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न याति न च तत्रासीदस्ति पश्चान्न चाशवत् ।
जहाति पूर्व नाधारमहो व्यसनसन्तति ॥"10 For the Jainas similarities and differences between things follow from their very nature Pure universals and pure particulars are mere abstractions, not real The Jainas accepted the argument that the resemblances of things (anugata-pratiti) and the success of action on that assumption (anugata-vyavahāra) prove that objects do have overlapping properties The Buddhist argument that such appearances and actions can be fully explained on the basis of Apoha or the negation which is necessarily involved in determination or designation, 17 cannot be accepted because if determination involves negation, negation equally assumes determination The positive and negative aspects of things, their similarities and differences, cannot be regarded as exclusive things and then sought to be somehow reconciled Thus against the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, the Jainas counterposed the view that for anything to be real it must possess the three characteristics of origination, destruction and continuance 18 Everything is both substance and modes As substance or di avya an object continues, while its modes change continually That is why, it is able to function differently at different moments 10 In other words, the nature of a thing mcludes a modal series Consequently the Buddhist dichotomy of simultaneous or successive functioning or of identity or difference is misleading In fact, the Jainas replace the Buddhist categories of pure identity and difference by the richer category of identity in difference, or, if one pleases, of difference in identity Between different substances which exhibit similarities, the Jainas postulate horizontal universals or tiryak sāmānya With respect to the identity of different modes, they postulate a vertical universal or ürdhvatā sārnānya These two are at once identical and different from their individual substrata 20
The Buddhists had postulated two utterly and radically different sources of knowledge Experience cognizes the bare momentary particular while understanding produces judgments
