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Lecture II
JAINA CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT
DR G C PANDE
In the earlier lecture I had argued that an ethical theory must reconcile the freedom of the moral agent with the necessity of the moral law and at the same time reconcile the universality of the moral law with its applicability and relevance to concrete and individual situations of practical life I had concluded that the success of Jaina ethical theory lies in its interpretation of moral life in terms of the dialectic of spiritual seeking I had also argued that Ahimsā, the central term of this seeking, ought to be interpreted as spiritual autonomy or non-interference As moral life presupposes right knowledge, Jaina ethics is really based on a distinctive theory of knowledge and being Here, again, the theory is called upon to reconcile the rational certitude of scientific knowledge with its experiential corrigibility This synthesis of definitive judgment and experience as cooperative moments in the growth of knowledge aspiring towards their complete union in the synoptic vision of Kevalajñāna is made possible ultimately by the Jaina theory of dialectic or Syādvāda
The Jaina conception of knowledge is distinguished by a realism which accepts both reason and experience as sources of valid knowledge On the one hand, it believes that perfect and ideal knowledge is not only meaningful as a theoretical idea but attainable as a spiritual experience On the other hand, it accepts the essentially empirical notion of actual knowledge being limited and corrigible in view of the infinity of reality and the vicissitudes of actual human experience This combination of rationalism and
