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to believe that merely observing particulars reveals generalities which are in fact grasped through a process of reasoning about the particulars The Naiyāyikas in their turn accept reasoning or tarka as the process of a hypothetical reductio ad absurdum and consider it to be an aid to the confirmation of vyāptı but not in itself an independent means of acquiring knowledge The Jaina answer is that Tai ka establishes as well as reveals a truth and hence must be counted as a valid and distinct source of knowledge In fact, but for Tarka and the iesultant vyāpti-jñāna, inference or Anumiāna would not be possible at all It would, of course, not do to derive vyāpti itself from Anumāna because that would be a petitio principii or a vicious infinite regress And since observation alone does not give vyāptı, it is obvious that Tarka or reasoning is an independent and indespensable source of knowledge involving generalization and necessity The Jaina view deriving the knowledge of vyāptı from reasoning based on observation and non-observation (upalambhānupalambhanımıtta) is reminiscent of the Buddhist view which derived vyāptı from upalanibhānupalambha-pañcaka ie, from twofold observations in conjunction with a threefold non-observation, the two observations being of vyāpya and vyāpaka together while the threefold nonobservation refers to the non-observation of the vyāpya by itself and of vyāpya when the vyāpaka cannot be observed
'भूमाधीर्वह्नि विज्ञान धूमज्ञानमधीस्तयो ।
97747179778TPffer Tafe racer 11937 The Jainas differ in so far as they do not consider Pratyaksa and Anupalamblia to be sufficient to explain the comprehension of vyāpti Nor can vyāptı result from the judgement immediately following perception (Pratyaksa-Prşthabhāvı vikalpa) since such a judgment cannot go beyond what is given in perception itself Since perception is limited to the particular the judgement which immediately recapitulates it cannot possibly give the knowledge of universal connection
The knowledge of Vyāptı forms the ground of inference and hence no topic has been so extensively and intensively discussed un the different schools of Indian logic as that of vyāptı In the
