). 211. If seeing would require touching, then, (in particular), the eyes should notice dust particles that are
found there. Since they do not see this, then it is (precisely) apatta-kāri "perceptible without touching".
. Cp. Viś. I 212 243 (especially 236 243) & 339 opening. The main reasons are: I 241 f. Because the intellect, at any moment so to speak, can avail itself of the object and can itself imagine,
and because it, firstly, concerns itself with the objects of the senses when the molecular stimulus (of the corresponding sense organ referred to) has finished, it thus grasps the object right from the first moment (directly) (not after a preparatory moment, where for him, himself, approaching molecular stimulus similar to that of hearing, etc., might take place). 242° Otherwise, it could not be applicable
(at all) (since he can behave himself towards the objects only in his own manner). 4 Viś. continues:
107
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