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apprehension of the existence of objects to enquiry and determination (ihā and avāya) The resultant empirical knowledge although distinct from is yet continuous with rational knowledge as a sequence of Pramāna and Praināna-phala 32 The retention of past observation leads to remembrance or Smrti, which is a type of valid cognition although it is indirect rather than experiential The Buddhists had regarded memory as fundamentally distinct from knowledge on the ground that while knowledge discovers its object, memory merely revives a past experience What is more, memory also includes falsification since it mixes up different experiences of similar things and produces a vague image which is a compounded and synthetic one The Jainas, however, argue that the knowledge of an object already known does not on that account cease to be knowledge Further, if we reject memory as a source of knowledge on the ground that it evokes a generalized image, we must then give up the hope of having any valid descriptive knowledge which is bound to be synthetic It is experience as aided by recollection that produces Pratyabhijñānu or synthetic judgment (sankalanātmakam) 33 Judgements of identity, similarity, dissimilarity or relation are included in this kind of knowledge It would be seen here that the Jaina theory of judgement does not compendiously analyse all judgments into just one mould of an attribute predicated of a subject Thus 'x' is greater than 'y' is a distinct variety of Pratyabhijñāna, depending on the relationship between two entities (tat pratiyogi-jñāna) other than that of similarity or difference This is similar to what is called 'apeksā buddhi' just as the judgments based on 'sādharmya' are similar to Upamāna The Jainas, however, reject Upamāna as a distinct Pramāna because in that case another Pramāna will have to be invented for judgments based on Vaidharmya Pratyablujñāna is neither a mere conjunction of recollective and perceptual cognition, nor is it the perception of an object as qualified by its predicate By comparing perceived and recollected objects it goes beyond each of them and judges their mutual relations which are neither perceived nor recollected but apperceived in a distinctive kind of judgment
