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because it is found even in the absence of the Sadhya i e, identity of the object and its cognition When the omniscient Buddha knows the minds of the common mortals, it is obviously not true that the mind of the Buddha and the minds which are its objects are identical In fact, in a more generalised manner, whenever there is a knowledge of different objects taken together, ie, a samūhālambanātmaka jñāna, it is obvious that while the cognition is one, its objects are different If each one of these objects were identical with the sanie cognition they would become identical with one another Then again, sahopalambha is in fact a contrary reason (viruddha hetu) Far from proving the identity of the cognition and its object it only proves their difference, since it is only different things which can be cognized together but distinctly The possibility of an identical entity masquerading in different forms is thus ruled out If knowledge and its object were the same, either the objects will exhibit the characteristics of knowledge and start cognizing each other independently of any knowledge, or cognitions themesleves will be insentient and inert like the objects If it be said that the invariance with which a particular object is apprehended in a particular cognition points to their identity and that if this were not so, any cognition might indifferently relate to any object, then it would have to be answered that cognitions relate only to specific objects as may be available for cognition The different cognitions are made possible by the difference of objects Otherwise all objects would become the same or the difference of cognitions would become arbitrary
The Buddhists in their turn had argued that the falsity of external objects is proved by the fact that while experience shows them as stable identities, they must, in fact, to be real be causally efficient and hence they can only be momentary particulars Because a thing exists, it produces its effect and with that ceases to be The destruction of things does not need any special or additional cause A continuing entity can not function causally either at once or over a period of time, because if it does not perform its functions in the first moment, there is no reason why it should do so at any subsequent moment 16 If it be said that the
