Book Title: Lecture on Jainism
Author(s): G C Pandey
Publisher: University of Delhi

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Page 65
________________ refutation of the need for Paksadharmatva In such instances as ‘udeșyatı šakațam Kịttıkodayāt' or 'Asti nabhascandro jalacandrāt', there is no Paksadharmatva 40 There is only a direct connection between the Hetu and sādhya What it really means is that all inference does not need to be syllogistic involving three terms and propositions so that the middle term' mediates between the the other two Where we predict a regularly subsequent event from a preceding one or reach the notion of something from that of its counterpart, we do not need to take into account the locus of the hetu or the subject of which it may be predicated It is, of course, a different matter that the knowledge of the belonging of the hetu to a subject or locus may in fact be implied in the apprehension of the Vyāptı Seeing the reflection of the moon in the water we infer the moon in the sky Here the reflection is connected with the moon which is in turn connected with the sky The apprehension of the vyāptı leads to the apprehension of the locus of the sādhya but the hetu is not directly connected with that locus Like the Naiyāyikas the Jaina logicians also rejected the Buddhist attempt to limit the determining relations of Vyāpti to just two viz, causality and identity But unlike the Naiyāyikas the Jainas themselves sought to give a different but systematic account of these relations These relations have been specified as fivefold 41 The hetu may be an 'innate characteristic' or svabhāva as for example, in "Anityah sabdah ki takatvāt" This is similar to the svabhāvānumāna of the Buddhists The hetu may, again, be the cause or the effect of the sādhiya The former case is illustrated by the inference of rain from clouds, the latter by the inference of fire from smoke While the latter case is the same as the Kāryānumāna of the Buddhists, the Jain logicians have expressed surprise over the failure of the Buddhists to consider the cause itself as an adequate reason for inferring the effect All practical life, and one may add, science depends on such reasoning The Buddhists were apparently deterred in this by the idea that it is not safe to predict an effect from a cause in the real world be

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