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which recapitulate and formulate the data of sensation in accordance with transcendental categories 21 The use of words, concepts and remembered images transforms the indescribable sensation of reality into generalized determinations which do not at all correspond to the nature of things in themselves It follows then that the objects as we know them are not real while the real nature of things remains unavailable in judgmental knowledge The truth of such knowledge does not consist in any direct correspondence with reality but in its pragmatic serviceability which arises from the indirect reference of conceptual knowledge to the data of sensation, a capacity which is really one of excluding what is not relevant The concept of 'water for instance, enables us to exclude all those things which are irrelevant to the quest for what will quench our thurst, etc Every concept dichotomizes the world of possible experience and while it does evoke a positive image, its real function is one of negation or exclusion 22 Scientific knowledge, on this view, is a necessarily abstract determination (vyāyrtyātmiaka) which has an indirect application to reality but does not in any way represent it or directly correspond to it Scientific laws do not picture realities, they have an operational and pragmatic relevance (vyayahārāvisamvāda)
The Jainas like the Naiyāyikas reject this doctrine of Pramānavyavasth, and accept that of Pramāna-samplava Experience and reason do not refer to two different worlds, real and ideal Bare sensation does not constitute experience, for which it is necessary that sensation should be accompanied with mental apperception Perceptual knowledge is not radically different from rational judgment since it already contains a judgment, however implicit it might be
Experience is of two kinds, pragmatic or Sâmvyavahārıka and ultimately real or Pāramārthika Sāmvyavahārika Pratyakşa is relevant to successful natural activity and social communication 23 Since it presupposes sensory and mental functioning it is in effect a kind of indirect knowledge Accordingly when the role of sensation is more important than that of thought, it is
